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Abstract 
The rising prices and high volatility in commodity markets, observed since 2002, have 
triggered a debate about whether these dynamics are in excess of what could be explained 
by market fundamentals alone. It has been argued by many that the price dynamics 
generated are linked to the behaviour of financial investors, in particular to that of a new 
class of investors known as index traders. This has given rise to two questions: firstly, what 
explains this high price volatility and, secondly, what are the implications of such price 
volatility for commodity producers?  
To answer the first question, this thesis investigates the relationships between dynamics in 
cash and futures prices, and between dynamics of futures with different maturities for 
selected grain and soft commodities using time series econometrics. By analysing the 
relationships between price series that follow common market fundamentals, price 
dynamics generated by non-market fundamental factors can be identified. To answer the 
second question, cocoa producers in Ghana were chosen for a case study, and semi-
structured interviews with stakeholders in the cocoa–chocolate chain were conducted. 
These interviews revealed the institutional structure of the cocoa chain and the nature of 
transactions across the different chain nodes.  
Chapter 1 contextualises the research and develops research questions. Chapter 2 presents 
a review of theoretical and empirical literature relevant to the first research question. 
Chapter 3 empirically tests assumptions about traders’ behaviour underlying the relevant 
theories. Chapters 4 and 5 provide investigations into the influence of different investor 
groups on price dynamics in commodity futures markets. Chapter 6 presents an 
institutional theory for price relevant to the second research question. With reference to 
this theory, Chapter 7 discusses the case of the Ghanaian cocoa sector. Chapter 8 
summarises key findings and discusses implications for theories and policies, as well as for 
future research.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction and Motivation 
Two decades of low prices of primary commodities came to an end in 2002 when prices 
across commodity markets experienced a steep and synchronised upward trend, peaking in 
2008. The subsequent global financial crisis unleashed a ‘free fall’ of prices, which was 
followed by a short period of stabilisation and a bounce back of some prices to almost pre-
crisis levels in 2011 (Figure 1.1). Although debates have started as to whether or not the 
increase in terms of real prices was unprecedented, volatility surely was extraordinary 
(Figure 1.2).  
Figure 1.1: Commodity Market Prices 
(monthly indices of nominal prices 2005=100, Jan. 2005–Apr. 2014) 
 
Figure 1.2: Commodity Market Volatility 
(12 months centred moving variance of price indices, Jan. 1992–Apr. 2014) 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Financial Statistics (IFS): 
Commodity Indices (author’s calculation). 
General equilibrium theory explains co-movements of seemingly unrelated commodities 
and extreme price volatility, as observed in Figures 1.1–2, by strong systematic factors in 
commodity market fundamentals and intrinsically low short-run supply or demand 
elasticities. Low elasticities can lead to substantial price hikes or falls from small supply and 
demand disruptions (Labys, et al. 1991, 4-5). Within this theoretical framework, market 
fundamentals are factors that drive supply and demand of fully rational, utility-maximising 
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agents. A commodity’s fundamental value, then, refers to the hypothetical price at which the 
physical commodity would trade in the general market equilibrium of a perfectly efficient 
market.      
Regarding the price trends in the past decade, it is argued that commodities have entered a 
‘super price cycle’, spurred by increasing demand from emerging market economies, which 
has reversed previously decreasing terms of trade (Kaplinsky 2006). On the supply side, (1) 
low investment in the preceding decades of the 1980s and 1990s, (2) low world stock 
inventories during 2007–08, (3) increasing costs of transportation and production due to 
rising fuel prices (Baffes 2007), and (4) a depreciation of the dollar against other major 
currencies have further accelerated the price increase (Jumah and Kunst 2001). For 
agricultural commodities, (1) the shift of arable land from food production to production 
of biofuel, (2) the effects of climate change, and (3) the repercussions from two decades of 
market liberalisation that has left an ‘institutional vacuum’ in many producer countries are 
additional factors contributing to high prices (Nissanke 2012a).  
Although these factors are widely accepted as influential, doubts have been raised about 
whether they are sufficient to explain anomalies like the synchronised price movements and 
unprecedented volatility in commodity markets over the last decade—see Basu and Gavin 
(2011) and Frenk (2011). Due to the difficulty of fully attributing price dynamics to 
developments in market fundamental factors, various researchers have suggested that the 
applications of novel investment instruments and strategies have caused a structural break 
in market behaviour. The arrival of formerly excluded trader types in commodity 
derivatives markets, such as index traders, precipitated these instruments and strategies. 
Structural breaks are reflected in ‘excess’ volatility and ‘excess’ co-movement of commodity 
prices—that is, price dynamics that are in excess of what can be explained by market 
fundamental factors (Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP) 2011; Nissanke 
2011; 2012a). 
As hypothesised by Mayer (2009), the renewed interest1 of financial market investors in 
commodity markets can be attributed to: (1) a general shift in portfolio strategies since the 
early 2000s; (2) the fact that commodity futures, due to their low correlation with stock 
markets, were found to have favourable diversification properties if added to a portfolio; 
and (3) possibilities of gaining higher returns on price trends and volatility in commodity 
                                                 
1 In the 1970s primary commodity futures markets had already seen a substantial increase in investment 
interest, and this phenomenon, similar to today, triggered a debate about a causal link between price volatility 
and investment activity (Labys and Thomas 1975, Maizels 1992). However, the situations differ in the scale of 
investment inflow and the nature of investment instruments used.  
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futures markets against the background of a low-interest-rate environment. Different from 
previous episodes of financial liquidity inflow into commodity futures markets, desired 
exposure to commodities is achieved mainly through investing in commodity index funds. 
For US commodity futures markets, the Commodity Futures Modernization Act in 
December 2000 made possible the availability and spread of index-based and other more 
complex instruments (US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) 2008; Frenk 
2011).  
The phenomenon of an unprecedented inflow of financial investments into commodity 
derivatives markets and, in particular, futures exchanges associated with the entry of 
speculative traders applying new investment instruments and strategies shall be referred to 
as the financialisation of commodity derivatives markets in this thesis. This interpretation of 
the term ‘financialisation’ follows the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD 2009; 2011) and should not be confused with a wider literature 
on financialisation, which refers to the ‘growing importance of financial motives, financial 
markets, financial actors and financial institutions’ (Epstein 2005, 3). Although these 
developments are linked (Newman 2009), the thesis focuses on the investment aspect. 
Speculation, in this context, is defined as any buying or selling in the futures or the physical 
markets that is motivated by an expected gain through a future change in the price relative 
to the going price and not by an expected gain through the use of the commodity or any 
kind of transformation or transfer between different markets (Kaldor 1939). A speculator is 
someone whose main business does not involve the sale, acquisition, use, or transformation 
of the physical commodity. Following these definitions, commercial hedgers, active in 
commodity futures markets, are not speculators, but can engage in speculation in both the 
physical and the futures market. Non-commercial traders, active in commodity futures 
markets, whose main line of business does not involve the sale or acquisition of the 
physical commodity, are always speculators and engage in speculation. Hence, speculators 
always trade speculatively, while not every trader who speculates is a speculator per se.  
At the heart of the financialisation hypothesis is not necessarily the novelty of the instruments 
but rather the general detachment of investment strategies from market fundamental 
factors. In this context, proponents of this hypothesis argue that such speculative 
investments cause commodity futures prices to divert from their fundamental value and 
commodity markets to progressively behave like asset markets (Domanski and Heath 
2007). This thesis presents empirical evidence in support of this hypothesis; however, it 
substantiates and amends it in important ways.   
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The growth in the activity of commodity derivatives markets since the early 2000s is indeed 
impressive. As estimated by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS)2, the volume, in 
US dollars, of commodities traded over-the-counter (OTC)3 increased more than 12-fold 
(Figure 1.3). Over the same time period, the number of contracts outstanding on 
commodity exchanges almost quadrupled between 2002 and 2008 (Figure 1.4). In the 
aftermath of the 2008 crisis, the appetite for OTC products decreased, but the number of 
exchange-traded contracts grew continuously. However, the jump in exchange-traded 
contracts in 2013 does not solely reflect new liquidity, but is partly attributable to a change 
in regulations for US commodity markets, which dictated clearing for swaps previously 
traded OTC. Contracts hence existed already, but only became visible in 2013 (Heidorn, et 
al. 2014).  
Figure 1.3: Amount of Outstanding 
Commodity-linked Derivatives  
 (in trillions of US$, 1998–2014) 
Figure 1.4: Number of Outstanding 
Commodity Exchange Contracts  
(in millions of contracts, 1998–2014) 
  
Source: BIS, 2014, BIS Quarterly Review: OTC Commodity Derivatives & Exchange 
Derivatives. 
Given the almost explosive liquidity inflow, the narrative of the latest commodity crisis 
opens parallels to well-known, self-fulfilling crisis models, drawn from experiences in 
currency markets (Nissanke 2012a; 2012b). The global savings glut provided money at a 
low cost, which, spurred by a low-interest environment, led to increasing investments in 
derivative instruments by traders in search of higher returns. The liquidity poured into 
commodity derivatives could not be fully absorbed, causing prices to increase excessively. 
Conversely, the anticipated recession and the resulting tightened credit conditions led to 
massive liquidations and triggered a synchronised price fall across commodities.  
                                                 
2 Data is based on semi-annual reports of 13 countries and triennial data of another 34 countries (BIS 2013).  
3 OTC refers to contracts that are not cleared via registered exchanges, but traded privately.  
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However, this conjecture remains contested. The five points, outlined below in italics, 
condense the main arguments put forward against a causal relationship between the latest 
liquidity inflow and price dynamics in commodity futures markets (Hailu and Weersink 
2011). The arguments are contrasted with counter arguments in non-italicised text:  
(1) A speculative bubble must be accompanied by a rise in inventory holdings (Hamilton 2009). This is 
because, although the cash price could be forced to increase by futures price movements through arbitrage, a 
price level above the market fundamental value can only be sustained by artificial scarcity4. However, for 
some commodities inventories were depleted during the price rise (Irwin and Sanders 2011).  
Inventory depletion only occurred in metal and energy markets (Korniotis 2009; Pirrong 
2008). For other commodity markets, inventory holdings increased during the pre-2008 
price rise (Lagi, et al. 2011). As metals and oil, unlike non-extractive resources, can be 
stored below ground, non-extraction has the same effect as inventory build-up. Hence, 
these cases do not serve as a convincing argument against the financialisation hypothesis 
(Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas 2008).   
(2) For the reason that futures traders take the counter position of any contract opened, there is no limit to 
the number of futures contracts possibly bought and sold at any given price level. Therefore, there is no excess 
in demand or supply that could cause price changes (Krugman 2011).  
While there is no limit to the number of contracts that can potentially be cleared at any 
commodity exchange, demand for long over short positions will lead to higher prices in 
order to attract new shorts for the market to clear, and vice versa (Petzel 2009). As in any 
other marketplace, prices will move in order to attract the more scarce counterparty 
(Daigler 1994). If counterparty positions are less than perfectly elastic, prices can change 
substantially (Mayer 2009).  
(3) Index investments are predictable and, as such, cannot have any (prolonged) price impact. Other market 
participants always know that the liquidity added by index traders is unrelated to market fundamentals. 
Since prices are ultimately driven by traders’ expectations, prices do not change in response to a change in 
index traders’ positions (Irwin and Sanders 2010).   
Although market participants are possibly aware of the presence of index investors, as well 
as the timing of their repositioning, the market entry and exit decisions of index traders are 
unpredictable (Irwin and Sanders 2012).  
                                                 
4 An alternative possibility is a perfectly inelastic demand, which might be the case in the short-run but 
probably not in the long-run. 
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(4) If index trading caused the 2002–08 price rise and price volatility, these effects should be more 
pronounced in commodity markets with larger index trader participation than in markets with few index 
investments. However, commodities that lack futures markets completely, or have only thinly traded futures 
markets, saw similar price dynamics over the same period (Redrado, et al. 2009; Stoll and Whaley 
2011).  
There is a substantial selection bias when comparing price behaviour in commodity 
markets with large index investments against price behaviour in commodity markets with 
low index trader participation. Commodity markets with low or no index participation 
either lack futures exchanges or have only thinly traded futures markets. Thinly traded 
markets have always been more volatile than liquid markets. Furthermore, physical markets 
are prone to political interventions, as evidenced by the example of rice, for which export 
bans in several countries were imposed in 2008 in the wake of rising food prices (Timmer 
2009). Last, but not least, if one commodity is a close substitute to another commodity 
with a liquid futures market, cross-price elasticity is likely to result in higher prices for the 
substitute as well.  
(5) With reference to Working’s T-index, which is commonly used to measure the excess of speculators 
relative to hedgers (Working 1960), it is argued that the presence of speculators is not excessive when 
compared to historical data (Buyuksahin and Robe 2014; Sanders, Irwin and Merrin 2010).  
However, the trader-position data used for the T-index’s calculation is not equivalent to 
trading behaviour, and the index does not distinguish between index and other speculative 
traders. Although historically, speculators’ market weight might have been non-excessive, 
speculative trading may have shifted towards strategies which are more unrelated to market 
fundamentals. Moreover, speculators (except index traders) often follow short-term trading 
strategies, which implies that they frequently close out their positions at the end of the 
trading day. Therefore, although open interest data by speculators at the end of the trading 
day, on which the T-index is based, is small, speculators’ trading volume during the day 
might be large.  
For each argument against the financialisation hypothesis, counterarguments can be 
presented. Therefore, objections against the hypothesis are fragile. Yet, the exact 
mechanisms by which the financialisation of commodity derivatives markets affects price 
dynamics in commodity markets—derivatives and physical—is not well understood. One 
reason for this lack of comprehension, as argued in this thesis, concerns confusion between 
two different strands of literatures. Proponents of the financialisation hypothesis explain 
price dynamics in commodity futures markets with reference to asset-pricing theories. 
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Opponents of the financialisation hypothesis explain price dynamics in commodity markets 
with reference to general equilibrium and rational expectation models. Both strands of 
literature, however, lack a framework that takes into account the commodity market’s 
specific interplay between futures, cash and inventory markets and the implications for 
price formation. When this interplay is considered in the literature, deliberations are 
tangential, without a deeper understanding of how speculative mechanisms in both markets 
can feed on each other.  
This gap in the literature is particularly surprising, since the link between financial and 
commodity markets is thought to have served as the main transmission channel of the 
financial meltdown in 2008 to world trade and the real economy, with severe consequences 
for food security and income for some of the world’s poorest (Nissanke 2012a). Rising fuel 
and food prices sparked social and political unrest globally, and the livelihoods of the poor 
were particularly hard hit (Harrigan 2011). The sharp decline in prices in mid-2008 
threatened the income of smallholder commodity producers and the stability of those 
developing countries, which are heavily reliant on primary commodities for exports.  
Commodity futures markets fulfil two main welfare-enhancing functions, which are price 
discovery and risk management. If the claim of the financialisation hypothesis proves to be 
true, these critical functions are compromised. A failure of futures markets in performing 
these functions does not only have ramifications for the stakeholders of the particular 
commodity sector, relying directly or indirectly on these functions for their businesses and 
livelihoods, but the failure further undermines the very legitimacy of commodity futures 
markets. Further, in this scenario, the reliance of market practitioners on futures market 
prices as a yardstick is misguided. While the preservation of these core functions is crucial, 
malfunctioning—often not considered in the existing debates—can have detrimental 
effects on the commodity sector as a whole, as well as on those countries depending 
heavily on primary commodities for imports and exports. 
The remainder of this chapter is divided into three sections. Section 2 presents the research 
questions, and the hypotheses and methodology, which aim to answer these questions. 
Section 3 discusses the main contributions of this thesis in the context of the broader 
debate in the literature. Finally, Section 4 presents the structure of the thesis and provides a 
short description of each chapter of this thesis.  
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1.2 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Against the background of the discussion in Section 1, this thesis is guided by one 
overarching research question and two hypotheses:  
Question—How, and in what way, are commodity prices affected by the latest episode of 
financialisation? 
Hypothesis 1 (H1)—Commodity futures markets are increasingly driven by 
speculative liquidity, leading to these markets behaving like asset markets and price 
dynamics becoming unrelated to commodity markets’ specific fundamentals.   
Hypothesis 2 (H2)—These price dynamics in futures markets both directly and 
indirectly affect price dynamics in the physical market, and speculation in both 
markets feeds on each other.   
Two sub-questions (Q1 and Q2), which decisively guide the structure of this thesis, are 
derived from the main question.  
Q1—How, and in what way, is price formation in commodity futures markets affected by 
financialisation? 
H1.1—Price formation in commodity futures markets is driven by traders’ 
expectations that, in turn, inform investment strategies. 
H1.2—Investment strategies based on expectations unrelated to market 
fundamentals materialise empirically in excessive volatility, and other anomalies in 
market basis5 and market term structure6 occur. 
Q2—How, and in what way, do price dynamics in commodity futures markets affect 
commodity sectors and, in particular, commodity producers and producing countries? 
H2.1—Price dynamics in the financial market spill over to the physical markets not 
only through arbitrage and traders’ expectations, but also through the institutional 
framework, which guides price formation and risk allocation processes in a 
commodity sector.  
                                                 
5 The basis is the difference between the underlying cash price of a commodity and the price of the respective 
futures contract at any given point in time [ =  − ,].  
6 The term structure refers to the price structure of simultaneously traded futures contracts with different 
maturity dates. 
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H2.2—If there are asymmetric power relationships within a commodity sector, 
market risk and price pressure are passed on to the weaker end of the commodity 
chain.  
H2.3—In the case of cash crops and agricultural commodities, this weaker end is 
comprised of farmers. 
The overarching research question and two sub-questions are assessed empirically on the 
example of soft and agricultural commodities, which differ in their exposure to financial 
investments, nature of the commodity and structure of the commodity sector.  
Regarding Q1, the International Commodity Exchange (ICE) cocoa (‘cocoa’, hereafter) is 
analysed in comparison with ICE Arabica coffee ‘C’ (‘coffee’, hereafter) and the Chicago 
Board of Trade (CBOT) soft red winter wheat (‘wheat’, hereafter). Time series econometric 
techniques and other non-parametric techniques are chosen in order to investigate trader 
behaviour and the relationship between financial investments and price dynamics. 
Regarding Q2, Ghana’s cocoa sector, the second largest globally in terms of production, 
serves as a case study. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with stakeholders in the 
Ghanaian and global cocoa sector. On the basis of these interviews the institutional 
structure of the global and Ghanaian cocoa sector is identified. 
Cocoa and coffee production is confined to a small area around the equatorial belt. 
Production cycles are highly sensitive to climate conditions and the political stability of the 
few producing countries. Therefore, these markets have always been highly volatile. While 
cocoa and coffee supply patterns are similar due to the physical resemblance of the crops, 
coffee futures markets saw a greater inflow of financial investments than cocoa futures 
markets. These commodities hence make a good comparative case study on anomalies in 
the market term structure, which is driven by supply cycles as well as financial investments. 
The CBOT soft red winter wheat market is one of the most liquid commodity futures and 
saw the second highest inflow of index-based investments between 1992 and 2008, only 
after crude oil (CFTC 2008). The wheat market is therefore a prime choice for an 
investigation into the impact of index investments on price dynamics.  
As the availability of trader-position data—an essential ingredient for the empirical 
analysis—is confined to US markets, only US-based commodity futures markets are 
analysed in the context of Q1. Data availability further confines the analysis to particular 
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categories of trader-position data. Publicly available7 trader-position data is highly 
aggregated into predefined categories. These categories can only serve as an approximation 
of trading strategies, which are subject to the following analyses.   
The approximation to trading strategies by aggregated position data, as shall be shown later 
in this thesis, is relatively precise for index traders, but not for other traders. While index 
traders have played an important role in the latest commodity price cycle due to their large 
market weight and deserve particular attention due to their relatively recent arrival in 
commodity futures markets, other speculative traders are equally important. However, due 
to the heterogeneity of trading strategies employed by traders in the remaining predefined 
categories, statistical inference about the impact of these traders on price dynamics is 
impeded. The focus of the empirical analyses is hence on the role of index traders with 
some imploratory insights into the role of other speculative traders. 
Cocoa is chosen as a case study with respect to Q2. In the case of cash crops like cocoa, 
the implications of price volatility and malfunctioning of futures markets are highly 
developmental. Major cocoa growing regions are located in West Africa, South America 
and Southeast Asia. Price fluctuations, therefore, affect the economies of some of the 
world’s poorest countries. Secondly, cocoa, especially in West Africa, is a smallholder crop, 
providing livelihoods for 40 to 50 million people, and producer prices directly affect rural 
family income (UNCTAD 2008). Thirdly, the cocoa–chocolate chain is highly centralised in 
the hands of few multinational grinders8 and brand-name companies. In 2010 five 
companies controlled more than 50 per cent of the market for export and processing, while 
another five companies controlled almost half of the world’s total confectionary sales 
(Tropical Commodity Coalition (TCC) 2010). Since then, market concentration, especially 
in the grinding segment, has grown even further with three more mergers among the ten 
biggest companies in the trading, grinding, and processing segment. Cocoa trade is hence a 
prime example of asymmetric bargaining power. 
Ghana, as the second largest cocoa producer globally, depends heavily on the sector for 
foreign exchange earnings and trade income (Figure 1.5). Further, the Ghanaian cocoa 
sector is a particularly interesting case study because of its unique institutional structure. As 
the only cocoa-producing nation that has withstood the pressure from international donors 
to fully liberalise its cocoa sector, Ghana, through its cocoa marketing board (‘Cocobod’, 
hereafter), maintains a monopoly on Ghanaian cocoa beans in the world market. This 
                                                 
7 Non-aggregated trader-position data exists, but is not publicly available and the researcher was denied access 
upon request, due to the sensitivity of the data. 
8 Companies who process raw beans into cocoa powder, liquor, butter and even finished chocolate.  
 
24 
arguably has implications for market power and price formation, as well as risk allocation 
processes within the Ghanaian cocoa sector and the global cocoa market. 
Figure 1.5: Ghana’s Export Earnings 
(annual composition % share, based on US$ values, 1996–2013) 
 
Source: Comtrade Database (author’s calculation). 
Moreover, taking Ghana’s cocoa sector as a case study is especially timely, as the recent 
commodity crisis has revived a debate about market-based price risk management for cash 
crop farmers (World Bank (WB) 2011). A series of projects, which have been implemented 
in order to empower farmers in this regard, have shown only limited success—e.g., 
Ethiopia Commodity Exchange (ECX) (Jayne, et al. 2014). The case of Ghana could pose 
an alternative to the widely promoted market-based risk management strategies (Williams 
2009). 
1.3 Contribution and Originality 
The dissertation attempts to contribute to the literature with respect to Q1 and Q2, 
empirically and theoretically.  
In an attempt to answer Q1, the thesis provides a synthesis of two strands of theoretical 
literatures: asset-pricing theories and commodity market-specific no-arbitrage models. It is 
argued that with the increasing inflow of financial investments into commodity futures 
markets, commodity futures increasingly behave like asset markets, and asset-pricing 
theories are needed in order to understand price dynamics observed in commodity futures 
markets. However, while these theories have informed the debate about the financialisation 
of commodity derivatives markets, they ignore the commodity-specific interplay between 
physical, storage and futures markets. In order to understand the complex feedback 
mechanisms between markets, no-arbitrage theories are taken into consideration. The 
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synthesis of both strands of literatures allows me to incorporate the interdependence 
between derivatives and physical markets to show how speculation in both markets can 
feed on each other. Further, the synthesis facilitates a better understanding of implications 
of financialisation for the commodity sector as a whole in anticipation of Q2.  
The empirical literature, which investigates the impact of financialisation on dynamics in 
commodity futures markets, predominantly focuses on price dynamics in single futures 
markets. Such investigations seek to identify the excess in price level and price volatility. 
This is an almost impossible task, since fundamental factors are either not well defined or 
not easily quantifiable. Hence, the extent to which a price series moves against its 
fundamental value is difficult to identify.  
This thesis proposes an alternative approach that is based on the difference between two 
commodity price series, as, for instance, the futures price and its underlying physical price, 
or price series of futures contracts with different maturity dates. Since these pairs of price 
series are driven by almost the same commodity-specific fundamentals, the difference in 
level and variability can be attributed to factors that are specific to the particular price 
series, including the different composition of traders in the particular market or contract.  
The composition of trading positions in the physical market differs from the futures 
market due to the presence of financial speculators in the latter. Further, the composition 
of traders differs across contracts with different maturity dates, since traders are 
heterogeneous in their investment interests and strategies. While some trading strategies 
involve taking positions in longer-dated contracts, other speculators might take positions in 
shorter-dated contracts. Since different traders are active in physical and futures markets 
and futures contracts with different maturity dates, differences in price dynamics can be 
linked to differences in trader composition.  
This novel approach does not only enable the researcher to sidestep the difficulties 
associated with determining the fundamental value of a commodity, it also provides 
insights into the impact of speculative trading on the relationship between futures and 
physical markets, as well as the market term structure. Both relationships are relevant for 
and closely watched by market practitioners. Despite the practical relevance, these 
relationships have been almost neglected in the empirical literature.    
The analytical framework proposed by the thesis in order to answer Q2 draws on the 
global commodity chain literature, which is combined with institutional economics. It is 
argued that although the global commodity chain framework is useful for an analysis of the 
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institutional structure and embedded power relationships within a particular commodity 
sector, existing literature in commodity chain analysis at present neglects price formation, 
as well as risk allocation processes (Gilbert 2008b). An institutional theory on price and, in 
particular, the transaction theory advanced by John R. Commons (1934) is used together 
with global commodity chain frameworks in order to shed light on these processes.  
The analytical framework is empirically backed by semi-structured interviews with key 
stakeholders in the Ghanaian and global cocoa sector. The interviews were conducted 
during three months of fieldwork in Ghana, as well as in-person contacts and telephone 
interviews with stakeholders in the US, Germany and the UK. These interviews provide a 
systematic analysis of the Ghanaian cocoa sector, which enables the researcher to link price 
formation and risk allocation to the evolution of the institutional structure of global, 
regional and national cocoa trade.  
1.4 Thesis Outline 
The rest of the thesis is divided into seven chapters:  
Chapter 2 presents a critical review of existing theories on price formation in commodity 
markets in the context of the overarching research question and sub-question Q1. The 
theoretical literature is divided into two strands, which are arbitrage and rational 
expectation theories. Underlying assumptions of both theoretical traditions are outlined 
and critically assessed before the two strands are synthesised towards a theoretical 
foundation for the financialisation hypothesis, as outlined in H1 and H2. The theoretical 
discussion is followed by a literature review of empirical studies, which aim to test different 
components of the financialisation hypothesis. Shortcomings in method and methodology 
of the empirical literature are identified, and an outlook towards a more fruitful empirical 
approach is presented.  
Chapter 3 provides an empirical analysis of hypothesis H1.1. Assumptions about trader 
behaviour are formalised, before traders’ position data are analysed descriptively for the 
three markets serving as case studies: cocoa, coffee and wheat. A detailed discussion about 
the quality of the data available on traders’ positions and the ability of the data to capture 
traders’ behaviour precedes a time series econometric analysis, which tests whether traders 
engage in extrapolation, herding and other investment strategies unrelated to market 
fundamentals. The empirical analysis, together with the discussion on limitations in the 
available data, lay the foundation for the empirical investigations in Chapters 4 and 5.  
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Chapter 4 provides an analysis of the relationship between cash and futures markets with 
respect to hypothesis H1.2. The cocoa and wheat markets serve as case studies. Firstly, the 
continuous relationship between physical and futures market prices is analysed using time 
series econometric techniques, including Granger non-causality and co-integration analysis. 
It is further tested for structural breaks in the co-integrating relationship, which could 
indicate differences in price dynamics in both markets. Secondly, the convergence between 
cash and futures markets at each futures contract’s maturity date is analysed using simple 
regression analysis. Although, no-arbitrage theories dictate convergence, non-convergence 
has emerged in both the wheat and the cocoa market over the last decades.  
Chapter 5 further contributes to the empirical investigation into hypothesis H1.2 and 
presents an analysis of intertemporal pricing between futures contracts with different 
maturity dates. The cocoa and coffee markets serve as case studies. Firstly, the relationships 
between pairs of consecutive futures contracts is analysed using dynamic econometric 
models. Secondly, a two-step econometric method is applied, which links traders’ positions 
and other explanatory variables to the particular shape of the futures curve. In a first step, 
the shape of the futures curve is extracted in a parsimonious way, using non-parametric 
methods. In a second step, the relationship between the shape of the futures curve and 
explanatory variables is estimated.  
After investigating the financial markets of cocoa, coffee and wheat, Chapter 6 and 7 
present, with reference to Q2, an analysis of the relevance of price dynamics in the futures 
market for the commodity sector as a whole, taking the Ghanaian and global cocoa sector 
as a case study.  
Chapter 6 develops an analytical framework that enables the researcher to reveal the 
institutional structure governing price formation and risk allocation mechanisms at all 
stages of a commodity sector in the context of hypothesis H2.1. Towards this aim, the 
global commodity chain and value chain literature is critically reviewed and combined with 
institutional theories of price formation and, in particular, with the work of John R. 
Commons (1934).    
Chapter 7 presents a case study of the Ghanaian cocoa sector in the context of hypotheses 
H2.2 and H2.3, and with reference to the analytical framework outlined in Chapter 6. The 
analysis commences with an assessment of the historical evolution of the institutional 
structures of the cocoa sector. In a second step, the structure of the Ghanaian cocoa sector 
is outlined, followed by an in-depth analysis of price formation and risk allocation 
processes at different nodes of the cocoa chain. The analysis is based on material collected 
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through semi-structured interviews with stakeholders in the global and Ghanaian cocoa 
sector.  
Chapter 8 concludes with a summary of the findings and discussions on implications for 
theory and policy, and suggests directions and issues for future research. 
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Chapter 2 Fundamentals versus Financialisation 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 hypothesised that the financialisation of commodity derivatives markets, 
understood as the increasing inflow of financial investments into commodity derivatives 
markets for portfolio diversification or speculation, has caused commodity markets to 
behave like asset markets. This behaviour materialises empirically in the synchronised price 
rise across commodity and asset markets and in the unprecedented volatility in commodity 
markets since 2002. These price dynamics are considered excessive, that is, in excess of 
what existing theories on price formation in commodity markets could explain with market 
fundamentals.  
Existing neoclassical theories on price formation in commodity markets are based on 
general equilibrium and rational expectation frameworks applied to the physical commodity 
market. The possibility of arbitrage ensures a close relationship between physical and 
derivatives markets. However, these theories fail to account for price formation 
mechanisms in commodity futures markets beyond mechanical arbitrage relationships. For 
an understanding of such price formation mechanisms, asset-pricing theories are more 
appropriate. These two theoretical approaches are consistent in their prediction of price 
dynamics, as long as asset-pricing theories assume that traders’ expectations in commodity 
futures markets are driven by fundamental factors of the underlying physical market. In 
that way, the consensus of futures traders’ expectations coincides with general equilibrium 
conditions in the physical commodity market.  
However, as argued further in this chapter, the validity of asset-pricing theories that link 
price dynamics in commodity futures markets exclusively to market fundamental factors 
depends on stringent and unrealistic assumptions about traders’ behaviour and uncertainty. 
Relaxing these assumptions, in the tradition of bounded rationality, rational herding and 
Post-Keynesian literatures, opens the way towards a more fruitful discussion about price 
formation in commodity futures markets. However, these asset-pricing theories fail to 
incorporate the interplay between futures, cash and inventory markets. This interplay is 
peculiar to commodity markets and can lead to complex speculative feedback mechanisms.  
Therefore, Chapter 2 aims to synthesise existing theories on price formation in commodity 
and asset markets in order to lay the ground for a theoretical framework for the 
financialisation hypothesis. It will be shown that the synthesis provides a more appropriate 
framework for explaining price dynamics in commodity markets, which accounts for the 
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mechanisms through which speculative influences in physical and derivatives markets feed 
on each other. A thorough investigation of these mechanisms is essential to understand the 
impact of financialisation on price formation and risk management in commodity markets.   
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews theories on price 
formation in commodity markets. While those theories capture the interrelationship 
between cash, inventory and futures markets, they locate the price formation process in the 
physical market. Speculative influences on price formation enter through inventory 
hoarding in the storage market. Section 3 reviews theories on price formation in asset 
markets. It is shown that by easing some of the stringent assumptions of the neoclassical 
rational expectations framework, price dynamics such as excessive volatility and speculative 
bubbles can be explained by financial traders’ heterogeneous investment strategies. 
Speculative influences on price formation processes enter through financial traders’ 
behaviour. Section 4 provides a synthesis of the two theoretical approaches on price 
formation. Synthesising both literatures allows me to construct a theoretical foundation for 
the financialisation hypothesis of commodity markets, which accounts for the dynamic 
interplay between physical and futures markets and for the speculative influences in both 
markets. Section 5 provides a critical overview of methodologies used in empirical studies 
on the influence of financial investments on price dynamics. The chapter concludes in 
Section 6 by identifying gaps in the existing empirical literature and suggesting ways 
forward.  
2.2 Theories on Price Formation in Commodity Markets 
Historically, two strands of theories describe the dynamics of price formation in 
commodity markets: the theory of storage ascribed to Kaldor (1939), Working (1949) and later, 
to Brennan (1958), and the theory of normal backwardation advanced by Keynes (1930) and 
Hicks (1939). In both theories, prices are understood to be discovered in the physical 
markets in a general equilibrium framework, while the possibility of arbitrage ensures 
alignment of the futures price9 to its underlying physical market.  
A simple no-arbitrage condition between the futures and the cash price, which is the price 
in the physical market for immediate delivery10, therefore builds the foundation of both 
                                                 
9 Originally, these concepts were developed on the relationship between the physical and the forward price, 
not the futures price. However, subsequent literatures have adopted the formal representation to describe the 
relationship between cash and futures markets—e.g., Hull (2011), Geman (2005), and Fabozzi, Fuss and 
Kaiser (2008).  
10 The ‘cash price’ is often denoted as ‘spot price’. In the literature, the spot price is commonly approximated 
with the closest-to-maturity futures price. Since the following debate emphasises the distinct dynamics in the 
physical and derivatives market, we will retain the term ‘cash price’.   
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theoretical strands. If no riskless arbitrage opportunity exists, the futures price must equal 
the cash price plus a compensation for the ‘carry cost proper’ (Kaldor 1939). The ‘carry 
cost proper’ consists of the opportunity costs incurred by buying the physical commodity 
now, i.e., the forgone risk-free interest rate11 [	
	,] and the storage costs [,] for carrying 
it until the futures contract’s maturity date. Let t be the current point in time and T the 
futures contract maturity date, then the no-arbitrage condition between the futures price 
[,] and cash price [] can be written as12:  
, = 1  	
	,  , (2.1) 
As the carry cost proper approaches zero with t → T, the futures price at maturity equals 
the cash price at time T. If this were not the case, risk-free arbitrage opportunities would 
arise. Hence, Equation 2.1 must always hold under the law of one price (see Appendix 2.1 
for a discussion). However, empirical data have shown that futures and cash prices do not 
necessarily comply with this law. In particular, the situation in which the futures contract 
trades below the cash price (backwardation) has received some attention, since according to 
Equation 2.1, futures contracts are bound to trade above the cash price (contango) at all 
times (as 	
	, ,   0). The theory of storage and the theory of risk premium offer two 
distinct, although complementary, explanations for deviations from Equation 2.1. Those 
two theories shall be discussed in turn.  
2.2.1 Theory of Storage 
The theory of storage explains backwardation with the distinct economic properties of the 
physical good compared to its derivative. Kaldor (1939) was first to argue that ‘net carrying 
costs’ are also determined by a utility-based reward (‘yield of goods’) from owning a 
commodity, which must be subtracted from the carry cost proper. Hence, the 
compensation for holding the commodity consists of the carry cost proper [	
	, ,] 
less the yield of goods or ‘convenience yield’ [,], which is received because of the 
flexibility gained from holding inventories (Brennan 1958). Kaldor (1939) argues that if 
speculative stocks – that is, stocks that exist in excess of what is required for normal business 
– are positive, net carrying cost (carry cost proper minus convenience yield) is likely to be 
                                                 
11 While the theory refers to the risk-free rate, empirical research usually considers the LIBOR rate instead. 
The LIBOR rate is more appropriate in applied studies, since for the execution of an arbitrage trade, one has 
to borrow money in order to buy the physical commodity.  
12 The equation is a simplification valid for linear rates—see Pindyck (2001), Hernandez and Torero (2010). 
In more general terms, the futures price can be rewritten as the continuously compounded cash price, 
following Hull (2011, 123-5): , = 	∗, with  =  − !. As the carry cost proper approaches zero 
with ! →   and hence	 → 0, the futures price at maturity must equal the current cash price.    
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positive, and if the stocks are zero, net carrying cost is likely to be negative. Therefore, the 
market would ‘normally’ be in contango, accounting for the cost of carry, and in 
backwardation only if the convenience yield strongly exceeded the costs associated with 
storing the commodity. That is the case when speculative stocks are depleted (Working 
1949). Extending Equation 2.1, accordingly, yields:13  
, = 1  	
,  , − , (2.2) 
The futures price is thus determined by the cash price, the foregone interest rate over the 
period t to T, physical storage cost over the same period and utility gained from 
inventories. Equation 2.2 implies that if the convenience yield is high, the market basis is 
strongly positive. The net storage cost determines if cash prices exceed futures prices 
(, − , ≪ 0, strong backwardation and positive market basis) or futures exceed cash 
prices (, − , > 0, contango and negative market basis)14. While the extent of 
backwardation has not a limit, a contango has its maximum in the carry cost proper 
(Lautier 2005). A negative basis, in theory, cannot exceed	, (with	, = 0; physical full 
carry15), while a positive basis depends on the ‘size’ of the convenience yield. 
The convenience yield found multiple interpretations in the literature. Kaldor (1939) 
originally introduced the yield as the inverse of Keynes ‘own rate of interest’. Keynes (1936, 
142-54) argues that every durable commodity has a “rate of interest in terms of itself”. The 
nature of the commodity rate of interest is, according to Keynes, commodity-specific and is 
constituted by the yield or output that a commodity produces by assisting some production 
or supply service and by its power of disposal, that is, its liquidity premium. Since 
commodity futures are denominated in money terms and not commodity terms, the 
difference between two futures contracts in money terms reflects both the own rate of 
interest of money and the own rate of interest of the commodity. Although not explicit in 
Keynes’s writings, this leads to the functional form as specified by Kaldor (1939)—see 
Appendix 2.2 for a discussion. Hence, in Keynes’s terms, the convenience yield is 
determined by the demand for the physical commodity relative to money.  
                                                 
13 For non-linear rates, (Hull 2011, 120-1): , = 	$%∗. 
14 If the net convenience yield is zero, the cash price equals the discounted futures price:  = , 1  	
,⁄ . 
If the cash price is less than the futures price but greater than the discounted futures price, the market is said 
to be in weak backwardation. 
15 Physical full carry is the situation in which the price difference between physical and futures price, or 
between futures prices of contracts with different maturity dates, fully compensates for the storage costs 
incurred.  
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Later authors moved away from Keynes’s concept towards a utility-based explanation of 
the convenience yield. Brennan (1958) assigns the convenience yield to the utility received 
by an owner of a commodity due to the opportunity gained by taking advantage of an 
unexpected increase in demand. Bozic and Fortenbery (2011) and Pirrong (2011) 
understand the convenience yield as an insurance-like reward, which accrues to the 
inventory owner in times of market uncertainty. Despite the different opinions on what 
constitutes the convenience yield, authors agree on a close link between the yield and the 
storage market through an inverse relationship between the yield and the commodity’s 
availability. Since the convenience yield converges to zero when a futures contract 
approaches maturity, the no-arbitrage condition implies convergence of cash and futures 
prices at the end of each contract’s maturity. 
Thus, the convenience yield links the futures market not only to the cash market but also to 
the inventory market. Pindyck (2001), in his structural model, formally illustrates the 
relationships between all three markets and shows that if a commodity is storable, the 
equilibrium in the physical market is not only governed by production and consumption 
over one period, but also by changes in inventories. Thus, for the physical market to be in 
equilibrium, net demand has to equal net supply. Therefore, the inverse demand function is 
a function of supply-and-demand-shifting variables (market fundamentals) and inventory. 
In reference to the convenience yield concept, Pindyck (2001) argues that consumers and 
producers hold inventories for precautionary reasons—to reduce costs of adjustment, to 
avoid running out of stock and to manage price variation. Hence, the utility gained from 
the insurance properties of inventory drives the demand for storage. The futures market 
price, in the tradition of theories of storage, is derived from the no-arbitrage condition 
outlined previously. It is interesting to note that in Pindyck’s (2001) model the futures 
market does not serve a price discovery function but an information function as it reveals 
the size of the convenience yield and hence, storage availability, as well as agents’ 
preferences (under the assumption that the structural model holds).    
Four important insights can be derived from these deliberations. Firstly, the impact of any 
shift in demand for, or supply of, the physical commodity on the cash price depends on 
what happens to inventories, which serve as a buffer. Secondly, the convenience yield is a 
negative function of inventories. Thirdly, greater cash price volatility and market 
uncertainty will result in an upward shift in the demand for storage, as the insurance 
property of inventories becomes more desirable. Fourthly, greater cash price volatility also 
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results in an upward shift of the net demand in the cash market, as greater volatility causes 
an increase in the value of the producers’ ‘operating options’16.  
These theoretical considerations are empirically endorsed by Bozic and Fortenbery (2011), 
who find that inventories are moving not only with levels, but also with second and third 
moments of prices. Their explanation is similar to Pindyck’s (2001). However, they stress 
that the relationship between inventory and price is non-linear, since inventories can only 
reduce upward pressure until stock runs out. Pirrong (2011) suggests that with increasing 
price volatility, actors in the physical market accumulate precautionary inventories. 
Consequently, higher orders of commodity futures prices affect inventory management, 
and hence, cash prices. Deaton and Laroque (1992) develop a ‘competitive storage’ model, 
based on the consideration that traders might hold back inventories if expecting higher 
returns. This behaviour drives up cash prices, as conditions in the physical market tighten. 
Such a scenario was empirically confirmed by Singleton (2014) for the crude oil market.  
In essence, the availability of inventories affects both the level and variance of the cash 
market price and the relationship between the cash and the futures market through the 
convenience yield. This triangular relationship unfolds complex feedback mechanisms. 
Positive price trends in volatile markets can be intensified through inventory hoarding, 
either because inventories serve as physical options or because they are accumulated for 
precautionary reasons. Further, owners of the physical commodity might hold back 
inventories in the expectation of a future price rise, and hence, amplify positive price 
trends. 
2.2.2 Theory of Risk Premium 
A second, arbitrage-based approach to commodity futures pricing assumes that prices 
should be subject to a risk premium. This idea is informed by the theory of ‘normal 
backwardation’ advanced by Keynes (1930) and based on the conjecture that non-
commercial speculators demand a premium for taking on commercial hedgers’ risk. 
Commercial traders, who hold the physical commodity over a particular time period for 
their regular business, can insure themselves against declining prices, i.e. a depreciation of 
their storage value, by entering into a short futures position. If prices decline, the gain from 
the short futures position, in theory, offsets the loss in the long physical position. Market 
actors with a future buying obligation adopt a similar hedging strategy when they take a 
long futures position.  
                                                 
16 In a similar way to financial options, volatility imposes opportunity costs to exercising the option rather 
than preserving it, i.e., to selling the commodity rather than storing it. 
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If there were as many long hedgers as short hedgers were in the market, only commercial 
hedgers would be needed for the futures market to function. Since this is an unlikely 
scenario, non-commercial speculators are invaluable in providing liquidity. Commercial 
traders are not exposed to any price risk after entering into the hedging position, while 
non-commercial traders take on risk exposure. Keynes (1930) and later, Hicks (1939, 147-
8) argued that the speculators would demand a premium for their insurance service to 
hedgers. Depending on the relative weight of short and long hedgers in the market, futures 
markets would be in contango if consumers’ hedging demand exceed that of producers 
(more long than short hedgers are in the market), or in backwardation if producers’ 
hedging demand exceed that of consumers (more short than long hedgers are in the 
market). Since Keynes assumes commercial hedgers to be short, he referred to such a 
situation as ‘normal backwardation’ (Keynes 1930). However, as noted by Kaldor (1939), 
the premium does not necessarily relate to backwardation, as both producers and 
consumers can be hedgers. Although Hicks (1939, 146) raises the same point as Kaldor, he 
argues in favour of the assumption of predominantly short hedging, and indeed Keynes’s 
theory remains unchallenged for most commodity futures markets (see Chapter 3).   
Working (1949) adds the profile of an arbitrageur to hedgers. He stresses that commercial 
traders are likely to actively position themselves in line with their market expectations, 
rather than passively hedge their risk exposure. He argues that hedging is both a form of 
arbitrage and, following the definition given in Chapter 1, speculation. While the hedger 
enters into the hedge if she believes that the price will move to her disadvantage, the non-
commercial arbitrage trader only enters into a trade if there are significant price deviations 
already. Therefore, according to Working (1949), hedgers trade even more speculatively 
than speculators. Kaldor (1939) makes a similar argument, noting that a market with more 
short than long hedgers can either be a result of expectations or of physical exposure.  
Although the theory of storage is not controversial, the theory of normal backwardation is 
frequently contested (Fama and French 1987). The convenience yield relates back to the 
concept of utility, which has a well-elaborated theoretical foundation in neoclassical 
economic theory, but the argument of Keynes’s risk premium is based on the assumption 
of excess demand, which is not easily compatible with neoclassical theorising (Cootner 
1960). Two strands of theories, which seek to make Keynes’s risk premium coherent with 
neoclassical theories, have been derived from his original ideas: (1) theories of asset-pricing, 
which assign a risk premium to (systematic) risk; and (2) theories of hedging pressure, 
which incorporate market imperfections, like transaction costs, into multiple-period pricing 
models.  
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With reference to Keynes (1930), Kaldor (1939) synthesises the convenience yield and risk 
premium approach. He links the premium to the uncertain expectations on future prices 
and thereby builds the foundation for asset-pricing models. If expectations are uncertain, 
the difference between the current price and the expected price covers not only carrying 
costs, but also a risk premium. According to Kaldor (1939), the premium varies with the 
degree of uncertainty, i.e., the dispersion of expectations around the mean or the own price 
variance, and increases proportionally to the original cash outlay. Since commodity owners 
free themselves from price uncertainty by selling forward, the forward price falls short of 
the expected price by the risk premium. Hence, the forward price becomes a biased 
estimator of the expected future cash price. Under the assumption of uncertainty, as 
defined by Kaldor, the difference between the expected cash price and the current cash 
price is determined by the risk-free interest rate, net carrying costs, and the risk premium 
(Hernandez and Torero 2010).  
'() −  = 	
,  , − ,  *, (2.3) 
with *, being the risk premium, which is a function of the variation of expectations on 
the future cash price. When substituting for the net storage costs17, from Equation 2.2 and 
2.3 it follows:  
, = '() − *, (2.4) 
Kaldor (1939) argues that if speculative stocks are zero, the convenience yield compensates 
for the carry costs proper, the interest rate and the risk premium18, and the expected future 
cash price equals the current cash price, which follows from Equation 2.3. Hence, in this 
particular case, the forward price falls short of the cash price by the risk premium: , =1 − *,. This is a situation of backwardation. If the convenience yield outweighs the 
carry cost proper, interest rate and risk premium, the cash price exceeds the expected cash 
price by more than the risk premium19. If speculative stocks are abundant, the convenience 
yield approaches zero, and the current cash price is the expected cash price minus storage 
costs proper and interest rate. The cash price is thus lower than the forward price, and the 
                                                 
17 , −, = , − 	
,  1. 
18 So that: 	
,  *,  , = , and thus, 	
,  *,  , − , = 0. 
19 If		
,  *,  , − , < 0, then	 > '() > ,. 
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forward price falls short of the expected price by the risk premium20. This is a situation of 
contango.  
Departing from Kaldor (1939), Dusak (1973) links the risk premium not to the own price 
risk (idiosyncratic risk), but to the joint price risk of the asset with a wider market portfolio 
(systematic risk). She is the first to apply a capital asset-pricing model (CAPM) to the 
commodity futures market and to show that the expected excess return which accrues to 
the holder of a commodity futures contract21 is equal to the excess market return22 
multiplied by the market beta23, as a measure for systematic risk. Hence, in contrast to 
Kaldor’s approach, the size of the risk premium depends on the covariance with a perfectly 
diversified market portfolio instead of the own price variance. This reasoning is grounded 
in the conviction that idiosyncratic risk can be diversified away, and thus, should not be 
priced. Only variance that is correlated with the overall market variation, and hence, 
systematic, should be reflected in the risk premium. According to Dusak (1973), 
commodity excess returns can be written as: 
',-.,/ − 	
,, = ,',-0,/ − 	
,,/1. (2.5) 
with ',-.,/ being the expected return on a long commodity futures position, ',-0,/ 
the expected return on a diversified portfolio or an investor’s total wealth and 1. the 
market beta. The expected risk premium is hence proportional to the market beta. After 
rearranging, Equation 2.5 can be rewritten as24:  
, = '() − *, (2.6) 
with *, = 1.',-0,/ − 	
,, being the risk premium according to Dusak’s (1973) 
model. Hence, the current futures price is defined as the expected cash price minus the risk 
premium multiplied by the original cash outlay.  
This expression looks identical to Kaldor’s (1939) derivation of the risk premium in 
Equation 2.4. Again, the futures price becomes a (downward) biased estimate of the future 
                                                 
20  < , < '(). 
21 The return to a commodity futures long position minus the risk-free rate of return. 
22 Excess return on a fully diversified portfolio. 
23 Defined in Equation 2.5 as 1. = .2345,467845 . 
24 After substituting and rearranging, 1  	
,, = '() − 1.',-0,/ − 	
,,. If returns are expressed 
in terms of prices, so that	',-.,/ = 9(:;)$:: , the current cash price can be written as:	<1  	
,, = '(<) −<1.',-0,/ − 	
,,. Following Dusak (1973), one can interpret <1  	
,, as the current futures price for 
delivery and payment in period T and '(<) as the cash price expected to prevail at time T, which leads to 
Equation 2.6. 
 
38 
cash price. Dusak (1973) is criticised by Carter, Rausser, and Schmitz (1983) firstly, for only 
considering the case of long traders, and secondly, for arguing against Keynes’s risk 
premium by assuming it away25. They correct for these shortcomings and find evidence for 
both systematic and idiosyncratic risk for three agricultural commodity markets.  
Although all risk premium models reviewed reach a similar conclusion in that the futures 
price is a biased estimator of the future cash price, the bias is derived differently among the 
models. Keynes links the premium to hedgers’ demand, relative to speculators’ willingness 
to enter into futures contracts. Kaldor understands the risk premium in terms of the own 
price variation, and Dusak and later authors derive the premium from the systematic risk 
component. Alongside theories which link the risk premium to own and cross-price 
variation, another theoretical strand developed, the so-called hedging pressure theories, 
which are, arguably, closer to Keynes’s original idea.   
Hedging pressure models are commonly derived from a general equilibrium framework in 
which rational agents maximise their utility over future consumption with respect to their 
optimal investment choices, regarding their positions on futures and other (commonly, 
stock) markets. The risk premium is derived as a function of commercial traders’ demand 
for hedging positions. Due to the problems associated with incorporating an excess 
demand framework into neoclassical theories, market frictions are introduced to make such 
a framework consistent (Hirshleifer 1988; 1990; Bessembinder 1992; Chang 1985). Without 
market friction, hedging demand would always meet liquidity supplied by speculators, and 
no price effect would arise. Under the assumption of market frictions – that is, under the 
assumption that the supply of contrarians to hedging positions is not perfectly elastic – 
hedging pressure models link the size of the basis over a contract’s life cycle to the hedgers’ 
demand as compared to speculators’ willingness to enter the market.  
Hirshleifer (1988), in his model, distinguishes between two trader types—producers 
(hedgers) and outside investors (speculators)—and assumes that the latter type faces 
transaction costs, due to fixed set-up costs or effective informational barriers. As a result, 
future consumption functions of speculators who chose to participate in futures markets 
differ from those who decide against futures market participation. A trader’s optimal 
choice of positions regarding future consumption depends on the size of the transaction 
cost that governs speculators’ participatory choices. The number of traders in the exchange 
is thus endogenously defined by the size of the transaction cost. Hirshleifer (1988) shows 
that in such a setting the risk premium entails a systematic risk component, which depends 
                                                 
25 They also criticise her for including only common stocks, which leads to downward-biased market betas.  
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on the market beta, and a residual risk component, which rises with transaction costs and 
hence, the number of non-commercial speculators participating in the market. In the 
tradition of Keynes’s risk premium, Hirschleifer (1988) argues that the residual risk 
premium exists to compensate speculators for their costs. In a later model, he corrects for 
only considering short hedgers by assuming fixed set-up costs for long hedgers and risk-
averse speculators (Hirshleifer 1990). If both long and short hedgers are free of transaction 
costs, every short hedger would meet a long hedger, and no hedging pressure would build 
up. The non-participation choice of some consumers, driven by a fixed set-up cost, thus 
restores the claim of hedging pressure made in his earlier model. When short hedgers are in 
excess of long hedgers, the futures price exhibits a downward bias, which means the 
market is in backwardation. 
Hirschleifer (1988; 1990) justifies his assumption of transaction costs incurred by 
speculators and/or consumers, but not producers, by the size of their businesses. He links 
set-up costs to scale economies and argues that consumers and speculators often run 
smaller businesses than commodity producers. However, this might not necessarily be the 
case, considering that the commodity processing and manufacturing sector is often as 
concentrated as the commodity production/extraction sector (see Chapter 7). The 
commodity industries’ structures might reveal an alternative explanation. Consumers, 
especially in the agricultural and soft commodity sectors often manage their risk outside the 
financial futures exchange via forward transactions. Further, the supply of speculative 
liquidity could be restrained, since speculators are disadvantaged against hedgers. The 
disadvantage arises because speculators lack the infrastructure for handling physical 
commodities, which means that they are constrained in their trading strategies and cannot 
exit the market by taking delivery.  
Acharya, Lochstoer, and Ramadorai (2013) suggest an interesting variation of Hirshleifer’s 
(1988; 1990) hedging pressure model by synthesising it with Deaton and Laroque’s (1992) 
optimal inventory management model. They show that with the assumption of market 
friction, hedging pressure not only impacts futures prices, but also cash market prices 
through inventory adjustments. According to their model, which assumes that short 
hedgers dominate in the market, the premium paid to speculators suppresses prices of 
longer-dated futures contracts relative to shorter-dated ones. Consequently, the costs for 
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short hedgers increase due to the supressed carry26. Producers might seek to avoid cost 
through the release of inventories, which then results in suppressed cash prices27. 
Bessembinder (1992), similar to Hirshleifer (1988), combines the CAPM framework with 
the hedging pressure hypothesis and links the market basis to systematic risk and hedgers’ 
demand. He finds evidence that after controlling for systematic risk, hedging pressure is 
significant for foreign currency and agricultural futures. De Roon, Nijman, and Veld (2000) 
further show that the risk premium also depends on hedging pressure from other markets, 
due to what they call ‘cross-hedging pressure’. Further, Basu and Miffre (2013) find 
evidence that hedging pressure is a systematic factor in determining commodity futures risk 
premiums.  
In contrast to previously reviewed theories of convenience yield and risk premium, the 
theory of hedging pressure accounts firstly, for the difference in traders active in the 
physical and derivatives markets in the form of non-commercial speculators, and secondly, 
for the possibility of traders executing price pressure in the futures market, which causes a 
deviation of the futures price from the underlying physical market price.    
However, despite these important insights, the theory of hedging pressure—like related 
theories which are based on the no-arbitrage condition between cash and futures 
markets—seems to suggest that price discovery takes place in the physical market (Stein 
1981; Chang 1985). Deviations from the no-arbitrage condition are explained by competing 
theories, which account for the ‘residual’ price variation, i.e., the variation that is not 
explained by the cash price and carry variables (Hayes 2006). However, the direction of 
causation of price formation between cash and futures markets does not logically follow 
from the no-arbitrage condition. 
Therefore, it is sensible to assume price formation mechanisms to be present in both the 
physical and the futures markets. This insight opens possibilities for bi-directional feedback 
mechanisms between those two markets, as shall be elaborated further in Section 2.4. 
Before considering dynamics in both markets jointly, another strand of literature is 
reviewed, which provides theories on price formation in asset markets.      
                                                 
26 The market carry refers to the level difference between the nearest-to-expiration and the next-nearest-to-
expiration contract price, i.e., the return one can earn carrying the physical commodity until the end of the 
next-nearest-to-expiration contract maturity. 
27 The same rationale applies to long hedgers dominating the market and is analogous to the argument that 
index traders caused excess demand for long positions, and as such, pushed futures and physical prices 
upward. 
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2.3 Theories on Price Formation in Asset Markets  
Neither the theory of storage, nor the theory of risk premium, leaves scope for an analysis 
of price formation in commodity futures markets. These theories are predominantly 
concerned with an arbitrage relationship between the cash and the futures markets, and the 
interplay between those two markets and the inventory market. A theory that is concerned 
with price formation processes in derivatives markets is the efficient market hypothesis, 
first formulated by Fama (1965).  
Although the efficient market hypothesis can be applied to commodity futures markets, its 
stringent assumptions linked to the neoclassical rational expectations framework have been 
doomed as unrealistic. Alternative theories emerged from this debate, including bounded 
rationality, rational herding and the Post-Keynesian theory of fundamental uncertainty. 
Those theoretical strands are discussed in the following sub-sections.  
It is argued that if the stringent assumptions of the efficient market hypothesis are eased, 
an analytical framework can be derived that is more appropriate for explaining price 
dynamics observed in asset markets and, by implication, price dynamics in commodity 
futures markets.  
2.3.1 Efficient Market Hypothesis 
In contrast to theories discussed previously, the efficient market hypothesis concerns itself 
with the translation of information into prices. It thus provides a theoretical framework for 
price formation in futures markets beyond no-arbitrage relationships with the physical 
market. According to this hypothesis, commodity futures prices reflect nothing but 
information on market fundamentals. This conjecture is based on the rationale that the 
value of a futures contract is determined by the consensus expectations on the market’s future 
fundamental value. Each rational trader is assumed to base her trading decision on a subset (=>,) of the total information set of market fundamentals [=?]. Consequently, each position 
taken by a trader will add to the market information density. With perfect foresight, the 
probability of the future price of the commodity would be certain, so that: <(@|=?) = 1, 
and hence: , = '(|=?) = . Since traders’ expectations directly translate into prices 
via their positions taken, the more market participants, the closer the futures price 
approaches its ‘true’ fundamental value.  
Under this premise, price deviations away from market fundamentals would introduce 
riskless arbitrage opportunities, which are instantaneously exploited by arbitrage traders, 
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who know the market fundamental value and bring the price back into equilibrium. 
Financial derivative instruments are assumed crucial for ‘market completeness’, in the sense 
that they provide arbitrageurs with the necessary flexibility to fully exploit arbitrage 
opportunities (C. P. Jones 2007; Deville, Gresse and Séverac 2014).  
The logic of the efficient market hypothesis critically depends on the assumption that key 
market participants evaluate assets on the basis of market fundamentals only, act fully 
rationally, base their actions on publicly available information or their own private sources 
and do so independently of each other. From this assumption, it follows that traders’ price 
expectations are identically and independently distributed around the fundamental value of 
the commodity (M. Carter 1991). Even if irrational ‘noise’ traders, who are defined as 
traders that do not base their information on market fundamentals, existed in the market, 
their behaviour is assumed to be uncorrelated, which implies that their positions cancel out.  
However, Fama (1965) argues that the efficient market hypothesis does not hinge on the 
absence of correlation between noise traders as long as arbitrage is possible. As long as 
enough sophisticated traders are active in the market, they would take advantage of the 
price deviation if unconstrained in their resources.  
It is important to note that Fama’s (1965) arbitrage mechanism differs from what is implied 
by the no-arbitrage condition suggested by the theories of storage and risk premium. Fama 
(1965) considers arbitrage possibilities for the price level and not the relative prices (e.g., of 
cash and futures) as done by the theories reviewed earlier. These two forms of arbitrage, 
often used interchangeably, have to be distinguished since their implications for market 
dynamics differ, a fact that is overlooked in the literature. In the following, I will 
differentiate between fundamental arbitrage and spatial arbitrage. In the case of fundamental 
arbitrage, to which Fama (1965) refers, arbitrage is exploited if prices deviate from their 
fundamental value (the price level is misspecified). In the case of spatial arbitrage, arbitrage 
is exploited if cash or any other close substitute and futures prices deviate (relative prices 
are misspecified).  
Regarding fundamental arbitrage, informed traders, based on their expectations of a 
commodity’s latent fundamental value, are assumed to go short if they think the 
commodity is overvalued or to go long if the commodity is undervalued, thus arbitraging 
away the misalignment. In contrast, if arbitrage opportunities of the spatial kind arise, 
traders are predicted to profit from buying in one market and selling in the other, thereby 
forcing the two markets to realign.  
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By implication, spatial arbitrage only enforces a close relationship between two related 
markets, but it does not necessarily link an asset to its fundamental value. An adjustment of 
an asset towards its fundamental value through spatial arbitrage only occurs if, firstly, the 
close substitute, with which the arbitrage trade is made, is priced according to its 
fundamental value and, secondly, if the asset price adjusts towards the price of its close 
substitute and not the reverse. Fundamental arbitrage, in contrast, only corrects for an 
over- or under-valuation of an asset, but not for relative prices. As shall be elaborated more 
in Section 2.4, the differentiation between fundamental and spatial arbitrage and their 
different implications for price formation processes are cornerstones of the financialisation 
hypothesis outlined in this thesis (see Figure 2.5).   
Not only do implications for price dynamics differ for the two types of arbitrage, but also 
underlying assumptions. Regarding fundamental arbitrage, two assumptions are made. 
Firstly, informed traders believe in the efficient market hypothesis—that is, they believe 
that the market will revert to its fundamental value28. Secondly, a probabilistic guess can be 
made about the fundamental value of the commodity on the basis of available information.  
As shall be elaborated in Section 2.3.2, the first assumption is questionable if trading 
decisions by noise traders are correlated. If this is the case, prices can systematically deviate 
from the fundamental value, which implies arbitrage traders lose on their positions, at least 
in the short-run. The profitability of an arbitrage position, then, depends on the relative 
market weight and resources of fundamental arbitrage traders relative to other uninformed 
speculators.  
The second assumption is based on the ability of rational individuals to quantify 
uncertainty, i.e., the assumption of ergodic systems. The literature, which questions the 
existence of such systems, shall be reviewed in Section 2.3.3. However, even if ergodicity is 
retained and only uncertainty—in the sense that traders face cognitive limitations in 
predicting the future with certainty—is assumed, fundamental arbitrage is not riskless even 
for sophisticated traders.   
The possibility of spatial arbitrage critically depends on the availability of an ‘essentially 
similar’ asset (Shleifer 2000, 3-5). If two assets are not close substitutes, the arbitrage is not 
riskless (Harris and Gurel 1986). For commodity futures, the close substitute for one 
                                                 
28 This assumption is logically inconsistent. Traders who believe in the efficient market hypothesis would 
have no motivation to trade, since they cannot expect any excess returns from a fully efficient market. A 
variation of this argument is made by Grossman (1976) and Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), who stress that it is 
nonsensical in such an environment to entertain costly information gathering if no return can be expected, 
and hence, the optimal choice of each trader would be to trade uninformed, if at all.  
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futures contract could be (1) a longer or shorter-dated futures contract of the same 
commodity at the same futures exchange; (2) a futures contract of the same commodity at 
different futures exchanges (e.g., cocoa is traded on the London and New York exchanges); 
or (3) a futures contract and the underlying physical good. Any difficulties in trading one 
asset against the other, like transaction costs, exchange rate risk and timing mismatch, 
impose limits to spatial arbitrage.  
The validity of the efficient market hypothesis, and also Fama’s (1965) argument, ultimately 
depends on the effectiveness of fundamental arbitrage (Shleifer 2000, 13). If arbitrage is 
not riskless, traders may refrain from arbitraging and market inefficiencies could arise. The 
assumptions necessary for effective fundamental arbitrage have been questioned on various 
grounds. One is the observation that traders are heterogeneous in trading motives and 
strategies beyond the informed–uninformed or arbitrageur–noise trader dichotomy. The 
financialisation hypothesis is essentially based on literature, which suggests a wide variety of 
trader behaviour. 
The assumption of different trading motives and strategies applied by heterogeneous 
traders provides a more realistic account of asset markets, in general, and commodity 
futures markets, in particular, and builds a strong argument against the view of market 
dynamics drawn from the efficient market hypothesis (Nissanke 2012a). If market 
participants are heterogeneous in their investment motives and trading strategies, not every 
investor’s position necessarily adds to the overall information set regarding market 
fundamentals (Hayes 2006; Adam and Marcet 2010b). Since market fundamentals might be 
less reflected in futures prices with the entry of new speculators, liquidity can be 
destabilizing (Stein 1981).  
This consideration sharply contradicts the conventional wisdom that the more liquid the 
market is, the more efficient and the more tranquil it is. This is because liquidity is often 
mistakenly equated with information content. This assertion is problematic, even if one 
ignores the possibility that traders might base their investment decisions on information 
about non-fundamental factors. An increase in liquidity does not necessarily imply a larger 
sample of opinions on the future fundamental value, i.e., there is not necessarily higher 
information content (Davidson 1998). The size of the sample of opinions on the market’s 
future fundamental value, and hence, the precision of the estimate—i.e., the futures 
price—depend on the number of traders and the diversity of independent information on 
market fundamentals they hold (Jones and Seguin 1997). This is not guaranteed by liquidity. 
If market efficiency is defined as the speed with which new, not exclusively fundamental-
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based information is incorporated into prices, liquidity might foster market efficiency, but 
not necessarily price stability and price discovery (Hirshleifer 2001). By allowing for the 
heterogeneity in traders’ investment strategies and investment motives, liquidity does not 
necessarily increase the precision with which prices mirror market fundamentals, liquidity 
also does not necessarily lower the amplitude of price movements (O'Hara 1997, 216-7). 
Furthermore, liquidity is understood as an indicator for the magnitude of the price impact 
of a single trader. Since the relative weight of an investor is smaller when the market is 
more liquid, liquidity is assumed to guarantee only a marginal price impact from each 
investor. The validity of this assertion depends on the assumption that traders act 
independently. If this assumption is violated, positions taken by only few traders might 
trigger a systematic response by others. Hence, a few traders can exert a significant ‘weight-
of-market’ impact (Nissanke 2012a). 
The assumption of heterogeneous market participants is not peculiar to the commodity 
market. It was introduced as a hypothesis to explain certain anomalies—especially in the 
stock and foreign exchange markets—which essentially contradict the efficient market 
hypothesis. Approaches seeking more consistency with neoclassical theories introduce 
either market frictions or bounded rationality in order to ease the assumption of fully 
rational agents and perfect foresight. This allows for the introduction of limits to arbitrage 
and hence, limits to market efficiency. From these approaches, behavioural finance and 
market microstructure theories evolved. Behavioural finance derives implications for price 
formation from behavioural traits of market actors, while microstructure theories 
additionally consider the institutional environment in which prices form (O'Hara 1997, 6). 
Both strands of literature show that speculative bubbles are possible, with the 
acknowledgement of heterogeneity of traders in their motives and strategies.  
Another approach acknowledging the possibility of speculative bubbles, but less 
compatible with neoclassical theorising, is followed by Post-Keynesians. These authors 
argue that market actors are confronted with fundamental uncertainty. In such an uncertain 
environment, economic agents interact diversely and strategically. 
These different schools of thoughts shall be revisited next, before an alternative view on 
price formation in commodity markets is composed and presented in Section 2.4.  
2.3.2 Bounded Rationality and Rational Herding 
The bounded rationality and the rational herding literatures are motivated by the need to 
explain anomalies like frequent deviations of asset prices from their hypothetical 
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fundamental value, fat tails of return distributions, and volatility in excess of market 
fundamentals in stock and in foreign exchange markets. The bounded rationality perspective is 
closely linked to behavioural finance, which moves away from the assumption of fully 
rational agents and takes a more eclectic approach to understanding agents’ behaviour. 
Theories are informed by cognitive science, human psychology, evolutionary biology and 
sociology (Baddeley 2010). The rational herding perspective introduces market frictions and is 
closely associated with market microstructure theories, which take the institutional 
environment and its links to the price formation process into consideration. Both strands 
of literature tend to divide financial market participants into two categories: informed 
fundamental arbitrage traders and uninformed systematic noise traders29. Noise traders are 
assumed to be systematic so that their trades correlate and introduce noisy price signals 
(Black 1986).    
The assumption of correlated noise traders is in contrast to the efficient market hypothesis 
reviewed previously. Hence, if one takes the efficient market hypothesis at face value, two 
questions arise (O'Hara 1997, 96-8). Firstly, noise traders supposedly lose money because 
they trade on the ‘wrong side’ of the market and, therefore, are eventually driven out of the 
market. The assumption of a continual flow of loss-making traders into and out of the 
market, despite the persistent evidence that they have the wrong strategy, demands an 
explanation. Secondly, if noise traders do not follow market fundamentals, then what 
constitutes the common factor driving their positions? Both bounded rationality and 
rational herding theories provide answers to these questions.  
Regarding the latter question, noise traders’ apply extrapolative strategies, which build upon 
technical indicators generated by models without an anchor in market fundamentals. 
Although, the models are highly sophisticated, they are based on the same trading signals 
derived from common data and indicators, and hence, noise traders’ positions can be 
correlated—see De Long, et al. (1990). Further, noise traders apply herding strategies by 
which they deliberately follow other seemingly informed traders—see Banerjee (1992). 
Although McAleer and Radalj (2013) insist that herding necessitates the deliberate 
mimicking of other agents, Devenow and Welch (1996) understand herding more broadly 
as a phenomenon that is driven by some coordination mechanism, such as a widely spread 
trading rule (extrapolative strategy) or the ability to observe other agents (herding strategy). 
Strategies of herding and extrapolation clearly overlap. Nevertheless, the distinction is 
                                                 
29 The Post-Keynesian approach does not rely on such a distinction, because with fundamental uncertainty, 
the future is unpredictable. Hence, rational behaviour, as defined by neoclassical economists, is a logical 
impossibility, which makes the distinction between rational and irrational behaviour obsolete (Davidson 2002, 
56). 
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important, as it is useful to differentiate between the motives underlying those strategies, 
which are association with either the bounded rationality or rational herding literature. 
The bounded rationality school, in its endeavour to explain price volatility and movements 
of asset prices away from their fundamental value, introduces noise traders that do not act 
rationally in the neoclassical sense of fully informed, utility-maximising agents. However, 
the conceptualisation of non-rational behaviour has changed as the literature developed. 
While earlier studies understand noise traders as non-rational insofar as their demand for 
risky assets is affected by beliefs and sentiments (Shleifer and Summers 1990), later studies 
focus on the cognitive limitations of optimising agents, which apply trial-and-error 
strategies in an evolutionary manner (De Grauwe and Grimaldi 2006; Hirshleifer 2001; Lo 
2004).  
Despite the differences, both manifestations of the bounded rationality literature come to 
the same conclusion that information on past prices and traders’ positions is not 
redundant, but contains valuable indications regarding how other traders behave under 
uncertainty (Adam and Marcet 2010a). Historical price and position data hence reveal 
important information about latent behavioural tendencies of other traders, which induce 
certain stochastic price processes.  
The early bounded rationality literature is strongly intertwined with empirical psychology. 
The term bounded rationality was originally coined by Simon (1957; 1959; 1955), who 
argues that individuals are unable to act as assumed in the neoclassical optimisation 
process. For example, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) show in experimental settings that 
people rely on simple heuristics when assessing probabilities and that cognitive biases are 
systematic30. In this tradition, Shleifer and Summers (1990) and Shleifer (2000, 113-6) base 
their models on two phenomena documented by the cognitive science literature—
‘conservatism’ and ‘representativeness’. Investors, showing these behavioural traits, do not 
incorporate information immediately, but over time, and tend to become overly optimistic 
after receiving a series of ‘good news’. Similarly, De Long, et al. (1990) argue that for the 
estimation of probabilities, individuals employ heuristics that can lead to non-random 
biases that are correlated across subjects. As a result, markets overreact or underreact to 
information, showing empirical patterns such as fat-tailed return distributions, excessive 
volatility and bubbles. 
                                                 
30 Almost a decade later, the authors co-edited a book under the same title with a collection of papers that 
summarised similar experiments (Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky 1982).  
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More recent bounded rationality models suggest successively adjusted strategies as a 
foundation for explaining traders’ behaviours. De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) introduce 
transactions costs, which leads the researchers to assume that rationally informed traders 
only trade if the asset, in this case the exchange rate, is outside the ‘transaction cost 
band’—that they only trade if the arbitrage position compensates for the transaction costs. 
Noise traders, or ‘chartists’, are assumed to compute the moving average of past exchange 
rates and extrapolate these into the future31. As the future becomes more uncertain, rational 
traders switch to trial-and-error strategies, including technical indicators. Such behaviour of 
market participants results in multiple equilibria. Hirshleifer (2001) also proposes a trial-
and-error approach to trader behaviour and explicitly links such behaviour to evolutionary 
processes. He argues that rule-of-thumb trading strategies are correlated across traders, 
since people share similar heuristics, ones that have worked well in humanity’s evolutionary 
past. He envisions the subordination of the purely rational paradigm as a special case under 
a broader psychological paradigm.  
Lo (2004) claims to have developed such a new paradigm, which he terms the ‘adaptive 
market hypothesis’. In a similar manner to Hirshleifer (2001) and other bounded rationality 
scholars, he links traders’ behaviour to psychological processes. His approach builds on 
evolutionary psychology by applying the principles of evolution to financial interaction (Lo 
2005). Optimisation of behaviour is understood as a trial-and-error process of applying 
different heuristics, including technical indicators, which, if challenges remain stable, adapt 
to deliver the optimal result. Suboptimal outcomes are not unlikely in the interim, although 
behaviour is never considered to be irrational, rather ‘maladaptive’ (Lo 2004). Distinct 
groups of market participants are understood as species that compete for scarce resources 
that are profit opportunities. Investment strategies undergo cycles of profit and loss, with 
Schumpeterian rents accruing to innovative strategies. With these cycles of profitability, Lo 
(2012) is able to address the puzzle posed by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and explain 
various financial anomalies.  
In contrast to the bounded rationality school, the rational herding literature shows that 
herding strategies can be rational in the presence of market frictions. Devenow and Welch 
(1996) distinguish between three different causes for the occurrence of rational herding 
which are (1) payoff externalities, (2) principal-agent problems, and (3) informational 
learning. The first friction includes, for instance, bank runs where the payoff to one agent 
                                                 
31 Certainly, chartists use far more sophisticated statistical models than simple moving averages, which can, at 
best, be only an approximation. However, these extrapolative models could similarly result in positive 
feedback trading, since even sophisticated algorithms are based on the same data and indicators available.   
 
49 
adopting a certain strategy increases as other agents adopt the same strategy. The second 
friction arises from strategic human interaction. Asset managers might prefer to ‘hide in the 
herd’, since a mistake is less damaging to a manager’s reputation if the same mistake is 
made by many (ibid.). This is a realistic assumption, because asset managers’ performances 
are usually measured against each other and not in absolute return terms. The third friction 
arises when partially informed agents discard their own information in the light of 
information inferred from the observed actions of other agents.  
Regarding the third cause for rational herding, Welch (1992) coined the term ‘information 
cascades’ and introduced an informational learning model in which, under uncertainty, 
herding becomes the rational strategy. In his model, agents make decisions sequentially and 
update their beliefs in a Bayesian probability model, given the information about previous 
agents’ decisions. Similarly, Banerjee (1992) builds a sequential decision model in which 
agents can observe previous decisions made by other agents without knowing whether the 
persons making the prior decisions were knowledgeable. He shows that even if an agent 
knows with a certain probability that her information is wrong, she does what she observes 
others are doing, even if this means discarding her own information. The model is built 
upon the assumption that all agents are rational in the Bayesian sense, i.e., they base their 
decisions on estimated probabilities using Bayes’ law.  
Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) stress the fragility of such systems in the 
presence of external disturbances. They distinguish between ‘previous-action-observable’ 
regimes and ‘previous-signal-observable’ regimes. In the former case the information 
cascade continues, while in the latter case the information cascade breaks if a long enough 
series of opposing signals occurs. Under the latter regime, it is assumed that the decision-
maker’s signal or knowledge is made available to everyone after the decision is made, 
regardless of whether the trader followed or ignored her own signal. The former case is 
arguably a better reflection of reality, as position data on futures exchanges are publicly 
available, although with a delay, while traders’ information is undisclosed.  
Adam and Marcet (2010a) also assume Bayesian optimisation under imperfect knowledge. 
They provide a micro foundation for models of adaptive learning where agents are 
‘internally rational’, which means that they maximise discounted expected utility under 
uncertainty, however, with consistent subjective beliefs about the future. Agents might not 
be ‘externally rational’, which means that they might not know the true stochastic process 
for variables beyond their control, like market outcomes and fundamentals. By relaxing the 
external rationality assumption, Adam and Marcet (2010a) formally show that the 
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equilibrium market price is equal to the marginal investor’s expected sum of total payoff in 
the next period, rather than the sum of all future payoffs. In a later paper, they show how 
their learning model could give rise to low-frequency boom and bust cycles in asset prices 
(Adam and Marcet 2010b). 
Another strand of literature focuses on principal–agent problems, arguing that it is rational 
for agents to follow the pack in order to protect their reputation, client base, or ‘to be on 
the safe side’ (Devenow and Welch 1996). Scharfenstein and Stein (1990) suggest that 
agents tend to imitate others, because they perceive a mistake to be more reputationally 
damaging if it is made by one person alone, whereas it becomes excusable if it is made by 
many. De Brouwer (2001, 156-7) adapts this argument to explain the performance of 
traders in the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98. Since macro hedge funds were commonly 
perceived as having the best market knowledge, smaller traders were strongly incentivised 
to mimic those funds. These behavioural assumptions are also demonstrated by Lütje and 
Menkhoff (2000), through a survey conducted among German fund managers.  
Another field of theories is based on externalities and game theoretical considerations in 
which presumably irrational behaviour, like herding, becomes rational in the presence of 
negative externalities. This literature mostly focuses on second- and third-generation 
currency crisis models. In such models, it has been shown that it is rational for an 
individual trader to pull out of a market if she believes that others might do so as well (e.g., 
bank runs, or the risk of a currency devaluation). In order not to be caught at the bottom, a 
trader tries to be among the first ones pulling out (Obstfeld 1986; 1996). Although in the 
first-generation currency crisis models—e.g., Krugman (1979)—changes in fundamentals 
are believed to precede the crisis, it is acknowledged in later models that fundamentals can 
fulfil expectations ex-post and that a crisis can evolve in a self-fulfilling manner. Jeanne 
(2000) distinguishes between ‘speculative attack’ and ‘escape-close’ models. The latter type, 
associated with second- and third-generation models, emphasises the self-fulfilling element 
of speculation, as market fundamentals are endogenised with mutual feedback mechanisms 
between speculative expectations and market fundamentals.  
Both bounded rationality and rational herding theories come to the conclusion that 
positions taken by noise traders can be strongly correlated and lead to aggregate demand 
shifts, which impact prices if the noise traders’ momentum in the market is large enough. 
These theories clearly break with the efficient market hypothesis, which assumes that noise 
traders’ positions are independently distributed, so that the aggregated impact is zero. 
Although, as pointed out before, the efficient market hypothesis does not hinge on the 
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assumption of uncorrelated noise traders as long as fundamental arbitrage is efficient, 
various reasons have been put forward in the literature for why arbitrage is generally risky, 
and hence, systematic limits to fundamental arbitrage exist.  
The conjecture that arbitrage is generally risky departs from four properties of financial 
markets: (1) the presence of ‘noise trader risk’, (2) market imperfections and transaction 
costs, (3) agency problems, and (4) information asymmetry.  
In the presence of noise traders, rational arbitrage traders face two types of risk, 
fundamental risk and the risk that the mispricing worsens. The second type of risk is 
aggravated by the presence of noise traders and coined ‘noise trader risk’ by De Long, et al. 
(1990). If mispricing worsens, fundamental arbitrage traders are required to put more 
money on the trade. If capital is constrained or costly, the trader might be forced out of the 
market before her arbitrage trade pays off due to margin calls and interest rates on 
borrowed capital. Even without the presence of noise traders, fundamental arbitrage is not 
riskless, since traders do not have perfect knowledge about the fundamental value. If 
arbitrage traders are risk-averse and trade with a finite horizon, their willingness to trade 
against mispricing is limited (Shleifer and Summers 1990). 
Further, the fact that arbitrage involves capital introduces various agency problems. If an 
arbitrage trader is trading on behalf of a client while losing money, it might be difficult and 
costly for her to acquire further capital to continue the trade.  
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that since arbitrage requires deep and specialised 
knowledge about the market, only a tiny group of traders has this knowledge. Hence, their 
market weight might be too small, and prices might move against them in the short-run, 
forcing them to liquidate their positions and act unwillingly as positive feedback traders, 
i.e., they would act as trend-following traders, thus aggravating the existing price trend.  
Last but not least, informed arbitrage traders might even purposely turn into positive 
feedback traders as argued by Shleifer (2000, 156). If arbitrage traders are aware of noise 
traders employing extrapolative strategies, arbitrageurs are tempted to bid up the price 
higher than warranted by fundamentals in order to stimulate noise traders into acting as 
positive feedback traders to, in turn, bid up the price even further.   
Shleifer (2000, 156) concludes that in the presence of extrapolative traders, ‘arbitrage can 
be destabilizing’ and extrapolative traders, although losing in the long-run, might gain 
significantly in the short-run. In the same spirit, Shleifer and Summers (1990) explain the 
continuing entrance of noise traders into the market by arguing that less risk-averse noise 
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traders are more aggressive in their trading than arbitrageurs. If risk is rewarded, those 
traders earn higher average returns than arbitrage traders. Such trading strategies come at a 
greater volatility, so that most traders become poor and only a few, very rich. De Long, et 
al. (1990) show that most noise traders fail, but noise traders as a group come to dominate 
the market. Although most noise traders are eventually driven out of the market, the high 
reward, which accrues to some, motivates others to follow. Hence, noise traders, if their 
weight in the market is large enough, create their own space in which their price bets are 
rewarded in a self-fulfilling manner (Shleifer, 2000, 52).  
Although both areas of literatures differ in their underlying assumptions—bounded 
rationality assumes partially rational agents, while rational herding assumes market 
frictions—they similarly conclude that trend-following and herding tendencies arise, which 
result in limits to fundamental arbitrage. In such scenarios, bubbles and price movements 
away from a market’s fundamental value are likely to arise.  
2.3.3 Fundamental Uncertainty and the Keynesian Tradition 
The Post-Keynesian literature, although coming to a similar conclusion on traders’ 
behaviour and the possibility of speculative bubbles, as the previously reviewed literature, 
starts from a different understanding of uncertainty. In neoclassical models, uncertainty is 
equated with ‘probabilistic risk’, but the Post-Keynesian authors argue that ‘true’ 
uncertainty is not quantifiable (Davidson 2002, 39-40). It is argued that if the future is risky, 
these risks are measurable, and by applying probability theory, the future is knowable.  
In contrast, if the future is uncertain, it cannot be reliably forecasted. Thus, an uncertain 
future is unknowable and must consequently be restricted to non-quantitative terms. This 
leads to the postulate of a non-ergodic system in which the future cannot be calculated on 
the basis of past and present data. This entails an important distinction from the bounded 
rationality literature, which has as its underlying assumption that while the future is 
knowable, it is unknown by traders due to cognitive limitations (Lawson 1985). For the 
bounded rationality school, uncertainty is an epistemological problem, whereas it is an 
ontological one for Post-Keynesians (Dunn 2001).  
Ergodicity, the necessary assumption for the existence of a predictable future, is rejected on 
the basis of the transmutable nature of the future resulting in ‘fundamental uncertainty 
(Dunn 2001; 2008, 96-8). If the system is permanently changed, the past is not 
representative of the future (Davidson 2002, 47). Elapsing time does not change the sample 
size, but the sample itself. To put it differently, by looking into the past for a prediction of 
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the future, a greater sample—which would make a more representative data set from the 
same population—is not drawn, but a sample that provides a systematically different data 
set from a different population is drawn. Expectations based on statistical estimators are 
therefore misleading. In contrast, rational expectation models require the existence of an 
ergodic system where today’s knowledge is projectable onto the future (Davidson 2002, 
51). Not only is ergodicity rejected, but it is also assumed that people are aware that they 
cannot foresee future events, that is, they are aware of true uncertainty (Hicks 1977, vii; 
Davidson 1991). 
If the future is unknown, a commodity’s fundamental value cannot be known by market 
practitioners, and no such thing as the efficient equilibrium price exists (Bernstein 1999). 
Further, if market practitioners are aware of the unknowability of the future, portfolio 
protection through diversification against changes in financial markets is an important 
activity (Davidson 2002, 188). So, too, is speculation over the psychological state of other 
market practitioners (Carabelli 2002). The insight that expectations translate into prices, 
then, produces behaviour, as in Keynes’s famous example of people betting on the winner 
of a beauty contest based on how they think other people will evaluate beauty and not on 
their own judgements.  
Keynes’s own writing about uncertainty and the ability to know the future is not as explicit 
as suggested, and slightly different interpretations are proposed by Post-Keynesian scholars 
(Rosser Jr. 2001). For instance, Lawson (1985) stresses that Keynes does not reject the 
existence of knowledge per se. Lawson (1985) distinguishes between three cases, which are 
knowledge of, knowledge about, and the unknowable. ‘Knowledge about’ is knowledge 
about the probability proposition of something (secondary proposition), but not the 
‘knowledge of’ something (primary proposition). Knowledge of a secondary proposition 
then leads to a ‘rational belief of the appropriate degree’ in the primary proposition. He 
distinguishes between cases where the probability is unknown due to lack of skills—close 
to the bounded rationality literature—and cases where the probability is immeasurable or 
indeterminate. Only in the latter case does true uncertainty exist, under which people fall 
back on conventions. For Lawson (1985), conventions fulfil an important role of making 
behaviour predictable, at least in the short-run. Interestingly, what he seems to argue is that 
conventions make knowledge about the future possible to some degree, but not of the 
future.  
For Lawson (1985), trader heterogeneity exists, since trading motives are conditioned on 
knowledge and the interpretation of knowledge that is obtained by each individual trader 
 
54 
through practice. Different societies or forms of societies will bring about different trading 
motives, and hence, behaviour. Similarly, Bibow, Lewis, and Runde (2005) refer to Beckert 
(1996) and argue that reliance on peoples’ ‘social devices’ makes action more predictable. 
Mimicking then arises from the attempt to conform to the majority. Shiller (2014) 
combines economic sociology with human psychology and Keynes’s remarks on 
conventions. He borrows from Durkheim’s notion of ‘collective consciousness’ in arguing 
that price formation is a convention, but maintains the ergodicity assumption, and thus, is 
closer to the bounded rationality school.  
Comparing the bounded rationality literature reviewed earlier with Post-Keynesian 
approaches, the distinction comes down to the question of whether the world is 
predetermined or open to choice – that is, whether we live in an ergodic or non-ergodic 
system, or what Lawson (1977) terms a closed (immutable) or an open (transmutable) 
system. The break with the efficient market hypothesis is necessarily stronger for Post-
Keynesians, since future market fundamentals are indeterminate (i.e., no stable market 
fundamentals can exist), while for the bounded rationality school, the fundamentals are 
determinate, (i.e., stable market fundamentals exist), but only the agents’ abilities to fully 
grasp market fundamentals are questioned.  
While the distinction is vital, it is useful to conclude that the consequences for the 
behaviour of agents derived from both theories are similar. For both schools of thought, 
the past only offers limited guidance for predicting future events, either because it cannot 
be fully comprehended or because it is substantially different from the future. In such a 
setting, maximisation, or optimisation, is not possible, and agents return to rules of thumb 
and conventions (Dunn 2001). 
Hedging pressure theories, reviewed in Section 2.2.2, describe how the interplay between 
hedgers and speculators in commodity futures markets affects the relationship between the 
physical and the derivatives market price. Theories on price formation in asset markets, 
reviewed in this section, further differentiate between informed and uninformed 
speculators and show that uninformed speculators, or noise traders, can systematically 
impact asset prices, which results in speculative bubbles and excessive volatility. The 
combination of both theories, amended by another trader category of index traders, 
provides the theoretical foundation for the financialisation hypothesis proposed in this 
thesis. Further, theories of convenience yield and risk premium enable the identification of 
implications of the financialisation hypothesis for the complex interplay between futures, 
cash and storage markets. These considerations are set forth in Section 2.4.  
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2.4 A Synthesis: Uncertainty and Heterogeneous Traders 
The combination of the efficient market hypothesis with no-arbitrage theories provides the 
neoclassical foundation for a theory on price formation in commodity futures markets. 
Two types of players are assumed to be active in commodity futures markets: hedgers, who 
are consumers and producers, and speculators, who act as rational fundamental arbitrage 
traders (Masters and White 2008). Hedgers aim to reduce their price risk exposure in the 
physical market, while rational arbitrage traders aim to maximise profits by exploiting 
arbitrage opportunities. Arbitrage traders base their investment decision on information—
private or public—about market fundamentals and thereby add to market information 
density. Although it is acknowledged that traders might err in their expectations on future 
market fundamentals, their errors are assumed to be random, and hence, likely to cancel 
out.  
Figure 2.1: Market Dynamics under Fundamental Arbitrage  
 
Source: Adapted from Tokic (2011). 
Under such conditions, consumers and producers in the market go long or short according 
to their hedging needs, the inventory level and expectations on market fundamentals. If 
prices temporally rise beyond the upper bound of a range within which informed 
commercial traders locate the fundamental value32, producers, expecting prices to decline in 
the future, take advantage of the favourable price level by selling speculative inventories. In 
                                                 
32 It appears realistic to assume that even informed traders disagree about the fundamental value, since 
economic data never fully corresponds to theoretical concepts and economic theory disagrees on the exact 
model formalisation.  
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addition, consumers, as well as rational arbitrage traders, go short in the futures market to 
lock in temporarily high prices. Meanwhile, consumers, likewise expecting a future decline 
in prices, deplete their inventories with the intention of postponing buying. As a result, the 
demand for short contracts increases along with the supply on the physical market, which 
puts downward pressure on both futures and cash prices, and prices are realigned with the 
expected fundamental value. With greater availability of storage, the convenient yield 
declines and the carry strengthens, compensating for inventory holding. The increasing 
carry eventually curbs inventory sales. The inverse case applies if prices are temporarily 
below the expected fundamental value (Figure 2.1). 
Hedgers, in this framework, fulfil a dual arbitrage role. While informed, non-commercial 
speculators align prices with the fundamental value, commercial hedgers fulfil the task of 
aligning not only prices with market fundamentals but also the physical and the futures 
markets through spatial arbitrage. Noise traders, as discussed previously, are arguably left 
without any price impact, since informed traders arbitrage away any price inconsistencies. 
Uninformed noise traders are, then, valuable liquidity providers who serve as 
counterparties for hedgers (Tokic 2011).   
One of the most striking developments over the last decade, which has attracted wide 
attention among academics and policymakers alike, is the relatively sudden influx of 
liquidity associated with index investment into commodity derivatives markets. Index 
traders invest in a basket of commodity futures and allocate investments into the respective 
markets, in accordance with the composition of the index they are seeking to replicate 
(Heidorn, et al. 2014). Such investment instruments are novel for commodities, but have a 
long history in other financial markets33.  
In this context, the binary division between informed and uninformed34 traders is amended 
by a third category to capture index traders. Index traders are categorised as ‘passive’ noise 
traders, in the sense that their investments are unrelated to market-specific traits, whilst 
‘active’ informed and uninformed traders base their investment decisions actively on 
market-specific dynamics (Nissanke 2012a). Further, for commodity markets, the active, 
informed trader category is subdivided into commercial hedgers and non-commercial 
arbitrageurs. It is important to note that the active uninformed trader category here 
corresponds to the uninformed noise trader category, as defined in the previously reviewed 
                                                 
33 The impact of portfolio insurance strategies, such as index trading, on market performance was already 
acknowledged in the late 1980s for security markets (Black 1986).  
34 Accepting the notion of uncertainty as either an epistemological or ontological reality suggests using 
‘informed’ instead of ‘rational’ and ‘uninformed’ rather than ‘irrational’.  
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bounded rationality literature. Hence, in this section the noise trader category is defined 
differently than before, or to be more precise, the noise trader category is split into the 
passive (index trader) and the active (uninformed speculator) noise traders.  
Index traders, subsumed under the passive noise trader category, commonly invest with the 
aim of portfolio diversification (Masters and White 2008). Since index investors do not 
attempt to time or arbitrage the market, their trading behaviour is largely detached from the 
respective market’s fundamental information set. Instead, positions taken are arguably 
correlated with overall market sentiments and global liquidity cycles, as index traders’ 
investment decisions are based on portfolio considerations. Further, unlike uninformed 
speculators, who take positions on both sides of the market (going long and short), traders 
who seek passive exposure to commodity prices are overwhelmingly long. As a result of 
their particular trading strategies, index traders’ positions are correlated as to the timing of 
their entry in the market, driven by global liquidity cycles, as well as their repositioning by 
rolling over long positions.  
Following the bounded rationality and rational herding literature, index traders are likely to 
have a systematic impact on prices, and index traders’ effects can be amplified by other 
traders, who employ extrapolative and herding strategies. Either under the assumption of 
market frictions (non-perfect elasticity of supply), or by acknowledging demand-driven 
price dynamics in the Keynesian tradition, long-only positions by index traders induce 
upward pressure on futures prices. These conjectured price dynamics are reminiscent of the 
hedging pressure hypothesis by which various authors have shown that short hedgers 
induce a bias to futures prices as an insurance premium to speculators (see Section 2.2.2). 
Therefore, index traders’ demand for long positions, like hedgers’ demand for short 
positions, is expected to have a decisive impact on futures prices. Since index traders take 
long-only positions, this price impact results in a positive premium on the futures price 
over the cash market price. In the following, I will refer to this price pressure effect 
induced by index traders as index pressure35.  
Since the presence of index traders in commodity futures markets is a relatively recent 
phenomenon, only a few studies provide a microstructure model for commodity futures 
markets that explicitly accounts for the presence of index traders. Among those studies, 
Brunetti and Reiffen (2014) suggest an equilibrium model, which includes index traders, 
speculators and hedgers. Their model predicts that the spread between two contracts is 
                                                 
35A more general version of this hypothesis is brought forward by Harris and Gurel (1986) as the ‘price 
pressure hypothesis’. They argue that with a shift in demand, investors who accommodate the demand shifts 
need to be compensated for their services.  
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enlarged by index traders rolling over contracts, and that the spread is correlated across 
commodities listed in the same index. A larger spread implies a decrease in the hedging 
costs. Their insights are based on the hedging pressure and risk premium approach in that 
they argue that index traders provide the liquidity to hedgers, so that the risk premium and, 
hence, hedging costs decline. However, their model is incomplete, as it only assumes short 
hedgers—hedging costs for long hedgers would increase with the presence of index 
traders—and it does not consider the relationship between the futures and the cash 
markets.  
Basak and Pavlova (2013) propose another structural model, which faces similar problems 
as the Brunetti and Reiffen (2014) model. They suggest a dual trader division in which they 
contrast hedgers and index traders. Different from Brunetti and Reiffen (2014), Basak and 
Pavlova (2013) do not make reference to the hedging pressure literature, but locate their 
model within a wider empirical and theoretical literature dealing with the effect of index 
traders on stock markets and price pressure hypotheses. Although they are able to derive 
many of the empirically observed anomalies and claims made by the financialisation 
hypothesis, like speculative bubbles, excessive co-movement, excessive volatility and 
various spillover effects across indexed and non-indexed commodity markets, they are also 
unable to extend the model to the physical market beyond a mechanical no-arbitrage 
condition. This shortcoming is explicitly acknowledged by the authors. By using the no-
arbitrage condition for an extension to the cash market, they simply substitute the futures 
price with the cash price plus carry.  
This crude way of dealing with the problem reveals a key difficulty with price discovery 
models for commodity markets. While the early models locate price discovery in the 
physical market in a general equilibrium framework, the later market microstructure models 
locate price discovery in the futures market. The former models derive the futures price as 
a mirror of the cash price, while the latter models derive the cash prices as a mirror of the 
futures price. Either way, price discovery on one of the two markets is removed from 
consideration with assumptions of the no-arbitrage conditions that equate one market price 
with the other. As a result, these theories are unable to fully reflect the dynamic interplay between 
both markets.  
Furthermore, the role of speculation in commodity markets is conceptualised differently in 
no-arbitrage and asset-pricing theories. For the former theories, speculation enters as a 
determining factor only through hoarding in the inventory market. For the latter theories, 
speculation is included only through bounded rationality and rational herding in the futures 
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market. The problems with these conflicting theories are addressed further here, after first 
reviewing the effect of index and speculative traders on dynamics in the futures market.  
Possible scenarios for the emergence of speculative bubbles in the presence of index 
traders can be derived based on the bounded rationality and rational herding theories. If 
the weight of passive index positions magnified by extrapolative traders outweighs the 
weight of positions of informed arbitrageurs and hedgers, the efficient market hypothesis is 
likely to fail, even in liquid markets (Hull 2011, 531-3). With increasing uncertainty, traders 
employing extrapolative strategies are rewarded for the risk they take on, and these 
strategies could eventually become more profitable than arbitrage trading (Gromb and 
Vayanos 2010). If uncertainty is high, extrapolative traders engaging in positive feedback 
trading are likely to prevail. This may prompt arbitrageurs to close their short positions by 
going long, as margin calls pose increasing costs36 and trend-following behaviour becomes 
profitable (Kilian and Taylor 2001; De Long, et al. 1990). Further, with increasing 
uncertainty, the bounds within which informed traders locate the fundamental value move 
apart. This delays price reversion further (Figure 2.2)37.  
Figure 2.2: Market Dynamics under Speculative Bubbles 
 
Source: Adapted from Tokic (2011). 
                                                 
36 The same argument was made by Tokic (2011) for commercial hedgers in the oil market and reported by 
the CFTC (2010) for the case of cotton in March 2008. 
37 This contradicts De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006). The reason for this is that they relate the fundamental 
price band to transaction costs while we argue for uncertainty, in line with Kilian and Taylor’s (2001) 
argument. 
 
60 
If the scenario as outlined above proves well founded, price deviations from market 
fundamentals can be explained by the changing composition and strategic interaction of 
different trader types exerting weight-of-market power. The market then oscillates between 
‘fundamental equilibrium’ and ‘bubble equilibrium’ states. At a certain ‘tipping point’, the 
market becomes excessively speculative, and arbitrage traders switch to simple trading 
heuristics rather than providing balanced liquidity (Nissanke 2012a).  
Upward price dynamics can be exaggerated similarly to downward price dynamics. If 
traders in times of financial distress face borrowing constraints or other pressures to 
liquidate their assets, the upward price trend will be reversed (M. Carter 1991). With index 
investors seeking diversification of their portfolios and increasingly contributing to the 
liquidity in commodity futures markets, a shock in the ‘central’ market, such as stock 
markets, could lead to the massive exit of traders from ‘satellite’ markets, such as 
commodity markets, causing cross-market contagion (Gromb and Vayanos 2010). 
Importantly, this development suggests a close relationship between financial and 
commodity markets and explains the double crisis in 2008–09 (Lagi, et al. 2011).  
Speculative bubbles in commodity markets are not new phenomena (Maizels 1987; 1994; 
Amin 1995), and bubble scenarios for stock and foreign exchange markets have been 
examined within the informed–uninformed trader dichotomy, as discussed in Section 2.3. 
The 2002–08 price surge in commodity markets, therefore, cannot be ascribed solely to the 
presence of index traders.  
Figure 2.3: Book Effect of Index Traders 
 
Source: Author. 
However, this thesis argues that index traders’ characteristic investment patterns have 
decisively contributed to the persistence of such phenomena. Considering the trading book 
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at a particular point in time, as depicted in Figure 2.3, a sudden influx of index traders 
shifts the settlement price upwards. Index traders push prices upwards, since their demand 
for long positions is price inelastic. Since index traders allocate a certain investment amount 
across commodity markets, index traders are insensitive to price changes in any particular 
commodity market and only change positions if changing total index exposure or if 
reweighting the index.   
This conjectured price impact of index traders is strengthened by earlier findings on stock 
price behaviour and index inclusion, which show that an inclusion of a company in one of 
the major indices is accompanied by a substantial and relatively permanent rise in returns 
(Harris und Gurel 1986; Shleifer 1986). Grossman (1988), as well as Brennan and Schwartz 
(1989), point out that with the presence of portfolio insurance traders (that is, index 
traders), the information content of the market is reduced and price volatility increases 
significantly.    
Such studies are also related to the literature on excess co-movements of indexed stocks 
due to common demand shifts, as suggested by Pindyck and Rotemberg (1990). Shleifer 
(2000, 37–39) shows in a structural dynamic model that co-movement of securities might 
not be caused by common fundamentals but by speculative investments. This conjecture is 
further empirically supported by studies undertaken by, inter alia, Greenwood (2005) and 
Barberis, Wurgler and Shleifer (2005), who confirm that the degree of co-movement 
between stocks included in the Nikkei 225 and S&P 500, respectively, are related to price-
pressures exerted by correlated investors’ demand.   
What follows from the stock market literature is that passive index traders, who trade in a 
unidirectional manner, have a significant impact on the prevailing price level and price 
dynamics in commodity futures markets. Such a price impact is a potential candidate for 
shifting the price beyond the upper bound of the fundamental value, as depicted in 
Figure 2.2. If information density is low, the price impact might conflict with an 
information signal, and extrapolative traders are likely to amplify the more newly 
introduced trend.  
This situation is even more likely in commodity markets, where information asymmetry is 
an inherent feature. Commercial traders have a known information advantage on inventory 
levels, as well as future production and consumption. Therefore, since the identity of a 
trader is not disclosed, the activity of a large inflow of index traders could easily be 
confused with a trade placed by an informed hedger. Further, following the price-pressure 
and hedging-pressure hypotheses, it has been shown that in the presence of market 
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frictions and transaction costs, the supply of contrarian traders is not perfectly elastic. 
Considering margin calls, trading fees and various capital constraints, a large inflow of 
long-only index traders is likely to have a substantial price impact.  
On the basis of no-arbitrage theories reviewed in Section 2.2, the analysis can be extended 
to the relationship between cash and futures markets and futures contracts with different 
maturity dates. This allows me to draw implications of the financialisation of commodity 
derivatives markets on the physical market and the commodity markets’ specific interplay 
between storage, cash and futures markets.  
Index trading might not only impact the price level, but also the term structure, which is 
the price difference between futures contracts with different maturities. Since the term 
structure entails important information for actors in the physical market, commercial 
traders’ decisions could be affected, which would then result in potential spillover effects to 
physical commodity markets.  
As illustrated in Figure 2.4, if the entry of passive index traders puts price pressure on the 
contract they are in, denoted as [F1], the contract’s price increases as long as index traders 
enter the market between t1 and t2. This trend is further magnified by the presence of 
extrapolative traders. When index traders rollover their contracts at maturity between t2 and 
T1, they execute upward price pressure on the deferred contract [F2] and downward price 
pressure on the maturing contract [F1]. This implies that, firstly, due to the presence of 
extrapolative traders, contracts are inflated more over their life cycle than they are deflated 
by the exit of index traders, and that, secondly, the carry of the market is increased. 
Figure 2.4: Index Rollover Effect in a Normal Market 
 
Source: Author. 
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This effect of index traders on the futures market’s term structure has been theoretically 
and empirically confirmed by Brunetti and Reiffen (2014), who find that the spread 
between contracts with different maturity dates increases with the rollover of index traders. 
The suggestion that index investment either turns the market into a strong carry or 
strengthens an existing carry is consistent with the index pressure hypothesis outlined 
previously. 
For markets of storable commodities, a carry is considered ‘normal’ in order to compensate 
for the storage costs. The market would only become ‘inverted’, that is, deferred contracts 
would trade at a lower price than closer-to-maturity contracts, if the convenience yield rises 
to the extent where it completely offsets the storage costs—which might occur when 
inventories are low. However, if index investment strengthens, so does the carry and hence, 
the costs to carry inventories over into the next period declines. If a high percentage of full 
carry38 coincides with price volatility, owners of the physical commodity might be reluctant 
to sell due to (1) the implicit option value of stock holdings (Pindyck 2001; Irwin and 
Sanders 2012); or (2) the utility gained from precautionary holdings in times of high market 
uncertainty (Bozic and Fortenbery 2011; Pirrong 2011); or (3) the expectation of higher 
prices in the future, given a positive underlying price trend (Deaton and Laroque 1992; 
Singleton 2014).  
Because of the limits to spatial arbitrage imposed by physical traders’ reluctance to sell into 
the storage market, futures and cash market prices might fail to converge at the end of a 
futures contract’s maturity. Moreover, high price volatility alone might impose limits to 
both spatial and fundamental arbitrage, as arbitrage trading becomes risky. As argued by 
Lyons (2001), arbitrage is only profitable if the returns to the arbitrage trade reach a certain 
threshold conventionally measured by the ‘Sharpe ratio’. This is a relative measure of the 
returns on an arbitrage strategy with respect to the variance of the returns on such strategy. 
Thus, high price volatility and larger carry situations might impose limits to spatial 
arbitrage, and hence, cause non-convergence between the cash and futures market. The 
extent of non-convergence could be further increased by the index traders’ roll effect.   
The efficient market hypothesis assumes that the full-information value, i.e., the market-
clearing price in the futures market under perfect foresight, equals the fundamental value, 
i.e., the market-clearing price in general equilibrium in the physical market, as depicted in 
                                                 
38 The percent of full carry is estimated as the percentage of the storage plus interest compensated for by the 
carry BCD$C@.EF G ∗ 100, with HI being the cost of storage, J the foregone interest rate and 1 and 2 , the 
prices of the nearest and next-nearest contract to maturity, respectively (Irwin, et al. 2011). 
 
64 
Figure 2.5. However, considering the differences in trader composition and market 
structure between physical and derivatives markets, clearing prices on both markets may 
diverge (O'Hara 1997, 227). If traders’ expectations do not coincide with fundamentals of 
the physical market, or if traders do not base their investment choices (only) on these 
fundamental factors, the market-clearing price of the commodity futures market does not 
necessarily equate the fundamental value of the commodity underlying the futures.  
Figure 2.5: The Different Theories on Commodity Price Formation 
 
Source: Author. 
This argument is not new and was already considered by Working (1948), who notes that 
“the question whether cash and future markets are equivalent apart from the time element 
includes the question whether cash and futures prices may differ because they reflect the 
opinion of substantially different groups of traders”. He also notes that a deviation 
between the two markets “requires the supposition that arbitrage between the cash and 
future price may be inefficient”, which is when limits to spatial arbitrage exist. Although 
Working (1948) discards the idea to treat the two markets separately, he acknowledges that 
if hedgers are scarce—he appears to assume that only hedgers are true arbitrageurs—the 
relationship between cash and futures markets may break down. Considering that spatial 
arbitrage is only riskless at a futures contract’s maturity (Yang, Bessler and Leatham 2001), 
prices might deviate substantially over a contract’s life cycle. 
Furthermore, mispricing in one market might spill over to the other market. As outlined 
before, there is no logical reason for the ex-ante belief that the direction of causation would 
only go from the cash to the futures market. Distortions in the futures market might not 
only have a direct impact on physical prices via spatial arbitrage trades, but also due to the 
fact that cash prices often consist of the futures prices and an agreed premium accounting 
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for quality considerations (see Chapter 7). If the responsiveness of demand with respect to 
prices is low, i.e., if the price elasticity of demand is close to zero in the short-run, the cash 
market price might follow the futures price for some time. This is particularly true if there 
is uncertainty about market fundamentals and the overall amount of supply available. The 
reversal of such a speculative price trend might also be delayed, as producers’ and 
consumers’ financial planning timeframes allow demand and supply in the cash market to 
react to price changes only after a significant lag. Lagi et al. (2011), with reference to 
interviews they conducted, point out that the delay with which prices enter planning 
decisions might be up to 12 months. And further, even if inventories start to adjust, 
information on such changes will enter the futures markets with an additional time lag. 
Recalling the work of Acharya, Lochstoer and Ramadorai’s (2013) on the impact of 
hedging pressure on cash market prices, the dominance of long index positions in the 
market would lead to a large carry, which, in turn, motivates inventory accumulation, and 
so would lead to an increase in the cash market price. 
If a market’s fundamental value is understood as a latent price, which is determined by 
structural factors behind market-clearing conditions in equilibrium, then the hypothetical 
framework outlined implies that if cash and futures markets differ systematically in the 
factors driving demand and supply (and price) in these markets, their market fundamental 
values differ as well. This occurs because demand and supply by speculative investors and 
index traders in the futures market and the factors driving such demand and supply enter 
the underlying price trend, and thus, become a market fundamental for the respective 
market (Gilbert 2008a).  
The potential inconsistency between equilibrium conditions in the physical and the futures 
market causes contrary price signals spilling over from one market to the other, creating 
uncertainty and price volatility and abrupt market adjustments at maturity dates. With high 
volatility and a strengthened carry, it has been shown that spatial arbitrage is limited, which 
further disconnects the two markets. Furthermore, misleading information signals about 
storage levels can be transmitted through a term structure, which is not solely driven by 
physical market fundamentals. This can lead to various spillover effects from futures to 
cash markets.  
The presence of uncertainty, whether in an epistemological or ontological sense, 
contradicts the rationality assumptions of the efficient market hypothesis, and trader 
behaviour—as suggested by bounded rationality, rational herding and Post-Keynesian 
scholars—provides a more accurate description of market realities. Against this 
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background, fundamental arbitrage is limited, and futures prices can be in excess—
regarding level, volatility and co-movement—of demand and supply conditions prevalent 
in physical commodity markets. Although physical and futures markets might not be linked 
through fundamental arbitrage, they are linked though spatial arbitrage, which results in 
spillover effects of price dynamics from futures to cash markets and high market volatility 
caused by inconsistent price signals in both markets.  
If, however, limits to spatial arbitrage exist, these differences in driving factors underlying 
price dynamics in the physical and the futures markets, including demand by index traders 
and uninformed speculators, are revealed in non-convergence between cash and futures 
markets and the extent of the market basis at maturity. Similarly, variations in index and 
uninformed speculative investments across futures contracts with different maturities are 
revealed in the shape of the market’s term structure.   
Long-established theories considering heterogeneity among traders are applicable, with few 
amendments, to commodity markets and build the foundation of what could be termed 
financialisation with respect to commodity futures markets. These theories build on the 
assumption of uncertainty as an epistemological or ontological reality, which results in 
certain behavioural tendencies of financial traders and heterogeneity regarding their 
investment motives and strategies. Under these assumptions, index and uninformed 
speculative traders’ investments can affect price formation mechanisms in commodity 
futures markets. Implications of the financialisation hypothesis for the relationship between 
physical and futures markets and futures contracts with different maturity dates can be 
derived on the basis of no-arbitrage theories.  
However, the strength of the financialisation effect, which is linked to the relative market 
weight of traders and the degree of uncertainty, has to be determined empirically. This 
leads to the Section 2.5, which provides a review of the empirical literature on the 
financialisation of commodity markets.   
2.5 Empirical Evidence 
Empirical investigations into the financialisation of commodity markets fall into two 
different, although linked, fields. By far the most popular field of research investigates the 
impact of traders’ investment positions on price level and price volatility. The second field 
focuses on the synchronisation of price dynamics across commodity futures markets and 
between commodity and equity markets.   
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Various papers provide reviews and assessments of evidence presented by the empirical 
literature—e.g., Irwin and Sanders (2010), Tollens (2011), Hailu and Weersink (2011). The 
aim of the following literature review is to provide an overview of methodologies used in 
existing empirical studies and to reveal potential flaws. Appendix 2.3 summarises studies 
published on the latest commodity price developments. It can safely be said that the 
evidence regarding the effect of speculative and index investments on price formation in 
commodity futures markets is, so far, inconclusive.  
Methodologies employed by studies focusing on price level, change and volatility include:  
• Simulations run with structural models that are derived from market microstructure 
theory and the literature on heterogeneous agents, the results of which are then 
compared to observed prices;  
• Simple regression analysis between returns (and/or price volatility) and changes in 
traders’ positions (and in some studies, fundamental factors are included);  
• Granger or rolling Granger non-causality tests between traders’ positions and 
commodity returns (and/or price volatility); 
• Vector autoregressive (VAR) models combined with impulse response analyses; 
• Rolling unit root tests that identify explosive growth in prices as evidence for 
extrapolative trading strategies; 
• Error correction models (ECM), which investigate the speed of adjustment towards 
market fundamentals; 
• Smooth transition functions, Markov-switching models and other non-linear and non-
parametric models. 
Methodologies employed by studies focusing on co-movement include:  
• Simple correlation, rolling correlation, dynamic conditional correlation and other 
variations; 
• Panel regression analysis; 
• Non-parametric methods like common factor analysis; 
• Network analysis and clustering. 
In the following sub-section, these two fields of empirical studies are reviewed critically.   
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2.5.1 Trader Composition and Price Level and Volatility 
By far, the most influential papers discussed in the early debate are a study published by 
Masters and White (2008) and an Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) study that was authored by Irwin and Sanders (2010). The former 
study presents descriptive evidence for index traders’ investment inflow coinciding with 
rising commodity prices. By contrast, Irwin and Sanders (2010) argue with econometric 
tests that little evidence for a causal relationship between index trading activities and 
commodity futures price dynamics exists. Irwin and Sanders (2010) run several Granger 
non-causality tests to investigate the impact of index traders’ net-long positions (long 
minus short positions) on commodity futures returns, as well as swap dealers39 net-long 
positions on price volatility for 12 agricultural commodities. Most coefficients are 
insignificant. 
Irwin and Sanders’ (2010) approach was subject to criticism for several reasons. One of the 
most substantial, because it also applies to many other empirical papers—e.g., Stoll and 
Whaley (2011), Lehecka (2013)—is that Granger non-causality tests have low power in 
identifying lead–lag relationships between commodity prices and trading positions, because 
published position data are only available in weekly frequency. As it is assumed that 
expectations are translated into prices almost instantaneously, data in weekly frequency are 
inappropriate for analysing a timewise causal relationship. Further, financial market data, 
like commodity futures prices, are known for their large noise component, which obscures 
underlying signals and hampers inference in a Granger non-causality framework (Frenk 
2011). 
In addition to limitations in the data, Irwin and Sanders (2010), ex ante, preclude any 
amplifying collinear effects between index traders and other speculators, since they omit 
the latter trader type. The same criticism applies to their later paper, Irwin and Sanders 
(2012). Moreover, due to the difficulties associated with non-stationary time series, they 
chose commodity returns as the response variable. This choice limits the scope of 
investigations to weekly changes in commodity prices. Any potential long-run or 
cumulative impact of index investors’ positions on commodity prices cannot be revealed in 
such test40. 
                                                 
39 Swap dealers are a particular trader category that is heavily involved in index trading, and hence, was used 
as a proxy for index traders in several studies (see Chapter 3 for more detail).  
40 Unless a great amount of lags is included, which is not the case. 
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Gilbert (2008a; 2010a; 2010b) also runs Granger non-causality tests, taking commodity 
returns as the regressant. In contrast to Irwin and Sanders (2010), he firstly allows for 
amplifying effects between index investors and other non-commercial traders by including 
both trader types (Gilbert 2008a; 2010a) and, secondly, he controls for market 
fundamentals and endogeneity problems between prices, open interest and market 
fundamentals in a three-stage least squares regression (Gilbert 2010b). He finds that index 
investments have a persistent impact on oil, metal and soybean prices. Findings for other 
agricultural commodities are insignificant. These results are confirmed by Mayer (2009), 
who conducts Granger non-causality tests, investigating the lagged correlation between the 
share of index traders and other non-commercial traders with commodity returns. He finds 
evidence for changes in index investments Granger-causing changes in price for five out of 
eight commodity markets. Robles, Torero and von Braun (2009) use rolling Granger non-
causality tests to control for parameter instability. They assess the impact of past values of 
various speculation indicators (similar to Working’s T-index) on price changes for wheat, 
maize, soybeans and rice. Their results show that past values of the chosen indicators are 
significantly and positively associated with price changes over several time periods.  
VAR models, combined with impulse response analyses, are suggested by Timmer (2009) 
and, in a more sophisticated way, by Juvenal and Petrella (2011). Timmer (2009) assess the 
impact of various factors including oil prices, exchange rate movements and dynamics in 
other commodity markets on rice, wheat and corn returns. He concludes that speculative 
demand in the futures market had a short-run impact on wheat and corn prices. Juvenal 
and Petrella (2011) follow a suggestion by Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz (2004) and augment 
their structural VAR by a small set of principal components. Their factor-augmented VAR 
(FAVAR) has the advantage of capturing unobservable factors inferred from a large 
amount of information from observable economic variables. Juvenal and Petrella (2011) 
analyse the impact of shocks from oil supply, global demand, speculative oil inventory 
demand and financial speculative demand. Informed by Hamilton’s (2009) structural model 
for speculation in oil markets, they derive restrictions on the signs of the parameters 
estimated. Global demand shocks are found to be the strongest driver behind price 
fluctuations and co-movement across commodities. The second strongest driver is found 
to be financial investments. Financial investment is especially significant between 2004 and 
2008. Since VAR models are basically systems of Granger non-causality tests (Qin 2013, 
43), the same criticism concerning the data frequency, noisiness of the data and exclusion 
of the long-run component applies.  
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Gilbert (2010b), Amanor-Boadu and Zereyesus (2009), Irwin and Sanders (2012), Stoll and 
Whaley (2011), and Singleton (2014) conduct contemporaneous regression analyses in 
addition to or instead of Granger non-causality tests. Amanor-Boudu and Zereyesus (2009) 
regress contemporaneous changes in non-commercial traders’ positions on returns in an 
autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) framework for corn, wheat and 
soybeans. They find that the relationship is insignificant.  
Irwin and Sanders (2012) conduct a cross-sectional data analysis and employ a new data set, 
which supposedly captures the positions of index traders more precisely. The inclusion of 
contemporaneous and lagged values of these data provides no evidence for index traders’ 
impact on prices over the sample period late-2007 to 2011. However, the index position 
data taken from the larger trader reporting system of the CFTC used by Irwin and Sanders 
(2012) are reported quarterly and hence, come at even lower frequency than the alternative 
CFTC weekly reports used by other studies. Because of the low data frequency and the 
limited time period for which the data are available—a time period that is known to have 
experienced a decrease in index positions across commodity markets—results have to be 
viewed with caution.  
Stoll and Whaley (2011) include contemporaneous values of index and other speculative 
investment flows in dollar terms in their regression. They find that investments by other 
speculators are significantly and positively related to commodity returns. The coefficient on 
index investment is insignificant. The use of investment data in US dollar units rather than 
the number of open contracts, as used in most studies, is questionable, given the way 
position data increase with both additional open interest and the dollar price level. Further, 
only contemporaneous positions and no lagged values for index and other speculative 
demand are considered, which restricts the model to static correlation between traders’ 
positions and commodity returns.  
In a more comprehensive analysis, Singleton (2014) includes index traders’ positions, 
managed-money spread positions41 and aggregated open interest, as well as various 
indicators to control for traders’ expectations on market fundamentals and overall market 
sentiments, in a linear regression model on crude oil futures returns. In contrast to 
previous studies, he finds that changes in index and managed-money spread positions have 
the largest impact on crude oil futures returns during the price peak in 2008. This evidence 
is significant for contracts with different maturities. Interestingly, Singleton (2014) uses 13 
                                                 
41 A particular group of speculative traders that does not engage in index trading (see Chapter 3 for more 
detail). 
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weeks of changes42 in index and managed-money spread positions instead of weekly 
changes. 
Bos and van der Molen (2012) use a similarly comprehensive data set to account for 
fundamental factors, as well as index positions. In their study of global coffee markets, they 
employ nonparametric estimation methods that do not presuppose any underlying 
distribution of the data. They argue that the impact of index investors on price formation 
might be negligible, on average, but substantial and significant in short time periods. This 
‘spiky’ impact cannot be captured by models relying on mean-variance estimation methods. 
By using nonparametric models, they find significant evidence that in times of market 
inefficiencies, index investments have a significant and positive impact on coffee prices. 
Many of the studies investigating the impact of financial investments on commodity futures 
returns also conduct analyses on the impact of such investments on price volatility. One of 
the earliest studies in this regard is published by Holt and Irwin (2000), who find that the 
positions of large hedge funds are positively correlated with price volatility. They argue that 
such volatility is not caused by hedge funds acting as noise traders, because this would have 
presupposed that these had to make losses, which they cannot find in the data. This 
argument can be refuted, since, according to the bounded rationality and rational herding 
hypotheses, noise trading can be highly profitable. Irwin and Sander (2010; 2012) assess the 
impact of index traders on implied and realised volatility in a Granger non-causality 
framework. They find either no significant relationship between volatility and index 
investment or a significant negative relationship for a few markets.  
Further, Brunetti, Buyuksahin and Harris (2010) find that the activities of hedge funds and 
swap dealers reduce volatility. Although they employ Granger non-causality tests, their 
methodology might not be subject to the same criticism as previously applied, as non-
public daily position data are used. The higher frequency of the data partly rebuts the 
criticism of Granger non-causality tests. However, such tests remain problematic due to the 
large noise component. Moreover, the authors take swap traders’ positions as a proxy for 
index investments, which is found to be imprecise (Irwin and Sanders 2012).  
Power and Turvey (2011) overcome the noisiness of the data by filtering aggregate volume 
data from January 1998 to December 2006 by wavelet transformations. Herein, they extract 
variation in trade volume with a time horizon beyond one month. Their method is 
                                                 
42 Herein he aims to assess the intermediate impact of traders’ positions on price formation. Short-run (over a 
few days) lead–lag relationships are, according to Singleton (2014), of limited use for assessing the long-run 
price pressure effect of investment flows.  
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motivated by the observation that index traders invest on a long-term horizon only. Low 
frequency variation in volume can thus be attributed to index traders. After applying the 
filter, they employ two-stage least squares models, regressing price volatility on index 
positions. Their approach is problematic firstly, because commercial hedgers also tend to 
follow a long-term investment approach and, secondly, because they exclude the time 
period after 2006 by arguing that important structural changes, which drove prices 
independently from index positions, had occurred. However, the validity of this assertion is 
at the core of the financialisation debate.  
Position data disaggregated by trader type are made publicly available by the CFTC for US 
futures markets and used by the majority of studies investigating the effect of 
financialisation on commodity markets, including the studies reviewed so far. However, 
several limitations have been identified with this data (see also Chapter 3). Firstly, positions 
data are published weekly. Secondly, positions in a particular commodity exchange are 
aggregated across all traded futures contracts. Thirdly, disaggregation is done according to 
the commercial background of each trader. While this poses difficulties in itself, since 
distinctions between commercial backgrounds are often not clearcut, the commercial 
affiliation does not necessarily imply a certain trading behaviour. Given these limitations in 
the data, some researchers suggest identifying price patterns, which are associated with a 
certain trading behaviour, instead. 
For instance, Gilbert’s (2008a; 2010a; 2010b) test for extrapolative trading is based on the 
argument that a root of a price series slightly greater than 1 indicates that past price trends 
are exaggerated in the preceding time periods, which is evidence for extrapolation. He finds 
many time periods in which explosive growth of metal prices is significant (Gilbert 2008a). 
These results are supported by a later study on agricultural commodities (Gilbert 2010a). In 
order to solve the somewhat arbitrary choice of the sample periods tested, he proposes a 
recursive unit-root test in his later paper (Gilbert 2010b). Results confirm his previous 
findings. 
Liao-Etienne, Irwin and Garcia (2012) combine the search for explosive bubble behaviour 
with Granger non-causality tests. They employ a forward and backward recursive 
procedure developed by Phillips, Shi and Yu (2012) 43 to test for unit roots in price series 
based on the standard Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. For corn, soybean and wheat 
futures, they identify explosive periods between late-2007 and mid-2008, as well as in the 
second half of 2010. In a second step, they develop dummy variables for the explosive 
                                                 
43 Gilbert employs a similar method developed by Phillips, Wu and Yu (2011). 
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growth periods and apply a Granger non-causality test to investigate the relationship 
between commodity index positions and changes in futures prices. Granger non-causality 
test results are insignificant for all but the CBOT wheat market, where changes in index 
net-long positions are significantly related to returns in bubble and non-bubble periods. In 
a later study, Liao-Etienne, Irwin and Garcia (2014) apply the same unit root test to single 
futures contracts to avoid the noise that is introduced when rolling over futures contracts 
at maturity dates44. For all 12 agricultural markets included in their analysis, various bubble 
periods are identified between 1970 and 2011. However, bubble episodes are of short 
duration, with 80–90 per cent lasting fewer than 10 days, and representing a maximum of 2 
per cent of price behaviour. 
The same test for explosive price behaviour is used by Coakley, Kellard and Tsvetanov 
(2015) for the crude oil market. They use continuous futures price series of all 
simultaneously traded contracts, that is, the continuous time series of the closest, the 
second-closest, and the third-closest, etc., contract to maturity45. Their analysis spans the 
time period 1995–2012. Results indicate that all series exhibit periods of bubble behaviour 
that ends in late 2008. Moreover, they find that bubbles in longer-dated contracts start 
much earlier and are longer lasting than bubbles in the shorter-dated contracts. 
Also, Cifarelli and Paladino (2010), Lagi, et al. (2011), and Vansteenkiste (2011) seek 
evidence for extrapolative feedback trading in the price data itself. They develop structural 
models, which explicitly allow for heterogeneous agents, as suggested by market 
microstructure theory.  
For instance, Cifarelli and Paladino (2010) incorporate positive feedback trading into a 
multivariate CAPM on crude oil prices. They find evidence for the conjecture that, in 
recent time periods, extrapolative trading strategies have caused considerable departure of 
the crude oil futures price from its fundamental value. Lagi, et al. (2011) construct a 
dynamic structural model derived from the theory of storage and heterogeneous agent 
models. They find that most of the food price dynamics observed from 2004 onwards can 
be ascribed to ethanol convergence and speculation. Vansteenkiste (2011) assumes two 
market regimes, a ‘fundamental-based’ and a ‘chartist-based’ regime. While the former is 
described by the theory of storage, the latter is described by a model derived from the 
market microstructure theory that accounts for heterogeneous agents and positive-
                                                 
44 The noise is particularly strong if first differences are used, since then positive/negative changes can be due 
to price changes as well as backwardation/contango in the market (Liao-Etienne, Irwin and Garcia 2014). 
45 They avoid the calendar effect by rolling over at maturity with the closing price of the last business day of 
each month.  
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feedback trading. A Markov regime switching function, conditioned on Working’s T-index, 
determines the market’s dynamic switching between these two regimes. She finds 
significant evidence that an increase in speculative activity increases the probability of the 
market remaining in the ‘chartist regime’. And, further, that the probability of being in the 
‘chartist regime’ has significantly increased from 2004 onwards.  
However, no direct inference from traders’ behaviour on price dynamics can be drawn 
from models focusing on price patterns, which is a major shortcoming. Hence, other 
explanations for explosive price behaviour might be equally valid. An exception might be 
made for Liao-Etienne, Irwin and Garcia (2012), however, they are confronted with the 
problems identified with Ganger non-causality tests.  
Further interesting approaches to the question of how to assess the impact of 
financialisation on commodity futures prices are suggested by Schulmeister (2009), Basu, 
Oomen and Stremme (2010), Mou (2011), and Brunetti and Reiffen (2014). These authors 
model the profitability of investment strategies, which explicitly accounts for noise trading.  
Schulmeister (2009) investigates the profitability of over 1,000 popular technical trading 
strategies and finds that strategies are profitable and that exit and entry points are largely 
synchronized. Mou (2011) shows that a strategy of front-running the roll of large 
commodity indices offers prolonged arbitrage opportunities. This finding implies that 
index traders have a significant price impact and that limits to spatial arbitrage exist. Basu, 
Oomen and Stremme (2010) compare the performance of trading algorithms, including 
information on positions of different trader types with those who exclude such 
information. They find that, in retrospect, algorithms including position information yield 
returns 12 times higher than their restricted alternatives. Hence, information on positions 
by different trader types entails predictive power on future price developments. Brunetti 
and Reiffen (2014) investigate the impact of index traders on the cost of hedging. They find 
that the roll of index traders increases the spread between the maturing and next-to-
maturity contracts. However, since they approximate index traders’ position with swap 
traders' open interest, their results are problematic.  
ECMs, which incorporate long-run and short-run effects, were suggested by Maurice and 
Davis (2011), Kaufmann (2011), Redrado, et al. (2009), and Beckmann, Belke and Czudaj 
(2014).  
Maurice and Davis (2011) use an ECM to test for the efficiency of the futures market, by 
analysing the speed of adjustment between futures and cash prices for cocoa and coffee 
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markets. Since they find an adjustment parameter above 0.5 and co-integration between 
cash and futures prices for all markets over the time period 1990 to 2011, they conclude 
that futures markets of those commodities are efficient despite financial investments. The 
validity of this argument is questionable both because it is not investigated whether or not 
the co-integrating relationship breaks and because the cash price might be influenced by 
financial investments if spatial arbitrage is effective. 
Kaufmann (2011) takes a more reliable approach. He suggests an ECM to assess the 
adjustment process of the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil futures prices towards 
its physical market fundamentals. He defines factors considered to be market fundamentals 
and formulates an ECM based on the co-integrating relationship between these variables. 
He finds that the co-integrating relationship between crude oil futures and their 
fundamental variables breaks down between 2007 and 2008.  
Redrado, et al. (2009) account for market fundamentals and, in addition, non-linearity in 
the market adjustment process and regime switching via transition functions conditioned 
on the price misalignment between the current and the fundamental value. Instead of single 
commodities, aggregates for metal and food commodities are used. Given the 
heterogeneity of commodities within, as well as between, the aggregates, the fundamental 
value is almost certainly erroneous. Moreover, the transition function, which drives changes 
in the speed of adjustment, is conditioned only on the size of the misalignment. No 
information on the presence of speculative investments is included. Although the authors 
suggest that the existence of small misalignments over a prolonged time period might be 
caused by market sentiment, their model does not provide support for this conjecture.  
Beckmann, Belke and Czudaj (2014) analyse the short-run and long-run effect of global 
liquidity on commodity prices in a Markov switching vector ECM. They approximate 
global liquidity with the first principal component of money supply time series of the US 
and various other European countries. They find a significant long-run relationship 
between global liquidity and commodity prices. 
2.5.2 Trader Composition and Co-movement 
In addition to explosive bubbles and excessive volatility, empirical studies focus on 
excessive co-movement in the price dynamics between different commodities, as well as 
between commodities and equities.  
Tang and Xiong (2012) were first to test for excessive co-movement in the context of the 
latest commodity crisis. They employ simple linear regressions to assess the correlation of 
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different non-energy commodities included and excluded in the major commodity indices, 
before and after 2004 with oil prices. They regress commodity futures returns on oil 
returns, as well as on control variables, capturing market fundamentals. In that way, they 
seek to test if, firstly, the correlation between oil prices and prices of other commodities 
has increased after 2004 and, secondly, whether this effect is significantly stronger for 
commodities included in the major commodity indices as would be expected if index 
investment drove price dynamics. They find that correlation between non-energy 
commodities and oil increased significantly, and that this development is more pronounced 
for indexed commodities than for off-index commodities.  
However, their methodology has to be criticised on several grounds. Firstly, oil prices have 
to be considered as a fundamental factor for some commodities. Secondly, no control 
variable for ethanol conversion—one of the major forces repeatedly suggested as being 
behind a strengthened correlation between oil prices and agricultural commodity prices—is 
added. Thirdly, a comparison between off-index and indexed commodities is biased 
because of the potential differences in market characteristics other than index inclusion or 
exclusion such as, liquidity and market completeness. Last but not least, simple changes in 
the correlation between oil and other commodity returns do not allow a direct inference to 
be made on the factors causing these changes. Nevertheless, Tang and Xiong (2012) 
attribute the causes to index investment. 
Buyuksahin and Robe (2011; 2014) provide tests on the impact of financial investors on the 
co-movement between commodity and equity prices by employing non-public daily 
position data in an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model. In their analysis on 
changes in cross-market linkages between energy commodity and equity markets between 
2000 and 2010, they find that it is not index traders, but hedge funds, which are active in 
both equity and commodity markets, have contributed to an increase in correlation.  
Silvennoinen and Thorp (2013) choose a non-linear modelling strategy by using double 
smooth transition conditional correlation functions. They condition the transition function 
on expected stock volatility and the participation of speculators. The model thus allows for 
shifts between different market states, conditioned on speculators’ weight-of-market and 
expected volatility. They find that transition indicators are significant and that commodities 
listed in the major commodity indices show a higher degree of co-movement than 
commodities excluded from major indices. 
Bicchetti and Mayestre (2013) analyse the potential impact of high frequency traders on co-
movement between commodity futures and the US stock market. Such analysis is made 
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possible by using the recently available Thomson Reuters Tick History database. They 
compute rolling correlations at three different frequencies—1 hour, 5 minutes, 10 
seconds—between returns in the most liquid US commodity markets and the S&P 500 
futures contracts over the time period, 1997 to 2011. They find a synchronized structural 
break, which starts during 2008 and continues afterwards, and conclude that this is 
consistent with the conjecture that recent financial innovations in commodity futures 
exchanges have a positive impact on commodity–equity co-movement. 
Ncube, Tessa and Gurara (2014) account for market fundamentals before analysing the 
monthly time-varying, pairwise co-movement between two groups of soft and grain 
commodities with crude oil during the time period, 1980 to 2014. They use a multivariate 
Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model and find no 
particular evidence for excessive co-movement, but note that during an economic 
downturn co-movement increases. They explain this by precautionary inventory hoarding 
during these time periods, synchronised across markets. 
Gomez, et al. (2014) analyse co-movement across a wide range of different commodities by 
network analysis between 1992 and 2010. They use a correlation matrix ordered according 
to the vicinity of its elements and construct a hierarchical network from it. In this way they 
are able to depict an accurate typology and hierarchy of the overall co-movement involved 
in commodity price dynamics. Their network analysis reveals that while there is no 
persistent increase in co-movement from mid-2008 to late 2009, co-movement almost 
doubled when compared to the average correlation. The authors link this phenomenon to 
speculation and uncertainty in the market. However, as with Tang and Xiong (2012) and 
Ncube, Tessa and Gurara (2014), no testable link is established between trader behaviour 
and variations in co-movement.   
2.6 Concluding Remarks 
In the previous discussion this thesis has shown that, under the assumption of uncertainty 
and information asymmetry, traders are likely to engage in extrapolation, herding and 
portfolio insurance strategies. These trading strategies have been demonstrated to lead 
potentially to price developments away from what is considered to be market 
fundamentals. Under the uncertainty assumption, either in the epistemological or 
ontological sense, fundamental arbitrage is limited. The relationship between markets 
supposedly driven by the same market fundamentals, then, hinges on the possibility of 
spatial arbitrage. However, price formation theories based on spatial arbitrage neither 
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suggest a direction of the effect of arbitrage trade, nor do they suggest arbitrage to be 
linked to market fundamentals. Hence, price dynamics introduced by index traders and 
other uninformed speculators can spill over to physical commodity markets through spatial 
arbitrage, changes in traders’ expectations and commercial traders’ reaction to changes in 
the market term structure.   
Most of the empirical studies reviewed face the difficulty that the methodology employed 
does not fully correspond to the dynamic processes outlined as the financialisation of 
commodity markets hypothesis in this thesis. Either market fundamentals or positions by 
traders other than index traders are omitted. Since these factors are suggested as correlated 
with index positions, the coefficients estimated are likely to be subject to omitted variable 
bias. Further, given concerns over non-stationarity, most models are estimated in first 
differences. This confines the analysis to weekly changes, which are not expected to reveal 
any effect.  
While the majority of the empirical literature focuses on testing price levels and volatility, 
the relative price between cash and futures market and simultaneously traded futures might 
be more revealing. This is because fundamental factors are notoriously difficult to quantify 
(Black 1986). It is close to impossible to make a full assessment of the extent to which 
price dynamics are related to market fundamentals or to uninformed speculators’ and index 
traders’ demand, since either data on identified market fundamentals are missing or 
conflicting theories on what constitutes market fundamentals exist.  
A way around the question of market fundamentals is to look at market basis and term 
structure effects. If two price series are supposedly driven by the same market 
fundamentals, their difference can only be explained, apart from the time factor (carry 
variables), by the difference in traders active in the different markets or contracts under 
investigation. For this reason, price differentials between cash and futures markets, as well 
as between contracts with distinct maturity dates, might serve as a more fertile ground for 
analysing the effect of different trader types on price formation processes. Further, such an 
analysis has arguably higher relevance for market practitioners, since potential spillover 
effects between derivatives markets and physical markets are taken into consideration.  
However, before such analyses can be conducted, assumptions made by the financialisation 
hypothesis on the behavioural traits of traders should be carefully tested. This will be done 
in the following Chapter 3.  
 
79 
Chapter 3 Traders’ Behaviour under Uncertainty 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 outlined how the interplay of different trader types could affect commodity 
markets’ price level, volatility, markets’ term structures and market basis. Various 
assumptions about traders’ behaviour under uncertainty underlie these considerations. 
These assumptions, as shall be elaborated more in the following, can be summarised in 
three hypotheses: (1) uninformed speculators employ extrapolative trading strategies, (2) 
uninformed speculators engage in herding strategies, and (3) traders are heterogeneous in 
their trading strategies and motives. 
However, the empirical literature, which investigates these assumptions with respect to 
commodity futures markets, is thin. The great majority of empirical studies on the 
financialisation of commodity markets directly jumps to test the impact of traders’ 
positions on price dynamics (see Chapter 2: Section 2.5), without an assessment of whether 
assumptions about traders’ behaviour hold or the data used adequately reflect traders’ 
behaviour.   
Therefore, this Chapter 3 is dedicated to systematically test assumptions about traders’ 
behaviour under uncertainty as outlined in Chapter 2: Section 2.4, and to carefully assess 
the adequacy of the data available.  
The introduction aside, this chapter is divided into four sections. Section 2 builds on the 
trader categorisation which has been introduced in Chapter 2: Section 2.4 and suggests a 
formalisation of the behavioural assumptions made. Against the background of the abstract 
trader categorisation proposed in the previous section, Section 3 discusses data availability 
and limitations. The discussion is followed by a descriptive analysis of trader-position data 
for the cocoa, coffee and wheat markets, which serve as case studies in this and the 
following empirical chapters. Section 4 presents an econometric analysis of trading motives 
and strategies. The analysis commences with a review of methodologies used for similar 
empirical investigations. Several shortcomings in the existing literature are identified. On 
the basis of this critique, I develop alternative empirical frameworks for testing the three 
hypotheses outlined above. The last Section 5 discusses the insights gained.  
3.2 Heterogeneity and the Financialisation Hypothesis 
Four stylised trader categories have been identified: informed hedgers, informed 
speculators, uninformed speculators, and noise traders. The first three categories are 
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considered to be active traders, in so far as their investment decisions are made on the basis 
of market-specific considerations. The index trader category is considered to be passive, 
since index traders’ investment decisions are thought to be unrelated to developments in 
the market they are investing in. Further, the first two trader categories are informed, that 
is, they are knowledgeable about market fundamentals and take those into consideration 
when investing. The latter two categories belong to the uninformed trader group. Their 
investment decisions are not based on a thorough assessment of market fundamentals. 
Instead these traders base their investment decisions on past price and volume patterns or 
considerations about market developments outside the particular market they are investing 
in, like portfolio diversification.  
The hedger or commercial trader category comprises all traders, whose core business is 
related to activities in the physical market. It is commonly assumed that their main trading 
motive is hedging their physical exposure. For this purpose, they offset their long (storage, 
production) or short (future purchasing) physical position by a short or long position in 
futures. However, they are known to engage in strategic hedging in order to minimise their 
risk by simultaneously maximising their revenue (CFTC 2008). This means that they 
potentially over- or under-hedge depending on their view of future market developments. 
Due to their engagement in the physical market, they are thought to be informed and base 
their trading decisions on their expectations regarding future market fundamentals. Since 
they are active in both the financial and physical side, they are able to execute not only 
fundamental but also spatial arbitrage where it arises, and thus enforce a close relationship 
between cash and futures markets.  
The demand function of the ith commercial hedger in the futures exchange can be 
described as46: 
L>,.: = M>,'<>,CNΩ>,C − </ (3.1) 
M> is a factor for risk aversion.	'<>,CNΩ>,C is the expected fundamental value of the 
commodity futures (that is the expected cash price at time F) conditioned on Ω>,C, which is 
the ith commercial hedger’s information set on market fundamentals. < is the current price 
of the commodity. Under perfect foresight:	Ω>,C = ΩPC and L.: = (<C − <) for all 
commercial traders.  
                                                 
46 The notation used is partly adapted from Tokic (2011). 
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Non-commercial informed arbitrage traders are assumed to base their decisions on 
expected futures prices, given hedging demand that drives the risk premium, and their 
knowledge about market fundamentals.  
LQ,FR = MQ,'<Q,@N∑L>,.: , ΩQ,C − </ (3.2) 
'<Q,@N ∑L>,.: , ΩQ,C is the expected price for one period ahead given hedgers demand 
and information about market fundamentals. If assuming perfect foresight and frictionless 
markets and that only rational arbitrage traders and hedgers are in the market, Equation 3.2 
becomes LFR = (<C − <) for all arbitrage traders.  
Under the efficient market hypothesis, the presence of uninformed traders is not 
precluded, but these are assumed to be white noise, with equally positive and negative 
feedback traders in the market.  
LT,UC = ∓1T(<$@ − <$D) (3.3) 
with 1T being the sensitivity of the kth feedback trader’s demand to price changes over the 
previous time period. Trading dynamics as depicted in Figure 2.1 would prevail if the 
behavioural assumptions of Equations 3.1–3 held.  
As discussed previously, index traders have become increasingly active in commodity 
futures markets. Because of their distinctive investment behaviour, they have to be 
modelled as a separate trader category: 
LW,FX = MW,'<W,:NΩW,0 − PZ/ (3.4) 
'<W,:NΩW,0 is the expectation on price dynamics with respect to information about 
overall market conditions affecting index traders’ investment portfolio. Their position-
taking is hence linked to systemic market factors rather than idiosyncratic market 
fundamentals. The presence of index traders changes the overall demand taken into 
account by informed arbitrage traders. Equation 3.2 has to be amended accordingly:  
LQ,FR = MQ,'<Q,@N∑L>,.:  ∑LW,FX , ΩQ,C − </ (3.5) 
Under perfect foresight, informed arbitrage traders are able to differentiate between L>,.: 
and LW,FX, and consequently discard index traders’ demand as noise, which would yield 
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Equation 3.2. However, if relaxing the assumptions of the efficient market hypothesis, so 
that: 
(1) There is uncertainty about market fundamentals among traders; 
(2) There is known informational asymmetry among traders; 
(3) Traders interact strategically and hence not independently of each other. 
The third assumption follows from the first and the second. If there is uncertainty about 
future market fundamentals and awareness about information asymmetry, additional 
demand from index traders is likely to enter arbitrage traders’ expectations.  
Since large commercial traders have a known information advantage, it is rational, 
especially for smaller traders, to follow large orders. This information advantage arises 
from an opaque storage market, a high market concentration and high costs associated with 
information gathering. Against this background, herding and extrapolative strategies are 
rational, especially for smaller traders. The systematic exploitation of data on past prices 
and other traders’ investment choices is likely to result in a prevalence of positive feedback 
traders in Equation 3.3. The presence of index traders is not a necessary condition for such 
situation to evolve, but given trader anonymity and the conformity of index traders’ 
positions, these are likely candidates for inducing price pressure. 
3.3 How to Quantify Speculative Demand? 
In reality, it is difficult to maintain the stylised trader categories as presented, and the 
distinction between trader types according to their investment behaviour is not as explicit 
as suggested (Heumesser and Starlitz 2013). Further, the categories, although useful, are 
too narrow to reflect the full behavioural spectrum. For instance, it is suggested that traders 
can be distinguished according to how knowledgeable they are about market fundamentals 
and how sensitive they are regarding idiosyncratic market factors. Other traits, like 
investment horizon, are neglected. High frequency traders employ different trading 
strategies and have a different price effect than lower frequency traders, although they 
might be equally well informed or sensitive to idiosyncratic market factors.  
Another neglected strategy is market manipulation. Since most strategies categorised as 
market manipulation require the manipulator to hold a high market weight and the ability 
to store the physical product, large commercial traders, as well as large non-commercial 
traders, who acquired storage space, are likely candidates (Heidorn, et al. 2014)47. Market 
                                                 
47 This insight motivated Gilbert (2010b) to regard traders’ positions as endogenous. 
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manipulation can be regarded as the purposeful exploitation of power in order to create 
price pressure48. Commodity futures markets are particularly prone to such incidences for 
several reasons. Firstly, markets are often extremely centralised. Secondly, information 
asymmetry between hedgers and non-commercial traders is structural. Trading on private 
information is an important aspect of a hedger’s usual business. Cases of market abuse or 
manipulation are, however, incidental and not continuous. They can hence only be studied 
on a case-by-case basis.  
Further, there are some practical difficulties with categorising traders. Categorisation is only 
feasible on the basis of observable and time invariant properties. However, trading 
strategies are neither observable nor static. There is arguably a circular relationship between 
investment strategies and their price impact, as the performance of investment strategies is 
reviewed regularly and adapted constantly (Lo 2004). Trading strategies are per se 
unobservable. Therefore, trader-position data, distinguished by the particular industry in 
which the respective trader is predominantly engaged in, are used as an approximation for 
behaviour. This again poses serious empirical challenges. Traders’ strategies within a 
particular industry are not necessarily homogeneous. Not only are industry groups 
heterogeneous, but trading strategies are often not linked to just one particular industry 
group, and there is a known overlap of strategies that are used across industries. 
While the categorisation suggested in the literature is useful, it is neither complete nor easily 
linkable to observable traits. In order to quantitatively assess the impact of various trading 
strategies on the price formation mechanism in commodity futures markets, available data 
used to quantify such strategies has to be carefully assessed before employing it in a 
regression-type analysis.   
3.3.1 Data Availability and Limitations 
Most commodity exchanges provide daily volume and open interest data for each traded 
futures contract. Volume counts the number of contracts traded over each trading day. 
Open interest counts the number of outstanding contracts at the end of each trading day 
(Lucia and Pardo 2010). Conventionally, daily volume is regarded as short-term investment 
and taken as a proxy for speculative activity, while open interest is regarded as long-term 
investment and ascribed to hedgers. Although the empirical literature confirms that volume 
                                                 
48 A definition of market manipulation is difficult, since the term is juristically defined and hence changes 
under the respective jurisdiction. Further, the abuse of a position of power can be regarded unfair but not 
necessarily unlawful. For the following the above definition should suffice. 
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is largely speculative while positions measured by open interest tend to be dominated by 
hedgers (ibid.), no further disaggregation of volume by trader type is possible.   
Open interest data disaggregated by different trader types is available for US-based futures 
markets through the CFTC Commitments of Traders (COT) reports. These data sources 
have been widely used in the empirical literature on commodity markets. The CFTC 
provides a breakdown of each Tuesday’s open interest by different trader types for US 
futures exchanges in three major flagship reports, which suggest different categorisations 
regarding the traders’ commercial backgrounds. The COT report is the earliest data 
publication, which dates back to the 1980s for some commodity markets, and distinguishes 
between commercial (hedgers) and non-commercial (speculators) traders. In 2008, the 
CFTC commenced the publication of the Commodity Index Trader Supplement (CIT), 
which adds index traders as a separate category and is available from the beginning of 2006. 
The third major report is the Disaggregated Commitment of Traders Report (DCOT), 
which distinguishes between producers and consumers, money managers, other non-
commercial traders and swap dealers, and provides data starting from mid-2006. 
Additionally to the three main reports, the Index Investment Data Report (IID) is 
published on a monthly frequency.  
The IID report captures index traders’ positions more precisely than the weekly CIT 
report. Data collection is based on a special call for traders classified as index traders. In 
the CIT report, all positions by an index trader are enumerated as index positions, but the 
special call allows for a differentiation between the index-based and non-index-based 
positions of a trader who is predominantly engaged in index trading. The IID data are 
often used as a benchmark to assess the extent to which other categories reflect index 
investment. Among the weekly reports, the CIT index trader category is found to reflect 
index positions most accurately (Irwin and Sanders 2012).   
The CIT supplement was produced on recommendation of a CFTC staff report in 2008 
which identified various shortcomings with the earlier COT data (CFTC 2008). One 
shortcoming arises from a controversy over the definition of commercial hedgers. Firstly, 
the institutional structure of US commodity exchanges provides strong incentives for 
traders to register under the commercial category, since position limits are less stringent for 
traders in this category. This incentive leads to overestimation of traders in the commercial 
category (Sanders, Boris and Manfredo 2004). This conjecture is supported by Ederington 
and Lee (2002), who analyse non-public position data for the heating oil market. The data 
enable them to identify the line of business of each individual trader. They conclude that 
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commercial traders cannot easily be regarded as hedgers, because many firms with no 
obvious physical business are also contained in this group. Secondly, the classification of 
swap traders poses various challenges. Swap dealers provide tailored derivative products to 
a wide customer base on an OTC-basis. They usually net their exposure internally and 
hedge their residual price risk at the more standardised exchange. Since they engage in 
futures trading for hedging of risk that results from their commercial business, swap traders 
were categorised as commercial traders (CFTC 2008). The report recommends redefining 
the commercial trader category and creating a separate category for swap traders. These 
recommendations resulted in the publication of the CIT and DCOT reports.  
The DCOT report started publication shortly after the CIT report in September 2009. The 
report provides more detailed classifications of non-commercial traders into swap dealers, 
managed money and other non-commercial traders than the CIT report. Money managers 
are either commodity trading advisors or commodity pool operators49 or any other fund 
(CFTC 2009). Other non-commercial traders are all reportable traders, who are neither 
swap dealers nor funds. These are mainly institutional investors and investment banks. 
Clients, who seek exposure to commodity indices, operate through swap dealers. Hence, 
there is some similarity between the CIT index trader category and the DCOT swap trader 
category. However, there are also important differences, since swap dealers also include 
non-index based swap traders’ positions, while the index trader category—in addition to 
swap dealers—includes large investment funds which engage in index trading directly at the 
exchange (CFTC 2009). The CIT category captures index investment more precisely, but 
the DCOT money manager category is an interesting addition as it captures funds known 
to engage particularly often in extrapolative trading strategies. Further, the producer 
merchant category in the DCOT report reflects hedging demand more accurately than the 
commercial trader category of the CIT supplement report, due to the remaining non-index 
swap traders in the latter.   
Despite the carefully defined trader categories, it is often not clear into which category a 
particular market participant might fall. Brokers, in particular, operate for a variety of 
clients with diverse investment interests and industry backgrounds, so brokers’ positions 
should ideally be disaggregated by client. Further, traders often engage in multiple 
commercial businesses—for instance, commercial traders use hedge funds (see Chapter 7), 
                                                 
49 A commodity pool acts similar to an investment trust or a syndicate and solicits or accepts funds, securities, 
or property for the purpose of trading commodity futures contracts or options. The commodity pool 
operator makes trading decisions on behalf of the pool or engages a commodity trading advisor to do so. 
Managers at hedge funds or their advisors are often registered with the CFTC as commodity pool operators 
(CFTC 2015). 
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index traders invest for non-index purposes, etc. The disaggregation of such positions is 
tedious and the categorisation often relies, to a certain extent, on the judgment of the 
person doing the categorising.  
Most importantly, one has to keep in mind that the CFTC can only observe the trader but 
not the trading activity executed. If trading activities are diverse in one particular trader 
category, the category is inadequate for capturing investment strategies. Given that the 
classification of traders is based on commercial categories and not trading strategies, the 
categorisation suggested by the CFTC is not one-to-one translatable into the stylised 
theoretical categories proposed. The typology in Figure 3.1 is an attempt, nevertheless, to 
link the theoretical classifications to the industry groups as suggested by the CFTC reports. 
Appendix 3.1 provides a more detailed account. 
Figure 3.1: Traders Typology after CFTC Reports 
 
Source: Author. 
The active and uninformed category corresponds to extrapolative and herding strategies 
associated with uninformed speculators. The active and informed category corresponds to 
arbitrage strategies associated with informed hedgers or informed speculators, who engage 
in fundamental and spatial arbitrage trades. The passive noise trader category corresponds 
to portfolio diversification strategies and is associated with index traders.   
Besides concerns over the degree of precision with which commercial categories reflect 
trading strategies, the data frequency is problematic, since CFTC reports are published 
weekly. Further, intra-day traders are excluded from the open interest data. This leads to an 
underestimation of the impact of traders engaging in short-term investment strategies, 
especially found among the money managers and other non-commercial trader categories. 
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In the following section, observed trader-position data are carefully analysed for three 
commodity markets—wheat, coffee and cocoa—before conducting econometric tests.  
3.3.2 Trader Heterogeneity in Commodity Markets 
Wheat, cocoa and coffee experienced similar price surges and high levels of volatility from 
the early 2000s onwards. Prices peaked in mid-2008 and experienced a sharp decline until 
the beginning of 2009 (Figure 3.2). While wheat, concurrently with the overall commodity 
price index, reached another slightly lower price peak in early 2011, cocoa prices already 
surpassed the 2008 peak in early 2010. Coffee prices reached a level almost twice the 
previous peak in early 2011.  
Figure 3.2: Commodity Price Indices  
(index 2010=100, monthly, Jan. 2004–Jul. 2014) 
 
Figure 3.3: Covariance Between Commodity Index and Single Commodity  
(three-year monthly centred moving covariance, Jun. 2011–Apr. 2013) 
 
Source: IMF, IFS: Commodity Prices (author’s calculation). 
Coffee and wheat show a high degree of co-movement with the overall commodity price 
index since 2002 and 2004 respectively, while cocoa is the least strongly correlated 
(Figure 3.3). However, since mid-2011 the degree of co-movement with the overall 
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commodity index for both, wheat and coffee, declined. This coincides with a decline in oil 
prices and index investment in these markets.  
All three commodities—again cocoa to the least extent—experienced an unprecedented 
inflow of liquidity, revealed in rising open interest over the last decade (Figure 3.4). In 
2006, open interest in the wheat market had jumped to a level 2.5 times as high as in 2004. 
For cocoa and coffee, the rise was more steady, but clearly visible as well. The extent of 
liquidity inflow can at least partly be linked to index investment. Wheat is included in all 
major basket commodity indices and is cited as the second most affected US market by 
index investment between 1992 and 2008, only after crude oil (CFTC 2008). Although 
coffee and cocoa are included in commodity indices as well, these are given smaller weights 
than wheat, which results in less index investment. 
Figure 3.4: Annual Average Open Interest  
(contracts in millions, 1996 - 2014) 
Wheat Coffee Cocoa 
   
Source: CFTC, COT. 
The difference in trader composition in these three markets is revealed by the shares of 
trader types in total open interest (Figure 3.5). While money managers and swap traders 
dominate the wheat market, cocoa and coffee are still dominated by commercial traders. 
The disaggregation into short and long positions provides evidence for the predominant 
strategy employed by different trader types. Commercial traders are overwhelmingly short, 
in support of Keynes’s normal backwardation theory. Index traders, here approximated by 
swap traders, are predominantly long, as suggested by the financialisation hypothesis.  
Although index traders provide liquidity to commercial hedgers, their positions, especially 
in the wheat market, seem to exceed commercial hedgers’ demand for trading 
counterparties, so that money managers and other non-commercial traders step in to fulfil 
the counterparty role for index traders (see Chapter 4). 
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Figure 3.5: Trader-composition in Total Open Interest  
(end of month % share, Jun. 2006–Dec. 2014) 
Wheat 
Percentage Open Interest Percentage Long Positions Percentage Short Positions 
   
 
Cocoa 
Percentage Open Interest Percentage Long Positions Percentage Short Positions 
   
 
Coffee 
Percentage Open Interest Percentage Long Positions Percentage Short Positions 
   
 
Notes: pm stands for Producer and Merchant, swap for Swap Dealers, mm for Money 
Managers, and other for Other Reportables. Source: CFTC, DCOT (author’s calculation). 
Early researchers into commodity markets attempted to measure this ‘excess’ of speculative 
liquidity. The most prominent indicator to evaluate the degree of speculation is Woking’s 
T-index, which estimates the ratio between hedgers’ demand and the supply of speculative 
positions (Working 1960). However, since estimation is commonly based on the COT 
commercial and non-commercial categories, the T-index tends to underestimate the degree 
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of speculation, due to the misclassification of swap traders. This bias is clearly visible in 
Figure 3.6. For the wheat market, Working’s T-index, estimated by COT data, does not 
exceed 1.4 until 2013, but, estimated by CIT data, the index reaches values up to 1.7 over 
the same time period. The difference reveals the extent of index trading, that is categorised 
as commercial positions in the COT data set. Moreover, intra-day positions are excluded, 
which adds to the bias. 
Figure 3.6: Working’s T-Index with COT and CIT Data  
(end of month, Jan. 1998–Dec. 2013) 
 
Source: CFTC, COT and CIT (author’s calculation). 
Although no disaggregation of open interest or volume by different trader types is available 
for individual commodity contracts, changes in the allocation of open interest and volume 
across simultaneously traded contracts still provide insights into changes in trading 
strategies associated with particular trader types (see Chapter 5). For the wheat market, that 
has been most affected by index investment, a clear shift towards longer-dated contracts in 
both open interest and volume is visible (Figure 3.7). Both hedgers and index traders use 
longer-dated contracts. However, the increase coincides with an increase in index 
investment, but not hedging positions, and can hence be linked to the former.  
Figure 3.7: Open Interest and Volume Across Contracts 
Open Interest (in %, 2003–2015) 
Wheat Coffee Cocoa 
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Volume (in %, 2003–2015) 
Wheat Coffee Cocoa 
   
 
Note: “1-2” indicates aggregated volume of the next-to-maturity and second next-to-
maturity contract, etc. Source: Datastream (author’s calculation). 
For the cocoa market, that has seen the least index investment, open interest shifted 
towards the short-dated contracts, at least until 2008 and again from 2012 onward. These 
dynamics roughly coincide with the cocoa price cycle (Figure 3.2) and are probably linked 
to speculators, who seek short-term exposure in order to benefit from a price rise. 
Interestingly, for both wheat and coffee, there is an increase of volume in deferred 
contracts during the 2008 price peak. This effect might be due to hedgers and index traders 
being forced to close out their positions during those volatile times.   
Wheat, coffee and cocoa do not only differ in the composition of open interest and 
volume, but also in the degree of market concentration. One measure of concentration in 
the futures market is the average number of contracts held per trader. This can be 
calculated from the CFTC reports. As shown in Figure 3.8, market concentration is high 
for the cocoa market and has been high historically compared to the coffee and wheat 
markets.  
Figure 3.8: Market Concentration  
(long and short reporting traders, end of month, Jan. 1998–Dec. 2013) 
 
Source: CFTC, COT (author’s calculation). 
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For the wheat market, concentration increased between 2004 and 2005 to a level as high as 
for cocoa. This might be linked to the entry of swap traders with a large client base or large 
institutional investors and investment banks. 
Due to its small size and few players on the physical side, the cocoa market has always been 
prone to market manipulation. The latest incident occurred in mid-2010 at the London 
cocoa exchange. Oversight is less stringent in London than in New York and the market is 
more opaque—no position data disaggregated by trader type is made public—so that 
London is more exposed to manipulation. A single hedge fund, associated with one of the 
largest cocoa trading houses, squeezed the market by taking large-scale long positions in 
the July 2010 contract and eventually forced short traders into delivery according to a 
report by the International Cocoa Organization (ICCO 2010). Those unable to deliver had 
to settle in cash with the long trader, who could then bid up the settlement price. The 
physical position, which gained value through the forced delivery, was subsequently hedged 
at the exchange in order to lock in temporarily high prices. Thereby, the trader is believed 
to have profited twice from the squeeze. Market manipulation of this kind is only possible 
by large traders that are strong both in the physical and in the derivatives market. The 
structure of the industry hence plays a key part in determining whether these manipulations 
are likely to occur (see Chapter 7). 
While cases of market manipulation are incidental, behavioural traits like herding, 
extrapolating and passivity regarding market fundamentals are systematic. The following 
empirical investigation tests whether there is evidence for those systematic behavioural 
tendencies in wheat, coffee and cocoa.  
3.4 Empirical Analysis of Traders’ Behaviour  
The key elements of the financialisation hypothesis outlined in Chapter 2 are assumptions 
about traders’ behaviour under uncertainty. Various suggestions have been made for the 
behavioural traits of different traders in commodity futures markets that could potentially 
lead to speculative bubbles, excessive volatility and other market inefficiencies. These can 
be summarised in three testable hypotheses:  
(1) Traders engage in extrapolation; 
(2) Traders engage in herding; 
(3) Traders are heterogeneous in their trading motives. 
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The first two hypotheses are linked to the bounded rationality, rational herding and 
fundamental uncertainty literature. The last hypothesis reflects the heterogeneity 
assumptions made and the particular traits attributed to different trader types. These 
hypotheses will be tested consecutively.  
Despite the fact that many theories on speculative bubbles build on behavioural 
assumptions, empirical investigation of trader behaviour is generally thin for commodity 
futures markets (Devenow and Welch 1996). Studies can be divided into three broad areas. 
One area is concerned with price patterns, which arise as a consequence of certain 
behaviour—e.g., Gleason, Lee and Mathur (2003), Christie and Huang (1995). These 
studies provide indirect tests for trader behaviour, which, however, only hold if there is a 
single path of causality between latent behaviour and observed price patterns (price pattern 
literature). Another strand analyses data on traders’ positions and investigates traders’ 
investment motives and strategies (position taking literature). The most prominent strand of 
literature looks into the question of whether traders’ positions or traders’ sentiments 
predict future returns (forecastability literature)—e.g., Tornell and Yuan (2009), Rouwenhorst 
and Tang (2012); and Wang (2001), Sanders, Boris and Manfredo (2004) for an overview. 
The most interesting area for market practitioners is the latter one, which explains the 
many publications in this area.  
Although more prominent, the forecastability literature is less useful in testing behavioural 
assumptions. Since this is the intention of this Chapter 3, the focus is on the position taking 
literature. The few empirical papers that have taken this route will be discussed next. 
Appendix 3.2 provides a technical summary, complementing this review. Some of the 
studies will be familiar already, since they have previously been mentioned in Chapter 2: 
Section 2.5. However, the previous review focused on the link between trader behaviour 
and price dynamics50. The elements of the literature that were dedicated to testing 
behavioural assumptions were hence ignored.    
One way of analysing traders’ behavioural traits is by psychological profiling, as for instance 
done by Canoles, et al. (1998). The authors survey 25 commodity brokers and their 114 
clients in Alabama and find that commodity speculators have the ‘psychological profile of 
habitual gamblers’. Similar insights are given by Schwager (1992; 1989). He conducted 
numerous interviews with commodity traders, which reveal insights into trading strategies 
that are not based on market fundamentals. A more recent study by Barclays Capital (BC 
2012), based on interviews with traders, similarly finds that most traders do not cite market 
                                                 
50 Here the focus is on the reverse impact of price dynamics on traders’ positions. 
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fundamentals as the main motive for position changes. No less than 45 per cent of the 
traders interviewed reduced their commodity exposure in 2011 due to the general desire to 
reduce risky assets, rather than due to commodity-specific concerns. An additional 25 per 
cent cited other non-commodity related factors, such as the need to reduce the dollar 
exposure of their portfolios. 
Ederington and Lee (2002) provide valuable insights into the diversity of traders. They use 
non-public CFTC data with information about each trader’s line of business. They find that 
especially traders in the speculator category differ in their holding strategies. Commodity 
pool operators and hedge funds speculate on price fluctuations in the short-term with most 
of their positions being taken in the nearby contracts, while floor traders51 are more 
involved in trading longer-dated contracts. Commercial traders tend to hold their short 
positions significantly longer than their long positions. This indicates that those hedge with 
a long-term focus and speculate with a short-term horizon52. Producers and intermediaries 
use the futures market as temporary hedge until their forward/OTC contract can be 
matched. Commodity pool operators take only long or only short positions, and rarely the 
spread positions53 that are characteristic for other speculative traders like investment banks. 
Commodity trading advisors hold more spread positions and position themselves in the 
medium-term. These findings do not only reveal the extent of trader heterogeneity but also 
expose the inherent difficulties with the publicly available CFTC data sets, which are unable 
to reflect this diversity.  
An attempt to formally test for extrapolative strategies employed by traders is made by 
Sanders, Boris and Manfredo (2004). The authors suggest two variables for capturing 
traders’ behaviour based on the COT report. Firstly, weekly percentage of total open 
interest held by each trader category and secondly, with reference to De Roon, Nijman and 
Veld’s (2000) measure for hedging pressure, the weekly percentage net-long position. The 
first variable captures the relative market weight of each trader category and the second 
provides the normalised size of the net-positions by trader type. The authors employ 
Granger non-causality tests to examine the lead–lag relationship between net-long positions 
and commodity futures returns for several energy commodity markets between October 
1992 and December 1999. For non-commercial traders they find that net-long positions are 
                                                 
51 Floor traders are brokers which either execute trades on behalf of others or execute their own trades 
(CFTC 2015). 
52 If accepting the assumption that most commercial traders are short hedgers, that is, producers rather than 
consumers.  
53 Spread trading is the simultaneous sale and purchase of different futures contracts with different delivery 
months or futures contracts of different commodities. A spread position takes advantage of changes in 
relative prices.  
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significant positively related to returns, while this effect is significantly negative for 
commercial traders. They argue that their results suggest positive feedback trading by non-
commercial traders.  
However, these findings are problematic for two main reasons. Firstly, the adding up 
constraint—if non-reporting traders’ positions are minimal—implies that the commercial 
and non-commercial trader categories are counter images: commercial traders being net-
short implies that non-commercial traders must be net-long. Results for one category have 
to be the inverse of the other (Wang 2003). Secondly, the COT categories are misleading.  
Similar pitfalls are found in a study by Wang (2003), although he explicitly acknowledges 
these limitations. He analyses trader behaviour for eight different commodity markets using 
COT commercial and non-commercial categories and additionally controls for various 
other trading motives by a trading sentiment index. This index is significantly positively 
related to changes in non-commercial traders’ positions. In contrast to Sanders, Boris and 
Manfredo (2004), he finds that commercial traders engage in positive feedback trading, 
which he explains by hedging practices involving synthetic options.  
Rouwenhorst and Tang (2012) apply data by all three major CFTC reports and analyse 
both the contemporaneous and lagged-Granger relationship between changes in net-long 
positions normalised by total open interest, excess returns and market basis for 28 
individual commodity markets. In line with Sanders, Boris and Manfredo (2004), they find 
that commercial positions are strongly negatively related while non-commercial positions 
are strongly positively related to returns. In contrast, swap dealer positions and, even more 
so, index traders’ positions are found to only marginally co-vary with returns. These 
findings support the hypothesis that swap dealers and index traders are passive in the 
market. Further, the authors find that positive feedback strategies employed by non-
commercial traders are largely driven by managed money positions.   
A test for herding is proposed by McAleer and Radalj (2013), who utilise the COT data in 
order to analyse the extent of herding activity in gold, oil—for which they find no evidence 
for herding—and other, non-commodity, futures. They assume that small traders employ 
herding strategies to mimic larger traders’ position taking. In order to test for this 
conjecture, they approximate small traders with non-reporting traders and large traders 
with non-commercial reporting traders. Two assumptions underlie this choice of variables. 
Firstly, reporting non-commercial traders are assumed to be informed traders. Secondly, 
non-reporting traders are assumed to be uninformed traders. This is problematic as both 
the motives and commercial background of non-reporting trades is unknown. Further, 
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other studies suggest that the non-commercial trader category is heterogeneous and does 
comprise of informed and uninformed traders (Ederington and Lee 2002). Finally, while 
the argument that non-reporting traders are less informed is reasonable, since information 
gathering is costly and large traders are more likely to have the financial resources to engage 
in such activity, earlier deliberations suggest that small traders would rather follow 
commercial than non-commercial traders. This is because commercial traders, due to their 
engagement in the physical market, have a known information advantage over inventory 
data and future supply and demand.  
Domanski and Heath (2007) explicitly tested for the heterogeneity assumptions regarding 
trader behaviour underlying the financialisation literature. They base their analysis on the 
COT report for the crude oil, natural gas, gold and copper markets. The dependent 
variable is the share of non-commercial traders’ net-long open interest in total open 
interest. Explanatory variables are informed by considerations about speculators’ trading 
motives and include returns, roll returns, volatility, opportunity costs (short-term interest 
rate) and diversification benefits, like correlation with equity price indices and expected 
inflation. The model is estimated for 1998-2001 and 2002-2006, and it is tested whether 
coefficients change significantly between the two time periods. Results suggest that short-
term factors, such as returns and the short-run interest rate, have become more important 
in recent years, while diversification benefits have declined in importance.   
Mayer (2009) extends the analysis by Domanski and Heath (2007) to other commodity 
market. He employs similar explanatory variables linked to return and diversification 
considerations as in Domanski and Heath (2007). However, instead of only looking at non-
commercial traders’ motivations, he analyses the behavioural tendencies of both index and 
other non-commercial speculators by using CIT index traders’ position data. This 
unfortunately restricts the data set that includes index traders to 29 oberservations in the 
period from January 2006 to June 2008. However, estimations based on COT non-
commercial traders’ positions are estimated for a larger sample including the three 
consecutive time periods 1999-2001, 2002-2004 and 2005-2008.  
Mayer (2009) finds that index traders, as well as non-commercial traders’ positions are 
strongly driven by return considerations. For index traders, roll returns have a significant 
influence on position-taking, but for non-commercial traders the main drivers are spot 
returns. These findings reveal the different trading strategies employed. For index traders, 
who pursue long-only investments, rolling over the position from one contract to another 
is an essential characteristic of their strategy. Coefficients for variables that capture 
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diversification benefits are less significant for the later time periods for non-commercial 
traders. Mayer (2009) suggests that speculative motives have gained importance over 
diversification benefits. However, results can also be explained by the fact that only post-
2005 index traders are accounted for in a separate category. In prior years, some of the 
index traders are categorised as non-commercial traders54. In a later paper, Mayer (2012) 
adjusts the definition of the explanatory variables slightly, but results remain largely similar.   
There are several shortcomings in the existing empirical literature, besides those stemming 
from limitations in the data available.  
Regarding the estimation of extrapolative strategies, studies consider return data only. 
However, most traders base their investment decisions on more complex technical 
indicators. Further, technical traders are known to often trade intra-day. Considering only 
open interest data results in an underestimation of the extent of extrapolation present in 
the market.  
Regarding tests for herding, while non-reporting traders are the best proxy for small 
uninformed traders available, large non-commercial traders are not the optimal choice as a 
proxy for informed traders. Moreover, reportable commercial and non-commercial traders’ 
positions are not necessarily large enough to trigger herding behaviour by smaller traders. 
Theoretical considerations also suggest that traders are more likely to engage in herding in 
the presence of uncertainty, which is not accounted for in existing studies.  
Finally, regarding tests for heterogeneity in trader behaviour, parameter variance is not 
analysed beyond periodisation of the available time span. Further, existing studies exclude 
the behaviour of non-index non-commercial and commercial traders from their analysis.  
Therefore, the following section addresses these shortcomings and proposes alternative 
methods to empirically test for trader behaviour, which circumvent the shortcomings 
identified in the reviewed literature. In the succeeding Section 3.4.2 I will conduct my own 
empirical analysis and discuss results in the context of the hypotheses outlined in Chapters 
1 and 2.  
3.4.1 Data and Methodology 
Three hypotheses on traders’ behaviour were proposed: (1) traders engage in extrapolative 
strategies, (2) traders engage in herding, especially under uncertainty, and (3) traders are 
                                                 
54 Mayer (2009; 2012) refutes this as unlikely as the share of index traders is small and between 10 to 15 per 
cent. However, for some markets, like wheat, the share of index traders’ position in the COT commercial 
category greatly exceeds 15 per cent.  
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heterogeneous and follow different investment strategies that may or may not be linked to 
market-specific considerations.  
Various shortcomings in the empirical literature, which seeks to test these hypotheses, have 
been identified. The next sub-section develops alternative methodologies, which overcome 
these shortcomings, before empirical results for extrapolation, herding and heterogeneity 
are presented in the last sub-section.  
3.4.1.1 Extrapolation 
Chartism, stop-loss trading, momentum trading and more sophisticated trading algorithms 
are common extrapolative strategies, well-known and discussed in the empirical finance 
literature (Shleifer and Summers 1990). These strategies are used for detecting patterns in 
price and position data that could give an indication of future price developments. Some of 
the most prominent extrapolative indicators are used in order to test the extent to which 
such strategies have been employed in commodity futures markets.  
Two models are estimated in order to test for the significance of extrapolative trading 
strategies employed by short-term intra-day traders. Using intra-day positions has the 
advantage that long-term traders, like hedgers, are filtered out. Hence intra-day positions 
closely represent short-term speculative trading motives. Intra-day volume [ is estimated 
as the daily volume less the change in open interest. For estimation, all days without any 
trading activity, i.e., zero volume, are excluded. Since [ has, par definition, to be strictly 
positive at all times, the data are filtered for non-positive values and where these occur due 
to data anomalies55, intra-day volume is replaced by total volume at the particular trading 
day. The first model, specified in Equation 3.6, tests whether traders respond to technical 
trading indicators in an autoregressive regression equation of order k, AR(k):  
∆[ = M] ^ M>∆[$>T>_@  1@'  1D-  ` (3.6) 
The lag length is determined by downwards testing from a maximum lag length of 20 
trading days and Akaike Information Criteria (AIC). ' is the extrapolative trading signal 
and - is market returns estimated as the difference between current and last period’s 
commodity price of the next-to-maturity contract in logarithms. ' is estimated as the sum 
of buy-signals, sell-signals and support signals by different prominent technical trading 
indicators: relative strength index, moving average convergence divergence, open interest 
                                                 
55 A maximum of five cases have been detected per market.  
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momentum, and volume oscillator. Those indicators are described in greater detail in 
Appendix 3.3. Since ' comprises two extrapolative indicators and two support 
indicators:	' ∈ (0; 4). The null hypothesis that traders do not engage in extrapolative 
trading is tested using t-tests. The alternative hypothesis is that traders follow extrapolative 
trading signals: 
d]:	1@ = 0  
df:	1@ ≠ 0	  
In order to identify potential asymmetries in traders’ reaction to buy- and sell-signals, 
another model differentiates between bullish and bearish signals as specified in Equation 
3.7. If traders are risk-averse, the reaction to a sell-signal should be greater than to a buy-
signal.  
∆[ = M] ^ M>∆[$>T>_@  1@'h  1D'I  1i-  ` (3.7) 
The null hypothesis is that traders are risk neutral, which means they react equally to buy 
and sell-signals. The alternative hypothesis is that traders are risk-averse56, which means 
that they react more strongly to sell-signals than to buy-signals.  
d]:	1@ = 1D  
df:	1@ ≠	1D  
The hypotheses are tested using Wald test for general restrictions based on Chi-squared. 
Since the test is not invariant to how the null hypothesis is formulated, both formulations 1@ = 1D and 1D = 1@ are tested. 
Daily closing price data are used together with daily volume and open interest obtained 
from Thomson Reuters Datastream. Continuous time series are created by taking the next-
to-maturity contract and rolling over into the second next-to-maturity contract at the day 
the next-to-maturity contract ceases trading. 
3.4.1.2 Herding 
In order to test for herding behaviour, I take the model proposed by McAleer and Radalji 
(2013) as a baseline and amend it by three variations towards a more appropriate definition 
                                                 
56 Two alternative hypotheses exist: risk-averse (1@ <	1D) and risk-loving (1@ >	1D). 
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of large traders’ positions. Firstly, the net-positions of the four largest traders active in the 
market are taken as an explanatory variable. Secondly, as an alternative explanatory variable, 
commercial traders’ net-positions are used as a proxy for large informed traders. Thirdly, 
index traders, approximated by swap traders57, are used in order to test whether small 
traders mistake large index traders’ positions for informed hedgers’ positions.  
The test is repeated for long and short positions separately. A difference in coefficients for 
long and short positions can arise due to risk aversion. Small traders might be more 
inclined to follow large sell positions than buy positions. Last but not least, uncertainty is 
controlled for by including market volatility. These considerations regarding risk aversion 
and uncertainty have been omitted from McAller and Radalji’s (2013) study.  
Only the COT and DCOT reports provide information on the share held by the largest 
four traders in total long and total short positions. With this information and knowledge 
about the total number of open contracts in the market, the total amount of contracts held 
short and long by the four largest traders is recovered. This information is used to build a 
proxy for large traders’ positions. Further, the correlation coefficients between the large 
traders’ positions and the positions of different trader classifications are estimated in order 
to identify the trader category within which these large traders predominantly fall. Given 
hedging exemptions for hedgers and swap traders, it is expected that large traders fall into 
these two categories.  
In line with the analysis by McAller and Radalji (2013), I include contemporaneous and 
lagged returns to control for herding-like behaviour, which is caused by trend-following 
(see Chapter 2: Section 2.3.2). Thereby, the extent of unidirectional trading can be clearly 
assigned to either extrapolative trading or herding. The regression equation is specified as 
∆ ,> = M]  M@∆j >,$@  MD-  Mi-$@  Mk∆lmj
^ 1Q∆ $Q,>TQ_@  n (3.8) 
with i = {net-long, long, short}, lmj is the past week’s daily volatility (Tuesday to 
Tuesday variance) as a proxy for market distress, ∆ ,> is the change of small traders’ i 
position over time period t-1 to t, and ∆j ,> is the change of large traders’ i position over 
                                                 
57 DCOT swap traders’ positions have to be used since the CIT report does not provide position data for the 
four largest traders.  
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the same time period. The null hypothesis is that small traders do not herd and the 
alternative is that they herd.  
d2:	M@ ≤ 0  
df:	M@ > 0.  
If Mp@ is significantly smaller than zero, small traders act as counterparties for large traders. 
If the coefficient is significantly greater than zero, evidence for small traders engaging in 
herding is found. Further, a significantly positive return coefficient indicates extrapolative 
behaviour. Lastly, the larger the lag length, decided by downward testing and AIC, the 
greater is the persistence, or the more long-term the small traders’ investment horizon.  
Data on market returns and volatility are estimated based on the continuous next-to-
maturity contract, which is obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream. Returns are 
estimated Tuesday to Tuesday. This is weekly data, taking every Tuesday’s entry point, 
determined by the availability of the COT reports.  
3.4.1.3 Heterogeneity  
Finally, the heterogeneity assumptions underlying the financialisation hypothesis are tested. 
A lagged regression equation in monthly frequency is chosen.  
qj>, = M] ^ MQΩQ,$@	TQ_@  1@-$@  1Dqj>,$@  ` (3.9) 
For the ith trader type, with i = {com, ncom, index, pm, mm, swap, other}58. qj>, are net-
long positions divided by total open interest, ∑ΩQ,$@ is the sum of relevant market 
information for the particular trader, and -$@ are returns lagged one period. The 
regression analysis is conducted in several steps focusing in turn on index traders i = 
{index, swap}, other non-commercial traders i = {ncom, mm, other}, and hedgers i = 
{com, pm}.  
Firstly, regression results obtained by Mayer (2009, 2012) are replicated for comparative 
reasons and amended in several ways. A longer time period is chosen, data from additional 
trader-position reports are considered, and the information set ∑ΩQ,$@ is altered by 
redefining some of the explanatory variables as listed in Table 3.2. Secondly, the analysis is 
                                                 
58 These categories refer to those in Figure 3.1 in the following way: com – commercial trader, ncom – non-
commercial trader, index – index trader, pm – producer, mm – money managed money, swap – swap trader, 
other – other non-commercial trader. 
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extended to non-index non-commercial traders. Thirdly, positions taken by commercial 
hedgers are analysed by adding variables that capture hedging effectiveness and hedging 
costs. This way, the analysis is extended to other non-commercial speculators and hedgers 
following previous theoretical deliberations summarised in Table 3.1. Moreover, recursive 
estimation methods are used throughout, in order to overcome the arbitrariness in the 
periodization of earlier studies.  
Table 3.1: Trader Behaviour and Potential Market Information Variables 
Trader Behaviour Variables 
Commercial hedgers  ∑,'<>,CNΩ>,C/  
Fundamentals:  
• Calendar spread (carry), exchange rate. 
Hedging costs: 
• Basis size, hedging effectiveness, volatility. 
Non-commercial traders (informed) ∑,'<Q,@N ∑L>,.:  ∑LW,FX , ΩQ,C/  
 
Returns: 
• Returns, roll returns, volatility, interest rate. 
Hedging demand: 
• Hedging positions. 
Non-commercial traders (uninformed) ∑(<$@ − <$D)  Trading indicators: • Returns, technical indicators. 
Passive index traders  ∑,'<W,:NΩW,0/  
Returns: 
• Returns, roll returns, volatility, interest rate. 
Diversification: 
• Market beta, expected inflation, exchange rate. 
Table 3.1 lists the behavioural assumptions made regarding the information sets used in the 
regression analysis. The empirical literature has so far focused on ΩW,0, that is on market 
information thought to be relevant for index traders. In the following analysis, hypotheses 
made on other trader categories are tested as well. 
Table 3.2 provides a list of all explanatory variables, definitions and data sources. Two 
variations from Mayer (2009; 2012) regarding variable definitions are suggested. Most index 
investment—at least in the early years—is motivated by the aim to replicate the main 
basket commodity indices. One of the most prominent indices is the S&P GSCI. All three 
commodities investigated here are included. However, the weight of these commodities in 
the index is relatively small. In 2014 cocoa had a weight of 0.23 per cent, coffee 0.58 per 
cent and Chicago wheat 3.45 per cent (Heidorn, et al. 2014). Since the highest weight in the 
S&P GSCI is put on energy commodities, the performance of those commodities is 
decisive for the overall performance of the index. Due to the small weight of the 
commodities analysed, the returns to the index will not be linked to the returns of the 
particular markets analysed.  
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Table 3.2: Market Information Variables, Definitions and Sources 
 Variable Definition Source 
F
u
n
d
a
m
en
ta
ls 
Calendar Spread 
The difference between the third-to-maturity and next-to-maturity futures 
settlement price as the last Tuesday of each month.  
Thomson Reuters 
Datastream 
Basis Size 
The difference between the underlying cash price and next-to-maturity 
futures’ settlement price at the last Tuesday of each month.  
Thomson Reuters 
Datastream 
Hedging 
effectiveness 
One minus the twelve months backward looking variance of the market 
basis divided by the one month backward looking variance of the cash 
market prices.  
Thomson Reuters 
Datastream 
R
etu
rn
s 
Returns 
Percentage change of the logarithmic futures price taking the last 
Tuesday’s settlement price of the current and previous month of the next 
to delivery contract. 
Thomson Reuters 
Datastream 
Roll returns 
The twelve month backward looking moving average of roll return 
defined as the difference between the last Tuesday’s of the month closing 
price of the next-to-maturity and third next-to-maturity contract. Prices 
are in logarithms.  
Thomson Reuters 
Datastream 
Volatility 
Twelve month standard deviation (backward looking) of the returns on 
the third next-to-maturity contract.    
Thomson Reuters 
Datastream 
Interest rate 
Average of the three month deposit interest rates in US, UK, Japan, 
Canada, France, Germany, Netherlands, and Switzerland. The averages 
over the last Tuesday of each month are taken.  
Thomson Reuters 
Datastream 
Technical 
indicators 
See Appendix 3.2. Series are constructed from daily next-to-maturity 
contract settlement prices, open interest and volume data.  
Thomson Reuters 
Datastream 
D
iversifica
tio
n
 
Market beta 
Twelve month backward looking correlation of commodity returns (next-
to-maturity) with Standard and Poor 500 equity index returns.  
Thomson Reuters 
Datastream 
Expected 
inflation 
Difference between inflation indexed and nominal market yield on 
Treasury security at 10-year constant maturity. 
Federal Reserve, United 
States 
Exchange Rate 
US-trade weighted value of US dollar against major currencies, index 
March 1973=100. 
Federal Reserve, United 
States1 
Note: 1 For details on the weights and estimation see Federal Reserve (FED) (2014) 
Looking at Mayer’s (2012) results, index traders’ behaviour for those commodities strongly 
represented in the basket indices, like crude oil, is found to be close to the predictions 
made, while this does not necessarily apply to index positions in other markets, which have 
a lower index share. A potential explanation is that the demand for index exposure is linked 
to the diversification benefits of the commodity index as a whole and not the particular 
commodity. Hence, I redefine returns and market beta variables as total returns of the S&P 
GSCI index and the twelve months backward-looking correlation between S&P GSCI total 
returns and S&P 500 equity returns as an alternative market beta. The passivity assumption 
for index traders is even stronger for these alternative variable definitions. 
In order to capture the roll yield variable accurately, the data selection is informed by index 
traders’ rolling date. Since for wheat, coffee and cocoa there are only five maturity months, 
the usual maturity day—about two to three weeks into the months—is taken and the data 
point eight calendar days before this day (the time of the roll) is chosen for every month. 
The same date is chosen in the construction of all other variables.  
3.4.2 Extrapolation, Herding and Heterogeneity 
Section 3.4 commenced with a critical review of methodologies employed in empirical 
studies on traders’ behaviour. On the basis of the review, the previous sub-section 
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presented alternative methodologies which overcome shortcomings identified in the 
existing literature. The following sub-section presents empirical results for the econometric 
tests conducted on extrapolative, herding and heterogeneous trading motives.   
Several difficulties with the available data have been identified in Section 3.3. The most 
critical of which is the continuous alteration of trading strategies. For the tests conducted, 
an alteration in the trading strategy is revealed in the time variance of the coefficients 
estimates. In order to account for parameter instability, recursive and rolling window least-
square estimations are conducted for most tests (Pollock 2003).  
3.4.2.1 Results for Extrapolation 
Regression Equation 3.6 is estimated for all three markets using contemporaneous and 
lagged explanatory variables over the time period January 1990 to December 2014 in daily 
frequency. For all three markets,	1r@, the coefficient on the trading signal indicator, is 
strongly significant and positive in both the contemporaneous and the lagged regression. 
The null hypothesis of no extrapolative trading can hence be rejected at the one per cent 
level in all cases. Further,	1rD, the coefficient on returns, is significantly negative in the 
contemporaneous regressions, except for the wheat market. This indicates that negative 
returns are associated with a higher trading activity than positive return, which is evidence 
for risk aversion. Throughout, a great amount of persistence is found in the volume data 
and autocorrelation is significant for a long lag length (Table 3.3).  
Table 3.3: Estimation Results Extrapolative Trading  
(1st Jan. 1990 – 9th Dec. 2014) 
 Cocoa Wheat Coffee 
AR(i) AR(18) AR(19) AR(18) 
 Coef s.e.1 Partial r2 Coef s.e.1 Partial r2 Coef s.e.1 Partial r2 
Contemporaneous 1r@ 544.184**  83.27 0.0069 1247.79** 258.9 0.0037 693.20** 94.79 0.0085 1rD -8470.41** 2524. 0.0018 -10883.7 10670 0.0002 -9962.2** 2449. 0.0026 
Diagnos. 
AR 1-2: 
Normality: 
Hetero: 
RESET: 
17.285 [0.0000]** 
1993.9 [0.0000]** 
16.272 [0.0000]** 
2.4778 [0.1155] 
AR 1-2: 
Normality: 
Hetero: 
RESET: 
17.152 [0.0000]** 
2343.4 [0.0000]** 
30.654 [0.0000]** 
2.8438 [0.0918] 
AR 1-2: 
Normality: 
Hetero: 
RESET: 
22.442 [0.0000]** 
3821.8 [0.0000]** 
21.883 [0.0000]** 
98.458 [0.0000]** 
Lagged 1r@ 362.158** 75.36 0.0037 1326.26** 238.4 0.0049 651.55** 106.1 0.0060 1rD -2679.96 2910. 0.0001 1106.41 11390 0.0000 -2058.60 2962. 0.0001 
Diagnos. 
AR 1-2: 
Normality: 
Hetero: 
RESET: 
2.7291 [0.0654] 
2076.2 [0.0000]** 
16.605 [0.0000]** 
4.5475 [0.0330]* 
AR 1-2: 
Normality: 
Hetero: 
RESET: 
9.3868 [0.0001]** 
2401.2 [0.0000]** 
28.981 [0.0000]** 
2.2443 [0.1342] 
AR 1-2: 
Normality: 
Hetero: 
RESET: 
9.8781 [0.0001]** 
3750.5 [0.0000]**  
18.080 [0.0000]** 
104.64 [0.0000]** 
Note: 1 Newey West standard errors. * indicates significance at 5% and ** indicates 
significance at 1% level. All variables are in first differences (returns and indices) and 
found stationary at the 1 % significance level using ADF tests.  
From the recursively estimated coefficients, one can see that the coefficient on returns in 
the cocoa market turned significantly negative in 2007, indicating a greater degree of risk 
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aversion since then. For all three markets, the coefficient on the trading-signal index 
appears to have increased over recent years, in particular since 2004 and more visibly from 
2008 onwards. This is probably due to a change in trader composition around this time that 
caused extrapolative trading strategies to gain in importance (Appendix 3.4, Figures 3.4.1–
3).  
Table 3.4 presents results from regression Equation 3.7 together with the Wald test 
statistics for asymmetry. For all three markets, the coefficient on sell-signals, 1r@I, is larger 
than the coefficient on buy-signals, 1r@h, as hypothesised. Sell-signals have a significantly 
positive effect on intra-day volume, both contemporaneously and lagged. In contrast, only 
contemporaneous buy-signals are significant at the five per cent level for all markets. 
Although the coefficient for sell-signals is larger than for buy-signals in all cases, the 
difference is only statistically significant for the coffee market.  
Table 3.4: Estimation Results Extrapolative Trading Asymmetries  
(1st Jan. 1990 – 9th Dec. 2014) 
 Cocoa Wheat Coffee 
AR(i) AR(18) AR(19) AR(18) 
 Coef s.e.1 Part. r2 Coef s.e.1 Part. r2 Coef s.e.1 Part. r2 
Contemporaneous 1r@h 459.374** 126.4 0.0021 1015.71* 396.1 0.0011 462.430** 168.5 0.0012 1r@I 602.353** 98.74 0.0060 1360.36** 301.2 0.0033 781.407** 116.1 0.0072 d]:	1@h = 1@I(3) d]:	1@I = 1@h(3) Chi^2(1)  =   1.3184 [0.2509] Chi^2(1)  =   1.0065 [0.3157] Chi^2(1)  =  0.81948 [0.3653] Chi^2(1)  =  0.54689 [0.4596] Chi^2(1)  =   5.1978 [0.0226]* Chi^2(1)  =   2.3109 [0.1285]  1rD -8455.5** 2521. 0.0018 -10358.4 10810 0.0001 -9799.84** 2370. 0.0027 
Diagnostics 
AR 1-2: 
Normality: 
Hetero: 
RESET: 
11.509 [0.0000]** 
1986.5 [0.0000]** 
16.226 [0.0000]** 
2.4571 [0.1170] 
AR 1-2: 
Normality: 
Hetero: 
RESET: 
18.140 [0.0000]** 
2347.1 [0.0000]** 
29.292 [0.0000]** 
2.5021 [0.1137] 
AR 1-2: 
Normality: 
Hetero: 
RESET: 
27.316 [0.0000]** 
3188.2 [0.0000]** 
15.897 [0.0000]** 
52.305 [0.0000]** 
Lagged 1r@h 370.668** 127.7 0.0014 904.770* 400.8 0.0008 354.512 184.1 0.0006 1r@I 367.220** 89.94 0.0027 1542.75** 290.3 0.0045 739.98** 109.4 0.0073 d]:	1@h = 1@I(3) d]:	1@I = 1@h(3) Chi^2(1)  =0.00060032 [0.9805] Chi^2(1)  =0.00053210 [0.9816] Chi^2(1)  =   2.2232 [0.1359]   Chi^2(1)  =   1.6684 [0.1965] Chi^2(1)  =   5.9221 [0.0150]*  Chi^2(1)  =   3.8284 [0.0504] 1rD -2711.81 2916. 0.0001 2136.55 11520 0.0000 -1658.68 2908. 0.001 
Diagnostics 
AR 1-2: 
Normality: 
Hetero: 
RESET: 
2.6199 [0.0729] 
2076.2 [0.0000]** 
15.925 [0.0000]** 
4.5442 [0.0331]* 
AR 1-2: 
Normality: 
Hetero: 
RESET: 
9.8818 [0.0001]** 
2405.5 [0.0000]** 
26.829 [0.0000]** 
2.0132 [0.1560] 
AR 1-2: 
Normality: 
Hetero: 
RESET: 
12.175 [0.0000]** 
3159.1 [0.0000]** 
14.380 [0.0000]** 
55.828 [0.0000]** 
Note: (1) Newey West standard errors. (3) Testing for general restrictions using Newey 
West standard errors. * indicates significance at 5% and ** indicates significance at 1% 
level. All variables in first differences (returns and indices) and found stationary at the 
1 % level using ADF tests. 
Recursive coefficient estimates reveal that both buy- and sell-indicators gained prominence 
over the years. This is particularly visible for buy-signals in the coffee market since 2008 
(Appendix 3.4, Figures 3.4.4–6). With the estimation of rolling windows over 500 days, 
sudden changes in the size of the coefficients are identified more clearly (Appendix 3.5, 
Figures 3.5.1–3). For the wheat market a significantly positive relationship between sell-
signals and trading volume is found since the late 1990s. This relationship strengthens, 
however not continuously, from 2002 onwards. For cocoa and coffee, the sell-signal is 
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found to be significant from the early 1990s and increases over recent years with a small 
kink during the price peak period in late 2008 for coffee. Interestingly, buy-signals are 
strongly significant and positively linked to trading volume from 2007 onwards with a 
visible drop in late 2008 coinciding with the commodity and financial crisis. While changes 
in returns do not appear to have been significantly related to trading volume for wheat and 
coffee, for the cocoa market the relationship is strongly negative between 2005 and 2010, 
which indicates risk aversion during these years. 
Tests for changes in trading patterns, using Hansen’s (1992a) parameter instability test, 
reveal that most of the parameter instability observed in recursive graphs is not statistically 
significant (Table 3.5). However, instability is confirmed for the contemporaneous 
relationship between trading signals and intra-day volume. By differentiating between buy- 
and sell-signals, this effect can be attributed to non-constancy in traders’ reaction to sell-
signals.   
Table 3.5: Hansen Parameter Instability Tests 
   Cocoa Wheat Coffee 
Combined 
Indicator 
Contemporaneous 
1r@ 0.55080* 0.92540** 0.72205* 1rD 0.53412* 0.04006 0.12679 
Lagged 
1r@ 0.14414 0.27370 0.18632 1rD 0.03882 0.27365 0.11667 
Sell and Buy  
Indicators 
Contemporaneous 
1r@h 0.34231 0.34136 0.04534 1r@I 0.28806 0.59619* 0.81335** 1rD 0.54051* 0.04025 0.11958 
Lagged 
1r@h 0.21764 0.06575 0.06239 1r@I 0.34564 0.40713 0.22130 1rD 0.03936 0.27550 0.12165 
Notes: * indicates significance at the 5 per cent level and ** indicates significance at the 
1 per cent level.  
One reason for this is probably the reaction to sell-signals during the 2008 price slump. 
Traders reacted more strongly to those signals than before, since risk aversion increased 
amidst fears for the stability of the financial system as a whole. Another reason is the 
growth in computerised trading (Baffes 2011). In 2006, CBOT launched electronic futures 
trading, while ICE did so a year later. Computerised trading promoted technical strategies 
based on complex algorithms at high frequency. The introduction of these new trading 
platforms coincides with an increase in the trading-signal coefficients for all three markets.  
However, low R-squares, parameter instability, as well as unfavourable residual diagnostics 
of estimated models suggest the omission of important variables, like changes in 
technology, as well as global market sentiments. This observation reveals the difficulty to 
approximate latent investment strategies with observed position data.  
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3.4.2.2 Results for Herding  
Before estimating regression Equation 3.8, the correlation coefficients between net-long, 
long, and short positions of different COT and DCOT trader categories and the largest 
four and eight traders are estimated. Results are reported in Appendix 3.6, Tables 3.6.1–6. 
Correlation coefficients for the wheat market clearly support the previous conjecture that 
the four largest traders’ short positions can be attributed to commercial hedgers, while their 
long positions can be attributed to index traders. Table 3.6.1b shows an almost perfect 
correlation between the largest traders’ and hedgers’ short positions and the largest traders’ 
and swap traders’ long positions. Interestingly, using the COT data set, as shown in Table 
3.6.4b, both the largest traders’ short and long positions have a high correlation with the 
commercial hedger category. This, once again, shows the extent to which the COT 
commercial category captures index traders.  
Results are not as distinct for the cocoa and coffee markets. For the cocoa market, the 
COT commercial trader-position data correlate with the four largest traders’ positions 
(Table 3.6.5a-b). Further, the largest traders’ long positions correlate with both swap 
traders’ and hedgers’ positions (Table 3.6.2b). This can be explained by the finding that 
index traders only make up a small percentage share of total open interest in the cocoa 
market so that commercial traders at least partly constitute both the four largest traders’ 
long and short positions.  
For the coffee market, the largest traders’ long positions correlate with both long positions 
by commercial and long positions by non-commercial traders in the COT data set (Table 
3.6.6b). The correlation table for the DCOT data reveals that the reason for this anomaly is 
that the largest traders’ long positions are correlated with both swap traders’ and money 
managers’ positions (Table 3.6.3b). This is unexpected.  
Results from regression Equation 3.8 for the wheat market provide little evidence for small 
traders mimicking the largest traders’ positions. There is evidence, however, for small 
traders imitating hedgers’ long and short positions. Further, there is strong evidence for 
small traders engaging in trend-following behaviour. All coefficients, but those for sell-
positions on returns, are significant at the five per cent level and show the expected sign 
(Table 3.6). 
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Table 3.6: Estimation Results Herding for the Wheat Market  
 COT (Jan. 1993 – Dec. 2013) DCOT (Jun. 2006 – Dec. 2014) 
 Net-long Short Long Net-long Short Long 
AR(i) AR(5) AR(0) AR(0) AR(2) AR(2) AR(2) 
 Coef. s.e.1 Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e.1 Coef. s.e.1 Coef. s.e.1 Mp@ -0.109** 0.032 0.003 0.025 -0.081* 0.040 -0.048* 0.024 -0.006 0.0291 0.014 0.053 MpD 10296.* 4277. -1252.6 3732. 10246.* 4405. 8263.** 3017. -2581.7 2737.0 5923.1* 2684. Mpi 14135.** 3159. -6143.5 3780. 9732.1* 4464. 7960.** 2668. -2564.1 3479.0 5367.3 3221. Mpk -0.459 0.402 0.393 0.516 -0.234 0.608 -0.126 0.287 -0.172 0.207 -0.371 0.293 
AR17 
Norm 
Heter 
Reset 
1.8575 [0.0732] 
850.32 [0.0000] 
5.3393 [0.0000] 
0.0320 [0.9686]   
1.5883 [0.1349] 
1303.8 [0.0000] 
0.2577 [0.9789] 
0.4963 [0.6089] 
1.3427 [0.2265] 
995.79 [0.0000] 
0.2334 [0.9847] 
0.5172 [0.5963]  
1.3188 [0.2396] 
102.64 [0.0000]  
2.8274 [0.0010] 
1.7406 [0.1767] 
1.6489 [0.1200] 
52.738 [0.0000] 
5.2725 [0.0000] 
3.3324 [0.0366] 
1.9517 [0.0603] 
45.454 [0.0000] 
2.0827 [0.0118] 
4.1821 [0.0159] Mp@s2t -0.039 0.021 0.029* 0.015 -0.008 0.020 0.016 0.017 0.038* 0.016 0.072** 0.024 Mp@u/ws2t 0.039 0.021 -0.029* 0.015 0.008 0.020 -0.050 0.028 0.048 0.071 0.009 0.032 
Notes: (1) White standard errors. For the last two rows the same model as above is 
estimated but alternative variable definitions are used to estimate Mp@. Diagnostics and 
remaining coefficients are not reported here to save space and because those differ only 
marginally.  
Results for the cocoa market show significant mimicking of the largest traders’ buy- and 
sell-positions by small traders. Evidence is also found for small traders following hedgers 
but not non-commercial traders. This finding supports the previous conjecture that small, 
uninformed traders are aware of the information advantage by large hedgers and hence 
inclined to follow those traders’ positions. Again, small traders are found to engage in 
trend-following behaviour with all coefficients on returns being significant at the five per 
cent level and showing the expected sign (Table 3.7). 
Table 3.7: Estimation Results Herding for the Cocoa Market 
 COT (Jan. 1993 – Dec. 2013) DCOT (Jun. 2006 – Dec. 2014) 
 Net-long Short Long Net-long Short Long 
AR(i) AR(5) AR(7) AR(1) AR(3) AR(2) AR(2) 
 Coef. s.e.1 Coef. s.e.1 Coef. s.e.2 Coef. s.e.2 Coef. s.e.2 Coef. s.e. Mp@ -0.01109 0.019 0.047** 0.017 0.0077 0.024 -0.0164 0.027 0.0362 0.024 0.0512* 0.025 MpD 4920.4** 983.7 -2125.* 880.6 3773.** 1122. 15069** 2051. -5507** 1594. 9374.** 1350. Mpi 886.76 888.1 -1220.3 871.0 1310.5 1168. 3958.0* 1648. -571.7 1774. 6668.** 1408. Mpk -0.0029 0.015 0.0015 0.013 -0.0048 0.011 0.0053 0.020 -0.003 0.016 -0.004 0.013 
AR17 
Norm 
Heter 
Reset 
1.0287 [0.4090] 
25.681 [0.0000] 
4.2224 [0.0000] 
2.6698 [0.1026]   
1.4967 [0.1645] 
116.57 [0.0000] 
3.8315 [0.0000] 
2.0424 [0.1533] 
2.5282 [0.0139] 
105.74 [0.0000] 
3.0235 [0.0009] 
4.7908 [0.0288] 
3.1954 [0.0026] 
37.045 [0.0000] 
5.4120 [0.0000] 
0.7749 [0.3792] 
2.5746 [0.0131] 
87.730 [0.0000] 
4.6432 [0.0000] 
1.1289 [0.2886] 
1.8792 [0.0714] 
78.535 [0.0000] 
0.8351 [0.6307]   
0.0003 [0.9852] Mp@s2t -0.0189 0.012 0.024* 0.011 0.0122 0.014 -0.042* 0.018 0.0113 0.014 0.0393* 0.020 Mp@u/ws2t 0.0189 0.012 -0.024* 0.011 -0.0122 0.014 0.0436 0.040 0.0930 0.072 0.0529 0.055 
Notes: (1) White standard errors. For the last two rows the same model as above is 
estimated but alternative variable definitions are used to estimate Mp@. Diagnostics and 
remaining coefficients are not reported here to save space and because those differ only 
marginally. 
For the coffee market, evidence for herding is inconclusive. While herding in net-long 
positions is significant, the coefficient is negative, which indicates that small traders act as 
contrarians. However, the coefficient is significantly positive for the largest traders’ and 
commercial hedgers’ long positions in the COT data set, which indicates that small traders 
mimic the largest traders’ and commercial hedgers’ long positions. Evidence for trend-
following behaviour by smaller traders is also weaker compared to the other two markets. 
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Significant coefficients on returns are only found for the later sub-period covered by the 
DCOT data set (Table 3.8). 
Table 3.8: Estimation Results Herding for the Coffee Market 
 COT (Jan. 1993 – Dec. 2013) DCOT (Jun. 2006 – Dec. 2014) 
 Net-long Short Long Net-long Short Long2 
AR(i) AR(7) AR(12) AR(5) AR(2) AR(5) AR(5) 
 Coef. s.e.1 Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e.1 Coef. s.e.3 Coef. s.e.1 Coef. s.e. Mp@ -0.056** 0.019 0.0089 0.018 0.069** 0.026 -0.0417 0.023 -0.0043 0.027 0.0644 0.036 MpD 587.54 623.8 -342.53 741.5 21.670 719.7 6360.8** 1308. -3194.* 1612. 2320.8 1659. Mpi 661.88 620.3 -1727.* 739.1 -514.82 711.5 1312.8 1009. 475.58 1187. 1859.1 1158. Mpk 0.0073 0.013 -0.0041 0.010 -0.0011 0.012 -0.0129 0.016 0.0222 0.013 0.0089 0.015 
AR17 
Norm 
Heter 
Reset 
1.8780 [0.0698]   
162.64 [0.0000] 
3.5253 [0.0000] 
12.664 [0.0004] 
1.7813 [0.0874] 
147.46 [0.0000] 
1.4386 [0.0508] 
20.734 [0.0000] 
1.5926 [0.1336] 
110.06 [0.0000] 
3.7254 [0.0000] 
8.0689 [0.0046] 
5.8095 [0.0000] 
116.14 [0.0000] 
8.4041 [0.0000] 
4.4662 [0.0351] 
1.3415 [0.2290] 
49.260 [0.0000] 
2.7791 [0.0003] 
4.4017 [0.0365] 
1.6297 [0.1252] 
27.561 [0.0000] 
3.5595 [0.0000] 
2.6690 [0.1031] Mp@s2t -0.03** 0.009 -0.0005 0.009 0.0314* 0.015 -0.042** 0.012 -0.0158 0.015 -0.0077 0.022 Mp@u/ws2t 0.03** 0.009 0.0005 0.009 -0.031* 0.015 0.0278 0.039 0.0498 0.081 0.0436 0.056 
Notes: (1) White standard errors. (2) One more lag for returns added in order to account 
for remaining auto correlation. (3) Newey-West standard errors. For the last two rows the 
same model as above is estimated but alternative variable definitions are used to estimate Mp@. Diagnostics and remaining coefficients are not reported here to save space and 
because those differ only marginally. 
Moreover, small traders’ positions are found to be more persistent in coffee than in the 
other two markets with autoregressive lags being significant up to a lag length of 12 weeks. 
This indicates a longer trading horizon for small traders in the coffee market. One reason 
might be that for the coffee market some hedgers are small enough to be non-reporting 
traders so that some small coffee traders behave like hedgers instead of uninformed 
speculators.   
3.4.2.3 Results for Heterogeneity 
Mayer (2012) in reference to Domanski and Heath (2007) suggests that index traders’ net-
positions are positively related to return variables and negatively related to opportunity 
costs. Index positions are expected to correspond positively to diversification benefits, like 
expected inflation, depreciation of the dollar and low market beta. The coefficient for 
market volatility could be positive or negative, given that higher volatility is associated with 
higher returns as well as higher risk. Table 3.9 summarises the expected signs for the 
coefficients in reference to the definitions of the variables described in Table 3.2 and 
regression Equation 3.9. 
Table 3.9: Expected Signs for Index Traders 
 Return Roll Volatility Interest Correlation Inflation Ex.-rate 
Index + + +/– – – + – 
Note: Expected signs as proposed by Mayer (2012). 
Although previous authors have refrained from testing for non-stationarity, probably due 
to the small sample size available, which makes unit-root tests unreliable, an ADF test is 
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conducted on trader-position variables, before proceeding with the regression analysis. 
Results are reported in Appendix 3.7, Table 3.7.1–3. The null hypothesis of non-
stationarity in traders’ position data can be rejected at the five per cent level for the wheat 
market, with the exception of DCOT swap trader position data. In contrast, for coffee the 
test fails to reject non-stationarity for all, but index and other non-commercial traders’ 
positions. For the cocoa market, all, but positions by non-commercial trader in the CIT 
report and hedgers in the DCOT report, are found stationary. Against this background, 
regression results have to be interpreted with great care. Because of the overlapping 
structure of the data due to the moving averages, I follow Mayer (2012) in choosing 
Newey-West robust standard errors. Only DCOT and CIT data are used because of the 
difficulties identified previously with the COT data.  
The following analysis contributes to the existing empirical literature in several important 
ways. Firstly, the sample size is enlarged considerably, which corrects for the small sample 
used in Mayer (2012). Secondly, the trader types under analysis are extended to commercial 
hedgers as well as further disaggregated into non-commercial trader types, like money 
managers, swap traders and other non-commercial traders, as specified in the DCOT data 
set. Thirdly, the IID index trader data are used in addition. Although the data reflect index 
investment more precisely, it is only available since June 2010 in a monthly frequency, 
which limits the sample size used in regressions including IID data to 53 observations. 
Fourthly, results are tested for parameter instability by recursive and rolling window 
estimation techniques (Pollock 2003). In this way, the timing of parameter changes can be 
determined more precisely in comparison to the ad hoc periodization of the sample. Finally, 
alternative definitions for return and correlation variables are suggested which are linked to 
a commodity basket index rather than to a particular commodity market. If significant, the 
passivity assumption for index traders is strengthened.  
Table 3.10 provides summary results for index and swap trader categories in the wheat 
market. Results for the same estimation with the remaining trader categories used as 
dependent variable are reported in Appendix 3.8, Table 3.8.1. In line with previous studies, 
index traders’ positions are not significantly linked to spot returns, but instead to roll 
returns and opportunity costs. Further, variables, which capture diversification benefits, are 
found to be significant more often for index and swap trader categories than for any other 
trader category. Surprisingly, the signs for return variables, in particular roll yield and 
opportunity cost, are unexpected, while coefficients on diversification variables show the 
expected signs.   
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Table 3.10: Estimation Results Heterogeneity Index Traders in Wheat 
Results Passive Trader 
  Return Roll Vola. Interest  Correl. Inflation Ex.-rate Adj. R2 AR(1) r2 
CIT  
Index 
Jan.2006 - 
Oct.2014 
-0.396* 
[0.192] 
-2.706** 
[0.823] 
-1.138 
[0.781] 
0.020** 
[0.005] 
0.030* 
[0.012] 
0.012* 
[0.005] 
-0.000 
[0.001] 
0.663 0.2743 
DCOT  
Swap 
Jun.2006 - 
Oct.2014 
-0.262 
[0.169] 
-4.086** 
[1.127] 
-0.698 
[0.869] 
0.030** 
[0.008] 
0.017 
[0.015] 
0.018* 
[0.007] 
-0.002* 
[0.001] 
0.801 0.2225 
IID  
Index 
Jun.2010 - 
Oct.2014 
-0.110 
[0.300] 
-10.89* 
[4.241] 
-4.068 
[3.195] 
0.003 
[0.056] 
-0.048* 
[0.023] 
-0.051 
[0.033] 
-0.002 
[0.004] 
0.643 AR(0)  
Results Passive Trader Stronger Assumptions 
  Return Roll Vola. Interest  Correl. Inflation Ex.-rate Adj. R2 AR(1) r2 
CIT  
Index 
Jan.2006 - 
Oct.2014 
0.130 
[0.434] 
-3.248** 
[0.835] 
-0.620 
[0.890] 
0.020** 
[0.005] 
0.007 
[0.009] 
0.012* 
[0.005] 
-0.001 
[0.001] 
0.609 0.3427 
DCOT  
Swap 
Jun.2006 - 
Oct.2014 
0.074 
[0.304] 
-4.795** 
[1.133] 
-0.199 
[1.026] 
0.028** 
[0.009] 
-0.006 
[0.011] 
0.017* 
[0.007] 
-0.002* 
[0.001] 
0.776 0.2164 
IID  
Index 
Jun.2010 - 
Oct.2014 
-0.705 
[1.048] 
-12.34** 
[4.485] 
-4.925 
[3.555] 
-0.029 
[0.062] 
0.019 
[0.022] 
-0.050 
[0.036] 
-0.003 
[0.004] 
0.630 AR(0) 
Notes: Newey-West robust standard error, lag truncation 12. All independent variables 
are lagged once and the regression is estimated as an AR(1) process (the lag is excluded if 
found insignificant). Residuals are tested for normality, autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity. The null hypothesis of spherical residuals cannot be rejected at the 
5 % level in all cases. * indicates significance at the 1 % level, and ** at the 5% level 
respectively.  
Rolling window estimations reveal that the coefficient on roll returns is significantly 
positive prior to 2009, as expected, and turns significantly negative at the beginning of 2013 
(Appendix 3.9, Table 3.9.1). The coefficient on market beta or correlation—including both 
the wheat market-specific correlation as well as S&P GSCI commodity index market 
correlation—has been negative or insignificant previously and turned positive from early 
2013 onwards. This switch of coefficients’ signs indicates a change in index investment 
strategies in 2009 and again in early 2013. An explanation is the emergence of roll adjusted 
and dynamic roll indices which take advantage of both normal and inverted markets, i.e., 
positive and negative roll yield (Heidorn, et al. 2014). Further, exchange traded notes on 
specific commodities as well as indices on particular commodity groups became available, 
so that the mass of index investment might not be linked to large basked commodity 
indices like the S&P GSCI any longer. This conjecture is supported by the rolling window 
coefficient for index traders’ reaction to S&P GSCI total returns (Appendix 3.10, Figure 
3.10.1). The coefficient is significantly positive until 2008, but turns insignificant thereafter.   
For the cocoa market, results are similar to wheat; however, less pronounced (Table 3.11). 
The coefficient on roll yield is negative in all cases but only significant at the five per cent 
level for the IID data set. Again, index traders show a positive response to higher market 
correlation and interest rates. The rolling window estimated coefficients reveal that the 
relationship between net index investment and roll yield had been positive until 2008 and 
only turned negative in later years (Appendix 3.9, Table 3.9.2). The coefficient on market 
correlation was negative between 2009 and 2012, but turned positive thereafter. This is 
even more visible for the S&P GSCI market correlation (Appendix 3.10, Figure 3.10.2). 
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Interestingly, coefficients for the swap trader category yield insignificant coefficients 
throughout, which might be due to a low percentage of index based investment in the swap 
trader category for the cocoa market (Figure 3.9).   
Table 3.11: Estimation Results Heterogeneity Index Traders in Cocoa 
Results Passive Trader 
  Return Roll Vola. Interest  Correl. Inflation Ex.-rate Adj. R2 AR(1) r2 
CIT  
Index 
Jan.2006 - 
Oct.2014 
-0.055 
[0.117] 
-5.266 
[4.100] 
1.269 
[1.498] 
-0.003 
[0.003] 
0.008 
[0.011] 
0.003 
[0.003] 
-0.003** 
[0.001] 
0.822 0.2458 
DCOT  
Swap 
Jun.2006 - 
Oct.2014 
-0.156 
[0.143] 
-3.211 
[3.477] 
1.835 
[1.199] 
0.000 
[0.002] 
-0.008 
[0.009] 
0.004 
[0.003] 
-0.001 
[0.001] 
0.663 0.5182 
IID  
Index 
Jun.2010 - 
Oct.2014 
-0.024 
[0.337] 
-14.15* 
[6.976] 
-2.039 
[1.924] 
0.038* 
[0.019] 
0.049** 
[0.011] 
0.038 
[0.025] 
0.003 
[0.002] 
0.633 AR(0)  
Results Passive Trader Stronger Assumptions 
  Return Roll Vola. Interest  Correl. Inflation Ex.-rate Adj. R2 AR(1) r2 
CIT  
Index 
Jan.2006 - 
Oct.2014 
0.091 
[0.157] 
-4.585 
[3.421] 
1.153 
[1.171] 
-0.001 
[0.004] 
0.014* 
[0.007] 
0.004 
[0.002] 
-0.004** 
[0.001] 
0.843 0.2571 
DCOT  
Swap 
Jun.2006 - 
Oct.2014 
-0.063 
[0.206] 
-0.973 
[3.380] 
0.955 
[0.862] 
0.002 
[0.003] 
0.004 
[0.003] 
-0.001 
[0.001] 
0.001 
[0.001] 
0.658 0.4780 
IID  
Index 
Jun.2010 - 
Oct.2014 
0.096 
[0.500] 
-19.26* 
[9.720] 
-1.850 
[2.619] 
0.0004 
[0.019] 
0.032** 
[0.006] 
0.015** 
[0.005] 
-0.002 
[0.001] 
0.713 AR(0) 
Notes: Newey-West robust standard error, lag truncation 12. All independent variables 
are lagged once and the regression is estimated as an AR(1) process (the lag is excluded if 
found insignificant). Residuals are tested for normality, autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity. The null hypothesis of spherical residuals cannot be rejected at the 
5 % level in all cases. AR(1) r2 is the partial r-square of the autoregressive component. * 
indicates significance at the 1 % level, and ** at the 5% level respectively.  
As for the previous two markets, index traders’ net positions in the coffee market are 
significantly negatively related to roll yield, in recent years while previously, the relationship 
has been significantly positive (Appendix 3.9, Table 3.9.3). Exchange rate diversification 
benefits are time invariant and significant with the predicted sign for all index categories, 
but the IID data (Table 3.12). Surprisingly, results for the IID index positions deviate 
substantially from results for the CIT index and DCOT swap positions. 
Table 3.12: Estimation Results Heterogeneity Index Traders in Coffee 
Results Passive Trader 
  Return Roll Vola. Interest  Correl. Inflation Ex.-rate Adj. R2 AR(1) r2 
CIT  
Index 
Jan.2006 - 
Oct.2014 
-0.102 
[0.190] 
-8.698** 
[1.959] 
0.259 
[0.914] 
-0.005 
[0.003] 
0.007 
[0.008] 
0.006 
[0.004] 
-0.004** 
[0.001] 
0.682 0.4721 
DCOT  
Swap 
Jun.2006 - 
Oct.2014 
-0.101 
[0.155] 
-5.794** 
[1.989] 
-1.515 
[0.947] 
-0.003 
[0.003] 
-0.002 
[0.008] 
0.001 
[0.004] 
-0.003** 
[0.001] 
0.807 0.5816 
IID  
Index 
Jun.2010 - 
Oct.2014 
-0.404* 
[0.154] 
-7.670 
[5.000] 
0.992* 
[0.369] 
-0.015 
[0.041] 
-0.037* 
[0.018] 
-0.022 
[0.027] 
-0.006 
[0.004] 
0.553 0.4233 
Results Passive Trader Stronger Assumptions 
  Return Roll Vola. Interest  Correl. Inflation Ex.-rate Adj. R2 AR(1) r2 
CIT  
Index 
Jan.2006 - 
Oct.2014 
0.153 
[0.296] 
-11.27** 
[1.648] 
1.448 
[0.799] 
-0.000 
[0.003] 
0.009** 
[0.003] 
0.030* 
[0.008] 
-0.005** 
[0.001] 
0.714 0.5273 
DCOT  
Swap 
Jun.2006 - 
Oct.2014 
0.248 
[0.304] 
-7.985** 
[1.940] 
-0.705 
[0.760] 
0.001 
[0.003] 
0.021* 
[0.009] 
0.003 
[0.003] 
-0.004** 
[0.001] 
0.820 0.5890 
IID  
Index 
Jun.2010 - 
Oct.2014 
0.405 
[0.596] 
-0.670 
[5.713] 
0.609 
[0.476] 
-0.035 
[0.044] 
-0.013 
[0.025] 
-0.034 
[0.031] 
-0.005 
[0.004] 
0.402 0.5165 
Notes: Newey-West robust standard error, lag truncation 12. All independent variables 
are lagged once and the regression is estimated as an AR(1) process (the lag is excluded if 
found insignificant). Residuals are tested for normality, autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity. The null hypothesis of spherical residuals cannot be rejected at the 
5 % level in all cases. AR(1) r2 is the partial r-square of the autoregressive component. * 
indicates significance at the 1 % level, and ** at the 5% level respectively.  
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Differences in results obtained from different proxies for index investment are explained 
by the extent to which these positions resemble another for a particular market. For wheat, 
all three position series move in parallel, with a slight underestimation of CIT and IID 
index net-positions by the swap category (Figure 3.9).  
Figure 3.9: Index Traders’ Positions by CIT, DCOT and IID 
(net-long in thousands, Jun. 2010–Oct. 2014)  
Wheat Cocoa Coffee 
   
 
Source: CFTC, Various Reports. 
In contrast, for the cocoa market, swap positions are detached from index positions 
provided by the two other reports. Hence, many of the swap positions in the cocoa market 
are unrelated to index investment. For the coffee market, positions are more closely related 
to one another than for cocoa until mid-2013. Thereafter net-long swap and CIT index 
positions declined while IID index data show an increase. This means that swap traders 
and other traders acting as index investors went short in their non-index related businesses 
over this period. A potential reason might be the prolonged price decline in coffee between 
2011 and 2014, which could have forced traders into short positions. A similar, but weaker, 
dynamic is observed for the cocoa and wheat market. Another explanation is the decline in 
oil prices, which caused investors to bet on falling prices across markets. 
Against the evidence provided, it can be concluded that diversification considerations, like 
changes in exchange rates and expected inflation, have regained importance since 2008. 
Opportunity costs had a continuous negative impact on index investment, at least in cocoa 
and coffee markets. Commodity market-specific returns continue to be unimportant for 
index traders’ investment decisions. While previously, index total returns had a decisive 
impact on index traders’ investment decisions, the importance of large basket indices seems 
to have declined since 2008, probably in favour of more market-specific sub-indices. Most 
interesting is the fact that the relationship between roll yield and index investment has 
changed from strongly positive to strongly negative for all three markets under analysis. 
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One possible explanation is innovations in the structure of indices towards roll optimised 
indices. Another explanation might be that index traders have caused a larger carry and 
hence the negative relationship. The reverse relationship, with roll yield as the dependent 
variable, has been estimated and found significant and negative as well. Furthermore, the 
coefficient on index net positions is found time invariant in this reverse regression59, which 
supports this conjecture.  
Table 3.13: Estimation Results Non-Commercial Traders’ Strategies 
Results Wheat 
 Return Roll Volatility Interest  Hedging Buy Sell Adj. R2 AR(1) r2 
CIT (Jan. 2006 – Oct. 2014) 
Ncom 0.334 
[0.249] 
-0.967 
[1.089] 
-0.410 
[0.884] 
0.007* 
[0.003] 
0.019 
[0.089] 
-0.002 
[0.002] 
0.001 
[0.001] 
0.641 0.3359 
DCOT (Jun. 2006 – Oct. 2014) 
Mm 0.556 
[0.403] 
-0.641 
[1.529] 
0.249 
[1.532] 
0.010* 
[0.005] 
0.075 
[0.174] 
-0.003 
[0.003] 
0.001 
[0.002] 
0.609 0.1941 
Other -0.033 
[0.145] 
0.472 
[0.531] 
-0.881* 
[0.448] 
-0.004* 
[0.002] 
-0.042 
[0.034] 
0.000 
[0.001] 
0.000 
[0.000] 
0.590 0.4128 
Swap -0.144 
[0.302] 
-2.322* 
[0.993] 
1.175 
[0.729] 
0.008** 
[0.003] 
0.021 
[0.062] 
0.001 
[0.001] 
-0.001 
[0.001] 
0.748 0.6024 
Results Cocoa 
 Return Roll Volatility Interest  Hedging Buy Sell Adj. R2 AR(1) r2 
CIT (Jan. 2006 – Oct. 2014) 
Ncom -0.354 
[0.690] 
-2.217 
[5.989] 
0.948 
[1.939] 
-0.003 
[0.005] 
0.276* 
[0.134] 
0.002 
[0.003] 
0.003** 
[0.001] 
0.759 0.4573 
DCOT (Jun. 2006 – Oct. 2014) 
Mm -0.143 
[0.850] 
-9.763 
[7.049] 
1.195 
[2.470] 
-0.005 
[0.005] 
0.226 
[0.232] 
0.003 
[0.004] 
0.003** 
[0.001] 
0.736 0.2043 
Other 0.272* 
[0.128] 
0.180 
[1.433] 
-0.066 
[0.412] 
-0.003* 
[0.001] 
-0.007 
[0.010] 
-0.0004 
[0.001] 
-0.0005* 
[0.000] 
0.627 0.2816 
Swap -0.466* 
[0.209] 
1.012 
[2.037] 
0.791 
[0.715] 
-0.004 
[0.002] 
0.001 
[0.016] 
-0.002 
[0.002] 
0.001** 
[0.000] 
0.691 0.6946 
Results Coffee 
 Return Roll Volatility Interest  Hedging Buy Sell Adj. R2 AR(1) r2 
CIT (Jan. 2006 – Oct. 2014) 
Ncom -0.351 
[0.413] 
-2.301 
[2.490] 
0.074 
[1.653] 
-0.002 
[0.006] 
0.073 
[0.122] 
0.001 
[0.003] 
0.003** 
[0.001] 
0.716 0.2539 
DCOT (Jun. 2006 – Oct. 2014) 
Mm -0.150 
[0.544] 
1.780 
[3.748] 
2.903 
[2.032] 
0.003 
[0.007] 
-0.127 
[0.122] 
0.0001 
[0.003] 
0.004** 
[0.002] 
0.719 0.2605 
Other -0.137 
[0.157] 
-1.771 
[0.975] 
-0.020 
[0.610] 
-0.003 
[0.002] 
-0.021 
[0.017] 
-0.0001 
[0.001] 
-0.0004 
[0.000] 
0.519 0.5257 
Swap -0.136 
[0.142] 
-2.766* 
[1.198] 
-2.212* 
[0.925] 
-0.003 
[0.003] 
-0.036 
[0.024] 
-0.001 
[0.001] 
-0.001 
[0.001] 
0.799 0.6207 
Notes: Newly-West robust standard errors are used. All independent variables are lagged 
once and the regression is estimated as an AR(1) process. Residuals are tested for 
normality, autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. The null hypothesis of spherical 
residuals cannot be rejected at the 5 % level in all cases. AR(1) r2 is the partial r-square of 
the autoregressive component. * indicates significance at the 1 % level, and ** at the 5% 
level respectively.   
In addition to index investment, other non-commercial traders’ strategies are analysed. As 
hypothesised previously, non-commercial traders can either be informed or uninformed. 
Uninformed traders are thought to rely on technical indicators like buy and sell-signals as 
well as past returns, while informed traders take market fundamentals and hedgers’ demand 
into consideration. Results for all three markets are summarised in Table 3.13. For the 
wheat and cocoa market, the relationship between interest rates and net-long positions is 
                                                 
59 Results are not reported here, but similar evidence and a discussion is presented in Chapter 4. 
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significantly positive, with the notable exception of the other non-commercial trader 
category (institutional investors and investment banks). Regarding the two smaller markets, 
cocoa and coffee, sell-indicators are significant among especially those trader groups 
associated with short-term trading strategies like money managers (hedge funds and other 
commodity funds). Volatility is found to affect institutional investors’ positions as well as 
swap traders’ positions negatively, while the effect is positive for money managers’ 
positions. This is expected since money managers are known to have a shorter trading 
horizon and lower risk aversion.   
Table 3.14: Estimation Results Commercial Traders’ Strategies  
Results Wheat 
 Return Volatility Interest Hedg. Eff. Basis ExRate Carry Adj. R2 AR(1) r2 
CIT (Jan. 2006 – Oct. 2014) 
Com -0.470** 
[0.174] 
0.056 
[1.235] 
-0.005 
[0.005] 
0.015 
[0.019] 
-0.0002 
[0.000] 
0.0002 
[0.001] 
-0.0001 
[0.000] 
0.697 0.5357 
DCOT (Jun. 2006 – Oct. 2014) 
Pm -0.785** 
[0.207] 
0.757 
[1.625] 
-0.012* 
[0.005] 
-0.006 
[0.021] 
-0.0001 
[0.000] 
0.001 
[0.001] 
-0.0003 
[0.000] 
0.666 0.4536 
Results Cocoa 
 Return Volatility Interest Hedg. Eff. Basis ExRate Carry Adj. R2 AR(1) r2 
CIT (Jan. 2006 – Oct. 2014) 
Com 0.434 
[0.838] 
-1.711 
[2.037] 
0.002 
[0.006] 
0.018 
[0.112] 
0.0002* 
[0.000] 
-0.001 
[0.002] 
0.0004 
[0.000] 
0.686 0.5791 
DCOT (Jun. 2006 – Oct. 2014) 
Pm 0.160 
[0.884] 
-0.396 
[2.831] 
0.003 
[0.005] 
0.033 
[0.112] 
0.0002* 
[0.000] 
-0.003 
[0.002] 
0.0004 
[0.000] 
0.719 0.5677 
Results Coffee 
 Return Volatility Interest Hedg. Eff. Basis ExRate Carry Adj. R2 AR(1) r2 
CIT (Jan. 2006 – Oct. 2014) 
Com 0.313 
[0.372] 
-1.082 
[1.413] 
-0.004 
[0.007] 
-0.090 
[0.191] 
0.002 
[0.002] 
-0.001 
[0.002] 
0.003 
[0.005] 
0.704 0.6564 
DCOT (Jun. 2006 – Oct. 2014) 
Pm 0.433 
[0.503] 
-1.33 
[1.924] 
-0.008 
[0.008] 
-0.107 
[0.197] 
0.003 
[0.002] 
-0.001 
[0.002] 
0.005 
[0.005] 
0.749 0.6754 
Notes: Newly-West robust standard errors are used. All independent variables are lagged 
once and the regression is estimated as an AR(1) process. Residuals are tested for 
normality, autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. The null hypothesis of spherical 
residuals cannot be rejected at the 5 % level in all cases. AR(1) r2 is the partial r-square of 
the autoregressive component. * indicates significance at the 1 % level, and ** at the 5% 
level respectively.   
In a third step, trading motives by commercial traders, that are believed to be 
predominantly hedgers, are analysed (Table 3.14). For the wheat market, only returns are 
significant and negative in line with the hedging pressure hypothesis. Hedgers’ positions 
tend to be negatively related to interest rates, which is linked to inventory choices, since 
inventory holdings are more costly in a high interest rate environment. For the cocoa 
market, a positive relationship between market basis and net-long hedging positions is 
found. If the basis rises, that is if the cash price is greater than the expiring futures contract 
price, future owners of the physical product have to over-hedge in order to gain protection. 
For instance, if the cash price declines less than the futures price a hedger would gain less 
in her short physical position than she would lose in her long futures positions. In order to 
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compensate this effect, she would have to over-hedge, which explains the positive 
relationship. 
3.5 Conclusion  
Assumptions made about extrapolative and herding strategies employed by speculative 
traders under uncertainty are supported by the findings presented in this chapter. An 
increase in traders’ reliance on technical indicators is observed since the early 2000s, 
concurrently with the liquidity inflow over this period. The use of technical indicators was 
boosted further around 2007 with the introduction of electronic trading platforms. Short-
term traders are found to be risk-averse on average, however in varying degrees. During 
price slumps, an increase in risk aversion is detected, and during price highs, a decrease in 
risk aversion. These findings support the cognitive phenomena referred to in the bounded 
rationality literature. Moreover, small traders are found to engage in herding strategies, 
particularly regarding commercial hedgers’ positions.  
Results further confirm the heterogeneity assumption regarding behavioural traits of 
different trader groups. Index traders do not react to market-specific returns, but to 
diversification benefits and return considerations relevant to their passive investment 
strategy. However, index strategies have changed significantly, not only regarding 
diversification benefits, but also in relation to returns. Changes in coefficient estimates 
suggest that index traders have moved away from large basket commodity indices towards 
roll adjusted and more commodity-specific indices. Moreover, managed money funds are 
found to be less risk-averse and more short-term oriented in their trading strategies than 
institutional investors and investment banks. Funds are found to base their trading 
strategies, at least to some extent, on technical trading indicators, as suggested by the 
literature. The findings also support the hedging pressure theory and suggest that 
commercial hedgers take hedging effectiveness and storage costs into consideration when 
taking positions. 
It can be conclude that, despite various shortcomings in the data available, convincing 
evidence in favour of the assumptions made by the financialisation hypothesis has been 
found. Uninformed speculative traders engage in extrapolative trading and herding, and 
traders active in the market are heterogeneous in their investment motives and trading 
strategies. However, parameter instability unveils the difficulty to attribute trader-position 
data to investment strategies. Results suggest that strategies change dynamically and not 
independently of market developments. 
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Identified shortcomings in trader-position data have important repercussions for the 
analyses of the following two empirical chapters. Firstly, while herding and trend following 
behaviour was identified via volume and open interest data, this behaviour could not be 
assigned to a defined trader category. Traders in other categories than the index trader 
category appear to be too heterogeneous in their trading strategies to make meaningful 
inference about their behaviour on the basis of the predefined categories. Given the data 
constraints, the following analyses will predominantly focus on the role of index traders.  
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Chapter 4 Futures and Cash Market Linkages 
4.1 Introduction 
Commodity futures markets fulfil two key functions: price discovery and risk management. 
The orderly performance of these functions critically depends on the close relationship 
between the physical and derivative markets. These are tied together by common 
fundamentals (fundamental arbitrage), as well as the possibility of arbitrage between these 
markets (spatial arbitrage). In the context of the discussion in Chapter 2: Section 2.4, it is 
argued that if spatial arbitrage is limited and if factors driving price dynamics in the futures 
market systematically differ from factors driving prices in the physical market, these 
divergences show in a large basis which is carried from one contract to the next. If 
fundamental arbitrage does not happen and spatial arbitrage is limited, non-convergence 
between cash and futures prices at a futures contract’s maturity date can emerge (see 
Figure 2.5).  
In recent years, the market basis for many commodities reached unprecedented levels and 
non-convergence became a frequent phenomenon. On the basis of hypotheses 
substantiated in Chapter 2 and evidence presented in Chapter 3, this Chapter 4 links 
traders’ behaviour to the increasing basis risk and the non-convergence of prices. 
Hypotheses are empirically tested for the wheat and cocoa market. Both markets exhibited 
large market basis and limits to spatial arbitrage in recent years which makes them good 
case studies60.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 elaborates on arguments 
made by the financialisation hypothesis and sets out implications for the relationship 
between the futures and the underlying physical market. Section 3 analyses the continuous 
relationship between cash and futures markets. The co-integrating relationship between 
price series is modelled and amended by cost of carry and risk premium variables. Further, 
tests for structural breaks are conducted and regime changes identified. Section 4 
investigates potential reasons for the occurrence and extent of consecutive non-
convergence by testing various hypotheses raised in the literature as well as alternative 
interpretations derived from the financialisation hypothesis in this thesis. Section 5 
summarises the key findings.  
                                                 
60 Space constraints do not permit to extent the analysis to the coffee market. The coffee market serves as a 
cases study in the next Chapter 5. 
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4.2  The Fragile Relationship between Futures and Cash Markets 
A close relationship between price dynamics in physical and futures markets is ensured by 
two underlying mechanisms: (1) common market fundamentals, which equally drive price 
formation in both markets, and (2) spatial arbitrage opportunities, which arise if prices in 
these two markets deviate. Various studies have investigated the relationship between 
futures and their underlying physical markets. The objective of these studies is twofold. 
Firstly, they seek to test whether markets are efficient and well behaved, that is, whether 
there exists a clearly defined and stable long-run relationship between the cash and the 
futures market. If such a relationship breaks down or varies over time, those events are 
ascribed to inefficiencies and market failure. Secondly, they seek to establish a lead–lag 
relationship between the two markets with the aim of testing which market incorporates 
any new information first.  
Although theories, as reviewed in Chapter 2: Section 2.2–3, agree on a close relationship 
between cash and futures markets, they disagree on the channels through which the link is 
enforced, as well as the direction of price signals from one market to the other. 
Conceptually, futures prices are derived from cash market prices by accounting for carry 
costs in a no-arbitrage equation. Cash market prices, in turn, are governed by supply and 
demand in a general equilibrium framework. Pindyck’s (2001) structural model is 
symptomatic of such an approach. In his model, the futures market is thought to mirror 
developments in the physical market and as such reveals useful information about the more 
opaque cash and storage markets. However, he fails to discuss the mechanisms through 
which information enters the futures market and hence how prices are formed. While he 
asserts that the futures market follows the cash market, his model does not suggest or 
explain a direction of causation. 
The efficient market hypothesis, in contrast, allows price formation to take place in the 
futures market since the driving force of price discovery is thought to be traders’ 
expectations. Demand and supply in the physical commodity market only indirectly enter 
the futures market through traders’ expectation formation. In such a framework, 
information efficiency dictates that both futures and cash markets should be perfectly and 
contemporaneously correlated at all times and one should not lead the other (Brooks, Rew 
and Ritson 2001). Only if one market incorporates information more slowly than the other, 
i.e., one market is informationally inefficient, does a lead–lag relationship arise61. Attempts 
                                                 
61 The reason for lead–lag relationships between markets is not necessary inefficiency as shall be argued in 
Chapters 6 and 7 of the thesis. 
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to expose lead–lag relationships between markets are motivated by the assumption that 
both markets are driven by the same fundamentals and hence move towards the same 
fundamental value. If this assumption holds, the market that resembles the fundamental 
value first, i.e., incorporates new information faster and more accurately, firstly indicates 
potential arbitrage opportunities and secondly serves an important price discovery function 
for the other market. 
The question of which market is leading is important also from the financialisation point of 
view. If the futures market is serving a price discovery function for the physical market, 
deviations from the fundamental value in the financial market due to speculative 
investments could easily spill over to the physical market. Although a lead–lag relationship 
does not prove causality, it could add evidence to a more thorough analysis as presented in 
Chapters 6 and 7. For example, it is known that the commodity futures market is often 
considered as a benchmark by practitioners for physical transactions. This is because 
financial markets are perceived as more transparent and more liquid, and because trading 
involves almost no transaction costs and is close to frictionless (Brooks, Rew and Ritson 
2001). The physical market, by contrast is considered to be opaque and prone to 
externalities.  
Another subject of empirical investigations is the question of whether the equilibrium 
relationship suggested by theory holds. The theory of storage and the theory of risk 
premium provide explanations for the deviation—despite common fundamentals—
between cash and futures prices over a contract’s life cycle. These are based on features, 
which distinguish the derivative from the underlying physical product. Since these features 
vanish with a futures contract’s maturity, futures and cash markets are notionally forced to 
converge over time—if physical delivery is possible. Similarly, the efficient market 
hypothesis explains price deviations by differences in the product itself, such as quality, 
origin, etc. Theoretical approaches alike argue for a stable long-run equilibrium relationship 
between cash and futures markets. Systematic and prolonged deviations from the 
equilibrium are ascribed to externalities, like transaction costs and market failure.  
This thesis argues otherwise. In Chapter 2: Section 2.4 it is questioned whether 
fundamental arbitrage is always riskless. It is argued that if the market weight of 
uninformed speculators, who obscure the information content of commodity futures 
markets, grows, fundamental arbitrage becomes impossible and markets can move away 
from their fundamental value for a prolonged period of time. In such a market regime, 
factors driving price discovery in physical and financial markets differ. With inconsistent 
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demand signals, prices and market basis might become highly volatile and hedging 
effectiveness declines. This thesis hypothesises that if limits to spatial arbitrage exist, the 
price differential, which is caused by distinct factors driving price formation in both 
markets, can build up over a contract’s life cycle and can be carried over from one contract 
to the next. This results in convergence failure and a large market basis. While a volatile 
basis and the declining hedging effectiveness show the failure of fundamental arbitrage, 
non-convergence only occurs in the additional presence of limits to spatial arbitrage. Such 
cases of limits to spatial arbitrage are of special interest, not only because these became 
more frequent over the last decade (Irwin and Sanders 2010), but also because the extent of 
the basis at a contract's maturity date gives some indication of the extent to which factors 
driving prices in the futures diverge from factors driving prices in the physical market.  
Figure 4.1 summarises how speculation in commodity futures markets is revealed in 
dynamics in the cash–futures relationship if limits to both fundamental and spatial arbitrage 
exist. These effects, large volatile basis and convergence failure, will be analysed in the 
following two sub-sections in turn. 
Figure 4.1: Speculative Investment and Limits to Arbitrage 
 
Source: Author. 
For the following empirical analyses, the cocoa and wheat markets are chosen as case 
studies. Both markets recently exhibited a large basis and incidences of non-convergence. 
They make an interesting comparative case, since the relative market weight of passive 
traders is different (see Chapter 3) and the sign of the basis is reversed. While in the wheat 
market physical wheat was trading significantly below the futures market price, in the cocoa 
market the case was the reverse.  
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4.3 Basis Risk and Market Failure  
The close relationship between physical and futures markets is of immediate importance 
for market practitioners, who seek to hedge their physical exposure via futures positions. If 
price dynamics and price levels in both markets diverge, the effectiveness of hedging 
strategies diminishes. The market basis measures the difference in price levels, while a 
measure for hedging effectiveness regarding dynamics is one minus the ratio between the 
variance of the hedge (basis) and the physical position (cash price). 
If the variance of the hedge, relative to the variance in the outright physical position is 
relatively small, the measure is close to one and the hedge is considered effective. 
Figure 4.2 depicts the hedging effectiveness measure for the cocoa and wheat markets over 
the time period from January 2000 to December 2013. For the cocoa market, the measure 
is close to one until 2008 when it starts decreasing. Especially from 2010 onwards, hedging 
effectiveness rapidly deteriorates and the volatility of the hedge outperforms the volatility 
of the outright physical position on several occasions. For the wheat market, the volatility 
of hedging positions frequently exceeded the volatility of the physical position since 2000, 
and in earlier times not depicted. 
Figure 4.2: Hedging Effectiveness 
(daily monthly, Jan. 2000–Dec. 2013) 
Cocoa 
 
Wheat 
 
Notes: The underlying cash positions are Cocoa Ivory Coast beans and Wheat No.2 
Hard (Kansas). Source: Datastream (author’s calculation). 
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An exceptionally high basis occurred over the last decade in the cocoa and wheat market 
(Figure 4.3). Although low hedging effectiveness in the wheat market does not necessarily 
coincide with a large basis, when the wheat market basis exceeded $2 per bushel of wheat 
(in absolute terms) in mid-2008, the hedging effectiveness measure was relatively low and 
large spikes in the basis are accompanied by a negative hedging effectiveness measure. For 
the cocoa market the increase in the size of the market basis clearly coincides with a 
decrease in hedging effectiveness. The basis of cocoa from four different origins increased 
from about 2006 onwards and peaked in late 2008 and again in mid-2010. There is a small 
lag with which hedging effectiveness is restored after the basis shrinks. This is probably due 
to the fact that the hedging effectiveness measure is calculated with backward looking 
variances. Hence the value on a particular day does capture the last month’s market 
adjustment mechanisms, which might have brought down the market basis already. 
Figure 4.3: Market Basis for Various Cash Markets 
(daily monthly average) 
Cocoa 
(in USD per ton, Jan. 2000–Dec.2013) 
 
 
Wheat  
(in USD per bushel, Jan. 2000–Dec.2012) 
 
Source: Datastream; US Merchant; USDA (author’s calculation).   
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referred to as the two-to-one calendar spread). The spread is calculated taking the 
difference of the two next-to-maturity March and May futures contracts until the maturity 
date of the March contract. At this date both contracts are rolled over into the 
consecutively maturing March and May contracts. Large spikes at the maturity of the 
March contract imply that either the price for the May contract suddenly drops (shoots up) 
or the price of the March contract shoots up (drops). The latter is likely the case in the 
presence of a large basis. At the contract’s maturity, arbitrage traders try to exploit the basis 
and hence drive the futures price of the maturing contract upward if the market is in 
backwardation and downward if the market is in contango. The extent of the spike then 
reveals the degree of previous detachment between futures and cash markets.  
Figure 4.4: Continuous Daily May-March Spread  
(Jan. 2000–Nov. 2012) 
Cocoa 
 
Wheat 
 
Source: Datastream (author’s calculation). 
Particularly large spikes are observed between 2009 and 2012 for the cocoa market and 
volatility in the spread increases from 2008 onwards. These patterns probably arise due to 
large price adjustments at the end of the March contracts, since the spikes coincide with a 
large market basis and low hedging effectiveness. Further, the spread between the March 
and May contracts appears to increase over the March contract’s life cycle. This is expected 
since the March contract approaches the cash price towards its maturity date while the 
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2008–09 in the presence of physical shortages that result in an inverted market (Figure 4.5). 
The wheat market shows similar patterns, which are interrupted between 2007 and 2008 
when the spread turns negative and exceptionally large, reaching more than $1.20 per 
bushel of wheat. This spike coincides with a large market basis. Further, after 2008 the 
spread flattens out, not showing any market adjustment at the March contract's maturity 
dates, although the market basis remains high until mid-2010. This anomaly is addressed in 
greater detail in Section 4.4. 
Following general equilibrium theories, a volatile market basis and large market adjustments 
are linked to changes in market fundamentals, especially changes in inventories. For cocoa, 
a large positive market basis (backwardation) was partly accompanied by a relatively low 
stock-to-grinding ratio indicating shortages in physical supply (Figure 4.5). In the presence 
of shortages, the futures price is expected to be downward-biased through the convenience 
yield, resulting in a positive basis. However, the extent of the basis remains puzzling. 
Although the large adjustment in the two-to-one spread  and a large basis occurred in a 
year where supply fell short of demand, this event is unlikely to solely account for the spike 
in the spread and the basis size, since an even larger decline in end-of-season stocks was 
observable in 2006, while the calendar spread did not show any striking features 
(Figure 4.4) and the basis remained relatively small (Figure 4.3).  
Figure 4.5: Cocoa Stock-to-Grinding Ratio and Changes in End-of-Season Stock 
(annual, 1999–2013) 
 
Source: ICCO, Quarterly Bulleting of Cocoa Statistics (author’s calculation). 
For wheat, the market basis turned negative during a time of abundance, which occurred 
due to an exceptionally good harvest in the 2008/09 crop season (Figure 4.6). Again, this is 
expected since in times of abundance the convenience yield is small and storage costs high, 
resulting in a large carry, i.e., upward bias of the futures price relative to the cash price (a 
move into contango). The previously low stock-to-use ratio in 2007 coincides with large 
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price adjustments at the future contracts’ maturity dates and a backwardation, which is 
reflected in a negative two-to-one spread (Figure 4.4). 
Figure 4.6: Wheat Stock-to-Use Ratio and Changes in End-of-Year Stock 
(annual, 1999–2014) 
 
Source: USDA Wheat Yearbook, Table 5 (author’s calculation). 
Cocoa and wheat markets differ not only in the sign of the market basis, but also in the 
composition of traders active in the market. While the cocoa market is generally dominated 
by commercial traders with little index investment, the wheat market is dominated by non-
commercial traders with a significant share of index traders (see Figure 3.5). 
Both markets recently experienced periods of exceptionally high market basis, although 
with opposing signs, and consequently abrupt price adjustments at the contracts’ 
maturities. These events can partly be related to changes in supply and demand patterns. 
However, especially for the wheat market, dynamics in the market basis and volatility 
remain puzzling. In the following, the relationship between cash and futures prices over the 
last decade will be analysed and linked to trader composition.  
4.3.1 Data and Methodology  
No-arbitrage conditions suggest that there is a stable long-run equilibrium relationship 
between futures and cash market prices and that price series do not drift apart over time. 
This means deviations are stationary (Brooks 2008, 344). This condition is exploited by co-
integration analysis. Two time series are co-integrated if the residual series of the co-
integrating regression is stationary. If co-integration is confirmed arbitrage is effective 
(Gregory and Hansen 1996).  
The conjecture that futures markets tend to incorporate new information on market 
fundamentals faster than physical markets is supported by many empirical studies—e.g., 
Asche and Guttormsen (2002), Garbade and Silber (1938), Kuiper, Pennings and 
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Meulenberg (2002). Nevertheless, some studies find that lead–lag relationships are bi-
directional—e.g., Mahalik, Acharya and Babum (2009), Lagi, et al. (2011); that lead–lag 
relationships are time variant—e.g., Silvapulle and Moosa (1999), Crain and Lee (1996), 
Baldi, Peri and Vandone (2011); and that the cash market is leading the futures market—
e.g., Mohan and Love (2004), Quan (1992). However, empirical studies univocally detect a 
long-run relationship between cash and futures markets, but the answer to the question of 
which market is the leading one appears to differ with markets and observation periods 
(see Appendix 4.1). In the following, I will adopt methodologies used in previous studies 
including Granger non-causality tests, co-integrating residual ADF (CRADF) tests and 
ECMs for an analysis of the wheat and cocoa markets.  
The concept of co-integration reaches back to Engel and Granger (1987), according to 
whom the co-integrating relationship between commodity futures and cash prices at time t 
can be specified as in Equation 4.1.  is the futures price,  is the cash price, xD is the co-
integrating vector, and n is the equilibrium error that is the deviation from the equilibrium 
relationship at time t.  
 = x@  xD  n (4.1) 
Equation 4.1 captures the long-run relationship between futures and cash prices. The co-
integrating vector is considered to be time invariant. For a co-integrating vector to exist, 
both time series have to be integrated to the same order—commonly I(1)—and the 
equilibrium error has to be stationary, that is integrated to the order zero, I(0). 
The theories of storage and risk premium amend this long-run equilibrium relationship by 
adding interest rates [y], storage costs [], convenience yield [z] and risk premium [	]. 
Following the hedging pressure and financialisation hypotheses, additional factors are 
suggested, which are index pressure and speculative investments [{]. If and only if these 
factors are stationary, the equilibrium error in Equation 4.1 can be assumed to be stationary 
as well. The fully amended regression equation specifying the long-run equilibrium reads as 
follows: 
 = M  1  x@y  xD  xiz  xk	  x|{  n (4.2) 
In order to conduct a co-integration analysis, the time series under consideration need to 
be continuous. For both cocoa and wheat up to nine futures contracts with different 
maturity dates are traded simultaneously. A continuous time series for futures prices is 
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constructed by taking the next-to-maturity contract and rolling it over into the second next-
to-maturity contract once the maturity date of the first contract is reached. Therein, the 
effect of carry costs is smallest. Complications arising from non-stationary carry variables 
are hence limited and Equation 4.1 is expected to hold. However, the results might give a 
misleading picture of hedging effectiveness, since hedgers often take positions in deferred 
contracts. Hence, an additional specification for the continuous futures price is proposed, 
which is the weighted average of all simultaneously traded futures contracts. The weights 
are estimated by the share of each contract’s open interest in total market open interest. 
Hence, contracts which have a stronger trader interest receive a higher weight. Price and 
open interest data are obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream. The no. 2 soft red 
winter wheat spot price at St. Louis, provided by the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA), is chosen as the wheat cash price. For cocoa, the Ivory Coast good 
fermented cocoa cash price, provided by the Cocoa Merchants Association of America62 
(CMAA) is chosen.    
Carry and risk variables are also considered. These include interest rate, storage costs, 
convenience yield, systematic risk, hedging pressure and speculative demand. The interest 
rate is approximated by the US dollar based LIBOR rate plus 200 basis points, which is 
obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream. Storage costs are unfortunately not publicly 
available, but since they are known to vary little over time the bias introduced by omitting 
those should be minimal. The convenience yield is latent and conceptually thought to vary 
with the level and change of inventory. For the cocoa market, inventory data are provided 
by the ‘Cocoa Warehouse Stock Report’, published monthly by the ICE Report Center. For 
the wheat market, data on inventory levels are not available in monthly frequency. USDA 
Wheat Yearbook Table 5 is used instead, which provides end-of-quarter data. In order to 
derive a time series at monthly frequency, the quarterly entries are matched with the last 
month of the respective quarter. The remaining months are interpolated. Systematic risk is 
approximated by Pearson’s correlation coefficient between the S&P 500 index and 
commodity prices over the past three years. 
Hedging pressure is calculated based on the COT report and the CIT supplement. Every 
last Thursday of a month’s observation is used. For the COT data set, hedging pressure is 
calculated, following De Roon, Nijman and Veld (2000) and Acharya, Lochstoer and 
                                                 
62 The price is based on differentials collected by a weekly survey conducted by the association among its 
regular members.  
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Ramadorai (2013)63, by taking the net-long commercial positions normalised by total open 
interest:  
Ls2t = }~wWmJ2fW (4.3) 
For the CIT data set, it is possible to differentiate between index pressure and hedging 
pressure. Two variables are calculated on the basis of the sum of the net-long index and 
commercial traders’ positions normalised by total open interest:  
Ls2t = }~wW  ywWmJ2fW ,			y|}~wW| > ywW 	0,																															y	|}~wW| < ywW  
L> = }~wW  ywWmJ2fW ,			y|}~wW| < ywW 	0,																															y	|}~wW| > ywW  
(4.4) 
Unfortunately, the CIT data only cover the time period January 2006 to December 2013, 
while the COT data reach back to April 1995. Hypotheses made regarding the impact of 
passive traders on futures prices can hence only be tested for a smaller data set. Because of 
the small sample constraint, both the COT and CIT data sets are used, despite the 
limitations identified with the former. In addition to the hedging and index pressure 
variables, index traders’ market weight is included, defined as the average percentage share 
of index traders’ open interest (long plus short) in total open interest. Seasonality in the 
data is controlled for by taking annual differences. The logarithm of prices is taken. The 
full data set ranges from April 1996 to December 2013.  
ADF tests are conducted with a constant, and with a constant and a trend on variables in 
annual differences to identify the order of integration. Results are reported in Appendix 
4.2, Tables 4.2.1–3 for coca and Tables 4.2.4–6 for wheat. All time series are found to be 
first difference stationary. In addition, all price series are found to be integrated to the 
order one.  
                                                 
63 These studies use a slightly different indicator, with		ds2t = s2tF . In order to make the indicator 
comparable to the index pressure variable, both hedging pressure and index pressure are net-long positions 
and standardized by total open interest.  
 
130 
4.3.2 Lead–Lag and Co-integrating Relationship 
In a first step, the lead–lag relationship between futures and the underlying cash market is 
identified by Granger non-causality tests. According to Granger (1969) a random variable 
Yt is said to ‘cause’ another random variable Xt if it is “better able to predict Xt using all 
available information than if the information apart from Yt has been used”.  
Since the price series under consideration are non-stationary, a procedure proposed by 
Toda and Yamamoto (1995) is used. A VAR model is estimated including the cash and the 
futures price in logarithms as endogenous variables. The order of the VAR is determined 
using the Schwarz information criterion (SIC) with a maximum lag length of 12. An 
additional m lags are added to the optimal lag length found, with m being the maximum 
order of integration of the included variables. In the present case m=1. 
In order to prepare for a later analysis which, due to data restrictions, demands separating 
the full sample into sub-samples, additional Granger non-causality tests are run for the sub-
samples April 1996 to December 2005 and January 2006 to December 2013. Both the 
relationship between cash prices (spot) and the continuous time series of close to delivery 
futures prices (fcont) and the relationship between cash prices (spot) and the weighted 
average of simultaneously traded active contracts (fwa) are analysed. Full results are 
reported in Appendix 4.3. 
For the cocoa market, the null hypothesis of fcont not leading spot can be rejected at the five 
per cent level for the full sample and both sub-samples. No evidence is found for the 
reverse case of spot leading fcont. Further, no significant Granger causal relationship is found 
between fwa and spot. This is not surprising since, for deferred contracts, omitted carry and 
risk variables gain importance when considering the relationship between cash and futures 
prices. For the wheat market, only for the later sub-period the null hypothesis of no 
Granger causality, that is spot leading fcont, can be rejected at the five per cent level. Weak 
evidence for the same relationship is found for the entire sample. Results do not change if 
taking fwa instead of fcont. The similarity between results for fcont and fwa in the case of 
wheat is probably caused by the high weight given to near-to-maturity contracts in the 
creation of fwa, especially before 2006 (see Figure 3.7). 
In a second step, the long-run equilibrium relationship as specified in Equation 4.1 is 
estimated. An ADF test is conducted on the residuals n with no constant (Dickey and 
Fuller 1979; Said and Dickey 1984). The lag length for the test regression is chosen by SIC. 
Residual diagnostics have been applied in order to test for remaining autocorrelation up to 
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the 12th lag, and additional lags are considered if residuals show remaining autocorrelation. 
Further, if heteroscedasticity is detected in the residuals, the Phillips-Perron test (PP) is 
used instead of the ADF test (Phillips and Perron 1988). In addition, the Kwiatkowski-
Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test is used in order to check for robustness of previous 
findings (Kwiatkowski, et al. 1992). As before, the observation period is split into two sub-
periods and estimated for forward (futures market is leading) and backward (cash market is 
leading) co-integration using fcont and fwa. 
Figure 4.7: Annual Difference of Logged Futures and Cash Prices 
(Apr. 1996–Dec. 2013) 
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Source: Datastream (author’s calculation). 
Graphically, cash and futures markets appear to have common dynamics (Figure 4.7). 
However, deviations are observable, especially for the wheat market in June 2005 and 
December 2011. Results for the co-integration analysis are reported in Appendix 4.4, Table 
4.4.1 for cocoa and Table 4.4.2 for wheat. Strong evidence for both forward and backward 
co-integration is found for the cocoa market. This is even true for the relationship between 
fwa and spot for which previously no Granger causality was found. The exception is the later 
sub-period for fcont where forward co-integration is rejected by KPSS at the five per cent 
level. Results for the wheat market resemble the cocoa market case and forward and 
backward co-integration is significant at the five per cent level for the full sample and both 
sub-samples. An exception is again the later sub-sample where in all cases co-integration is 
rejected at the five per cent level by KPSS. 
According to the Granger Representation Theorem, the relationship between two time 
series can be expressed as an ECM if these two series are co-integrated (Engle and Granger 
1987). By exploiting this theorem one can test for co-integration by testing whether the 
relationship between the variables can be expressed in an ECM. An ECM has the 
advantage that it incorporates the previous period’s disequilibrium error in the long-run 
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relationship. Both long-run and short-run dynamics can be modelled simultaneously with a 
test for co-integration (Banerjee, Dolado and Mestre 1998). Starting from a simple ARDL 
model for the cash–futures relationship, one can derive an ECM that incorporates the 
long-run equilibrium Equation 4.1, so that (the derivation is provided in Appendix 4.5):  
∆ = 1D∆  *($@ − x@ − xD$@)  ` (4.5) 
The [.] brackets above enclose the last period’s long-run equilibrium error. Hence, the long-
run coefficients are nested in the error correction term. The coefficient * indicates the 
speed with which the market adjusts to its long-run equilibrium, i.e., the extent to which 
the last period’s error is corrected. For the two time series to be co-integrated:	ρ < 0, that 
is, the speed of adjustment coefficient has to be significantly different from zero and 
negative. Since in the case of co-integration the t-statistics calculated do not follow the 
student t-distribution, Banerjee, Dolado and Mestre (1998), five per cent critical values are 
used. Regression Equation 4.6 is estimated: 
∆ = 1]  1@∗$@  1D∆  1i∗$@  ` (4.6) 
with 1] = −*x@, 1@∗ = *, and −*xD = 1i∗. Residual diagnostics are estimated and the 
optimal lag length is identified by testing downwards from a lag length of 12. Further, the 
model is re-estimated on the split sample. Results are reported in Appendix 4.6, Table 4.6.1 
for cocoa and Table 4.6.2 for wheat. 
ECM t-tests for the cocoa market confirm the existence of a co-integrating relationship 
between fcont and spot in all cases, but backward co-integration in the later sub-sample. For 
the relationship between fwa and spot a significant co-integrating relationship is found only 
for the full sample but not the sub-samples. In the case of the wheat market, results 
confirm findings by the KPSS test and reject a forward co-integrating relationship for the 
later sub-sample.  
Table 4.1 summarises the evidence gained regarding co-integration and direction of 
causation between futures and cash market prices. The cocoa market forward co-
integrating relationship between fcont and spot is found to be significant by all tests and only 
the KPSS test rejects the null of a co-integrating relationship for the later sub-sample. Less 
evidence is found for backward co-integration, given results from Granger non-causality 
tests. Regarding fwa, results are inconclusive regarding the question which market is leading. 
For the wheat market, in contrast to the cocoa market, most evidence is found for the 
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existence of a significant backward co-integrating relationship over the entire sample 
period, while forward co-integration is mostly rejected for the latter sub-period. Results are 
almost identical for fcont and fwa. 
Table 4.1: Summary Evidence on the Presence of a Co-integrating Relationship 
(at 5 % significance level) 
 Cocoa fcon-spot Cocoa fwa-spot Wheat fcon-spot Wheat fwa-spot 
 Forward 
(Y=S) 
Backward 
(Y=F) 
Forward 
(Y=S) 
Backward 
(Y=F) 
Forward 
(Y=S) 
Backward 
(Y=F) 
Forward 
(Y=S) 
Backward 
(Y=F) 
 F E L F E L F E L F E L F E L F E L F E L F E L 
Granger  O O O X X X X X X X X X X X X O X O X X X O X O 
CRADF O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 
KPSS O O X O O O O O O O O O O O X O O X O O X O O X 
ECM O O O O O X O X X O X X O O X O O O O X X O O O 
Σ “O” 11 8 7 7 7 10 6 10 
Notes: “O” indicates significance at the 5 % level of a co-integrating relationship and 
“X” indicates no significance respectively. “F” indicates estimation over the full sample, 
“E” the early sup-sample, and “L” the late sub-sample.  
In the following, explanatory variables, which capture variations in market fundamentals, 
risk components and speculation, are added to the co-integrating relationship. Assumptions 
made on the significance and impacts of these variables are assessed, and it is tested 
whether those additional variables control for potential structural breaks in the co-
integrating relationship between cash and futures markets. 
4.3.3 Conventional Theories and the Long-Run Equilibrium 
Following theories of storage and risk premium, deviations between cash and futures prices 
over a futures contract’s life cycle can be attributed to interest rates, costs of storage, and 
level of inventory relative to demand. The theory of the risk premium is more controversial 
and there are competing suggestions of what drives the premium. Among these are 
hedging pressure, idiosyncratic risk, and systematic risk. Linked to hedging pressure 
theories, an alternative driver of the premium has been identified by this thesis, which is 
index pressure (see Chapter 2: Section 2.4). With reference to Equation 4.2, the ECM 
regression Equation 4.6 is extended by these additional explanatory variables so that: 
∆ = 1]  1@$@  1D∆  1i$@ ^M>∆>,T>_@ ^M>∗>,$@
T
>_@  ` (4.7) 
with  explanatory variables , including the interest rate times the original cash outlay, 
storage costs, convenience yield, risk premium, and hedging and index pressure. The co-
integrating relationship is modelled as before. Table 4.2 summarises expected signs of 
estimated coefficients. 
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Table 4.2: Expected Signs of Explanatory Variables in Backward ECM  =  M  y J zJ, ∆J 	 L  
Theory 0 + + + – – +/–  =  M  jJm- J ∆J <}~	 L}~ Ly 
Expected 0 + + + + – – + 
If the regression is specified with the futures price as the dependent variable, the 
coefficients for  is expected to be strictly positive. Opportunity costs, that is, interest rate, 
are expected to be positively related as well. The storage rate should be a function of 
storage and is hence thought to increase with the level of storage and hence the coefficient 
for level of storage should be positive. The convenience yield is approximated by level and 
level change in inventories. Since the convenience yield should decrease with an increase in 
inventories and a higher level of inventories, the coefficient for level and for level change 
of inventories should be positive64. Following the theory of a risk premium, the coefficient 
on the risk variable is expected to be negative. The coefficient for hedging pressure is 
expected to be negative while it is expected to be positive for index pressure. If the 
regression is calculated with the cash market price being the dependent variable, 
coefficients are expected to switch signs. 
Equation 4.7 is run for both forward and backward co-integration taking fcont and fwa price 
series into consideration. By estimating both forward and backward co-integration, it is 
tested whether previously rejected cases of co-integration might turn out to be significant 
when controlling for carry, risk and speculative variables. Further, as before, the regression 
is estimated over the full sample and two smaller sub-samples, which split in January 2006. 
For the later sub-sample, index pressure and hedging pressure variables are jointly included 
in an alternative model specification. Full estimation results are reported in Appendix 4.7 
for cocoa and Appendix 4.8 for wheat. 
4.3.3.1 Results Cocoa 
Previously gained evidence suggests that the cocoa futures price is leading the cash prices, 
that is, that the two price series are forward co-integrated. Multivariate forward ECMs only 
reject the significance of a co-integrating relationship between fwa and spot for the early sub-
sample. Interestingly, a significant co-integrating relationship is found for all later sub-
sample cases where bivariate ECMs reject such a relationship. Hence, the previous 
rejection of a co-integrating relationship appears to be caused by omitting carry, risk and 
trader-position variables.  
                                                 
64 The coefficient for convenience yield should be negative but since there is an inverse relationship between 
storage and convenience yield the expected sign is the reverse. 
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Results of the multivariate forward ECMs are summarised in Table 4.3. Regression 
specifications for which no significant co-integrating relationship is found are left blank. 
The lagged level change short-run inventory variable is excluded due to multicollinearity 
and hence left blank in all cases. If a variable is significant at the five per cent level, the sign 
of the coefficient is provided. The insignificance of a variable is denoted by a ‘0’ in the 
respective field.  
Table 4.3: Cocoa Summary Results Forward ECM  =     ∆   _ %
Exp. + – – – + + – – 
Short-run 
 F E L A F E L A F E L A F E L A F E L A F E L A A A 
fcon + + 0 0 0 + 0 0 0 0 0 0 – – – – 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
fwa +  + + 0  0 0 –  – – –  – – +  0 + 0 0 0 0 – 0 
Long-term  
 fcon + + + + 0 0 0 0 + + + 0     – 0 – – 0 + 0 – + 0 
 fwa +  + + 0  0 – 0  – –     0  – 0 0  – 0 – + 
Note: F is full sample, E is early sub-sample, L is later sub-sample, and A is alternative 
model specification later sub-sample. 
Generally, carry, risk and trader-position variables show the predicted signs and are 
significant in more instances for the ECM based on fwa than for the ECM based on fcont, as 
expected. Carry and risk variables are assumed negligible for the latter case since they 
approach zero with a contract’s maturity. Coefficients for level and level change in 
inventory are significant in the short-run and long-run throughout all time periods. 
However, for fcont the level of inventory is only significant in the long-run and with a 
positive sign which is puzzling. 
Coefficients for the systematic risk premium are insignificant for the early sub-sample but 
significant for the later sub-sample. This is in line with the observation made by Domanski 
und Heath (2007), who claim that commodity futures markets increasingly behave like asset 
markets and Tang and Xiong’s (2012) observation that the correlation between stock and 
commodity markets increased over the last decade. However, the sign switches for the 
long-run to a negative which is puzzling. Also, the sign for the hedging pressure coefficient 
appears to contradict theory for the later sub-sample, while it is significant with the 
predicted sign for the earlier sub-sample.  
Data restrictions make it impossible to test for index pressure effects in the earlier sub-
sample. Hence regression equations over the full sample and the earlier sub-sample only 
consider hedging pressure, while for the later sub-sample both hedging and index pressure 
effects are accounted for in an alternative model specification. Index pressure is significant 
with the predicted sign in the short- and long-run. The sign only contradicts theory for 
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fcont. This could be due to the fact that index traders execute a positive price pressure in 
general but a negative price pressure when exiting a maturing contract for their roll. Since 
fcont comprises maturing contracts only, index positions induce a negative price pressure. 
The same regression analysis is conducted for backward ECMs, taking the futures price as 
the dependent variable. Results are summarised in Table 4.4. No significant backward co-
integrating relationship is found between fcont and spot. However, when using fwa, co-
integration is found significant for all sample periods except for the early sub-sample. 
While a co-integrating relationship has previously been rejected for the later sub-sample it 
is found significant if accounting for carry, risk and trader-position variables.    
Table 4.4: Cocoa Summary Results Backward ECM  =     ∆    %
Exp. + + + + – – +  
Short-term 
 F E L A F E L A F E L A F E L A F E L A F E L A A A 
fwa +  + + 0  0 0 +  + + +  + + 0  – – 0  0 – + 0 
Long-term  
fwa +  + + 0  0 0 0  + +     0  + 0 0  0 0 + 0 
Note: F is full sample, E is early sub-sample, L is later sub-sample, and A is alternative 
model specification later sub-sample. 
With the exception of the systematic risk premium in the later sub-sample, all coefficients 
show the predicted sign. While interest rates are insignificant throughout all sample 
periods, inventory level and level change are highly significant across all observation 
periods. Again, coefficients for systematic risk are only significant in the later sub-sample. 
Distinct to the forward EMCs, hedging pressure is only significant jointly with index 
pressure. As before, index pressure is significant in both the long- and short-run with the 
expected sign.  
4.3.3.2 Results Wheat 
Table 4.5 summarises the results for forward ECMs on the wheat market. The existence of 
a co-integrating relationship has previously been rejected for the later sub-sample by 
bivariate ECMs. Even when accounting for carry, risk and trader-position variables, this 
finding is not contradicted. However, co-integration is significant for the earlier sub-sample 
period in the case of fwa, while it was formerly rejected by the bivariate ECM. Evidence 
hints towards a general break in the co-integrating relationship in the latter half of the 
sample, which cannot be captured by the added explanatory variables. Coefficients in the 
multivariate forward ECMs are either insignificant or come with a reverse sign. An 
exception is the coefficient for the futures price, which is significant and positive. The 
insignificance of inventory variables is probably due to both the insufficient data frequency 
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and the heavy weight put on the near-to-maturity contracts for which carry variables are 
less significant.  
Table 4.5: Wheat Summary Results Forward ECM  =     ∆    %
Exp. + – – – + + –  
Short-term 
 F E L A F E L A F E L A F E L A F E L A F E L A A A 
fcon + +   0 +   0 0   0 0   0 0   0 0     
fwa + +   0 0   0 0   0 0   0 0   – –     
Long-term  
fcon + +   0 0   0 0       + 0   0 0     
fwa + +   0 0   0 0       0 0   – –     
Note: F is full sample, E is early sub-sample, L is later sub-sample, and A is alternative 
model specification later sub-sample. 
Hedging pressure is significant in the short- and long-run for fwa, however, with a sign that 
is contrary to the hedging pressure hypothesis. An explanation is that the hedging pressure 
variable, which is constructed with the commercial category of the COT report, does 
capture index instead of hedging positions (see Chapter 3). If index traders outweigh 
commercial traders—a likely scenario for the wheat market where up to 80 per cent of 
COT commercial long positions are CIT index long positions (Figure 4.8)—the hedging 
pressure variable might indeed capture index pressure instead.  
Figure 4.8: Wrongly Categorised Traders in the COT Commercial Category 
(in %, weekly, Jan. 2006–Aug. 2014) 
Wheat  Cocoa 
  
 
Source: CFTC, COT and CIT (author’s calculation). 
In contrast to the cocoa market, the inclusion of carry and risk variables for the wheat 
market results in a rejection of formerly significant backward co-integrating relationships 
for the case of fcont. The hedging pressure coefficient shows the correct sign for the case of 
the backward ECMs throughout all sample periods and index traders’ market weight has a 
significantly positive effect on the price level (Table 4.6). 
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Table 4.6: Wheat Summary Results Backward ECM  =     ∆    %
Exp. + + + + – – +  
Short-term 
 F E L A F E L A F E L A F E L A F E L A F E L A A A 
fcon + +   0 0   0 0   0 0   0 0   – –   0 0 
fwa + + + + 0 + 0 0 0 0 0 + 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 – 0 0 0 – 0 + 
Long-term  
fcon + +   0 0   0 0       0 0   – –     
fwa + + 0 + 0 0 + 0 0 0 + –     + 0 0 + 0 0 0 0 – + 
Note: F is full sample, E is early sub-sample, L is later sub-sample, and A is alternative 
model specification later sub-sample. 
Results for the cocoa and wheat market generally seem to confirm the theory of storage, 
risk premium, hedging pressure and index pressure hypotheses. However, results for the 
wheat market are weaker, which is probably partly linked to data insufficiency regarding 
inventory and partly due to structural breaks and omitted variables dominating in the later 
sub-sample.   
4.3.4 Structural Breaks in the Long-run Equilibrium  
Parameter instability can arise due to omitted variables or structural breaks (Hansen 1992a; 
1992b). In the application at hand, this could mean that instability in the co-integrating 
relationship between cash and futures prices arises because of omitted carry variables or 
structural breaks in the co-integrating relationship. In the following, formal statistical tests 
for parameter instability on the long-run co-integrating vector between cash and futures 
prices are conducted. In addition, the time invariance of the speed of adjustment parameter 
of restricted and unrestricted ECMs is assessed graphically by recursive estimation 
techniques and rolling window estimation with reference to Pollock (2003). Since the co-
integrating vector, as well as the speed of adjustment parameter is estimated on a non-
stationary variable, the previously used Hansen parameter instability test is invalid (Hansen 
1992a) and alternative tests are used (Hansen 1992b).  
Hansen (1992b) suggests three different tests for parameter instability of coefficients 
estimated on non-stationary variables. These are distinct in their test statistics as well as 
alternative hypotheses. The null hypothesis for all three tests is constancy of the coefficient 
under consideration. In the first test, denoted ‘SubF’, the timing of the break is treated as 
unknown, but is otherwise conceptually similar to the break point Chow test in that it takes 
as an alternative a significant difference between the parameter estimates before and after 
the break point. This test is particularly useful to discover sudden regime shifts. For the 
second and third test, denoted ‘MeanF’ and ‘Lc’, the alternative hypothesis is that the 
parameter follows a Martingale process. Due to the nature of the alternative hypotheses, 
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the latter two tests are better in detecting a gradual shift over time rather than a sudden 
regime shift. Results for all three tests are reported in Table 4.7. 
Table 4.7: Hansen Test for the Restricted Model  
(monthly, Jan. 1996–Dec. 2013) 
 Forward Backward 
 Spot - Fcont Spot – Fwa Fcont – Spot Fwa - Spot 
 test stat.2 p-value1 test stat.2 p-value1 test stat.2 p-value1 test stat.2 p-value1 
Wheat 
SupF 6.494562          0.20 7.217602          0.20 6.714887          0.20 7.558482          0.20 
MeanF 3.42081          0.20 3.443334          0.20 3.100561          0.20 3.343982          0.20 
Lc 0.3019767          0.20 0.3062145          0.20 0.3012116          0.20 0.3204551          0.20 
Cocoa 
SupF 11.85312          0.17 8.342783          0.20 61.78043          0.01** 16.35072          0.03* 
MeanF 2.86531          0.20 2.179609          0.20 14.49844          0.01** 6.454183          0.04* 
Lc 0.3178899 0.20 0.2109136          0.20 1.587633          0.01** 0.6816465          0.04* 
1 p-value 0.20 means greater or equal to 0.20. 2 Estimated using R program file by 
Hansen (1992c). Method of estimation of covariance parameters: pre whitened, 
quadratic spectral kernel, automatic bandwidth selection. ** indicates significance at the 
1% level and * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
The long-run co-integrating relationship for the wheat market is found stable for all model 
specifications. For the cocoa market, parameter stability is rejected at the one and five per 
cent level for the backward co-integrating relationship using fcont and fwa respectively. This 
adds to previous evidence which favours forward over backward co-integration. The 
graphs in Appendix 4.9 depict the sequence of F statistics for structural change along with 
the five per cent critical values (straight lines) of the ‘MeanF’ and ‘SubF’ as well as for a test 
close to the break point Chow test. For the wheat market, the sequential F statistic 
increases from about 2002 onwards and crosses the ‘MeanF’ five per cent critical value in 
2005 for all four model specifications. Another break emerges in 2009, where the test 
statistic approaches the five per cent critical value once more. This is evidence of an 
increasing instability of the cash–futures relationship. A more swift structural change is 
observed for the forward co-integrating relationship of the cocoa market in recent years. In 
2011, the sequential F statistic crosses the five per cent critical value of both the ‘MeanF’ 
and the known break point test.  
In addition to the instability tests on the co-integration regression, recursive coefficients are 
estimated for the speed of adjustment term65 obtained by the ECMs reported previously. 
The recursive estimation is done over an initial sample of 36 months for the COT data and 
12 months for the CIT data. Then the model is re-estimated, adding one observation at a 
time until the full sample is included. Estimations are conducted for both forward and 
                                                 
65 A separate statistical test for parameter instability is not needed for the long-run coefficients in the ECM 
since the long-run has been estimated and tested previously already (Gabriel, Lopes und Nunes 2003). 
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backward ECMs taking fcont and fwa as the regressant. Graphical results are reported in 
Appendix 4.10 for wheat and Appendix 4.11 for cocoa.  
Regarding recursively estimated coefficients for the wheat market, three patterns emerge. 
Firstly, the speed of adjustment coefficient is generally larger, in absolute terms, for the 
unrestricted model than for the restricted. Secondly, recursive residuals only exceed the two 
standard deviation band after 2007 for the unrestricted model, while this is observed 
throughout the sample for the restricted model. Thirdly, recursive residuals increase and 
turn more volatile from 2007 onwards. This is more visible for the unrestricted model than 
for the restricted model. These observations suggest that the addition of carry variables 
helps to recover the co-integrating relationship between cash and futures markets. 
However, this relationship, while stable before, weakens in more recent years. This is 
exhibited by a stepwise reduction, in absolute terms, of the speed of adjustment coefficient 
in 2003 and again in 2007 when taking the futures price as the dependent variable and in 
2006 and 2011 if taking the cash price as the dependent variable. In recent years, the speed 
of adjustment coefficient converges towards the level of the unrestricted models, which 
suggests that carry variables have lost power in explaining the relationship between cash 
and futures prices since then. Regarding the post-2006 sub-sample estimation, the decline 
in the speed of adjustment coefficient is visible from late 2010 onwards for the unrestricted 
model. However, the coefficient remains significant for the unrestricted model, while it 
turns insignificant for the restricted model, suggesting no co-integration between cash and 
futures prices for the latter time period.   
Results for the recursive estimation of the speed of adjustment term in the ECMs 
estimated on the cocoa market can be condensed in three main observations. Similar to the 
case of wheat, the speed of adjustment coefficient is found larger, in absolute terms, for the 
unrestricted than for the restricted models. Further, coefficient estimates for the 
unrestricted models also tend to be more stable. This is particularly visible for the post-
2006 sub-sample estimation using fwa, where the restricted model shows a successive 
deterioration in the speed of adjustment coefficient from 2010 onwards while the same 
coefficient remains relatively stable for the unrestricted models. This is evidence for carry 
and speculative variables accounting at least partly for the parameter instability.  
Secondly, recursive residuals appear to increase over time and frequently move outside the 
two standard deviations interval in more recent years. This is particularly pronounced for 
ECMs based on the full sample estimation using fwa. For these models, residuals increase 
for both the restricted and unrestricted models from late 2008 onwards, which surprisingly 
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coincide with an increase, in absolute terms, of the speed of adjustment coefficient as well 
as more varying coefficient estimates.  
Thirdly, the situation regarding the full sample estimation using fcont appears to be almost 
the opposite, with the speed of adjustment coefficient deteriorating from 2009 onwards. 
These seemingly contradictory results can be interpreted as a deteriorating relationship 
between cash and futures market as well as an assimilation between the fwa and fcont 
variable. This is either caused by a greater consonance of price variation in simultaneously 
traded contracts or a greater weight given to the near-to-maturity contract in the fwa 
variable due to an increase in open interest in this contract (see Figure 3.7). Since the speed 
of adjustment coefficient is generally larger for the fcont-spot relationship than for the fwa-spot 
relationship, the speed of adjustment coefficient for fwa improves. 
Further, rolling window estimation is used for the speed of adjustment coefficient of the 
full sample between fcont and spot forward and backward ECMs over a five year window. 
Results are reported in Appendix 4.10. There is some evidence for an increasing gap 
between the cash and the futures market from about 2004 onwards. For cocoa, there are 
two interesting observations to make. The first is that the assumption that the cash market 
is leading can be discarded. The second is that the relationship between cash and futures 
prices is close until 2008, after which it deteriorates until a new, lower level of integration is 
reached in 2012.   
Overall, the long-run equilibrium relationship between cash and futures prices is 
maintained throughout the sample January 1996 to December 2013. However, a weakening 
of the relationship is observed over recent years for both markets. While the co-integrating 
vector for the wheat market turns gradually more unstable and shows greater variation, 
revealed in both the sequence of the F-statistic and the rolling window estimation, the 
cocoa market has experienced a more sudden structural change in 2011. This is revealed in 
the transition of the speed of adjustment term from -0.9 to -0.7 between 2009 and 2011 in 
the rolling window estimation as well as in the detected structural break by the “MeanF” 
and “SubF” test. Carry and trader-position variables appear to account for at least some of 
the variation in coefficient estimates, but, especially, in recent years, they fail doing so.  
The weakening and increasingly volatile link between cash and futures markets, reflected in 
a reduced and unstable speed of adjustment coefficient, is strikingly obvious for both the 
wheat and the cocoa market. Carry variables have lost explanatory power over recent years 
and fail to explain the growing volatility in market basis. Concurrently, systematic risk and 
index pressure have become significant drivers of market basis—an observation which 
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strongly supports the hypothesis that commodity markets increasingly behave like asset 
market as a result of speculative trading. However, no conclusion can be drawn regarding 
implications of changing price dynamics in the futures market for the cash market. For the 
cocoa market, there is strong evidence for the futures leading the cash market, while the 
evidence for wheat is weaker and the lead-lag relationship between futures and cash 
markets shifts over time. A more thorough analysis of the relationship between cash and 
futures markets, as will be presented in Chapter 7, is needed.   
4.4 The Conundrum of Non-Convergence  
The previous sub-section analysed the continuous relationship between the cash and 
futures market. A related, but slightly different, question is whether both markets do not 
only closely relate to each other but also converge at a futures contract’s maturity date. This 
is an important question as non-convergence, similar to breaks in the co-integrating 
relationship, points to market and hedging inefficiencies. In practice, convergence between 
futures and spot prices is rarely exact as arbitrage is not costless. However, historically, 
large differences between cash and futures prices during a contract’s delivery period have 
been rare. If they occur, they are one-off events often associated with market manipulation 
by single actors (Garcia, Irwin and Smith 2011). Against this background, the occurrence of 
consecutive convergence failure in both the cocoa and the wheat market is puzzling.  
Since March 2008, wheat contracts failed to converge for 11 consecutive months and the 
futures contracts repeatedly matured with a price far66 above the cash market price. In the 
cocoa futures market, convergence started to fail since the end of 2008 and was only re-
established in late 2011 (Figure 4.9). Differently from the wheat market, cocoa futures 
consecutively matured below the cash market price. The large deviations between cash and 
futures prices at maturity in March and May 2011 might partially be linked to the outbreak 
of the second civil war in Ivory Coast, which resulted in a larger premium for cocoa from 
this region. However, during the first civil war in 2002-04, non-convergence did not occur. 
Further, the large basis was not specific to Ivorian cocoa (Figure 4.3).    
 
 
 
                                                 
66 The difference amounted to 25 per cent of the futures price. 
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Figure 4.9: Basis at Each Futures Contract’s Maturity Day 
(in USD, Mar. 2006–Sep. 2012) 
Wheat 
 
Cocoa 
 
Source: Datastream (author’s calculation). 
Figures 4.10-11 illustrate how non-converging futures contracts varied relative to the cash 
price throughout their life cycles. Contracts are normalised by the cash market price and 
the x-axis shows the remaining months to maturity. Before convergence failed, the cocoa 
market turned from a contango in 2002 into a backwardation in 2003 (Figure 4.10).  
Backwardation is commonly interpreted as a sign of a shortage in the physical market. This 
is puzzling, since during 2003 stocks were increasing and the stock-to-grinding ratio 
improved (Figure 4.5). However, the outbreak of the first civil war in Ivory Coast, the 
largest cocoa producing country globally, gave rise to an expected shortage which explains 
the backwardation. During the contract months when non-convergence was prevalent in 
2009-11, contracts were surprisingly close to the cash market price before they moved into 
a backwardation and further away from the underlying cash price. 
 
 
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
M
a
rc
h
M
a
y
Ju
ly
S
e
p
te
m
b
e
r
D
e
ce
m
b
e
r
M
a
rc
h
M
a
y
Ju
ly
S
e
p
te
m
b
e
r
D
e
ce
m
b
e
r
M
a
rc
h
M
a
y
Ju
ly
S
e
p
te
m
b
e
r
D
e
ce
m
b
e
r
M
a
rc
h
M
a
y
Ju
ly
S
e
p
te
m
b
e
r
D
e
ce
m
b
e
r
M
a
rc
h
M
a
y
Ju
ly
S
e
p
te
m
b
e
r
D
e
ce
m
b
e
r
M
a
rc
h
M
a
y
Ju
ly
S
e
p
te
m
b
e
r
D
e
ce
m
b
e
r
M
a
rc
h
M
a
y
Ju
ly
S
e
p
te
m
b
e
r
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
-100
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
M
a
r
M
a
y
Ju
l
S
e
p
D
e
c
M
a
r
M
a
y
Ju
l
S
e
p
D
e
c
M
a
r
M
a
y
Ju
l
S
e
p
D
e
c
M
a
r
M
a
y
Ju
l
S
e
p
D
e
c
M
a
r
M
a
y
Ju
l
S
e
p
D
e
c
M
a
r
M
a
y
Ju
l
S
e
p
D
e
c
M
a
r
M
a
y
Ju
l
S
e
p
D
e
c
M
a
r
M
a
y
Ju
l
S
e
p
D
e
c
M
a
r
M
a
y
Ju
l
S
e
p
D
e
c
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
 
144 
Figure 4.10: March Cocoa Contracts Relative to Cash Prices 
(daily monthly centred average) 
2001–2004 2009–2011 
  
Source: Datastream (author’s calculation). 
The situation for the wheat market is different (Figure 4.11). Although the contango 
weakened in 2007, before the occurrence of non-convergence, the market did not turn into 
a backwardation. With the exception of 2008, contracts show a contango throughout their 
life cycle. Non-converging contracts in 2008-09 exhibit wave forms, whereby the basis 
increases sharply months before the maturity date and declines slightly in the maturity 
month. This tendency to revert to the cash market price in the maturity month is absent in 
the cocoa market, where prices in the last contract month even diverge further away from 
the physical price.    
Figure 4.11: December Wheat Contracts Relative to Cash Prices 
(daily monthly centred average) 
2006–2008 2009–2011 
  
Source: Datastream (author’s calculation). 
Consecutive convergence failure is heavily discussed for Chicago wheat, but it has gained 
less attention in the case of cocoa. For the wheat market, the literature has put forward 
various explanations for limits to spatial arbitrage that then result in non-convergence. 
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However, while studies suggest plausible theories about the occurrence of non-
convergence, it is argued here that those fail to explain the extent of the basis at the 
contracts’ maturity date. The reasons for limits to arbitrage put forward in the literature 
include insufficient storage space, specifications of the delivery certificates, and factors like 
a large carry and price volatility which cause practitioners to refrain from selling 
inventories. 
Seamon (2010), for example, blames non-convergence on a shortage in delivery space. He 
argues that, after a decade of a declining stock-to-use ratio, the good harvest in 2008/09 
quickly exhausted existing storage capacities. Storage costs in turn increased, which 
suppressed cash prices relative to futures prices. Indeed, wheat stocks in exchange 
registered warehouses were high during the second jump in the basis from mid-2009 to 
mid-2010 (Figure 4.12). This, however, was not the case when non-convergence started to 
occur. In fact, stocks were low when the basis reached its first maximum in mid-2008 and 
warehouses were only about 30 per cent full.  
Figure 4.12: Wheat Basis and Storage at Exchange Registered Warehouses 
(monthly, Jan. 2008–Dec. 2012) 
Basis and Storage Level  Basis and Percentage of Storage Filled  
  
Source: Datastream; USDA. 
However, this observation on storage space can be explained by the time lag with which 
stocks at the exchange-registered warehouses reflect new supply, especially in times of 
previously low inventories. The harvest period for US winter wheat starts in mid-May, 
which is about the time when the non-convergence problem started. Since commercial 
storage space is filled before stocks in exchange-registered warehouses pile up, the excess 
supply only becomes visible in exchange-registered storage facilities in later months. This is 
a reasonable assumption as exchange inventories commonly reflect the quantity of residual 
wheat, i.e., wheat that is not currently needed for commercial business, and hence it can be 
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freed for speculative purposes. With commercial storage facilities filling up, storage rates 
were rising in May 2008 already, which then brought about the non-convergence. 
Another explanation is based on the availability of delivery instruments. It is argued that 
issuers of shipping certificates were reluctant to sell those certificates to potential arbitrage 
traders, as the selling would have interfered with their normal merchanting activities 
(O'Brien 2010). Every short trader in the futures market who seeks to make delivery has to 
buy a shipping certificate from a regular firm—commonly a large commercial grain 
merchant—that is eligible to issue such certificates. Hence, unless the short position holder 
at the exchange is a regular firm, she is reliant on the availability of such certificates. 
Regular firms, however, are not obliged to issue certificates. Although, according to the 
CBOT rulebook, shipping certificates allow such firms to issue certificates over more 
wheat than they store, the factor by which the certificates can exceed the amount stored in 
registered warehouse is fixed (CBOT 2014). If they want to issue more certificates, they 
eventually have to transfer wheat from their own warehouses to the exchange. Further, it 
has been argued that since storage space at the exchange was already filled with wheat, 
issuers of shipping certificates were reluctant to take on new wheat arriving due to high 
opportunity costs incurred by a loss of space that could be used for storing other 
commodities like soybeans and corn (Garcia, Irwin and Smith 2011). 
The first argument fits the early period of non-convergence, when commercial grain traders 
were still stocking up their previously depleted inventories for regular business. Hence, they 
might have been reluctant to fill exchange-registered warehouses in order to sell shipping 
certificates to potential arbitrage traders. The latter hypothesis applies to the second period 
of non-convergence. During the time when the extent of non-convergence peaked first in 
mid-2008, only 30 per cent of storage capacity at exchange registered warehouses was 
filled. At the second peak, 70 per cent of storage capacity was taken (Figure 4.12).  
Aulerich, Fishe and Harris (2011) ascribe the failure of convergence to a change in delivery 
instruments. Instead of ‘warehouse receipts’, ‘shipping certificates’ were introduced. 
Shipping certificates provide the owner with the option to choose if and when to take 
control of the underlying physical commodity. The owner of the certificates can, instead of 
executing his right to take physical delivery, sell the certificate into the next futures 
contract. Since a shipping certificate can be conceptualised as an ‘embedded real option’, 
which gains value with an increase in the price volatility of the underlying physical product, 
owners of the certificate are incentivised to delay load-out when price volatility is high. This 
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might result in convergence failure. Indeed, price volatility was, by historical comparison, 
high over the entire non-convergence period (Figure 4.13).  
Figure 4.13: Wheat Price Volatility 
(3 months daily centred moving variance, in hundred USD per bushel,  
Jan. 1990–Dec. 2012) 
 
Source: Datastream (author’s calculation). 
However, the CBOT wheat market was no exception and various other commodity futures 
markets suffered from consecutive non-convergence, ones that had not introduced a 
shipping certificate. In addition to wheat, Baldi, Peri and Vandone (2011) analyse the 
CBOT corn and soybean markets, and Kaufman (2011) examines non-convergence in the 
WTI crude oil market. Not all of these markets share the same delivery instruments.   
Irwin, et al. (2011) argue that if the spread between the price of the expiring and the next-
to-expire contract is large enough to compensate for the costs of owning the delivery 
instrument, i.e., the shipping certificate, the owner faces an incentive to postpone load-out. 
This, in turn, postpones the purchase of the cash commodity, which holds back 
convergence mechanisms. Hence, they investigate whether high two-to-one calendar 
spreads, which is synonymous with a large financial carry67, occurred concurrently with 
non-convergence in recent years. The financial carry was high before mid-2007 and after 
mid-2009, but in-between the average percentage of full carry was at 50 per cent or below, 
while non-convergence occurred (Figure 4.14). 
 
 
                                                 
67 The carry usually refers to the “percent of full carry” which is estimated as the percentage of the storage 
plus interest opportunity costs compensated for by the spread between the nearest to expiration and next 
nearest to expiration contract price. This is represented by H		z = BCD$C@.EF G ∗ 100, with HI being the cost 
of storage, J the foregone interest rate, and 1 and 2 the price of the nearest and next-nearest contract to 
maturity (Irwin, et al. 2011).  
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Figure 4.14: Wheat Basis and Average Percentage of Full Carry  
(at each contract’s maturity, Jan. 2006–Dec. 2012) 
 
Source: Datastream (author’s calculation). 
Irwin, et al. (2011) further investigate a hypothesis proposed by a staff report of the 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the United States (US Senate 2009). The 
staff report argues that index traders’ passive long positions have successively increased 
futures prices, while physical prices remain unaffected by their demand and as a result led 
to a large basis. Irwin, et al. (2011) test this hypothesis by event studies and Granger non-
causality tests. The event analysis shows a coinciding increase in carry with the roll of index 
investors. In order to assess the continuity of the effect, Granger non-causality tests are 
employed. Their results reject a significant impact of index traders’ positions on the market 
carry, which leads the authors to argue that an increase in the precautionary demand for 
commodity stocks driven by an increase in uncertainty about market fundamentals might 
be at the root of the non-convergence. However, the observation that poor convergence 
occurs whenever the carry is high is interesting and provokes the question: what caused the 
large carry in the first place? 
The previously discussed literature suggests cogent arguments for limits to arbitrage in the 
wheat market. However, it fails to explain the extent of non-convergence. While non-
convergence can emerge if spatial arbitrage is limited, the extent of non-convergence 
should still be confined by the possibility of fundamental arbitrage. Only a few researchers 
attempt to explain this anomaly.  
Garcia, Irwin and Smith (2011) argue that since storage costs at exchange-registered 
warehouse are fixed by the exchange, physical storage charges eventually exceeded the 
storage premium fixed by the exchange so that the calendar spread, which is bound to not 
exceed financial full carry, could not fully reflect the costs incurred by storage in the 
physical market. As a result costs were reflected in the non-convergence of futures and 
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cash markets. They propose a ‘dynamic rational expectations commodity storage model’ in 
which non-convergence could arise in equilibrium when the market price of physical 
storage is greater than the cost of holding the delivery instrument, i.e., the premium charge 
set by the exchange. They show that the ‘wedge’, which they define as the difference 
between market storage costs plus convenience yield and the cost of holding the delivery 
instrument, drives the basis at maturity.  
Two independent equations for the cash and the futures market are assumed in their 
model. The current cash price is defined as the continuously discounted expected future 
cash price minus storage costs plus convenience yield, while the futures price is defined as 
the continuously discounted expected futures price minus the exchange premium. The 
difference between the current cash and futures price (basis) is hence the continuously 
discounted expected basis plus the ‘wedge’ defined as:   = ¡ − zJ − x, with ¡ 
being physical storage costs, zJ being the convenience yield which changes with 
inventories, and x being the storage premium at the exchange68. The wedge is assumed to 
vary with the level of inventories through the convenience yield and the physical storage 
costs as long as the exchange premium remains constant. The authors argue that “a 
relatively small wedge term in period t can have a large effect on the basis if it is expected 
to persist for an extended period”, that is if it enters the expectation on the future basis.  
However, for Garcia, Irwin and Smith’s (2011) model to be coherent, one has to accept 
assumptions that violate the no-arbitrage conditions. Their model, and hence their 
conclusion, is based on the crucial, however, implicit assumption that the cash price is 
determined independently of the futures price. This assumption enables them to explain 
the increasing basis in terms of the continuously discounted expected basis. This 
assumption is necessary for their model to hold as otherwise the size of the basis could 
only be related to the difference between physical storage costs and the storage premium at 
the exchange (the wedge) and not to the expected basis. However, the size of the basis at 
non-convergence is shown to be about 50 times the size of the wedge (van Huellen 2013).  
Such a violation of no-arbitrage conditions demands justification. This can be found in the 
financialisation hypothesis as outlined in Chapter 2. It has been argued that traders in the 
physical and the futures market differ systematically in their investment motives and 
strategies. As a result, expectations, investment decisions and hence prices are formed in a 
fundamentally differently way in those markets. Depending on the relative weight of 
                                                 
68 The basis at maturity date T:  − , = ¢9(I£¤)@ − ¡  zJ¥ − ¢9(C;£¤,;£¤)@; − x¥ 	⇔  = ¢9(h;£¤)@;  ¥. 
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traders, which are solely represented at the futures exchange, price differences can be 
substantial. If limits to spatial arbitrage exist, those differences are carried over from one 
contract into the next and the basis becomes excessive even at a contract's maturity.  
What distinguished the Chicago wheat market case from other incidences of non-
convergence, and hence attracted attention, is that futures contracts traded far above 
physical wheat prices. The rule that a contango has its maximum in the ‘carry cost proper’ 
(Lautier 2005) is hence consecutively violated. This is because a negative basis, as observed 
in the case of wheat, in theory cannot exceed storage costs (, in Equation 2.2, 
with	, = 0; physical full carry). However, if limits to spatial arbitrage exist, this equation 
cannot be enforced and the basis might exceed full carry.  
For the cocoa market, in contrast to wheat, the sign of the basis was less puzzling, since a 
positive basis depends on the ‘size’ of the convenience yield and hence has no limit 
according to conventional theories. The case of the cocoa market consequently attracted 
almost no attention. Commonly, a high marginal convenience yield, and hence a situation 
of strong backwardation, is explained by a shortage of inventories. Cocoa storage levels 
appeared relatively low during the months before non-convergence. This would explain the 
market turning into backwardation. However, storage levels were rising again in late 2009 
when non-convergence was prevalent (Figure 4.15).  
Figure 4.15: Cocoa Basis and Storage Level at Exchange Registered Warehouses 
(monthly, Jan. 2006–Dec. 2012) 
 
Source: Datastream; ICE Reporting Centre. 
Arguably, in the wake of the crisis in Ivory Coast, market uncertainty was high and so was 
the demand for precautionary inventories. Nevertheless, the convenience yield should 
decline with a contract approaching its maturity date and eventually reach zero. Again, the 
assumption of limits to spatial arbitrage is crucial. If these were not present, arbitrage 
traders would take delivery in the futures market and sell in the physical market at a higher 
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price. However, as argued for wheat before, if limits to arbitrage exist, convergence might 
not be enforceable and the basis is carried over from one contract to the next. 
For the cocoa market, reluctance or inability of physical traders to free their inventories for 
speculative purposes could have contributed to limits to arbitrage. One likely reason is an 
attempted squeeze, timed well with the arising shortage in the physical market, in the 
London cocoa exchange, by one single hedge fund. Since October 2009, a single trader 
built up a large long position in the July 2010 contract and eventually forced delivery of 
over 240 thousand tonnes of cocoa—the entire European speculative stock (ICCO 2010). 
As a result, cocoa prices at the London exchange reached a 33-year high, the basis spread 
was inflated and the price differential between the American and the British exchange 
reached more than $1,000 USD per tonne. 
Hedgers assume that they are able to close out their futures position at a contract’s maturity 
date. However, if a long trader is reluctant to close out her position, a short trader has to 
deliver. When the hedge fund forced delivery for almost the entire long positions in the 
July 2010 contract, short traders were forced to sell their inventory or acquire physical 
cocoa to subsequently sell. If a short trader fails to deliver, the position is settled in cash, 
which implies huge gains for the hedge fund and losses for the short trader (ICCO 2010). 
As a result, inventories became scarce which, although the squeeze occurred on the 
London exchange, had arguably direct implications also for the availability of speculative 
stocks in the American futures market69.   
While various cogent reasons for limits to spatial arbitrage have been presented for both 
wheat and cocoa, research papers fail to explain the extent of non-convergence. I have 
shown that Garchia, Irwin and Sanders’ (2011) structural model, which claims to explain 
the extent of non-convergence, is based on the implicit assumption that price formation 
mechanisms on the physical and the futures market differ systematically, which is a sharp 
break with conventional rational expectation theories. In Chapter 2: Section 2.4 of this 
thesis, a similar argument has been developed in the context of the financialisation 
hypothesis, which suggests that physical and futures markets are driven by different market 
fundamentals due to the different nature of traders active in the two markets. In the 
following section I show that, by taking the assumption of trader heterogeneity serious, not 
traders’ expectations of a continuously discounted market basis, as suggested by Garchia, 
                                                 
69 Such shortage would not show in the storage level since it is not caused by usage but by a change in 
ownership.  
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Irwin and Sanders’ (2011), explain the extent of non-convergence, but the different, though 
linked, nature of investments and hence price formation at futures and cash market. 
4.4.1 An Alternative Explanation for the Extent of Non-Convergence 
Under normal market conditions, spatial arbitrage ensures that the equilibrium relationship 
between cash and futures market prices holds at maturity regardless of the enforceability of 
fundamental arbitrage. However, if there are limits to spatial arbitrage, deviations from the 
efficient market hypothesis, that is limits to fundamental arbitrage, are revealed in the 
market basis. In the presence of limits to spatial arbitrage, three market regimes can be 
distinguished: (i) failure of fundamental arbitrage and storage cost differential, (ii) failure of 
fundamental arbitrage, (iii) fundamental arbitrage.  
¤,8 − ¤ = 
§¨
©
ª¨'¤,8/ − '¤,8/1  	¤ − x¤,8  ¡¤,8 − z¤,8 					y'¤,8/ − '¤,8/1  	¤ 																																																yy0																																																																																	yyy
 (4.8) 
The efficient market hypothesis postulates that: '¤,8/ = ¤,8 = '¤,8/ = 8  so 
that the futures price at T1 maturing at T2 is an unbiased estimator of the futures price at T2 
maturing at T2, and the futures price maturing at T2 is an unbiased estimator of the 
expected and realised cash price at T2. If these conditions hold, case (iii) prevails and 
convergence is established despite limits to spatial arbitrage. However, if fundamental 
arbitrage is rejected, expectations on futures and cash markets might not be congruent and 
this gives rise to case (ii). In this case, expectations regarding future cash prices and future 
futures prices are formed independently. Case (i) corresponds to Garchia, Irwin and 
Sanders’ (2011) model in which price expectations are independent and storage cost 
differentials occur.   
If fundamental arbitrage is rejected, Keynes’s normal backwardation, which was later 
transformed into hedging pressure, provides a strong argument for why expected cash 
prices do not need to equal expected futures price. Hedging pressure models build on the 
crucial dichotomy between ‘hedgers’ and ‘speculators’ as two distinct types of market 
actors. With the entrance of new types of traders, this assumption has to be amended by 
another category: index traders. Following the rationale of the hedging pressure hypothesis, 
if a counterparty is scarce, due to market frictions like transaction costs, capital constraints 
or fundamental uncertainty, the price has to move in order to attract traders to enter into 
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the market as a counterparty. Index traders, similarly to commercial hedgers, have to 
compensate other non-commercial traders for entering into a contract. This consequently 
causes the futures price to be a biased estimator for the expected future cash price. In other 
words, the futures price will diverge from its fundamental value by the price pressure 
exerted by either hedgers or index traders.   
Since hedgers are predominantly net-short, index traders essentially supply liquidity to 
commercial traders. This decreases the costs of hedging and as a result eases the 
(downward) hedging pressure on prices. Hence, the presence of index traders could even 
increase market efficiency in that they decrease the bias arising from hedging pressure. This 
is only the case as long as index demand is not in excess of hedging positions. Index traders 
indeed appear to have taken over the counterparty role for commercial hedgers from other 
non-commercial traders for the cocoa and wheat market. However, in some cases, index 
traders are far in excess of commercial traders' hedging demand, so other non-commercial 
traders have to step in to cover the index traders’ long positions. I refer to such situation as 
index pressure.  
In Figure 4.16, the area for jointly commercial and non-commercial net-long positions 
turns into a light purple (labelled excess com) when index traders’ net-long positions are fully 
covered by commercial traders’ net-short positions. That is when non-commercial traders 
are needed to take the counter position to commercial hedgers as in the hedging pressure 
hypothesis. In the case where the area is in a light orange (labelled excess ncom), non-
commercial traders are needed to take the counter position of index traders because these 
are not fully taken up by commercial traders. This is a case of index pressure. 
Figure 4.16: Hedging and Index Pressure 
(monthly open interest, Jan. 2006–Dec. 2013) 
Wheat 
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Cocoa 
 
 
Source: CFTC (author’s own calculation). 
For the wheat market, the case where index traders’ net-long positions are in excess of 
hedgers' net-short positions prevails. As a result, the hedging pressure hypothesis is 
reversed: speculators are needed to fill the long positions of index traders. In this case, the 
futures price is expected to be upward-biased, since short traders need to be attracted. For 
the cocoa market, the graph looks quite different. Only in late 2010 and between mid-2011 
to mid-2012 did index traders’ positions exceed hedgers’ demand. 
The predictions made by the index pressure hypothesis appear to be validated by the 
examples of the cocoa and the wheat market. If index traders’ net-positions exactly cover 
commercial traders’ net-hedging positions, the premium is expected to be zero. If passive 
long traders exceed net-short hedging positions, the bias is expected to be positive, which 
means a negative basis (index pressure: futures exceeds cash price). The reverse is predicted 
when commercial net-short positions exceed index traders' net-long positions, which 
means a positive basis (hedging pressure: cash exceeds futures price), as summarised by 
Equation 4.9.   
«y¬ = 0, y	}~wW  ywW = 0> 0, y	}~wW  ywW > 0< 0, y	}~wW  ywW < 0 (4.9) 
Since index trader participation in the cocoa market is relatively low so that the excess com 
situation dominates in Figure 4.16, a positive market basis is expected. For the wheat 
market, where index participation is relatively high and non-commercial traders have to 
cover the excess long positions by index traders, the reverse is the case. As net-long index 
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positions are larger than net-short commercial positions, the market basis is expected to be 
negative. Both predictions are reflected in the actual market regimes. 
Various causes for the occurrence, inspired by existing literature, of non-convergence were 
noted in the previous section, while the present section has put forward a hypothesis on 
the factors that explain the extent of non-convergence, which especially in the case of 
wheat, was puzzling and remains so far unexplained. Garcia, Irwin and Sanders (2011) 
attempt a formal model which they argue explains the extent of non-convergence. 
However, their model was built on the implicit assumption that the formation of 
expectations in the physical and the futures markets takes place independently. It is argued 
here that such a deviation from conventional theories demands justification. This 
justification is found in the financialisation theory. The reference of the financialisation 
hypothesis does not only justify the implicit assumption made by the Garcia, Irwin and 
Sanders (2011) model, but also suggests a radically different explanation for the extent of 
non-convergence, which is index and hedging pressure. In the following sub-section, the 
hypotheses about the extent of non-convergence discussed in the literature and the 
alternative explanations promoted by this thesis are tested.  
4.4.2 Data and Methodology 
In an attempt to explain the extent of non-convergence, i.e., the size of the basis at 
maturity, a simple regression analysis is conducted which relates the basis to various factors 
which have been advanced in the literature cited above as well as to hedging and 
speculative demand as hypothesised in this thesis.  
The basis is defined as the difference between cash and futures prices  − >, = >, at 
each contract’s maturity, with y indicating the yth contract (e.g., May 2008 contract) at its 
maturity date   (e.g., 14th of May 2008). For the wheat market, price data for the cash and 
the futures price have been obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream. The futures price 
is the CBOT no. 2 soft red winter wheat settlement price at the last day of trading of each 
contract. The cash price is the no. 2 soft red winter wheat spot price at St. Louis provided 
by the USDA. 
Open interest differentiated by trader type, with commercial, non-commercial, index, and 
non-reporting traders who hold positions below the reporting level, is obtained from the 
CIT report. The relative market weight of each trader type is calculated as the average 
percentage share of traders’ open interest (long plus short) in total open interest in the last 
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trading days of the contract, starting with the first trading day of the expiration month and 
ending with the contract’s expiry day, which is usually two weeks into the maturity month. 
The storage premium at the exchange is obtained from the CBOT. Data on storage costs 
outside the exchange are not available, and hence the exchange premium can only serve as 
an approximation for the variation in the storage costs difference. In order to capture limits 
to arbitrage, which were related to storage capacity, the wheat stock-to-use ratio is used. 
The estimate for the stock-to-use ratio is based on the USDA Wheat Yearbook Table 5 and 
calculated as the ratio between ending stocks and total disappearance (depletion of 
inventory) over the same period. As the data are available only quarterly, the ratios are 
matched with different contracts in the following way: March with Q370 (December to 
February), May with Q4 (March to May), July with the average of Q4 and Q1 the following 
year, September with Q1 (June to August), December with Q2 (September to November). 
The stock-to-use ratio is not ideal, as it does not capture the opportunity costs that might 
have arisen due to a shortage of storage space. An alternative variable, the percentage of 
storage capacity filled in CBOT exchange-registered warehouses is obtained from the 
USDA Grain Stock Report, published every Friday. The observation on the last Friday 
before each contract’s final trading day is used.  
Lastly, the average percentage of full carry is estimated as the ratio between the total costs 
of holding the delivery instrument until a contract’s maturity and the two-to-one calendar 
spread over the life cycle of each contract from the point where it became the next-to-
maturity contract till its maturity (CME Group 2009). The interest rate used is the three-
month USD LIBOR plus 200 basis points, which is obtained from Thomson Reuters 
Datastream. The variables used are summarised in Table 4.8. 
Table 4.8: List of Wheat Market Variables  
Variable Description 
basis CBOT Soft Red Winter Wheat basis in USD cents per bushel of wheat. 
index Average percentage share of index traders open interest (long plus short). 
ncom_sp Average percentage share of non-commercial spread trader’s open interest. 
ncom-sp 
Average percentage share of non-commercial traders’ open interest (long plus short 
excluding spread traders). 
com Average percentage share of commercial traders’ open interest (long plus short). 
nrep Average percentage share of non-reporting traders’ open interest (long plus short). 
StCost Exchange premium for the currently trading contract in USD cents per bushel per day.  
StToUs Stock-to-use ratio.  
AvFlCar Average of the percentage of financial full carry over the contract’s life cycle. 
CapFil Percentage of capacity filled in exchange registered warehouses at the contract’s maturity. 
                                                 
70 The quarters do not follow the calendar year, but the crop year. 
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The time period covered starts with the March 2006 contract and ends with the maturity of 
the September 2012 contract. There are 35 observations in total. Unfortunately, data for 
the percentage of storage filled in exchange-registered warehouses are only available from 
January 2008 onwards, which constrains the sample of the model in which the variable is 
included to 22 observations.  
For cocoa, the traders’ position data are chosen in the same way as for wheat. For the cash 
price, the Ivorian cash market price provided by Thomson Reuters Datastream is chosen. 
The stock-to-grinding ratio is taken from the ICCO Quarterly Bulletin of Cocoa Statistics. 
The data entries are available for March, June, October, and December. March is paired 
with the March contracts’ maturity dates. For the May contracts’ maturity dates the average 
between the March and June stock-to-grinding values is taken. July is paired with June. 
Stock-to-grinding values for October are paired with the September maturity contracts and 
the values for December with the basis values for contracts maturing in December.  
Table 4.9: List of Cocoa Market Variables  
Variable Description 
basis ICE Cocoa basis in USD per tonne of cocoa. 
index Average percentage share of index traders open interest (long plus short). 
ncom_sp Average percentage share of non-commercial spread trader’s open interest. 
ncom-sp 
Average percentage share of non-commercial traders’ open interest (long plus short 
excluding spread traders). 
com Average percentage share of commercial traders’ open interest (long plus short). 
nrep Average percentage share of non-reporting traders’ open interest (long plus short). 
stCost The weighted average of storage costs in ICE registered warehouses. 
stToGr Stock-to-grinding ratio. 
iceMilSt Level of stocks at the ICE exchange registered warehouses. 
exRate The end of month exchange rate CFA Franc per USD for the contract month. 
The storage rate is calculated based on the actual storage rates as of date May 2001. The 
weighted average was calculated from the storage rates at Port of New York, Port of 
Delaware River, Port of Baltimore, and Port of Hampton Roads. The weights are derived 
from the percentage share of cocoa stored at the respective ports. Regarding the interest 
rate, the end of month value for the month in which the contract matures is taken. The 
data are provided by the IMF, IFS data service. Variables used are summarised in Table 4.9:   
4.4.3 Empirical Results 
Different model specifications are run with the basis [] as the dependent variable and 
varying explanatory variables in order to assess the contribution of each factor to the size 
of the basis at maturity. The models are specified as:  
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 = 1] ^1>>,  n , y!{	n~JJL (4.10) 
>, is the ith explanatory variable at the Tth maturity. 1]	is the intercept coefficient and 1> is 
the slope coefficient of the ith explanatory variable, and n is the error term. The tables 
below provide an overview of estimated coefficients, their standard errors, partial r-squares, 
and residual diagnostics for each model (Tables 4.10-13).  
4.4.3.1 Results for Wheat 
Table 4.10 shows the regression results for the first three model specifications for the 
wheat market. The first model specification includes the weight of speculative demand as 
the percentage share of each trader group in total market open interest. Commercial 
traders’ share is excluded in the first model specification to avoid perfect collinearity 
between explanatory variables. The coefficient for the market weight of non-commercial 
non-spread traders and index traders is negative and highly significant. The remaining 
coefficients are insignificant. The overall fit of the model appears relatively good, with an 
R-squared of about 0.6. However, residual diagnostics reveal a significant degree of 
autocorrelation that indicates omitted variables.  
Table 4.10: Wheat Regression Results and Residual Diagnostics for Model 1–3 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
basis coeff. s.d. part. r^2 coeff. s.d. part. r^2 coeff. s.d. part. r^2 
constant 1113.20*** 200.1 0.5178 947.81*** 164.0 0.5439 917.243*** 180.4 0.5084 
index -25.273*** 4.490 0.5221 -24.882*** 3.574 0.6339 -24.9211*** 3.392 0.6834 
ncom_sp -1.36663 2.602 0.0094 -2.77120 2.097 0.0587 -3.85766* 2.096 0.1284 
ncom-sp -16.823*** 4.566 0.3189 -14.257*** 3.684 0.3485 -14.010*** 4.239 0.3040 
nrep -18.4642 8.471 0.1408 -10.3022 7.013 0.0716 -7.60530 6.867 0.0468 
stCost - - - 17966.*** 4259. 0.3886 16188.3*** 4132. 0.3804 
stToUs - - - - - - 0.167315* 0.09663 0.1071 
avFlCar - - - - - - -0.394175* 0.2141 0.1194 
Diagnost. 
sigma 
RSS 
R^2 
Adj.R^2 
log-likelihood 
 
Joint test: F(4,29) 
AR1-2.: F(2,27) 
Normal: Chi^2(2) 
Hetero.: F(8,25) 
47.3613 
65049.7463 
0.596734 
0.541111 
-176.705 
 
10.73 [0.000] 
3.756 [0.036] 
0.300 [0.861] 
0.588 [0.779] 
sigma 
RSS 
R^2 
Adj.R^2 
log-likelihood 
 
Joint test: F(5,28) 
AR1-2.: F(2,26) 
Normal: Chi^2(2) 
Hetero.: F(10,23) 
37.6883 
39771.3305 
0.753443 
0.709416 
-168.341 
 
17.10 [0.000] 
0.468 [0.631] 
1.653 [0.438] 
1.130 [0.383] 
sigma 
RSS 
R^2 
Adj.R^2 
log-likelihood 
 
Joint test: F(7,26) 
AR1-2.: F(2,24) 
Normal.: Chi^2(2) 
Hetero.: F(14,19) 
35.6689               
31806.6893 
0.80045 
0.744576 
-160.195 
 
14.30 [0.000] 
0.214 [0.809] 
2.684 [0.261] 
0.845 [0.620] 
Note: * indicating significance at 10% level, ** indicating significance at 5% level, and 
*** indicating significance at 1% level respectively. 
Since the market weight of different trader groups in the derivative market is unlikely to 
directly affect the cash market, the negative coefficients indicate that non-commercial 
traders’ relative demand results in a significant increase in the futures prices relative to the 
cash prices. Estimated coefficients suggest that, ceteris paribus, if the market weight of 
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index traders increases by one per cent (either due to decreasing positions of non-index 
traders or increasing open interest by index traders), the futures price increases by about 
$0.25 USD per bushel of wheat on average relative to the cash price. For non-commercial 
non-spread traders’ this would ceteris paribus result in a $0.17 USD per bushel of wheat 
increase on average in the futures relative to the cash price. 
In order to solve the non-convergence problem, the CBOT introduced a variable storage 
rate (VSR) that was designed to successively narrow the gap between the storage premium 
at the exchange and the storage rate in the physical market—the wedge. The VSR, effective 
since the July 2010 contract’s maturity, increases at each contract’s maturity as long as 
financial full carry prevails (CME Group 2009). Since the model seems to systematically 
under-predict the size of the basis after mid-2010, when the VSR was introduced 
(Figure 4.17), the second model specification includes the exchange storage premium 
(stCost) as an additional explanatory variable. 
Figure 4.17: Model 1–3 Observed and Fitted Basis at CBOT Wheat  
(in USD per bushel) 
 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
The additional coefficient is significant and the model has a better fit compared to the 
previous one. Residual diagnostics also suggest spherical residuals. The size of the 
coefficient indicates that for a 10/100 cent per bushel per day increase in the storage 
premium, the futures price would ceteris paribus decrease by almost $1.80 USD on average 
relative to the cash price.71 This effect counterbalances the otherwise upward price pressure 
on the futures prices by non-commercial traders’ market weight, and hence adjusts for the 
under prediction of the basis in the latter half of the sample period. This confirms Garcia, 
                                                 
71 Note that the storage rate is expressed in USD cents and is increased by 10/100 USD cents each time the 
average percentage of full carry over the maturing contract exceeded 80 per cent. Hence, it increases stepwise 
by 0.001 USD cents and not 1 USD cents, which means that the coefficient has to be divided by 100 for a 
meaningful interpretation.    
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Irwin, and Sanders’ (2011) hypothesis that a mismatch in the storage premium causes non-
convergence. According to their model, a higher exchange premium results in a smaller 
wedge and consequently in a reduction of the difference between cash and futures prices 
(decrease of the basis in absolute terms), as predicted in Equation 4.8. 
Besides the storage premium mismatch, two further explanations for successive non-
convergence in the wheat market were put forward in the literature: firstly a high market 
carry which resulted in a reluctance to load out, and secondly, insufficiencies in the delivery 
system. In order to account for these two effects, the average percentage of full carry 
(avFlCr) and the stock-to-use ratio (stToUs) are included. Both coefficients are weakly 
significant. The coefficient on the average full carry is negative, supporting the theory that 
the compensation for storage costs is related to non-convergence. However, the carry can 
only explain the existence of limits to arbitrage but not the extent of non-convergence, 
which probably accounts for its low significance. The coefficient on the stock-to-use ratio 
is positive, indicating that as stocks increase relative to use, that is as supply becomes 
relatively abundant, the premium of the futures price relative to the spot price decreases. 
This is consistent with the theory of storage, which predicts that the marginal convenience 
yield is a negative function of inventories (Pindyck 2001). 
One might argue that the significance of the market weight of non-commercial traders is 
due to a decreasing market weight of commercial traders resulting from a loss in hedging 
effectiveness. Hence, the causality would be the reverse, where commercial traders exit the 
market because of an increasing basis. The counter image of this effect is an increase in the 
market share of non-commercial traders, which then shows a significant effect falsely 
suggesting causality. In order to test for this alternative hypothesis, a fourth model is run 
with the percentage share of commercial traders included (Table 4.11). 
Indeed, by only including the share of commercial traders, the coefficient is significantly 
positively related to the basis, supporting the above argument. However, the size of the 
coefficient is smaller than the estimated effect of the market share of non-commercial 
traders on the market basis. Further, comparing adjusted R-squares of model one with 
model four, as a rough indicator of the relative goodness of fit, the first model specification 
appears preferable. However, in order to test whether index trader or commercial traders’ 
market weight has the greater explanatory power, a direct comparison of models with only 
one of the respective variables included is needed. This is done in model five. Both partial 
r-square and adjusted R-square are significantly larger for the fifth model specification 
where index traders’ market weight is included compared to the fourth model where only 
 
161 
the average share of commercial traders is included. This indicates that, while some of the 
effect of index traders found in model three might be due to a decrease in commercial 
traders' share, a great part is solely due to index traders’ price pressure effect. 
Table 4.11: Wheat Regression Results and Residual Diagnostics for Model 4–6 
 Model 4 Model 5  Model 6  
basis coeff. s.d. part. R^2 coeff. s.d. part. R^2 coeff.  s.d. part. R^2 
constant -385.16***      68.40 0.5311 399.44*** 91.48 0.4051 976.228***      297.3      0.4182 
com  8.74365***      2.184 0.3640 - - - - - - 
index - - - -22.375*** 3.562 0.5850 -29.2057***      5.822     0.6265 
ncom-sp - - - - - - -13.9427** 5.845     0.2751 
ncom_sp  - - - - - - -2.68197 2.725    0.0606 
nrep - - - - - - -7.37043       9.342    0.0398 
stCost 20030.1***      5424.0 0.3275 20168.***       4360.0 0.4332 13886.5**      4720. 0.3659 
stToUs 0.225253*      0.1248 0.1043 0.3004*** 0.1012 0.2392 - - - 
avFlCar -0.267085      0.2826 0.0309 -0.15931 0.2260 0.0174 -0.419307*     0.2358     0.1741 
capFil - - - - - - 1.81619*      0.9738     0.1882 
Diagnost. 
sigma                  
RSS                 
R^2                   
Adj.R^2               
log-likelihood        
 
Joint test: F(4,29)     
AR1-2.: F(2,27)    
Normal: Chi^2(2)    
Hetero.: F(8,25)   
50.72               
72030.6072 
0.548092 
0.483534 
-173.683    
 
8.49 [0.000] 
1.14 [0.336] 
10.6 [0.005] 
1.05 [0.428] 
sigma                  
RSS                 
R^2                   
Adj.R^2               
log-likelihood        
 
Joint test: F(4,29)     
AR1-2.: F(2,27)    
Normal: Chi^2(2)    
Hetero.: F(8,25)   
40.9724 
47004.5593 
0.705102 
0.662973 
-166.64 
 
16.74 [0.000] 
0.091 [0.913] 
0.341 [0.843] 
2.471 [0.041]   
sigma                  
RSS                 
R^2                   
Adj.R^2               
log-likelihood        
 
Joint test: F(7,15)     
AR1-2.: F(2,13)    
Normal: Chi^2(2)    
Hetero.: F(14,8)   
36.0535  
19497.8237 
0.84928  
0.778944   
-110.175 
 
12.07 [0.000] 
0.090 [0.915] 
3.414 [0.181]  
5.133 [0.013] 
Note: * indicating significance at 10% level, ** indicating significance at 5% level, and 
*** indicating significance at 1% level respectively.  
This conjecture is further confirmed by an additional model (not reported here), which 
jointly includes commercial and index traders’ market share and excludes non-commercial 
spread traders instead. The coefficient on the market weight of commercial traders turns 
insignificant while still positive. Although non-significant, the inclusion of commercial 
traders’ market weight seems to result in a decrease of the effect of index traders, which 
suggests that these trader groups are not independent. However, the effect of index traders’ 
market weight, as well as that of non-commercial non-spread traders’ market weight, 
remains significant. This refutes the pervious hypothesis that non-commercial traders’ 
market weight is only significant on the basis of it being the counter-image of commercial 
traders’ market weight. 
Further, the variable for the stock-to-use ratio does not fully capture the argument of the 
insufficiencies in the delivery system, which is related to high opportunity costs of storing 
additional wheat as storage space becomes scarce. Hence, the stock-to-use variable (stToUs) 
is replaced by the percentage of storage space filled at exchange-registered warehouses 
(capFil) in a sixth model. Unfortunately, data for this new variable are only available from 
January 2008 onwards, which reduces the sample size of this particular model to 22 
observations. The coefficient for the additional variable is significant at the ten per cent 
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level and positively related to the market basis. This confirms the theory that a shortage in 
storage capacity has contributed to limits to spatial arbitrage. However, the variable is 
unable to explain the extent for non-convergence. Fitted and observed values for the basis 
for model four to six are presented in Figure 4.18. 
Figure 4.18: Model 4–6 Observed and Fitted Basis at CBOT Wheat  
(in USD per bushel) 
 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
4.4.3.2 Results for Cocoa 
For the cocoa market, similar regression results are conducted, however, explanatory 
variables differ slightly. The first model, as previously, includes the relative market weight 
of different groups of non-commercial traders (Table 4.12). As for wheat, index traders’ 
market share is highly significant. A weakly significant coefficient is found for non-
commercial excluding spread traders’ and non-reporting traders’ market share. However, 
while the coefficient for non-commercial traders has the same negative sign as in the case 
of the wheat market, index traders’ market weight is positively related to the size of the 
cocoa basis in contrast to findings for the wheat market. 
This means that the larger the percentage share of index traders, the larger the market basis. 
Since index traders are unlikely to directly impact the cash market price, index traders’ 
market weight appears to be negatively related to the futures prices. This is in stark contrast 
to the index pressure hypothesis, which predicts the reverse. However, it partly supports 
the information content hypothesis, since the greater the share of uninformed traders, the 
further the futures prices is assumed to disengage with its underlying physical price. It 
follows that the greater the share of index traders, the greater the share of uninformed 
traders, the lower the information density and thus the greater the market basis in absolute 
terms due to uncertainty and limits to arbitrage arising. 
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Table 4.12: Cocoa Regression Results and Residual Diagnostics for Model 1–3 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
basis coeff. s.d. part. r^2 coeff. s.d. part. r^2 coeff. s.d. part. r^2 
constant 39.6368 238.9 0.0009 224.213 481.5 0.0080 3257.87*** 758.2 0.4152 
index 24.8985*** 8.169 0.2365 25.7324*** 7.172 0.3229 35.973*** 7.524 0.4679 
ncom_sp 1.57133 6.273 0.0021 6.98208 5.691 0.0528 7.99079 5.151 0.0847 
ncom-sp -10.8339* 5.593 0.1112 -3.64360 6.103 0.0130 3.49614 6.123 0.0124 
nrep 52.7369* 27.11 0.1120 24.2769 26.11 0.0310 14.0208 23.88 0.0131 
stCost - - - -1403.20** -2.21 0.1538 -1910.22*** 602.6 0.2788 
stToGr - - - 16.3691** 6.033 0.2143 15.349*** 5.459 0.2332 
iceMilSt - - - -26.2380 21.92 0.0504 -22.4902 19.83 0.0471 
exRate - - - - - - 1.51411** 0.5668 0.2153 
Diagnost. 
sigma                  
RSS                 
R^2                   
Adj.R^2               
log-likelihood     
    
Joint test: F(4,30)     
AR 1-3: F(3,27) 
Normal: Chi^2(2)    
Hetero.: F(8,26)   
107.169 
321588.368 
0.439111 
0.360885 
-198.37 
 
5.80 [0.001] 
4.82 [0.008] 
0.60 [0.740] 
2.37 [0.046] 
sigma                  
RSS                 
R^2                   
Adj.R^2               
log-likelihood     
    
Joint test: F(7,27)     
AR 1-3: F(3,24) 
Normal: Chi^2(2)    
Hetero.: F(14,20)   
90.849 
222845.667 
0.620563 
0.52219 
-202.943  
 
6.308 [0.000] 
1.278 [0.304] 
0.304 [0.859] 
0.682 [0.766] 
sigma                  
RSS                 
R^2                   
Adj.R^2               
log-likelihood     
    
Joint test: F(8,26)     
AR 1-3: F(3,23) 
Normal: Chi^2(2)    
Hetero.: F(16,18)   
82.0087 
174861.008 
0.702266 
0.610655 
-198.7 
 
7.666 [0.000] 
0.542 [0.658] 
0.372 [0.830] 
1.024 [0.477] 
Note: * indicating significance at 10% level, ** indicating significance at 5% level, and 
*** indicating significance at 1% level respectively.  
In a second model, carry variables are included in addition to speculators’ market weight. 
Storage costs (stCost) are highly significant and show an inverse relationship to the size of 
the basis. The finding confirms the theory of storage, which predicts that ceteris paribus the 
higher the storage cost, the larger the futures price relative to the cash price (stronger 
contango). The stock-to-grinding ratio (stToGr) shows a significant positive relationship to 
the market basis. This is puzzling, because, conventionally, the convenience yield should be 
negatively related to the ratio. However, the reverse sign in the context of non-convergence 
could be an indication of storage hoarding as outlined in Deaton and Laroque’s (1992) 
model. If actors refuse to free speculative inventory for arbitrage trades, non-convergence 
can arise, resulting in a positive link between basis and stock-to-grinding ratio. This effect 
has been present in the cocoa market during the previously discussed market squeeze. 
In a third model, the CFA Franc-USD exchange rate (exRate) is added in order to account 
for idiosyncratic factors of the particular cash market price. The exchange rate is significant 
and positively related to the market basis, which can either be due to a positive effect on 
the cash price or a negative effect on the futures price. This is because the higher the 
exchange rate the more expensive the domestic currency and the cheaper the product for 
imports. Both the exchange rate and the commodity futures price are forward looking 
(Chen, Rogoff and Rossi 2010). Hence, an explanation for the observed sign is that the 
futures price incorporates the information signalled by the exchange rate sooner than the 
cash price and hence decreases while the cash price remains unaffected in the short-run. 
The adjusted r-square is highest for the third model and residuals for the second and third 
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model are spherical. Looking at the fitted values against the observed, the superior fit of 
the third model is evident (Figure 4.19).     
Figure 4.19: Model 1–3 Observed and Fitted Basis at ICE Cocoa  
(in USD per tonne) 
 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
As previously for the wheat market, it is tested whether the significant effect of index 
traders is a result of a relative change in other trader’s market weight. Models four and five 
include index traders’ and commercial traders’ market weight, respectively. The results for 
cocoa are concur with findings for the wheat market in that coefficients for both trader 
types are significant, however the model fit is better and partial r-square is higher for the 
model with index traders’ market weight included (Table 4.13).  
Table 4.13: Cocoa Regression Results and Residual Diagnostics for Model 4–6 
 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
basis coeff. s.d. part. r^2 coeff. s.d. part. r^2 coeff. s.d. part. r^2 
constant -196.765 357.3 0.0103 861.605* 492.0 0.0956 119.964 418.5 0.0029 
com - - - -17.799*** 4.544 0.3461 -6.15367 4.409 0.0650 
index 39.2616*** 6.086 0.5893 - - - 33.0704*** 7.453 0.4129 
stCost -1655.7*** 528.9 0.2526 -1782.38** 696.3 0.1843 -1873.58*** 543.4 0.2980 
stToGr 14.4763*** 4.749 0.2427 21.413*** 6.038 0.3025 16.2795*** 4.848 0.2871 
iceMilSt -22.5945 18.99 0.0465 -13.1589 24.07 0.0102 -19.4593 18.83 0.0368 
exRate 1.45531*** 0.4977 0.2277 1.35223** 0.6516 0.1293 1.66897*** 0.5131 0.2742 
Diagnost. 
sigma                  
RSS                 
R^2                   
Adj.R^2               
log-likelihood     
    
Joint test: F(5,29)     
AR 1-3: F(3,26) 
Normal: Chi^2(2)    
Hetero.: F(10,24)   
81.172 
191077.791 
0.674654 
0.61856 
-200.252 
 
12.03 [0.000]  
1.021 [0.399] 
0.389 [0.823] 
2.353 [0.042] 
sigma                  
RSS                 
R^2                   
Adj.R^2               
log-likelihood     
    
Joint test: F(5,29)     
AR 1-3: F(3,26) 
Normal: Chi^2(2)    
Hetero.: F(10,24)   
102.432 
304277.309 
0.48191 
0.392584 
-208.394 
 
5.395 [0.001] 
1.759 [0.180] 
1.019 [0.601] 
1.399 [0.240] 
sigma                  
RSS                 
R^2                   
Adj.R^2               
log-likelihood     
    
Joint test: F(6,28)     
AR 1-3: F(3,25) 
Normal: Chi^2(2)    
Hetero.: F(12,22)   
79.8771 
178649.732 
0.695815 
0.630632 
-199.075 
 
10.67 [0.000] 
0.638 [0.598] 
0.128 [0.938] 
1.538 [0.184] 
Note: * indicating significance at 10% level, ** indicating significance at 5% level, and 
*** indicating significance at 1% level respectively.  
In a sixth model, both the relative market weight of index and commercial traders’ is 
included. As for the wheat market, the commercial trader variable turns insignificant and 
the partial r-square for both, index and commercial traders’ market weight decline, which 
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indicates that these are not independent. The model fit of the sixth model specification is 
found best and fitted values are able to replicate most of the basis size at maturity for the 
observation period. While the first model under-predicts the extent of the basis between 
2009 and 2011, model three with carry variables included yields a better fit. When 
accounting for idiosyncratic factors, by the addition of the exchange rate, the basis size at 
non-convergence is almost fully replicated (Figure 4.20). 
Figure 4.20: Model 4–6 Observed and Fitted Basis at ICE Cocoa 
(in USD per tonne) 
 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
4.4.3.3 Comparison Wheat and Cocoa 
Results for the cocoa market regarding the market weight of commercial and index traders 
are puzzling. While coefficients for wheat regarding traders’ market weight yield signs in 
line with the hedging and index pressure hypotheses, signs are reversed for the cocoa 
market. The reason for this might be found by taking a closer look at traders’ position 
taking in the two markets.  
It is assumed that hedgers are not sensitive to the price level but to hedging effectiveness, 
while index traders are not sensitive to idiosyncratic market factor. With declining hedging 
effectiveness, the share of commercial traders is expected to decline, which means that the 
share of index traders would increase as a result of commercial hedgers reacting to 
convergence failure. This would mean that the higher the degree of non-convergence, the 
higher the share of index traders as they react to idiosyncratic anomalies with a lag (or not 
at all). Consequently, with the increasing share of index traders in the market, index 
pressure increases. If index traders’ net positions exceed commercial hedgers net hedging 
demand, a positive price bias is introduced, which strengthens the market’s contango and 
causes the basis to turn negative (or become even more negative). The coefficient for the 
wheat market suggests this relationship.  
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Looking at total and net positions by different trader types, these behavioural assumptions 
are confirmed for the wheat market. While net positions remain relatively stable, large 
swings are observable in total positions. All trader types significantly reduced their total 
positions over the time period of non-convergence. This is more pronounced for 
commercial and non-commercial traders than for index traders. As a result, the market 
weight of index traders increased (Figure 4.21).    
Figure 4.21: Wheat Market Trader Positions 
(basis in USD (right), positions in thousands(left), Jan. 2006–Dec. 2012) 
Total Positions Net Positions 
  
Source: Datastream, CFTC CIT.  
For the cocoa market the case is different, since commercial traders did not close out their 
hedging position when non-convergence occurred. This is because commercial traders, 
who are mostly short in the futures market, gain from the mispricing between cash and 
futures prices in the particular case of the cocoa market. In the case of an overall price 
increase, a positive basis indicates that the futures price does not rise as much as the 
physical. Short hedgers hence gain on their futures position since the hedge does not fully 
offset the price rise. Further, if the price level drops, the futures price drops more than the 
cash market price and hence short hedgers again make a net gain. Therefore, short hedgers 
are incentivised to stay in the market and even over-hedge. This explains why commercial 
trader total positions were increasing during the period of non-convergence (Figure 4.22).  
However, commercial net positions are not net-short the entire time period. The crisis in 
Cote d’Ivoire is probably one cause of this development. With traders predicting coming 
shortages, owners of the commodity are incentivised to under hedge, while consumers are 
motivated to over hedge. With commercial traders betting on increasing prices, they turn 
net-long just before the peak of non-convergence in early 2011. With hedgers being net-
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Basis [F-S] ncom_tot
com_tot index_tot
-250
-200
-150
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
250
-250
-200
-150
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
250
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Basis [F-S] com_nl
ncom_nl index_nl
 
167 
long, the hedging pressure hypothesis is inverted, which explains the negative sign for 
commercial traders in the cocoa market in contrast to the wheat market.   
Figure 4.22: Cocoa Market Trader Positions 
(basis in USD (right), positions in thousands(left), Jan. 2006–Dec. 2012) 
Total Positions  Net Positions  
  
Source: Datastream, DFTC CIT. 
The second puzzle for the cocoa maker is the significant positive sign of the coefficient on 
index trading. A possible explanation is the roll effect executed by index traders. Since the 
market shows a strong backwardation (and the whole futures curve is inverted) index 
traders earn roll yields when rolling over their positions. The prospect of a roll yield 
motivates index traders to roll their positions more frequently (possibly each maturity 
month). Index traders who close out their positions when a contract matures execute 
downward pressure on the contract they are in and hence increase the market basis even 
further (see Figure 2.4). 
This explains why the futures price moved even further away from the cash price short 
before maturity (Figure 4.10). While index traders over the contract’s life cycle execute no 
significant price pressure, since commercial traders fully cover index positions most of the 
time, they execute price pressure close to a contracts’ maturity date, when the market gets 
thin. 
Index traders in the wheat market execute significant price pressure over a contract's life 
cycle. They hence strengthen the market’s contango and contribute to a continuously 
decreasing market basis. If limits to spatial arbitrage exist, as suggested by the literature and 
confirmed empirically, this results in a large negative basis which is carried over from one 
contract into the next. In contrast, the market weight of index traders in the cocoa market 
is marginal throughout a contract’s life cycle but potentially significant at maturity. With 
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those traders having an additional incentive to rollover their contracts frequently due to an 
inverted market regime, index traders execute downward price pressure on maturing 
contracts, further increasing a positive market basis shortly before maturity. In both cases, 
index traders contribute significantly to the absolute size of the market basis at maturity.  
Figure 4.23: US Wheat Cash Prices minus Prices in Canada, Argentina, Australia 
(monthly, in USD per metric ton, May 1989–Apr. 2013) 
 
Source: USDA. 
For both markets, convergence was eventually restored. In the cocoa market, the market 
basis declined again in mid-2011, when expectations about future shortages due to the civil 
war in Cote d’Ivoire were revised as the harvest and exports remained almost stable and the 
situation slowly deescalated in late 2011. For the wheat market, convergence was reinforced 
with the introduction of the VSR. However, although convergence was restored, various 
complaints by market participants about inflated storage costs, which resulted in 
excessively high wheat cash prices, indicate that market order was still not fully achieved 
(Stebbins 2011). Indeed, after the introduction of the VSR, US soft red winter wheat prices 
increased rapidly relative to Canadian, Argentinean, and Australian prices (Figure 4.23). The 
extent to which the futures price was previously detached from the underlying cash price is 
revealed in suppressed cash prices after forced convergence.  
4.5 Conclusion  
Both wheat and cocoa markets were recently characterised by the excessive level and 
volatility of the market basis and prolonged periods of convergence failure. These 
phenomena have been theoretically linked to speculative investments, in particular 
investments by index traders. Empirical results suggest that index pressure has significantly 
altered the short- and long-run relationship between futures and cash markets. Further, the 
continuous relationship between futures and the underlying cash market price is found to 
have become increasingly volatile in recent years and several structural breaks have been 
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identified. Concurrently, carry variables have lost explanatory power regarding the market 
basis and adjustment between cash and futures prices takes longer than in previous 
decades. These developments coincide with an increasing inflow of speculative liquidity 
into these markets.   
While cogent arguments have been proposed by the literature about reasons for limits to 
arbitrage causing non-convergence, the extent of the basis at a contracts’ maturity date has 
remained unexplained so far. This thesis builds on insights gained from the hedging 
pressure hypothesis, which inspires the development of the index pressure hypothesis. This 
way, the thesis is able to theoretically and empirically link the extent of non-convergence to 
the composition of hedgers and speculators in the respective markets. Presented evidence 
indicates that index traders have a positive price impact on futures prices over a contract’s 
life cycle, while they execute negative price pressure on the maturing contracts when rolling 
over their positions. Since index traders are only active on the derivative but not the 
physical market, they significantly contribute to the extent of the market basis.  
Findings suggest that speculative demand, and in particular index pressure, has not only 
altered the price level in futures markets, but also severely undermined hedging 
effectiveness in terms of basis size and basis volatility. This conclusion is supported by 
results presented in earlier studies regarding increasing hedging costs over recent years—
e.g., Mallory, Liao-Etienne und Irwin (2011), Brunetti and Reiffen (2014). Consequently, 
these findings put into question both the price discovery and risk management function of 
futures markets. Last, but not least, the reaction of physical prices to the enforcement of 
arbitrage in the case of wheat suggests that the direction of causation at least partially runs 
from the futures to the cash market. This implies that speculative demand does potentially 
affect both futures and physical market prices.  
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Chapter 5 The Commodity Term Structure 
5.1 Introduction 
Intertemporal price relations in commodity futures markets are of immediate importance 
for price hedging, efficient inventory management and timing of production decisions. The 
term structure influences storage, production and other decisions made by consumers, 
producers and intermediaries in the commodity industry (Borovkova and Geman 2008). 
An understanding of the term structure is hence imperative for any actor in the physical 
commodity market.  
In Chapter 2 existing theories of price formation on commodity futures markets have been 
critically reviewed in the light of bounded rationality, rational herding and Post-Keynesian 
theories. This Chapter 5 revisits the previous theoretical discussion in the context of 
intertemporal pricing in commodity futures markets. In accordance with the 
financialisation hypothesis it is argued that not only market fundamental factors, but also 
factors specific to the derivative market influence the term structure of commodity futures.  
The ICE coffee and ICE cocoa markets serve as case studies, which provide an interesting 
comparison. Both crops have similarities in the production process with seasonality, which 
would be reflected in their term structure, while, as discussed in Chapter 3, trader 
composition in the two markets differs. 
The introduction apart, Section 2 applies previously developed theories to intertemporal 
pricing in commodity futures markets and identifies factors which drive prices across 
different contracts. Section 3 provides graphical analyses of term structure behaviour in the 
cocoa and coffee markets over the last decade. Potential anomalies are identified and 
discussed in the context of preceding theoretical considerations. In Section 3 econometric 
analyses are presented. Firstly, individual calendar spreads are related to various factors 
identified as influential in the literature. Secondly, a two-step method is applied which links 
explanatory variables to the particular shape of the futures curve. Section 4 concludes by 
assessing the evidences and discussing implications for hedgers and speculators. 
5.2 A Theory on Intertemporal Pricing 
Two strands of theories are commonly referred to when explaining intertemporal price 
relations on commodity markets: (1) theories based on no-arbitrage conditions, and (2) 
theories based on informational efficiency. The theories of storage and risk premium 
belong to the first category and present two complementary approaches to explaining 
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differences in commodity prices for a good acquired/sold at some future date at the 
exchange (futures price) and a good acquired/sold immediately in the physical market (cash 
price). Although these theories fall short of explicitly explaining price differences between 
different futures contracts with distinct maturity dates, the no-arbitrage conditions, on 
which those theories and progressions rest, are applicable to intertemporal pricing of 
derivatives as well (Lautier 2005)72. The second category of theories related to 
intertemporal pricing encompasses the efficient market hypothesis, which explains price 
differentials by differences in expectations regarding future market regimes. Futures prices 
are thought to be a reflection of what is expected to be the physical price at the expiration 
date of the respective futures (Geman and Sarfo 2012).  
Intertemporal price relations at futures markets are commonly described by the term 
structure of the market. The term structure refers to a set of prices of futures contracts 
with different maturity dates. By plotting the set of prices at a particular point in time the 
futures curve is revealed, which can be understood as an instantaneous ‘snap-shot’ of 
contracts with different maturity dates (Borovkova 2010). If the price of the futures 
contract with longer time to maturity is higher than the price of a contract closer to 
maturity, the market is said to be normal. In the reverse case the market is said to be 
inverted73. Since at a single point in time several ‘live’ contracts are traded simultaneously, 
the futures curve is not one straight line and indeed the slope coefficient of the curve in 
different segments does not necessarily show the same sign.  
Figure 5.1: Stylized Futures Curve Patterns 
 
Figure 5.1 distinguishes between four stylized patterns that are frequently observed: 
normal, inverted, inverted U and U-shaped. The X-axis provides the different maturity 
                                                 
72 Many empirical approaches to testing the validity of these two hypotheses approximated the spot price with 
the closest to delivery futures price due to liquidity concerns regarding the underlying physical market. Hence, 
they implicitly analyse the price relationship between futures of different maturities.  
73 Note the crucial difference to contango and backwardation, which refer to intertemporal pricing between 
cash and futures prices. 
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months, while the Y-axis indicates the price. Each node refers to one single contract with a 
particular maturity date T1, T2 …, T12 and a price. 
The simple arbitrage relationship between cash and futures markets, as discussed in 
Chapters 2 and 4, links the price differential between the two markets to certain properties 
which distinguish the physical commodity from the futures contract prior to its maturity. If 
considering the intertemporal price relation between different futures contracts instead of 
futures and cash prices, the influences of properties like storage costs and interest rate do 
not decay when a contract approaches maturity. This is an important difference between 
futures-cash and futures–futures relations. Since the delivery date for the cash price is 
always the current date, the distance between the future’s delivery and the cash position 
declines continuously with time. The relative time factor, which drives the decline in 
storage and interest rate in the futures–cash relation, is static in the futures–futures relation, 
because the distance between the contracts’ delivery dates does not decay as time elapses. 
This is not to say that those factors are invariant through time, but that they do not 
necessarily decrease proportionally with time. 
A more formal way of looking at this is by considering Equation 2.1 for two futures 
contracts with distinct maturity dates T1 and T2 (with T2 > T1). If solving for the cash 
market price, the two equations can be set equal which, after rearrangement, yields: 
,8 = ,¤  y,  , (5.1) 
with	 being the time difference between the two maturity dates74, , being equal to the 
storage costs incurred by holding the physical product over the duration of , and y, 
being the interest paid over the same time period. This simple no-arbitrage condition has 
been amended in the theory of storage and the theory of normal backwardation by a 
convenience yield and risk premium discussed in Chapter 2.  
Since the convenience yield is derived from considerations about the relationship between 
the physical product and the derivative, it becomes questionable whether this concept is 
applicable to pricing of derivatives. In theory, a convenience yield accrues to the owner of 
the physical commodity due to the commodity’s use value, which a derivative instrument 
clearly lacks. Nevertheless, the concept is still applicable if physical delivery is possible. 
While the futures positions can be liquidated against money any time, it can only be 
exchanged against the physical goods at a certain point in time which is the contract’s 
                                                 
74 This is	 = D − @ =  D − ! −  @ − ! =  D −  @. 
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maturity date. This means, the contract that matures at an earlier date has a convenience 
yield earlier than a contract with a later maturity date. Hence, the convenience yield in the 
intertemporal price relation between derivatives should depend on the distance between 
those two maturity dates (and as usual the demand for, and supply of, inventory).  
In contrast to the convenience yield, the concepts of risk premium are not linked to the 
physical properties of the commodity and hence directly transferable to intertemporal 
derivative-pricing. However, various competing interpretations have been identified in the 
literature, which yield different implications for term structure dynamics. If the risk 
premium is linked to the own price variance (idiosyncratic risk) or market covariance 
(systematic risk), the risk premium should vary with the variance and market covariance 
across contracts. The own price variance, following Samuelson (1965), should be higher for 
contracts closer to maturity compared to deferred contracts. The market covariance should 
depend on the correlation of each contract with wider market dynamics. If the conjecture 
that index traders and other non-commercial traders increase co-movements between 
commodities and stock markets is true—see Tang und Xiong (2012), Juvenal und Petrella 
(2011)—the risk premium should be higher for those contracts where a larger number of 
these traders are active. If, however, the risk premium is understood as suggested by the 
hedging and index pressure theories, the premium should vary with the relative market 
weight of hedgers and index traders across the futures curve. Again, implications differ 
from the cash–futures relationships, where hedging and index pressure can only affect 
futures prices. For the futures curve each element of the intertemporal price equation is 
affected and the effect depends on the different traders’ relative market weight in each 
particular contract.  
Recalling the simple no-arbitrage condition in Equation 5.1, the concepts of convenience 
yield and risk premium can be incorporated.  
,8 = ,¤  y,  , − z, − 	, (5.2) 
with z, being the convenience yield gained over the time period	. The variable 	, 
resembles the risk premium which can take on different manifestations. More generally, let ! be the current point in time,  > the point in time at which the ith contract matures,  Q the 
point in time at which the jth contract matures with j<i, and > the time span between the 
maturities of the two contracts	 > −  Q, then:  
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,® = ,¯  y,®  ,® − z,® − 	,® (5.3) 
From this one can derive the slope coefficients for any two consecutive contracts:  
,> = ,® − ,¯ > −  Q = 1> y,®  ,® − z,® − 	,® (5.4) 
Equation 5.4 describes the slope coefficient of a straight line connecting two adjunct nodes 
(as in Figure 5.1)—this is, the relationship between two contracts with consecutive maturity 
dates at time t. If storage costs, risk-free rate, convenience yield, and risk premium are 
assumed constant through time75, one can rewrite so that: 
 = y   − z − 	 (5.5) 
With the above representation, the slope coefficient is steeper, the smaller the convenience 
yield and the risk premium and the larger are the storage cost and risk-free interest rate. 
With a relatively high convenience yield and/or high risk premium the slope is flatter or 
negative. Extending this exercise over all pairs of consecutive futures contracts would then 
yield the observed shape of the futures curve at any particular point in time:   
 > =   > (5.6) 
However, if, and only if, storage cost, interest rate, convenience yield, and risk premium are 
assumed constant through time—that is, for example, at time t convenience yield for T2 is 
expected to be the same as for T1—the above Equation 5.6 holds. If this is not the case, 
which is a more realistic scenario, the slope coefficient does not only vary with time, but 
also with the segment of the futures curve, i.e., with i, so that: 
 > =  y > (5.7) 
The futures curve is hence not restricted to be linear, but can take on various functional 
forms and shapes. Recalling Equation 5.4, we can identify different factors behind the 
particular shape of the futures curve, i.e., the slope coefficient in particular segments. 
Those factors vary with time t and segment i. A change not in the slope but the intersect 
coefficient in Equation 5.7 occurs only if the price at zero time-to-maturity, i.e., the spot 
                                                 
75 So that: ,® = >,	y,® = >y, z,® = >,z, and 	,® = >	.  
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price76 [], changes. A change in the overall slope of the futures curve occurs if there are 
even changes in expected interest rate, storage costs, convenience yield, or risk premium 
across all contracts. That is the slope coefficient for each pair of contract is transformed 
linearly. A change in the curvature of the futures curve occurs if factors determining the 
slope coefficient change unevenly across contracts, that is, differ with i.   
While interest rate, storage cost and convenience yield are subject to traders’ expectations, 
the risk premium is linked to contract-specific variation, correlation and relative trader-
positions. Hence on the one hand, the shape of the futures curve reflects participants’ 
perceptions of market fundamentals and anticipated price trends (Borovkova 2010). On the 
other hand, it reflects trader-positions and contract-specific idiosyncratic and systemic risk. 
Factors that are hypothesised to drive the risk premium, although derived from competing 
theories, are not necessarily independent. Following the excessive co-movement 
hypothesis, index traders are identified as one of the potential drivers of systemic risk, 
while speculation in general is theoretically linked to excessive volatility and hence 
idiosyncratic risk.  
Along similar lines, Gabillon (1995) combines information efficiency with heterogeneous 
agents and market microstructure theories in his commodity futures curve analysis. He 
assumes that the first segment of the crude oil futures curve is populated by hedgers, while 
the second segment is populated by financial investors. Since the two trader types are 
driven by different investment motives, he argues that the first part of the futures curve is 
driven by changes in inventories and supply and demand shocks in the physical market 
(fundamentals), while the latter part is driven by changes in the interest rate, anticipated 
inflation and prices for substitutes among the energy commodities (speculative demand). 
Lautier (2005) seems to support Gabillon’s (1995) idea and argues that in order to extend 
the logic of intertemporal pricing beyond the bivariate relationship between consecutive 
futures contracts, one has to treat each individual contract as a single market. She 
consequently links the price differential between contracts to the relative supply and 
demand for each individual contract. According to her, the presence of wave forms—the 
simultaneous presence of a normal and inverted market along the curve—can then be 
explained by a surplus in the supply or demand of particular futures contracts (Lautier 
2005)77.   
                                                 
76 The spot price is here understood as the commodity price at the futures market for immediate delivery 
which is only observable at the contracts’ maturity dates.  
77 Working (1934) was probably the first to discuss this possibility, although arguing vehemently against it.  
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In the following analysis the hypothesised drivers of commodity futures curves shall be 
tested by taking the two commodities, coffee and cocoa, with maturities in March, May, 
July, September and December as case studies.  
5.3 The Term Structure of Cocoa and Coffee 
Over the last decade, the term structures of cocoa and coffee markets have shown some 
salient features, which are difficult to explain by conventional theories. Figure 5.2 depicts 
the continuous spread between the maturing and next-to-maturity contract. According to 
the theory of storage, the spread is expected to exhibit cyclical behaviour reflecting market 
adjustment processes over seasonal fluctuations in inventories.  
Figure 5.2: Continuous Calendar Spread 
(continuous daily 2-to-1 spread and centred moving average, Jan. 2000–Dec. 2013) 
Cocoa 
 
Coffee 
 
Source: Datastream (author’s calculation).  
For both crops seasonal patterns are clearly visible. While coffee shows annual seasonality, 
the cocoa spread additionally reflects larger growing cycles over five to six years. These 
adjustment cycles cause the cocoa market to oscillate between normal and inverted market 
regimes. In the coffee futures exchange a normal market regime prevails, hinting towards 
more stable production cycles. However, the calendar spreads in both markets severely 
misbehave, since 2007 for cocoa and 2009 for coffee. Seasonal cycles are interrupted and 
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flattened out while the size and volatility of the spread reaches exceptional levels, especially 
for the more tranquil coffee market.  
Despite these anomalies, the term structures of both markets appear to retain their links to 
market fundamentals (inventories) throughout the time period. The bars in Figure 5.3 
reflect net-inventory, whereby the lines indicate the price level of simultaneously traded 
contracts, ordered by their maturity dates—with 1 being the maturing and 10 the most 
deferred contract. Observations are shown as of each May contract’s maturity date. All 
simultaneously traded contracts are normalised by the maturing May contract.  
Figure 5.3: Term Structure and Change in Inventory 
(at each May contract’s maturity, May=100, normalised prices on left scale, 2000–2015) 
Cocoa 
 
Coffee 
 
Source: Cocoa inventory obtained from ICCO, Quarterly Bulletin of Cocoa Statistics, 
World Cocoa Bean Production, Net-inventory: current net world crop (gross crop 
adjusted for loss in weight) minus grinding, several volumes (2015 crop is ICCO forecast 
in Vol. XLI No.1); coffee inventory obtained from ICO, 2012, Net-inventory: Annual 
change of inventories at the end of December: Importing country in 60-kg bags; cocoa 
and coffee futures prices obtained from Datastream (author’s calculation). 
The graphics indicate that an inverted market occurs with tightening conditions in the 
physical market. This is expected since the convenience yield is negatively related to 
changes in inventories. For the cocoa market this effect is visible in 2002, 2007–08 and 
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2015 when inventories depleted. The coffee market is predominantly normal with the 
exception of 2010 when net-inventory decreased and the market became inverted. 
Recalling Figure 5.2, the depletion of inventories coincides with volatile calendar spreads. 
Another way of graphically analysing the term structure of commodity markets is borrowed 
from Parsons (2010). Figure 5.4 depicts the price level, calendar spread between the 
deferred (F8) and maturing (F1) contract and futures curves in a single graphic. Each 
observation of the futures curve Ti at t0 is paired with the respective future point in time ti. 
For the cocoa market the futures curve appears to rightly predict the direction of price 
changes, however, underestimates its extent. Adjustments take place over the entire futures 
curve and the shape of the curve is flexibly shifting between normal and inverted market 
regimes. For the coffee market not much variation in the futures curve is observed until 
2010 when a shortage arises. Although the market switches to inverted, as predicted by 
theory, the futures curve loses its predictive power as it wrongly indicates falling prices in 
early 2010 and rising prices in mid-2011.   
Figure 5.4: Monthly Price Level, Futures Curve, and Intertemporal Spread 
(price level in USD left scale, Jan. 2000–Apr. 2014) 
Cocoa 
 
Coffee 
 
Source: Datastream (author’s calculation) 
Not only the shape of the futures curve but also the variance is of interest. According to 
Samuelson (1965), the closer a contract is to its maturity date, the more volatile it should be 
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due to market adjustment effects. This is relevant with regards to Kaldor’s (1939) risk 
premium hypothesis. If there are differences in the variance of simultaneously traded 
contracts these should result in differences in the risk premium and hence contribute to 
dynamics in the futures curve.  
For the cocoa market, as visualised in Figure 5.5, the closest to maturity contract (Var(1)) 
shows a higher or similarly high volatility compared to the deferred contract (Var(8)) in 
most times. However, inventory depletion appears to trigger high volatility in the maturing 
contracts first and in the deferred contracts with a lag, leading to a wave-shape of the 
volatility difference series in 2002, 2009, and 2012. Further, during the time period 2010 to 
mid-2011 the volatility in the maturing contract by far exceeds volatility in the deferred 
contract. This can be linked to convergence failure and potentially abrupt adjustment 
mechanisms at maturity as discussed in Chapter 4.  
Figure 5.5: Difference in Volatility of Next-to-maturity and Deferred Contracts 
(Var(1)-Var(7/8), 12-month daily centered moving variance, Jan. 2000–Apr. 2014) 
Cocoa 
 
Coffee 
 
Source: Datastream (author’s calculation). 
For the coffee market the difference in variance in mid-2000 is puzzling since it is only 
associated with a decline in the growth rate of inventories but not a decline in net-
inventories. Only in 2004–06 inventories shrank, which is associated with volatility in both, 
the longer- and shorter-dated contract. An even greater decline in inventories took place in 
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2010. As for cocoa, price adjustments go through the maturing contracts first and affect 
the deferred contracts with a time lag, which results in a wave shape. 
Lautier (2005) suggests that the price of individual futures contracts contributing to the 
futures curve is determined by the relative demand and supply of traders. Since this 
demand and supply is motivated by traders’ expectations, those expectations should be 
reflected in the relative price of each contract. According to the financialisation hypothesis, 
different traders follow different expectations/trading strategies, which are linked to 
market-specific fundamentals or, alternatively, factors unrelated to the particular market. 
The effect of different traders on the market term structure is however difficult to 
determine since disaggregated open interest by trader type is only available as aggregate 
positions across contracts, but not for individual contracts (see Chapter 3).  
Figure 5.6: Percentage Share Trader Type and Total OI 
(total OI right scale in million contracts, Jan. 2000–Jun. 2014) 
Cocoa 
 
Coffee 
 
Source: CFTC COT and CIT supplement. 
In Figure 5.6 the COT data set is used until December 2005 and the CIT supplement since 
January 2006. Especially for the coffee market the combination of the two data sets 
becomes visible in the abrupt drop of the commercial traders’ market share in January 
2006. While open interest in both markets is similar, index traders’ and non-commercial 
traders’ market share is higher for the coffee market than for the cocoa market. Further, 
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while for coffee most open interest is located in the near to maturity contracts, for cocoa a 
considerable amount of open interest is in deferred contracts, which is probably due to the 
higher share of commercial hedgers in the market (see Figure 3.7).  
5.4 Term Structure Anomalies 
Although most term structure models have been developed with reference to the interest 
rate yield curve (Nelson and Siegel 1987; Litterman and Scheinkman 1991; Diebold and Li 
2006), some of these approaches have been adapted to commodity markets. Especially for 
energy commodity markets a rich literature on term structure forecasts and modelling has 
evolved (Blanco and Stefiszyn 2002; Borovkova 2010). In particular the oil market enjoys 
great popularity due to its economic significance, but also because oil futures contracts 
trade with long maturities so that an extended futures curve and its shape can be observed 
(Gabillon 1991; Parsons 2010).  
Two approaches are commonly taken when analysing a market’s terms structure. The first 
type, which is often referred to as ‘state variable approach’, is derived from structural no-
arbitrage models, which impose equilibrium conditions between futures contracts of 
different maturities (Lin and Roberts 2006). Factors driving the evolution of the futures 
curve derived from the equilibrium equation, are then modelled by certain stochastic 
processes. Such models are deductive as they are based on assumptions about the 
stochastic properties and functional form of the state variables (or factors) which constitute 
the commodity futures curve. Various model specifications which differ in their choice of 
factors and stochastic properties have been proposed, including one factor models 
(Brennan and Schwartz 1985; Cortazar and Schwartz 1994), two factor models (Gabillon 
1991; 1995), and three factor models (Schwartz 1997; Escobar, Hernández and Seco 2003; 
Geman and Sarfo 2012). Spot price, convenience yield, interest rate, long-term price, and in 
few cases seasonality (Frackler and Roberts 1999; Borovkova and Geman 2008; Borovkova 
2010) are included as stochastic state variables and are modelled as geometric Brownian 
motions, Wiener processes, Monte-Carlo processes, mean reversion processes and alike 
(see Lautier (2005) for a more detailed review). Such models are predominantly concerned 
with pricing of complex derivative instruments and value-at-risk modelling. Applications 
for agricultural and soft commodity markets include Power and Turvey (2008), Richter and 
Sorensen (2002) and Geman and Sarfo (2012). 
The second type of term structure models is based on some variation of factor or 
component analysis. Those models capture stylised features of the futures curve in a 
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parsimonious way. Two prominent types can be distinguished which are non-parametric 
models like principal component analysis (PCA) and parametric models, as for example the 
factor model suggested by Nelson and Siegel (1987). Compared to state variable 
approaches, such models are more inductive since they seek to describe the futures curve, 
rather than impose stochastic properties on structural factors. In PCA common properties 
of historical price data resembling dominant shapes of the futures curve are extracted, 
while the Nelson-Siegel factor model pre-imposes stylised shapes and estimates the factor 
scores on a set of factor loadings.   
PCA transforms a bunch of correlated time series into fewer uncorrelated components. 
Each component captures common variation patterns underlying the time series. As the 
components are produced by transformation, the original information is fully retained. In 
addition, the analysis provides information on the degree of communality in variation 
across the price series (Blanco and Stefiszyn 2002). In contrast to PCA, the model 
suggested by Nelson and Siegel (1987) presupposes a structure of the components and 
makes a-priori assumptions about the factor loadings. Factors are hence designed so that 
they satisfy certain structural properties which are regarded desirable (Dunteman 1984, 
171). 
Due to their more inductive nature, factors and components lack a priori economic 
meaning. Litterman and Scheinman (1991) were the first to assign different interpretations 
to the first three components extracted from the yield curve of fixed-income securities by 
PCA. They coined the terms ‘level’, ‘steepness’ and ‘curvature’ component for the three 
stylised shapes of the loadings commonly found for yield curves. These interpretations 
were widely adopted in the analytical literature and given different economic 
interpretations. Blanco and Stefiszyn (2002) assign changes in the level to changes in the 
overall price, and changes in the slope to changes in the convenience yield. Chantziara and 
Skiadopoulos (2008) link the slope component to changes in the term structure from 
normal to inverted markets and vice versa. They explicitly discard the fourth component as 
noise. Borovkova (2010) argues that for energy markets the level component is linked to 
changes in the global economy, the political situation and exploration techniques, while the 
slope component captures the expected long-term price or a change in the convenience 
yield. The third factor, according to her, is linked to volatilities of futures prices. Diebold 
and Li (2006) slightly reformulate the Nelson and Siegel (1987) model specification and 
show that the factor loadings can then be interpreted as level, slope and curvature in the 
tradition of Litterman and Scheinman (1991). 
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Since the purpose of the analysis at hand is to study the relationship between the shape of 
the futures curve and proposed factors that drive the futures curve, a method is needed, 
which captures the joint evolution of futures contracts. Both, PCA and the Nelson-Siegel 
factor model, provide methods to capture the latent factors of the futures curve in a 
parsimonious way that maximises the amount of information contained in the original data 
and reduces dimensionality. No-arbitrage models are less suitable since these impose 
restrictions, which might not hold in reality. If restrictions do not hold, i.e., the model is 
misspecified, the factors do not resemble the true dynamics of the futures curve (Afonso 
and Martins 2012), which renders any preceding empirical analysis meaningless.   
Although there has emerged a vast empirical literature that investigates the relationship 
between commodity price levels and speculative investment (see Chapter2: Section 2.5), 
only a few consider the impact of speculative investment on a commodity market’s term 
structure. For example, Coakley, Kellard and Tsvetanov (2013) take continuous time series 
of all simultaneously traded contracts into consideration when searching for bubble 
behaviour in oil futures. Karstanje, Wel and Dijk (2013) employ an extension of the 
Nelson-Siegel model in order to analyse the excessive co-movement hypothesis for level, 
slope and curvature factors in futures curves of different commodities. They find a 
significant increase in co-movement. Brunetti and Reiffen (2014) conduct a two-step 
regression analysis for soybeans, wheat and corn futures in order to test the impact of 
index traders’ positions on the costs of hedging. Since they approximate the cost of 
hedging with calendar spreads, they implicitly test for the impact of index traders on the 
futures curve. Irwin, et al. (2011) also test for the impact of index traders on the calendar 
spread by event studies as well as Granger non-causality tests.  
However, these existing empirical studies have several shortcomings. Irwin, et al. (2011) 
and Brunetti and Reiffen (2014) only take the first two contracts into consideration but not 
the futures curve as a whole. Coakley, Kellard and Tsvetanov (2015) analyse all traded 
contracts, however, not their relationship and hence not the futures curve. Karstanje, et al. 
(2013) takes the whole futures curve into consideration. However, they do not link the 
observed co-movement to speculative variables like traders’ positions. 
5.4.1 Data and Methodology  
Previously, the slope coefficients between different nodes of the futures curve have been 
linked to various explanatory variables. However, some of these hypothesised driving 
factors, like risk premium and convenience yield, are latent while for others, like storage 
costs, data are unavailable. These factors have to be approximated. Following earlier 
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deliberations, the convenience yield can be expressed as a function of current and expected 
inventory changes [z,>∆J, E(∆I¤)]. Current inventory changes should affect the 
convenience yield evenly across the term structure, while expected inventories, especially 
for seasonal commodities, explain deviations in slope coefficients across the commodity 
term structure resulting in bump and wave shapes. Storage cost should be a function of the 
level of inventories, i.e., the demand for storage space [IZ]. The risk premium can 
either be linked to the own price variation [	,>σ,>D ], the market beta [	,>β,>], or 
hedging and index pressure [	,>∑L,>). Recalling Equations 5.4–5, a functional form of 
the slope of the futures curve for each pair of consecutive contracts can be derived.  
, = y,  J − z,∆J, ',(∆J,) − 	,^L, , 1,, ´,D  (5.8) 
A regression analysis following the above specification could be run for every observable 
part of the futures curve, that is, the calendar spread between every two consecutive 
contracts. Although results give a good indication of the relevance of hypothesised driving 
factors for the different segments of the futures curve, such analysis misses taking the 
futures curve as a whole into consideration and hence its particular shape. In order to 
conduct a time series analysis on the term structure, methods have to be applied which 
capture a three-dimensional dynamic process—the term structure evolves through time-
maturity-value space—into a two-dimensional time-value space only. Both PCA and the 
parametric factor model developed by Nelson and Siegel (1987) can be used for this 
purpose.  
The advantage of the Nelson-Siegel model is that factors are easier to interpret. The 
disadvantage is that they are restrictive as they impose properties on the futures curve a-
priori. Whether the pre-imposed factor loadings match observed dynamics has hence to be 
assessed before estimation. Further, extracted factors might be correlated and hence 
capture related dynamics. While components extracted by PCA are not subject to these 
shortcomings, component loadings are non-robust in the sense that those are sensitive to 
the particular sample under consideration. In the following, PCA will be used in order to 
assess the fit of the factor loadings imposed by the Nelson-Siegel model. After assessing 
the appropriateness of the Nelson-Sigel model for dynamics in the coffee and cocoa 
market, factors extracted will be used in an autoregressive model (AR) in a second step, 
which links suggested explanatory variables to the dynamics in the futures curve. A simpler 
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regression analysis, which tests the significance of identified explanatory variables on 
individual calendar spreads, is conducted prior to the more complex factor model. 
Although this has not been attempted for commodity markets in this precise form before, 
empirical papers analysing non-commodity futures markets have used a similar 
methodology. For example Diebold and Li (2006) employ a VAR model for their ‘out of 
sample’ forecast of future term structure dynamics. However, no exogenous variables are 
added. Alfonso and Martins (2012) use the Nelson-Siegel model to decompose the interest 
rate yield curve into latent factors and then link those to macroeconomic and fiscal policy 
variables in a VAR model.  
In the cocoa and the coffee market, eight contracts are traded simultaneously—in later 
years more than eight. Price data for each contract are obtained from Thomson Reuters 
Datastream. Eight continuous time series are generated of the first- to eighth-closest 
contract to maturity. In order to generate continuous time series, contracts are rolled over 
into the contract with the next nearest maturity at the last trading day of the maturing 
contract. Thereby the term structure can be represented in matrix form. For a commodity 
with at minimum m simultaneously traded contracts [F] and a sample period which ranges 
from time period t1 to tn we would have the following (m x n) matrix representation of the 
commodity term structure over the sample period:  
 = µ@,@ ⋯ @,w⋮ ⋱ ⋮t,@ … t,wº (5.9) 
Once the factors, resembling characteristic dynamics of the shape of the futures curve, are 
extracted, these are linked to explanatory variables as identified in Equation 5.8. We follow 
German and Sarfo (2012) and approximate the latent spot price with an average value of all 
futures contracts. The advantage of taking all contracts into consideration, rather than 
using the maturing contract, is that this quantity is void of seasonality and a robust 
estimator of the overall price level, i.e., the level of the futures curve. The interest rate is 
approximated with the US dollar LIBOR rate plus 200 basis points obtained from 
Thomson Reuters Datastream. The ICE Report Centre publishes end of month warehouse 
stocks available for coffee and cocoa, which serve as inventory data. An obvious shortcoming 
in taking only exchange-registered stocks into considerations is that these are residual 
stocks and hence might not be a reflection of actual supply and demand in the physical 
market. However, since speculative stocks serve as a buffer, which is depleted in times of 
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shortages and is built up in times of abundance, changes in those should still be a reflection 
of productive inventories. Speculative stocks can reveal future shortages earlier since they 
are depleted for precautionary reasons in the wake of an expected squeeze. Idiosyncratic risk 
is measured by the three-year backward moving variance of the weighted average futures 
price. Weights are determined by the respective contract’s share in total open interest. In 
order to capture differences in idiosyncratic risk across contracts, the difference in variance 
between the continuous series of the closest and the deferred contract is considered. 
Systematic risk is measured by the three-year backward moving covariance between the 
weighted average future price and the S&P500 index. Variations across contracts are again 
captured by the difference in covariance between the closer and the deferred contract.  
In addition, explanatory variables capturing speculative positions are considered. Hedging 
pressure (Dcom) and index pressure (Dix) are specified as in Equation 4.4. An additional 
variable is designed to capture excessive speculation (Ncomex). Similar to Working’s (1960) 
T-index, it measures the demand of non-commercial traders (non-commercial plus index 
CIT category), which is in excess of commercial traders’ hedging demand. The measure is 
constructed as following with subscripts s, l, and nl indicating short, long, and net-long 
positions:       
q}~» =
§¨©¨
ª }~u}~wW , y	}~wW > 0}~W|}~wW| , y	}~wW < 00,													y	}~wW = 0
 (5.10) 
Since inventory data are only available as end of month data, the regression analyses are 
conducted in monthly frequency. For this, the observations of the last Thursday of each 
month are taken. If the date falls on a holiday, the previous weekday nearest to the 
Thursday’s value is taken. Trader-position data, which includes index traders, are only 
available from January 2006 onwards. For this reason the analysis is restricted to the time 
period from January 2006 to May 2014. 
5.4.2 Calendar Spread Analysis 
The slope coefficient between each consecutive observable segment of the futures curve 
was linked to various explanatory variables specified in Equation 5.8. Although a 
relationship between single contracts does not permit capturing the dynamics of the futures 
curve as a whole, it provides insights into how factors correlate with particular segments of 
the curve. In the following, the continuous calendar spreads of the cocoa and coffee 
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markets are regressed in an AR model on explanatory variables which are designed to 
capture cost of carry, convenience yield, risk premium and trader-positions.  
The calendar spreads are defined as the difference between the logarithm of the price of 
the deferred contract and the logarithm of the price of the near contract. In order to reduce 
seasonality in the data, all variables are differenced annually. For both, cocoa and coffee 
markets, calendar spreads have been tested for unit-roots. For the cocoa market all spreads 
in levels are found stationary at the five per cent significance level. This is in contrast to the 
coffee market, for which most spreads are found non-stationary and integrated to the order 
one. This is probably caused by non-stationary carry and convenience yield variables 
(Appendix 5.1). Since including these carry and convenience yield variables in the 
regression could still yield stationary residuals, AR models for coffee are run in levels and 
residuals are tested for non-stationarity. Equation 5.8 is transformed into an AR regression 
specification so that:  
, = M] ^,$>W>_@ ^MQQ,
T
Q_@  ` (5.11) 
with , being the calendar spread  and	 = ¼y; J; ∆J; ∆J$@; 1; ´D; L½. The 
appropriate lag length l is determined by testing downwards from a maximum lag length of 
12. Lags found insignificant are excluded until the optimal lag length is reached.  
Table 5.1: Variable Overview and Expected Signs 
Variable Name Description Sign 
I  J  Level of inventory (then-thousand bags of cocoa, million bags of coffee). + 
DI ∆J  Changes in level of inventory. + 
DI_1 ∆J$@  Last period’s changes in level of inventory. +/–  
SLIBOR y  Spot price times USD LIBOR rate plus 200 basis points. + 
VAR ´D  Past three year variance of near contract divided by variance of the deferred. – 
COR 1  Past three year correlation S&P500 with near divided by correlation of deferred. – 
OI_WEIGHT L  Past three year average OI of near contract divided by OI of deferred contract.  +/– 
D_HEDGE L  See specification Chapter 4. +/– 
D_INDEX L  See specification Chapter 4. +/– 
NCOM_EX L  See above. +/– 
Table 5.1 provides a summary of the variables included in the regression analysis, the 
respective definitions and expected signs. The trader-position variable is approximated by 
hedging pressure, index pressure and excess speculation. As an additional control variable 
the ratio between open interest figures in the two respective contracts is taken. The 
inclusion is useful since position data do not provide information on the particular contract 
in which the respective traders are active. For this reason the sign for the position data 
variable remains undetermined. Note that this is not the case for the two risk variables, 
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since these are estimated for individual contracts and the ratio of the values for the two 
contracts is taken.    
Results for the cocoa market are summarised in Table 5.2. While the level of inventory 
shows a positive and significant relationship for near and medium term calendar spreads, 
changes in inventory are significant and negative for deferred spreads. This effect is 
probably linked to expected seasonality. The interest rate shows a negative relationship 
with the spread throughout, which is puzzling since higher opportunity costs should be 
associated with a larger spread. Risk variables are found to be significant with the predicted 
signs. While idiosyncratic risk is significant across spreads, systematic risk is only found 
significant for deferred spreads. This is similar to the impact of hedging pressure and 
excess speculative demand, which is significant for the same segments of the term structure 
than systematic risk. This finding supports the previous conjecture that risk variables and 
speculative positions are not independent. While index pressure is significant in the near 
and deferred ends of the futures curve, hedging pressure is found to be significant in the 
medium term, when also inventory variables are found significant. Hence, findings for the 
cocoa market suggest that medium term contracts are driven and dominated by hedgers, 
while near-to-maturity and deferred contracts are driven and dominated by speculators. 
This coincides with a greater dominance of market fundamentals in the medium term 
contracts and a greater dominance of financial risk variables in the maturing and deferred 
contracts.      
Table 5.2: Results Cocoa Calendar Spread Model  
  2-1  3-2  4-3  5-4  6-5  7-6^  8-7 
Carry 
Variables 
I   2.093***  1.920***  9.738***  1.389***  7.788***  0.270  0.587** 
DI  2.934 -0.917  7.054 -0.606 -4.276 -1.075** -1.064* 
DI_1  0.190 -1.107 -7.328 -1.509** -1.113** -0.004 -1.654*** 
SLIBOR -0.005* -0.006*** -0.003** -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002** 
Risk 
VAR -196.5* -291.3*** -379.3*** -332.7*** -195.2*** -168.0** -268.6*** 
COR  4.885 -4.453 -4.990 -0.003 -2.191 -3.296***  5.896 
Trader 
Positions 
OI_W  69.20 -41.66** -28.54  18.64 -0.285 -26.39** -4.115 
COM_H -0.034 -0.008  0.013  0.020**  0.014*  0.001 -0.009 
IND_H  0.150**  0.074***  0.039  0.001 -0.015  0.061**  0.058*** 
NCOM_EX -1.084 -0.087 -0.390 -0.076 -0.422 -0.956*** -0.576 
Note: *** indicates significance at the 1 per cent level, ** indicates significance at the 5 
per cent level and * indicates significance at the 10 per cent level. ^ White standard 
errors are used due to presence of heteroscedasticity. 
The same regression specifications are run for the coffee market and reported in Table 5.3. 
Residuals are tested for unit roots and found stationary. Similar to cocoa, inventory 
variables are significant in the near and medium term coincidental with hedging pressure. 
Again, risk variables show the predicted sign and are significant for medium and deferred 
contracts. Speculative demand and index pressure is significant for deferred contracts for 
which market fundamental variables turn insignificant. Results, as before for cocoa, 
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confirm the conjecture that hedging pressure is associated with the dominance of market 
fundamental variables, while index pressure and speculative demand is associated with the 
dominance of risk variables.  
Table 5.3: Results Coffee Calendar Spread Model  
  2-1  3-2  4-3  5-4^  6-5  7-6  8-7  9-8^ 
Carry 
Variables 
I  6.80***  3.60***  1.40*  1.80**  2.85**  0.42  2.33  6.03 
DI -0.20 -1.49   5.44  3.36  8.75  4.61 -1.98 -21.5 
DI_1  0.36***  4.58 -2.36  0.63  3.83  8.47  8.40 -1.62 
SLIBOR  3.12  12.2** -2.246 -11.7 -11.6**  2.62  0.28  30.4 
Risk 
VAR -0.17* -0.00 -0.09*** -0.13*** -0.14*** -0.05 -0.04* -0.18*** 
COR  0.02 -0.00  0.00 -0.01 -0.01*** -0.00  0.00 -0.003* 
Trader 
Positions 
OI_W -0.01 -0.01**  0.01  0.01  0.00 -0.01  0.00  0.01 
COM_H -0.02  0.09**   0.06*  0.15***  0.14***  0.14***  0.08* -0.05 
IND_H  0.19  0.04  0.10  0.02  0.11  0.19  0.22  1.00** 
NCOM_EX  0.00 -0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.00 -0.02** 
Note: *** indicates significance at the 1 per cent level, ** indicates significance at the 5 
per cent level and * indicates significance at the 10 per cent level. ^ White standard errors 
are reported due to presence of heteroscedasticity. 
An obvious shortcoming of the presented analysis is that it only provides insight into 
contemporaneous correlation. Dynamics beyond autoregressive elements remain 
unconsidered. This is because of the low data frequency enforced by the availability of 
inventory data. Another shortcoming is that the particular signs of the trader-position 
variables are not interpretable. Despite these shortcomings, the significance of these 
variables provides evidence for the distribution of different trader types across contracts 
and their potential impact on particular segments of the futures curve. 
5.4.3 Two-Step Futures Curve Analysis 
The following analysis will adjust for some of the shortcoming of analysing individual 
spreads—although not for the low data frequency—and take the shape of the futures curve 
as a whole into consideration. In a first step, factors resembling the particular shape of the 
futures curve are extracted using the method developed by Nelson and Siegel (1987) and 
extended by Diebold and Li (2006). The underlying assumption is that the futures curve 
can be summarised by three particular shapes commonly found with PCA in yield curves, 
which are level, slope, and curvature. In order to test whether this assumption holds for 
cocoa and coffee futures markets, PCA is conducted first. In a second step, the factor 
scores are used in a regression model. Explanatory variables put forward previously are 
tested for their significance in explaining the scores and hence the evolution of particular 
shapes of the futures curves through time.   
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5.4.3.1 Principal Component Analysis 
PCA is a nonparametric method to reduce the dimensionality of the data by linear 
transformation (Dunteman 1984, 156). Its purpose is to transform a set of correlated 
variables to an orthogonal set which reproduces the original variance-covariance structure 
or correlation matrix (Chantziara and Skiadopoulos 2008). For this to be achieved, the 
weights for the transformation are chosen such that the variance of the linear composite is 
at maximum, i.e., has the highest possible correlation with the original data. This process of 
maximising the variance is repeated until it is accounted for a chosen percentage of the 
original variation. Hence, after the first composite with maximum variance—i.e., the first 
principal component—is calculated, the second composite with maximum variance is 
calculated from the residual correlation matrix under the additional restriction that it is 
uncorrelated with the first principal component. This way, the different independent 
dimensions of the common variance in the data series are iteratively captured in the 
components (Dunteman 1984, 157-67). If the covariance matrix of the original variables is 
non-singular, this process can be iterated as many times as there are variables.  
This way, components can be extracted out of the different simultaneously traded 
contracts. If the first component explains 100 per cent of the variation, the contracts are 
moving in lockstep. With perfect contemporaneous correlation across futures contracts the 
vector representing the time t change in the futures curve  as defined in Equation 5.9 can 
be expressed in terms of a single component (Barber and Copper 2012): 
 = «¾ (5.12) 
With ¾ being an (mx1) vector independent of time (direction of the shift) and « being a 
scalar changing over time (component of the shift in the direction U). This would 
correspond to the case outlined in Equation 5.6. If not all of the variation can be explained 
by one component, one could either add an error term as in Equation 5.13 or extent the 
number of extracted components as in Equation 5.14. With m maturities a maximum of m 
components would be required in order to capture the total variation.  
 = «¾  ` (5.13) 
 =^ «>¾>t>_@  (5.14) 
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Commonly the number of components is chosen so that k << m, but still a satisfactory 
degree of variation is explained, as in Equation 5.15 (Barber and Copper 2012). 
 =^ «>¾>T>_@  ` (5.15) 
Various authors stress the importance to de-season the data before conducting PCA. 
Blanco and Stefiszyn (2002) suggest estimating components for each month individually so 
that 12 PCAs are conducted over the entire sample period. Borovkova (2010) suggests 
estimating the seasonal component and then subtracting it from the historical futures curve 
before conducting PCA. She defines the seasonal component as the long-term (over the 
entire sample) average price deviation from the daily level. However, Sclavounos and 
Ellefsen (2009) show on the example of oil and energy commodity markets that only the 
third principal component is affected by seasonality, while the first and second components 
are unaffected by seasonal patterns and are unchanged after de-seasoning the data.   
Further, the applicability of PCA on non-stationary data is questioned, since components 
extracted could be spurious (Chantziara and Skiadopoulos 2008). This, however, is not the 
case if time series are co-integrated. Yang and Shahabi (2005) show that in the presence of 
a co-integrating vector, PCA analysis with variables in levels resembles the common 
variation in the underlying data better than PCA analysis based on variables in first 
differences. Hence, in order to proceed, a Johansen (1992) co-integration test is run on the 
simultaneously traded contracts for cocoa and coffee. Due to the sensitivity of the test to 
the choice of deterministic components (Ahking 2002), the test is run with and without a 
linear trend. The lag length is chosen by testing downward for single time series in an AR 
process starting from a lag length of 12. Continuous futures series are in logarithms. 
Results are reported in Table 5.4.  
Table 5.4: Johansen Co-integration Test for Continuous Futures Prices 
Cocoa (number of co-integration equations) 
Data Trend: None None Linear Linear 
Test Type No Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept 
 No Trend No Trend No Trend Trend 
Trace 5 4 5 4 
Max-Eig 5 4 4 3 
Coffee (number of co-integration equations) 
Data Trend: None None Linear Linear 
Test Type No Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept 
 No Trend No Trend No Trend Trend 
Trace 5 5 8 4 
Max-Eig 4 4 4 3 
Note: Critical values are based on MacKinnon, Haug, and Michelis (1999) at 5 per cent 
significance. 
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For both, cocoa and coffee, the Johansen tests identify several co-integrating relations. 
However, the number varies with the choice of the deterministic components and test-
statistics used. With eight simultaneously trading contracts at most three to five co-
integrating equations are found. The exception is the trace test with linear trend included, 
which detects at most eight co-integrating equations for coffee suggesting stationarity. 
Given the co-integration results we can conclude that there is at least one co-integrating 
relationship for the cocoa and coffee futures prices series. As discussed previously the co-
integrating relationship is expected to break if the carry variables driving the calendar 
spread are non-stationary which explains the number of co-integrating vectors found.  
Against the background of the previous discussion, PCA is conducted on the continuous 
price series of simultaneously traded contracts in logarithms and annual differences. By 
using annual differences, the price series are adjusted for seasonality in a less rigorous way 
than suggested by Borovkova (2010), using the last year’s prices rather than the sample 
average. Since PCA is not used in the preceding regression analysis but only as a yardstick 
against which results from the factor model can be compared, this more simple way of de-
seasoning should suffice.  
For both, cocoa and coffee, the PCA shows that over 99.99 per cent of the common 
variation in the futures contracts is captured by the first four principal components. This 
corresponds to findings for other future markets (Lautier 2005). Table 5.5 shows the 
eigenvalues, percentage of variation and cumulative percentage of variance explained by all 
principal components. The high percentage captured by the first component is due to the 
non-stationarity of the data.  
Table 5.5: Component Eigenvalues and Percentage of Variation Explained 
 Cocoa  Coffee 
 Eigenvalues % variation % cumulative  Eigenvalues %variation %cumulative 
PC1 7.982000 99.77 99.77  7.974000 99.68 99.68 
PC2 0.015060 0.19 99.96  0.023490 0.29 99.97 
PC3 0.002001 0.03 99.99  0.001036 0.01 99.99 
PC4 0.000533 0.01 99.99  0.000603 0.01 99.99 
PC5 0.000240 0.00 100.00  0.000262 0.00 100.00 
PC6 0.000136 0.00 100.00  0.000072 0.00 100.00 
PC7 0.000059 0.00 100.00  0.000051 0.00 100.00 
PC8 0.000033 0.00 100.00  0.000032 0.00 100.00 
The interpretation of the PCs is revealed by the correlation loadings that show how each 
component affects or ‘loads on’ each variable (Chantziara and Skiadopoulos 2008). This is 
made visible by the eigenvectors which reveal the dominant shapes of the term structure 
(see Appendix 5.4). For cocoa and coffee the most common variation is a straight line, 
which means contracts are shifting in parallel, in other words, the overall price level 
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changes. Component loadings have the same sign and are of similar magnitude. This 
component is commonly interpreted as the level factor. The second component’s 
eigenvector is monotonically increasing and can hence be interpreted as the slope 
component. The slope component resembles the steepness of the curve, that is, the relative 
distance between different contracts in terms of price. Component loading for the front 
months might be of different sign and magnitude than for the back of the curve. The third 
component’s eigenvector reveals a U-shape which can be understood as the curvature of 
the futures curve. The last and barely significant eigenvector has a wave shape and shall in 
the following be referred to as the wave component. In the interpretation of the last 
component we differ from the literature which commonly discards the fourth component 
as noise. However, the fourth component is retained for comparability with the Nelson-
Siegel procedure employed in the next sub-section.  
Another way of understanding the loadings of the eigenvectors is in terms of the 
contribution of each component to the variation in each of the continuous futures 
contracts (Table 5.6). The first principal component for the cocoa and coffee market loads 
equally heavy on all contracts (absolute values are considered). The second component 
loads heavily on the contracts far up and far down the futures curve with reverse signs. The 
third factor loads positively on both early contracts and contracts further up the futures 
curve. The fourth factor shifts with relatively heavy loadings on the second, fifth, and 
eighth contract for cocoa and second and third, sixth and eighth contracts for coffee.  
Table 5.6: Component Eigenvectors and Loadings 
 Eigenvectors and Loadings for Cocoa Eigenvectors and Loadings for Coffee 
 
PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 
F1 -0.35 -0.67 0.62 -0.19 -0.35 -0.46 0.68 -0.37 
F2 -0.35 -0.33 -0.30 0.54 -0.35 -0.38 0.03 0.41 
F3 -0.35 -0.18 -0.38 0.22 -0.35 -0.27 -0.24 0.42 
F4 -0.35 -0.03 -0.37 -0.23 -0.35 -0.13 -0.42 0.02 
F5 -0.35 0.12 -0.22 -0.52 -0.35 0.04 -0.36 -0.38 
F6 -0.35 0.25 0.04 -0.32 -0.35 0.21 -0.15 -0.47 
F7 -0.35 0.37 0.24 0.07 -0.35 0.41 0.11 -0.01 
F8 -0.35 0.45 0.37 0.44 -0.35 0.58 0.36 0.39 
Althouth both markets reveal the characteristic futures curve shapes, as identified in the 
empirical literature, one difference between the two markets is that the slope component 
shows a convex form for the coffee market while it is concave for the cocoa market. 
Further, the wave component loads differently for the coffee market, and the curvature 
component loadings decay sooner and increase slower for cocoa than for coffee.  
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Once the eigenvectors are extracted, the matrix of the original data is multiplied with the 
transpose of the eigenvectors—i.e., components—that are of interest for the following 
analysis. 
H = ¾′ × Á (5.16) 
The transformation yields the features of the original data solely in terms of the vectors 
chosen (eigenvector one to four). Hence, four continuous time series (component scores) 
are generated which express the common variation in the originally eight continuous 
futures contracts in terms of level, slope, curvature, and wave component. The evolution of 
the scores over time is depicted in Appendix 5.5. 
The first component scores reveal the common price level, i.e., the parallel shift of prices 
across all contracts. The second component scores reveal the slope across contracts, i.e., 
whether the term structure is normal or inverted. A positive value indicates an upward 
sloping term structure—that is, the contracts with longer maturities trade at a premium 
(normal). A negative value indicates a downward sloping term structure—that is, contracts 
with a shorter maturity trade at a premium (inverted). The third component scores, i.e., the 
curvature, reveal if there is a maximum or minimum in the futures curve. A positive value 
indicates a hump-shaped (concave) curve, while a negative value indicates a U-shaped 
(convex) curve. The values of the fourth component scores indicate the form of the wave. 
A positive value means the wave form is N-shaped (sinusoidal) and a negative value means 
the wave form is inverted N-shaped (cosinusoidal).  
For the cocoa market, the level closely resembles the inverse of the overall price level 
(Figure 5.5.1). The component scores are negative as the axis is not the term structure but 
the eigenvector. The slope indicates an inverted market from mid-2007 to mid-2009, in 
early 2011 and again from early 2012 onwards. These periods are characterised by depleting 
or low inventories (Figure 5.3). The curvature shows a positive spike in mid-2008 which is 
probably due to price corrections after the price peak around that time. The time period 
from mid-2010 to early 2011 sows a continuously concave term structure. This period is 
associated with low inventory levels and incidences of convergence failure (cf. Chapter 4). 
In 2007 and late 2010 the futures curve sowed N-shaped wave forms which in early 2011 
switched to in inverted N-shape. This incidence coincides with high volatility in front 
months (Figure 5.5). 
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The interpretation for the coffee market is similar to the cocoa market (Figure 5.5.2). The 
level closely resembles the inverse of the coffee price. With reference to the slope we can 
see that the coffee market became inverted in 2010 and returned to a normal market in 
2011, which is closely linked to developments in inventories (Figure 5.3). The component 
scores for the slope are generally less volatile than for the cocoa market indicating more 
stable supply cycles as suggested earlier. Also the curvature scores are less volatile for 
coffee. Convex futures curves are identified in 2007-08, 2011, and 2014, coinciding with 
supply shortages (Figure 5.3). Further, the fourth wave component appears to capture 
seasonal patterns in the term structure, which appear regularly before 2010, but irregularly 
thereafter. This is also visible in Figure 5.2. 
5.4.3.2 Nelson-Siegel Factor Method 
An alternative method of reducing the dimensionality of the term structure is proposed by 
Nelson and Siegel (1987). On the basis of empirical descriptions of yield curves as 
monotonic, humped or S-shaped, they propose a function based on differential equations 
of yield curves, which are able to generate these typical shapes: 
	 = 1]  1@1 − $t%t/  1D$t% (5.17) 
	is the maturity date and  is a time constant that determines the rate at which the 
regressors decay to zero (Nelson and Siegel 1987). The beta coefficients are estimated date-
by-date based on the forward rates of the contracts with different maturities and the 
respective exponential components. The particular shape of the yield curve at each point in 
time depends on the beta coefficients, which can be interpreted as measuring the strength 
of the short- [	1@], medium- [1D], and long-term [1]] components of the futures curve. 
With this parsimonious representation, Nelson and Siegel (1987) are able to reconstruct 
most of the historically observed shapes of the US T-bill with three time-varying 
parameters.  
While the shape of the loading in the Nelson and Siegel (1987) model is determined ex-
ante, the rate of decay of the loadings is decided by grid search so that the best fit is 
reached. Bliss (1997) adds flexibility to the model by introducing a second decay factor for 
the loading of the curvature component. Svensson (1994) adds a fourth curvature 
component to the original model which is given a different decay factor than the first 
curvature component loading. De Rezende and Ferreira (2013) analogue to Svensson’s 
(1994) extension of the curvature component add a fifth factor which functions as an 
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additional slope component with a distinct decay factor from the first slope component. 
Diebold and Li (2006) present an alternative specification of the Nelson and Siegel (1987) 
model, given in Equation 5.18, for which the three parameters can be interpreted as the 
latent level, slope and curvature factors in a similar manner as it has been done in PCA. 
This is particularly useful for comparability reasons and ease of interpretation.  
- = 1Â  1I Ã1 − $ÄÅ Æ  1. Ã1 − $ÄÅ − $ÄÆ (5.18) 
Diebold and Li (2006) show that the first beta coefficient corresponds to the level 
component [1Â], the second to the slope component [1I], and the third to the curvature 
component [1.]. The Å value, similar to  in Equation 5.17 governs the exponential decay 
rate. The factor loading for the level is assumed to be one. The factor loadings of slope and 
curvature vary with the number of month remaining until maturity [] and the decay rate 
[Å]. The loading for the slope factor is a function of  that starts at one and decays 
monotonically to zero, while the loading for the curvature factor is a function of  that 
starts at one, increases and then decays to zero. The value of Å determines at which month  the curvature has its maximum.  
The factor scores can be extracted from the term structure by firstly estimating the factor 
loadings for the slope Ç@$»ÈÉÊÄ Ë and the curvature Ç@$»ÈÉÊÄ∗ − $ÄË for each contracts’ 
maturity at each point in time (for the level component this is always one) and secondly 
using OLS78 estimation method in order to find values for	1Â,	1I and 1. for each point in 
time. The OLS regression equation is specified as79:  
- = 1,Â  1,I  1,.H  ` (5.19) 
As there are as many regression equations as observations per continuous time series, i.e., 
one regression result for each month for a monthly data set, the exercise yields a 
continuous monthly time series for	1Â,	1I, and 1..  
Considering the strong seasonality in coffee and cocoa markets, level, slope and curvature 
factors might be insufficient for capturing seasonal patterns in the futures curve. For 
                                                 
78 Fixing Å allows estimation by OLS. Diebold and Li (2006) have shown that the loss of precision is marginal 
if Å is fixed and is hence determined by grid search, which eases estimation. 
79 In contrast to conventional notations, the 1 coefficients vary with time t while level, slope and factor 
loadings only vary with , 
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example, employing the Nelson-Siegel model on the cocoa market, the Å coefficient is 
fixed at 0.22416, which maximises the curvature factor loadings at the 8th month (see 
Appendix 5.6). This value is identified by grid search over the entire data set and found to 
yield the best fit on average. However, despite a good average fit, for some months the 
model is unable to capture the particular shape of the futures curve (Figure 5.6.1). When 
analysing the outlier dates, these mostly exhibit wave shapes, which cannot be captured by 
the three defined factors. Inspired by Power and Turvey (2008) a fourth sinusoidal wave 
component is added, which should increase the fit of the model:  
- = 1Â  1I Ã1 − $Ä∗Å ∗  Æ  1. Ã1 − $Ä∗Å ∗  − $Ä∗Æ 1Ì− sinÐ−Å  (5.20) 
While the other factors have the same properties as before, the sinusoidal element loads 
heavily on early and late months but less on medium-term months as it is shown in 
Figure 5.7.  
Figure 5.7: Four Factor Nelson-Siegel Properties 
 
Note: For this example λ is fixed at 0.163026, so that the curvature factor has its 
maximum at the 11th month. Source: Author. 
The regression equation for each time period t then reads as following: 
- = 1,Â  1,I  1,.H  1,Ì   ` (5.21) 
For the cocoa market, as before, the grid search finds that Å = 0.22416 reveals the best fit. 
In comparison to the earlier specification, the fit of the model increases substantially at 
occasions where the futures curve takes on wave shapes. In Appendix 5.6 the improvement 
is demonstrated on the example of the March 2008 futures curve (Figure 5.6.2).  
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The beta coefficients (factor scores) evolve similarly to the principal components scores 
estimated previously, however, with reversed signs (Appendix 5.7, Figure 5.7.2). The level 
reflects the overall price trend, while the slope indicates whether the market is normal or 
inverted. A positive value indicates a downward sloping futures curve, i.e., the contracts 
with longer maturities trade at a discount (inverted), and a negative value indicates an 
upward sloping futures curve, i.e., contracts with shorter maturity trade at a discount 
(normal). A positive value for the curvature coefficient indicates a convex and a negative a 
concave curve. The wave component follows the same sign as the PCA wave component. 
A positive value signals an N-shaped futures curve and a negative value signals an inverted 
N-shaped curve. 
As suggested, the level factor resembles the overall price level in the cocoa market. The 
market is inverted only in 2008–09 and briefly in 2010. These time periods are associated 
with declining inventory levels, and hence shortages in the physical market in line with the 
theory of storage. These findings roughly coincide with what was revealed by PCA, with 
the exception of early 2011, where PCA suggests an inverted market. The time periods 
2008–10 and 2012 show a convex futures curve while in remaining time periods the futures 
curve appears to have been concave. The wave component oscillates with increasing 
amplitudes around zero from 2008 onward, while an increase in the volatility of the wave 
component extracted by PCA is only visible from 2010 onwards.    
For the coffee market, grid search analysis finds that Å =	 0.199254 yields the best fit, 
which means that the curvature has its maximum at the 9th month. Considering the 
coefficient of contingency, the fit of the four factor model appears even better for the 
coffee market than for the cocoa market (Appendix 5.7, Figure 5.7.3). However, between 
the years 2010 and 2012 the fit of the model—although excellent during the remaining time 
period—deteriorates slightly.  
As for cocoa, the level factor closely resembles the overall price level. Further, according to 
the slope factor, the coffee market is only inverted over the time period mid-2010, which is 
slightly later than what PCA indicates. The inverted market coincides with a convex futures 
curve. These years are associated with a shortage in the physical market (Figure 5.3). 
However, an abrupt change of the curvature scores in mid-2008 and early 2011 is visible 
which is striking. This change is found again in both the slope and the wave factor, 
however, remains undetected by PCA.  
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5.4.3.3 Comparison between Nelson-Siegel and Principal Components 
Despite the different methods, the factors and components extracted by the Nelson-Siegel 
model and PCA correspond closely for the cocoa market. Reviewing the correlation matrix 
of all scores, the close relationship between the level, slope, curvature and wave factors and 
the respective component scores is clearly visible (Figure 5.7). 
Table 5.7: Correlation Matrix for Cocoa Component and Factor Scores  
 L S C W PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 
L 1.00        
S 0.04 1.00       
C -0.27 0.66 1.00      
W 0.35 -0.49 -0.84 1.00     
PC1 -0.92 -0.39 -0.06 -0.10 1.00    
PC2 0.16 -0.60 0.06 -0.09 0.00 1.00   
PC3 0.17 -0.28 -0.45 0.03 0.00 0.00 1.00  
PC4 -0.15 0.36 0.49 -0.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
The correlation matrix for the coffee market differs for the wave component from what is 
found for the cocoa market. The remaining three components correspond similarly well to 
the respective factors. Instead of correlating with the wave factor, the fourth component is 
strongly correlated with the level factor (Figure 5.8). 
Table 5.8: Correlation Matrix for Cocoa Component and Factor Scores 
 
L S C W PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 
L 1.00        
S -0.02 1.00       
C -0.46 0.68 1.00      
W 0.74 0.10 -0.61 1.00     
PC1 -0.89 -0.41 0.05 -0.61 1.00    
PC2 0.26 -0.69 -0.24 -0.21 0.00 1.00   
PC3 0.16 -0.31 -0.46 0.09 0.00 0.00 1.00  
PC4 -0.07 0.06 0.20 -0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
The missing correspondence between factors and components in the coffee market is also 
visible from autocorrelation functions (Appendix 5.8). For the cocoa market these behave 
similarly. The levels exhibit strong autocorrelation which only slowly decays. 
Autocorrelation for the slope component scores is slightly stronger than for the slope 
factor scores, but in both cases autocorrelation decays quicker than for the level. For the 
curvature, no autocorrelation is present, while for the wave, both component and factor 
scores show seasonality over four to six months periods (Figures 5.8.1–2). 
For coffee this is where the strongest difference appears. While for the wave factor scores 
no seasonality is visible and the scores show great persistence, the wave component scores 
show no persistence. This means that wave forms, as picked up by the Nelson-Siegel factor 
scores, in the coffee futures curve might stem from factors other than seasonal patterns 
(Figures 5.8.3–4). These differences might be linked to abrupt changes in the coffee futures 
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curve in mid-2008 and 2011, which are picked up by the factors but not by PCA. These 
shocks are puzzling and demand further investigation.  
5.4.3.4 Empirical Results 
Components and factors do not resemble the slope between consecutive contracts but 
common variation in simultaneously traded contracts. However, the previously derived 
relationship (Equations 5.8) still provides indication of which explanatory variables are 
expected to drive which components. The level captures the common underlying price 
trend. Dynamics in level scores should hence be linked to physical demand and supply and, 
following the financialisation hypothesis, traders’ positions. Of greater interest regarding 
previously reviewed theoretical considerations are the slope and the curvature scores. Both 
capture dynamics, which affect the price level of simultaneously traded contracts 
differently, that is, they capture the different shapes of the futures curve. Firstly, differences 
can arise due to expectations about future developments in market fundamentals. These 
include differences in storage costs, interest rate and convenience yield. Secondly, 
differences can be caused by distinct trader-positions in certain contracts. If the differences 
in traders’ positions arise due to expectations about market fundamentals, this would be 
equivalent to the first reasoning. If traders’ positions are however motivated by factors 
unrelated to market fundamentals, as hypothesised, these become driving factors in their 
own right. Thirdly, risk premium, which is linked to idiosyncratic risk, systematic risk or 
hedging pressure, can affect individual futures contracts differently. 
Before conducting regression analyses, all factor series are tested for unit-roots. Test results 
are reported in Appendix 5.9. For cocoa, all but the level factor scores, are found to be 
stationary. For the coffee market results differ in that all, but the slope factor scores, are 
found to be non-stationary and integrated to the order one. Given the presence of a unit 
root in one cocoa and all, but one, coffee factor, AR(i) models with the first difference of 
the factor scores as the dependent variable are run. The order i is determined by downward 
testing from a maximum lag length of 12. In the presence of heteroscedasticity in the 
residuals, White robust standard errors are used. In a second step, the same models are run 
in levels. Residuals for those regressions involving non-stationary factor scores are tested 
for a unit root using the ADF test procedure. For residuals of all regressions the null 
hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected at the one per cent significance level. Estimated 
values for cocoa are summarised in Table 5.9 and for coffee in Table 5.10. Full regression 
results and residual diagnostics are reported in Appendix 5.10 for cocoa and Appendix 5.11 
for coffee.  
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A positive coefficient in the level regression means a higher value of the explanatory 
variable is associated with a higher price. A positive coefficient for the slope regression 
indicates that a higher value for the explanatory variable is associated with a (more) 
inverted market, and a lower value is associated with a (more) normal market. A positive 
coefficient in the curvature regression indicates an association with a more convex (higher 
at the tails and lower in the middle) futures curve while a negative coefficient indicates an 
association with a more concave (higher at the middle and lower at the tails) futures curve. 
For the wave regressions, a positive sign of a coefficient means that a higher value for the 
independent variable is associated with an N-shaped futures curve. A negative value 
indicates an association with an inverted N-shaped futures curve.  
5.4.3.4.1 Results for Cocoa 
Regression results for the cocoa market are reported in Table 5.9. As predicted by hedging 
pressure theories, the hedging pressure variable is found to be significantly negatively 
related to the price level.  
Table 5.9: Futures Curve Factor Regression Results Cocoa 
 First Difference Levels 
 Level Slope^ Curvature^ Wave^ Level Slope^ Curvature^ Wave^ 
I 64.51 26.99 -32.92 -3.00 -13.50 -4.69 -36.85 -1.69 
DI -22.40 35.01 111.66 2.40 6.91 **71.44 96.48 -1.17 
DI_1 7.57 0.86 20.34 0.46 41.51 8.27 -21.24 -0.49 
SLIBOR -0.47 -0.42 -0.12 -0.02 **-2.16 0.55 ***-3.84 -0.06 
VAR -0.38 ***6.37 5.15 0.25 -0.14 ***1.70 ***2.70 -0.01 
COR 688.04 217.20 **-2013.9 -81.94 -249.945 ***417.89 **-526.48 *-19.06 
WEIGHT 0.10 -0.19 *9.46 0.40 **11.26 1.00 **11.67 *0.50 
COM_H ***-4.90 **-2.34 -1.50 -0.08 ***-3.54 -0.67 ***-4.54 *-0.14 
IND_H -4.33 -3.32 2.14 0.33 -1.78 -1.61 *5.13 **0.36 
NCOM_EX 2.40 ***7.20 ***-18.14 *-0.50 -7.60 2.57 -4.05 -0.17 
Note: * indicates significance at the 10 per cent level, ** indicates significance at the 5 
per cent level, *** indicates significance at the 1 per cent level. ^ White robust standard 
errors used.  
Both, idiosyncratic and systematic, risk variables are significantly and positively related to 
the slope of the futures curve. This indicates that higher risk is associated with an inverted 
market, which is predicted by the theory of normal backwardation or risk premium. 
Current changes in inventories are also found to be significantly positively related to the 
slope factor. This is in contrast to the theory of storage, but, as for the calendar spread 
regression results, might be explained by seasonal cycles, which cause the cocoa market to 
oscillate between inverted and normal market regimes. Further, for the first difference 
equation, a significantly positive relationship is found between the slope of the futures 
curve and excess speculation. This means that speculative positions are associated with a 
more inverted market regime in the cocoa market. The negative association between the 
hedging pressure variable and the slope is puzzling, since hedging pressure should be 
associated with an inverted market or a weaker carry. The negative sign, although 
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insignificant, for the index pressure variable indicates, as predicted, that index positions are 
associated with a larger carry or normal futures curve.  
Importantly, results for the curvature give an indication of the allocation of index traders 
and hedgers across contracts. Hedging pressure is associated with a more concave futures 
curve—that is, loads more heavily on the medium term—and index pressure is associated 
with a more convex futures curve—that is, loads more heavily on the short- and long-term. 
This supports findings obtained in the previous section and supports assumptions made in 
Chapter 4 that while commercial traders dominate in the medium term (throughout a 
contract’s life cycle), index traders have a particular price impact when they rollover (at the 
tails of the futures curve).  
This is further confirmed by a significant and positive coefficient for index pressure in the 
wave factor regression, which suggests that index pressure is associated with an N-shaped 
futures curve. In other words index pressure is associated with a suppressed price level of 
maturing contracts and boosted price level of deferred contracts in line with Figure 2.4. 
Another interesting observation is that idiosyncratic risk is stronger for the medium-term 
contracts (positive coefficient in the curvature regression), while systematic risk is stronger 
for the near to maturity and deferred contracts (negative coefficient in the curvature 
regression), coinciding with what is found for hedging and index pressure respectively. The 
finding that index pressure coincides with increased market covariance supports the 
excessive co-movement hypothesis.  
5.4.3.4.2 Results for Coffee 
The same regression equations have been estimated for the coffee market and results are 
reported in Table 5.10. As for cocoa, hedging pressure is found to be significantly 
negatively related to the level, which is in line with the hedging pressure theory.  
Surprisingly the slope factor is negatively associated with systematic risk which means 
higher risk is associated with a normal market. This is in contrast to the theory of risk 
premium and findings for the cocoa market. Findings regarding traders’ positions, 
however, conform more closely to findings for the cocoa market. Hedging pressure is 
negatively related to the slope factor and is significantly and negatively related to the 
curvature, which means it is associated with a stronger weight on medium-term contracts. 
In contrast to the cocoa market case, index pressure and speculative demand variables 
remain insignificant throughout.   
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Table 5.10: Futures Curve Factor Regression Results Coffee 
 First Difference Levels 
 Level^ Slope^ Curvature^ Wave^ Level^ Slope^ Curvature^ Wave^ 
I -0.0101 *-0.0120 -0.0058 0.0079 *-0.0057 -0.0020 0.0026 -0.0001 
DI *0.0405 -0.0073 -0.0462 0.0667 0.0181 *-0.0259 -0.0345 0.0063 
DI_1 -0.0077 0.0111 0.0741 *-0.0900 0.0007 0.0012 0.0539 -0.0087 
SLIBOR ***14.6545 -2.7225 **-10.2570 0.8698 -1.0358 0.7701 1.6549 -0.1639 
VAR 0.0623 0.0392 -0.0269 0.0285 *0.0385 -0.0010 -0.0167 0.0029 
COR 99.5802 -120.8280 -45.1602 -19.3944 68.9598 **-59.5308 -75.7106 -2.8467 
WEIGHT **-0.3869 -0.0084 ***1.4824 ***-0.1307 -0.1619 0.0130 0.5382 -0.0296 
COM_H 0.0495 ***-0.3455 ***-0.7940 0.0196 **-0.4867 -0.1348 -0.3608 -0.0215 
IND_H -0.3650 -0.2919 -0.2389 -0.0094 -0.5040 -0.1330 -0.2803 -0.0583 
NCOM_EX 1.3817 2.4652 4.1653 0.1714 0.9043 -1.5898 1.9655 0.8270 
Note: * indicates significance at the 10 per cent level, ** indicates significance at the 5 
per cent level, *** indicates significance at the 1 per cent level. ^ White robust standard 
errors used.  
At large, result for the coffee market remain less clear than for cocoa, while results for the 
cocoa market seem to support previous hypotheses on the positions of index and other 
speculative traders and their impact on the shape of the futures curve.  
5.5 Conclusion 
Against the evidence presented, it can be concluded that over recent years in both cocoa 
and coffee markets, the influence of fundamental factors has weakened. Further, futures 
contracts which are dominated by hedgers—mostly the medium-term contracts—tend to 
be driven by market fundamentals and those dominated by index traders—mostly the 
short- and long-term contracts—tend to be driven by risk variables. This is particularly 
pronounced for the cocoa market. However, not much can be said about the direction of 
causation since the data frequency is too low to determine a lag structure. This is caused by 
limitations stemming from the availability of inventory data. Reverse causality would mean 
that contracts, which are driven by fundamentals might attract hedgers, while those 
associated with risk are attractive to speculators. However, results presented in Chapter 3 
reject this conjecture for index traders. Index traders are found to not react to market 
specific factors including idiosyncratic risk.  
At the same time, the significance of index pressure at the tails of the futures curve strongly 
supports the conjecture that index traders’ passive rollover of contracts has a significant 
price impact. It is likely that index pressure and other speculative positions have entered 
the term structure of futures markets especially through the tails. Short-dated contracts are 
known to serve a price discovery function for the physical market, while long-dated 
contracts provide guidance over storage level to market practitioners. Identified speculative 
influences are likely to undermine these core functions.  
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Chapter 6 Price Formation in Commodity Sectors 
6.1 Introduction 
Two major welfare enhancing functions are attributed to commodity futures markets: price 
discovery and risk management (Chang 1985). Evidence presented in the preceding two 
chapters suggests that these two critical functions have been undermined by structural 
changes in global commodity futures markets. These changes have ramifications not only 
for price discovery, but also for price risk exposure of commercial traders and, depending 
on the organisational structure of commodity trade, other stakeholders in the sector 
including commodity producers.  
Considering asymmetric power relations, especially in agricultural commodity sectors, it is 
reasonable to assume that risks, and associated costs, are passed on to the weaker end of 
the sector (Kaplinsky 2004). This is presumably constituted by farmers in the case of 
smallholder crops like cocoa, which will serve as a case study in the following Chapter 7. In 
order to fully assess the impact of changes in commodity price dynamics at the futures 
market on smallholder producers and cocoa producing countries, it is essential to gain a 
better understanding (1) about the role of the futures market in the price formation 
mechanisms across the sector, and (2) about the nature of risk allocation and management 
within the sector  
As previously discussed in Chapter 2, price impulses, whether speculative or based on 
fundamentals, potentially spill-over from commodity futures markets to the respective 
physical markets. While economic theory does not provide guidance on the direction of 
causation between futures and physical markets, empirical studies present some case 
sensitive evidence. For instance, the analysis in Chapter 4 reveals a bidirectional effect for 
the wheat market, whereas, for the cocoa market, the futures price is found to lead the 
physical price. However, such econometric exercise is limited as it does not allow inference 
on what causes a particular lead–lag relationship.  
In this Chapter 6, it is argued that the interrelationship between futures and physical 
markets and its implications can only be understood by examining the underlying 
institutional structure, which governs price formation mechanisms at all stages of the cocoa 
sector. The focus on institutional structure instead of general equilibrium theory is 
encouraged by the observation that cocoa beans are mostly traded outside a competitive 
market environment.  
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For an analysis of the institutional structure of the cocoa sector and its implications for 
price formation and risk allocation, two strands of literature are consulted. Firstly, the 
global commodity and value chain literature (jointly referred to as chain literature hereafter) 
provides a method to reveal the different segments of the commodity sector, and that way 
to identify main stakeholders and their linkages. Despite the chain literature’s focus on 
institutional structures and associated power relationships, the literature falls short of 
providing a discussion on implications for price formation and risk allocation (Gilbert 
2008b). A second strand of literature fills this gap, which is, institutional theories of price, 
which in particular draw on the transaction framework by John R. Commons (1934). The 
latter strand of literature provides a framework within which price formation and risk 
allocation can be jointly understood.  
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the chain literature 
and the role of institutions within different approaches of the literature. Contributions 
from empirical studies on cash crops like cocoa are reviewed alongside the theoretical 
literature. Section 3 discusses institutional theories on price with reference to Commons’ 
transaction theory. Section 4 combines the two approaches towards an institutional theory 
of price and risk following Palpacuer’s (2009) call for an institutional view on chain 
analysis. Section 5 discusses the empirical applicability of this approach.  
6.2 Commodity Chains and Governance  
Cocoa beans are bought, sold, and transformed multiple times before being consumed as 
ingredient in a chocolate bar, other confectionary products, foods or beverages. Along this 
process the bean, raw or processed, is transferred between different actors in different 
settings. These modes of transfer are institutional. According to Gibbon and Ponte (2005, 
93) chain analysis “sees trade not only as being embedded in, but to a considerable extent 
determined by, specific (but changing) institutional structures”. However, with the 
literature evolving, the concept and role of institutions saw substantial transformations, 
which can be summarised in the three conceptualisations of governance as ‘driveness’, 
‘coordination’, and ‘convention’ (Gibbon, Bair and Ponte 2008).  
Since this has been done in great detail elsewhere (Bair 2005; 2009; Kaplinsky 2013), I 
eschew a full review of the chain literature and only summarise core ideas on institutions. 
Further, I follow Gibbon, Bari and Ponte’s (2008) selection of the main strands of the 
literature. This selection is necessarily narrow and excludes other traditions, as for instance 
Marxist inspired system of provision (Fine 1994; 1996) and commodity system analysis 
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(Friedmann 1982). However, since the chosen chain tradition draws heavily on concepts in 
institutional economics, it is critical to evaluate the chain literature in relations to 
institutional theory and amend it by institutional theories of price formation and risk 
allocation envisaged later in this chapter. 
Despite its popularity, the chain framework has been criticised for being a method rather 
than a methodology (Gilbert 2008b; Sturgeon 2009). The nature of the criticism is closely 
linked to the evolution of the literature. The commodity chain concept has originally been 
developed explicitly as an analytical tool, and not a methodology, within the tradition of the 
world system theory of the 1980s (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1986; 1977; 1994). Later 
authors picked up the chain analogy, but dropped the theoretical underpinning of the 
world system theory. The first adaption of the chain analogy is based on the empirical 
observation of new modes of production, which emerged in the East Asian Newly 
Industrialised Countries (NICs) (Gereffi 1999). The evolving literature hence started off 
inductively and the focus shifted from the world as a conceptual whole towards power 
asymmetries embedded within single industries (Bair 2005).  
The second transition into what is referred to as global value chain (GVC) analysis is born 
out of a merger between different theories from management, business and the political 
economy literatures (Bair 2005). Due to the interdisciplinary nature, some key terms 
remained undefined and confused. The notion of ‘value chain’ was favoured over other 
suggestions as it was perceived as most inclusive of possible chain activities80. The 
terminology was foremost inspired by international business scholars and in particular 
Porter’s (1985) work on competitive advantages (Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon 2005). 
Thereafter, the concept of ‘value-added’ entered the research agenda together with the 
notion of chain upgrading, which describes the process of moving into more profitable 
industry sections (Humphrey and Schmitz 2004b).  
However, as argued by Kaplinsky (2013), although the plot of the value chain is a 
descriptive construct, later contributions to the literature started providing an analytical 
structure. One element of analytical structure can be linked to the notion of ‘governance’ 
and is, as shall be argued in the following, closely linked to institutional economic theories.  
                                                 
80 Also because of the confusion caused by the term commodity, since the chain literature encompassed 
primary commodities, indifferentiated factors, products and services (Kaplinsky 2013). 
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6.2.1 Driveness and Lead Firms 
Gereffi (1994, 96-7) adds the concept of ‘governance structure’ to the commodity chain 
framework of the world system approach, which became a core theme in the evolving 
literature. He defines governance as ‘authority and power relations that determine how 
financial, material, and human resources are allocated and flow within the chain’ (ibid.). 
Power is exercised by what Gereffi (1999) calls the ‘lead firm’ in the chain, which controls 
access to major resources that generate the most profitable returns. These lead firms 
further have the ability to decide over the inclusion (or exclusion) of less powerful actors to 
perform lower value added activities (Raikes, Jensen and Ponte 2000). Against this 
background, Gereffi (1994, 97) distinguishes between ‘buyer-driven’ and ‘producer-driven’ 
commodity chains, representing different governance structures and modes of 
organisation81. Buyer-driven commodity chains are defined as those where brand-named 
merchandisers and large retailers play the central role in organising decentralised 
production networks. Producer-driven commodity chains, are those where transnational 
corporations control the production system with a high degree of vertical integration.  
Especially in the context of agricultural and soft commodity chains, Gereffi’s framework 
was repeatedly criticised for being too narrow. Cramer (1999) is first to point out the 
necessity of broadening the focus from labour-intensive manufacturing only to include also 
primary commodities. Gibbon (2001a), with reference to Cramer (1999), aims to fill this 
gap by developing the concept of international ‘trader-driven’ commodity chains. In such 
chains, international trading companies play a ‘coordinative role’. A position of economic 
power is achieved and maintained by those firms through high entry barriers due to high 
levels of working capital needed. Working capital is not only needed to exploit scale 
economies through large trade volume, but also to hedge effectively via financial futures 
markets and, at the same time, be able to benefit from market knowledge by outright 
speculation. Market knowledge is acquired though vertical integration and close linkages 
with the producer side, which is, particularly in developing countries, not easily established 
(Gibbon 2001a; 2001b).    
Talbot (2002) criticises Gibbon’s trader-driven chain for ignoring the part of the chain 
beyond the traders. Talbot (2009) further stresses path dependency of the chain evolution 
and, with reference to tropical chains, their colonial history. Fold (2002) suggests a bipolar 
governance structure for cash crops like cocoa, where both grinders and branders are main 
                                                 
81 In his later work he adds ‘informedary-driven’ commodity chains, in which he accounts for the emergence 
of the internet (Gereffi 2001a; 2001b).  
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drivers. While grinders are working in the processing sector of raw cocoa beans, branders 
engage in the manufacturing of consumer chocolate and marketing of the final product. 
The interplay between both chain drivers then shapes complex power relationships 
between lead firms, which remain unacknowledged in Gereffi’s framework. Fold and 
Larsen (2011) later complement the dual structure by acknowledging the importance of 
multinational retailers. The power struggle then involves three groups of lead firms—
buyers, branders and retailers—which compete at the vertical and horizontal chain level. 
Besides particularities arising from agro-commodity chains, Gereffi’s concept was criticised 
on more general terms for several reasons. Firstly, it cannot account for different forms of 
transactions at different nodes of the chain (Raikes, Jensen and Ponte 2000). Secondly, 
despite the institutional focus, which presents the chain as socially constructed and 
historically determined, the core concept of ‘driveness’ is used in a rigid manner and it is 
unclear whether the chain can switch between the governance structures (Gibbon, Bair and 
Ponte 2008). Thirdly, the concept does not provide an analysis of the horizontal power 
structure and leaves open the question whether different players at a lead firm segment 
have the same influence than their neighbours (Kaplinsky and Morris 2000, 24).  
6.2.2 Coordination and Standards 
The observation of an increasing level of specialisation and product differentiation 
necessitated a framework for more complex arrangements of chain governance, as has 
empirically been shown by Sturgeon’s (2002) work on turn key suppliers, as well as studies 
on the changing role of standards from product to process standards. Further, with a shift 
from tangible to non-tangible factors of value addition, the buyer driven chain structure 
became dominant, accompanied by an increasing importance of branding, marketing, 
product development and coordination of inter-firm relations (Palpacuer 2000; Kaplinsky 
and Morris 2000). In this context, the discussion transitioned from the overall governance 
structures of the chain, to chain coordination at a more disaggregated level. Authors 
implicitly and explicitly turned to transaction costs economics in order to explain the 
growing importance of process standards and the resulting complexity of intra-chain power 
relationships embedded in different modes of chain coordination.  
Messner (2004, 23) identifies three different layers of governance regarding standards, 
which is local and regional governance, private and public-private governance, and 
international global governance. He argues that international lead firms adopt global 
standards set by international organisation in order to reduce chain governance costs, while 
the adoption of such standards at the local and regional level functions as a ‘ticket’ into the 
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chain. He puts forward three reasons for the growing importance of standards: (1) lowering 
transaction costs in a world with limited information, (2) creating and safeguarding stable 
expectations, and (3) providing an orientational and sense-giving-dimension (ibid, 36-7). 
Nadvi and Wältring (2004, 54-6) add the use of standards as a marketing tool. The 
challenge for newcomers in such system is not how to compete in a global competitive 
world market but how to engage with private ‘rule systems’ and exploit or transform those 
to their own advantage (Messner 2004, 32).  
Humphrey and Schmitz (2004a, 97) define governance as inter-firm relationships and 
institutional mechanisms through which non-market, or ‘explicit’, coordination of activities 
in the chain is achieved. In this context, the term governance is used “to express that some 
firms in the chain set and enforce the parameters under which others in the chain operate” 
(ibid, 96). They focus on motives behind degrees of vertical integration or disintegration 
which, according to them, is driven by four trends: (1) concentration at the retailing 
segment which results in economies of scale and makes inclusion increasingly difficult; (2) 
the increasing importance of branding and a focus on core competences; (3) the risk of 
supplier failure when outsourcing; and (4) transaction costs. They further develop a 
typology of inter-firm relationships including arm’s length, network, quasi hierarchy, and 
hierarchy to which market is added as the baseline (Humphrey and Schmitz 2000; 2001). 
The form of firm relationships has particular ramifications for upgrading opportunities by 
different actor (Humphrey and Schmitz 2000; 2004b).  
These approaches to governance, standardisation and organisation have led Gereffi, 
Humphrey and Sturgeon’ (2005) to suggest a fivefold classification of modes of chain 
governance, which is often accredited for marking the beginning of the GVC literature 
(Bair 2005). Their modes of chain governance represent variations between the two 
extremes of market and hierarchical organisation. The former presents the most flexible 
with the lowest level of explicit coordination and power asymmetry. The latter presents the 
least flexible with the strongest form of explicit coordination and power asymmetry. The 
intermediate forms are, from most to least flexible, modular, relational and captive. The 
authors argue that the organisational form is determined by three variables: (1) the 
complexity of the transactions involved; (2) the ability to codify transactions; and (3) 
capabilities in the supply base. While the market relationship is characterised by a low 
complexity, but high ability to codify a transaction and high capabilities in the supply-base, 
the reverse is the case for hierarchical chain governance. Captive governance structures 
arise if the capabilities in the supply-base are low and relational governance structures 
emerge if the ability to codify a transaction is low. For modular governance structures to 
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emerge, the complexity of the transaction has to be relatively high—like for all but the 
market structure—while codify-able and with a capable supply-base.  
Three main points of critique have been raised. Firstly, although authors appear to agree on 
the idea that, through division of labour, benefits are unequally distributed across a 
production process, the question how value is created and unequal distribution achieved is 
not well understood (Gibbon, Bair and Ponte 2008). Indeed, the concept of value and its 
measurement is highly contested, and so are theories about how value is appropriated by 
different stakeholders. In this context, Gilbert (2008b) cautions against the common ‘value 
division fallacy’ which arises from the cake analogy of a total of value created along the 
chain—measured as the price fetched by the end-product—and divided among different 
stakeholders. He stresses that value creation/loss at one stage does not necessarily come at 
the expense/gain of value at another stage. For instance, a decreasing share of value 
accrued by one stakeholder in the chain might be due to an increase in production costs for 
another stakeholder and not increasing profit margins. In the context of the same debate, 
Kaplinsky and Morris (2000) suggest to focus on incomes82 at different parts of the chain, 
rather than profits or prices, for unveiling the distributional outcome of global production 
systems. 
Secondly, with the transition to GVC, the focus of analysis has shifted from a clear macro 
focus of the ‘world’ understood as a ‘social whole’ (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1977), 
towards the meso level of particular commodity chains, and further towards the micro level 
of intra-firm relationships. With this shift in the unit of analysis, the chain framework has 
arguably lost its capacity to embed the interrelationship of single firms into a contextual 
whole (Bair 2005). This critique is carried to the extreme by Gibbon and Ponte (2005), who 
argue that the chain metaphor becomes obsolete if turning towards modes of governance 
at single nodes of the chain.   
Thirdly, with the shift from driveness to coordination, the understanding of governance is 
narrowed down to transaction cost economics where organisational forms are assumed to 
reflect the efficient solution to some sort of market imperfection. Asymmetric power 
relationships and strategic interactions of chain participants are excluded (Gibbon, Bair and 
Ponte 2008), and the social or political dimension of governance is no longer considered 
(Gibbon and Ponte 2008). 
                                                 
82 Income is defined as output value minus input cost and employment (Kaplinsky and Morris 2000). 
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6.2.3 Conventions and Systems of Justification 
From this critique, an alternative but related literature evolved, which turns to convention 
theory. Conventions are either formalised rules or simple agreements regarding the 
expected frame of action (Rosin 2008). Governance, in this context, is understood as 
normalisation (Gibbon, Bair and Ponte 2008). Convention theory originates in the work of 
Boltanski and Thevenot (1991; 1999), who argue that any social action, and with this 
economic action, is framed by ‘systems of justification’. These systems are multiple83 and 
can be in conflict. The assumption of conflicting systems of justification is in contrast to 
the notion of rationality refered to by transaction cost economics, which allows for only 
one superior system of justification leading to one optimal solution.  
Systems of justification can serve as coordination or become conventions as long as there 
is objectivity. However, when the identity of the object, i.e., the nature of a commodity, is 
questioned over for instance quality, the market form of coordination is undermined and 
other systems of justifcation set in, which might or might not be in conflict (Thevenot 
2002). If objectivity is questioned, ‘critical uncertainty’ arises, which is uncertainty that 
cannot be dealt with in the particular system of justification, and a new convention arises 
(Boltanski and Thevenot 1999).  
The concept of conventions resembles the idea of standards in the previous literature. 
However, the concept is richer as it entails formalised product and process standards, as 
well as informal frameworks in which transaction takes place. It encompasses international 
trade agreements, contracts, standards or general practices (Rosin 2008). Further, 
convention theory focuses on the sense giving component to actions, with transaction 
costs being one justification among others. Governance is hence not only linked to 
economic and technical attributes, like market concentration and complexity, but to 
dominant normative paradigms that provide legitimacy (Ponte and Gibbon 2005). 
The theory has been used to explain the role and emergence of standards and tendencies of 
outsourcing. Ponte and Gibbon (2005) relate the change in the use of standards to a 
transition from mass consumption to market saturation in industrialised economies, 
coupled with a rising awareness of consumer safety and environmental and social concerns, 
which pose conflicting systems of justification (Ponte and Gibbon 2005). Daviron and 
Ponte (2005, 33-6) apply the convention theory to standards in the coffee industry. They 
argue that if there is uncertainty over the quality of the product, actors set up conventions, 
                                                 
83 For instance, ‘market’ follows the logic of price, ‘industry’ follows the logic of efficiency, ‘domestic’ follows 
the logic of status, ‘civic’ follows the logic of the common good. 
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which are linked to three different forms of coordination outside the market. These are 
domestic, industrial and civic. In the first form, uncertainty is solved through a long-term 
relationship of trust. In the second form, common norms and standards are enforced via 
certification. In the third form, a collective commitment ensures quality. Similarly, Ponte 
(2007), on the example of South African wine, links different modes of coordination to 
systems of justification for different wine qualities, while Raynolds (2002) uses the concept 
to explain the emergence of Fair Trade coffee.    
Rosin (2008) suggests linking chain governance to the capacity of agents to influence the 
conventions of exchange to their advantage. He argues that agents engage strategically in 
the formation of conventions, that is, agents actively negotiate conventions in order to 
improve their relative economic position. On the example of yerba mate in South America, 
Rosin (2008) studies the change in production conventions for small-scale yerba mate 
producers as a reaction to a change in the macroeconomic environment, brought about by 
the MERCOSURE trade agreement.  
Ponte and Gibbon (2005) explain the evolution of the shareholder value doctrine as a new 
legitimate corporate strategy with convention theory. The authors argue that this new 
convention has direct implications for the restructuring of the respective commodity chain. 
Most symptomatic of this restructuring is the outsourcing of inventory management, 
regardless of the potential risks of stock-outs attached to it. Further, it is argued that the 
financial justification system has won over the industrial justification system especially in 
the US (Palpacuer, Gibbon and Thomsen 2005).    
The convention theory successfully introduces a social component to the chain analysis and 
makes leadership dependent, not only on economic attributes, but also legitimacy and 
normative paradigms, which are actively shaped for competitive purposes (Ponte and 
Gibbon 2005). Convention theory is also more flexible regarding the unit of analysis and 
importantly considers consumers as active participants in the chain (Ponte and Gibbon 
2005; Raynolds 2002). However, an obvious shortcoming is the indeterminacy of different 
systems of justification (Ponte and Gibbon 2005).    
My review shows an evolving shift in emphasis in literature: the early literature focuses on 
economic power relationships in its emphasis of driveness. The later literature shifts 
towards standards and understands governance as coordination or rule giving. The 
convention theory puts emphasis on the sense giving and ethical component of 
governance. An institutional theory for price that combines all three components—
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economic, law and ethics—of the chain literature, without subordinating one over the 
other, is reviewed next.  
6.3 Institutional Theory for Price 
The chain literature appears to agree on the fact that linkages between different 
stakeholders in a chain can take on different forms, which embed different power 
asymmetries. However, the literature lacks an assessment of implications of the particular 
governance structure for price formation mechanisms (Gilbert 2008b). Given the different 
concepts of governance, an intuitive starting point appears to be an ‘institutional theory for 
price’ (Kaufman 2007). Markets as well as other modes of transaction are social constructs, 
whose evolution is shaped by a unique historical trajectory. Seen as an institution, the price 
mechanism is both a result of the intentional action of individuals as well as shaped by rules 
of everyday human interaction (Gloria and Palermo 1996). The market-structure “is a 
central determinant of the process of price formation and of the division of benefits of 
trade” (Maizels 1992, 162) and agents continuously try to change the structure as markets 
evolve (Callon, Meadel and Rabeharisoa 2002). The power of agents to shape the market 
structure, as well as the transaction within a given structure hinges on their relative 
bargaining strength (Maizels 1992, 166). Kaufman (2007) argues that each agent’s relative 
bargaining power is determined by a specific regime of working rules. These working rules 
are set by some people in power to do so. He concludes that “therefore, it is political 
power, not the impersonal forces of supply and demand, that determines […] who reaps 
the rewards and bears the costs of economic activity” (Kaufman 2007).  
Both Gloria and Palermo (1996) and Kaufman (2007) explicitly link their institional theory 
for price to the work of John R. Commons and his concept of transaction. Commons 
(1934) presents his work as an antithesis to 19th century economists, which he accuses of 
focusing narrowly on exchange, which places the price formation mechnism into a 
mechanical harmonic relationship (equilibrium) between man and nature (Gloria and 
Palermo 1996). By focusig on exchange rather than transaction, those economists fail to 
account for the legal transfer of property rights, which is a process characterised, quite 
differently, by conflict, in a relationsip between man and man.  
For Commons (1934) transactions are the smallest unit of institutional economics, which 
he defines as:  
“the alienation and acquisition, between individuals, of the rights of future 
ownership of physical things, as determined by the collective working rules of 
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society. The transfer of these rights must therefore be negotiated between the parties 
concerned, according to the working rules of society”. (Commons 1934, 58) 
Four aspects are immediately striking with Commons’ definition: (1) his focus on property 
rights as the matter of the transfer, (2) his emphasis on ‘futurity’—not immediate but 
future physical ownership is transferred which brings in uncertainty, (3) the working rules 
which determine the mode of the transfer, and (4) his emphasis on negotiation of mode 
and matter of transfer within the boundaries of the working rules.  
According to Commons, the focus on exchange neglects the legal and ethical component 
of economic activity (Commons 1934, 56). He argues that transaction and exchange are 
only congruent when contracts are complete, which means when there is no uncertainty 
involved. However, inspired by Keynes, he maintains that uncertainty is a reality, which 
implies that contracts are incomplete by nature. This leads to the differentiation between 
legal and physical control that is between transfer of property rights and transfer of a 
physical good (Kaufman 2007).  
Since a transaction is an interpersonal relationship, it is characterised by conflict, mutuality 
and order. The first two characteristics are regarding the interest of ownership of the 
parties involve, which are conflicting and mutually dependent. The latter characteristic is 
about security of expectations. Security of expectations is a necessary characteristic because 
of the true uncertainty of the future. Commons argues that the future must, to some 
extent, be reliable in order to facilitate action in the present (Commons 1934, 58). The 
security of expectations is guided by the working rules of society, which are subject to 
negotiations. Working rules “work as a limiting factor on behaviour” and guide what is 
legally and ethically accepted (Commons 1934, 140).  
Because working rules “define each economic agent’s opportunity set, endowments, and 
rights and conditions for exchange of property” (Kaufman 2007), the enforcement is the 
gain for one which comes at a loss for the other. When it creates liberty for one party, it 
results in exposure for the other. When it creates security for one party, it demands 
conformity from the other. In this sense, working rules set the limits of the three 
dimension of behaviour: (1) performance, that is the power exerted in an act or the attempt 
to persuade and coerce; (2) avoidance, that is the choice of one performance over another; 
and (3) forbearance, that is the difference between the potential power and the actual 
power exerted in a transaction. The distinction can be summarised as actual performance, 
alternative performance avoided, and the limit placed on performance (Commons 1934, 
88). These three dimensions of behaviour are linked to the doctrine of reasonableness or 
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ethical and legal legitimacy. Each actor involved in a transaction seeks to influence the 
other towards these three dimension, which is the ‘social psychology of negotiations’ (ibid, 
91).  
Commons (1934, 58) distinguishes between three types of transactions based on the 
manner in which ownership rights are transferred, resulting in different power 
relationships. These are bargaining transactions, managerial transactions, and rationing 
transaction.  
A bargaining transaction is one between legal equals, but not necessarily economic equals. 
Whether the agents are economic equals or not has an impact on the negotiation 
psychology, which is one of persuasion for economically equal agents, and one of coercion 
for economic unequal agents. Since such relationship is always one of conflict, working 
rules are required to introduce limits to the ability of parties to exercise power. If a dispute 
arises, some legal authority is needed to decide the dispute and the outcome of this 
decision enters future expectations and in that way becomes a custom.  
Managerial transactions are guided by working rules as well, but the relationship is one 
between economic and legal unequal agents. The negotiation psychology is one of 
command by the legal superior and obedience by the legal inferior. The terms of a 
managerial relationship can be negotiated and agreed upon between two legal equals before 
entering into the relationship of legal hierarchy. While the purpose of the bargaining 
relationship is the voluntary transfer of ownership over wealth, the purpose of the 
managerial transaction is wealth creation. The former is driven by the principal of scarcity, 
while the latter is driven by the principal of efficiency (Commons 1934, 64). 
Table 6.1: Transaction Typology under Commons 
 Bargaining Managerial Rationing 
Legal Equal Unequal Unequal 
Economical Equal Unequal Unequal Unequal 
Psychology Persuasion Coercion Command/Obedience Enforcement 
Type of Parties Individual Individual Collective 
Number of Parties 4 2 2 
Purpose 
Transfer of ownership of 
wealth 
Production of wealth 
Allocation of burdens 
and benefits of wealth 
creation 
Structure 
   
Source: Author. 
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A rationing transaction is one where a working rule is enforced by a superior collective. The 
enforcement of the working rule depends on the negotiation of those in power. Agents 
with power are part of the superior collective and have the authority to allocate the benefits 
and burdens of wealth creation. The negotiation is hence a collective bargaining. The 
rationing transaction can take the form of output-rationing or price-rationing (Commons 
1934, 68). Table 6.1 summarises the transaction types.    
A network of all three transaction types is a ‘going concern’. A going concern, with the 
working rules that keep it together, is Commons’ definition of an institution (Commons 
1934, 69). In this framework, institutions can be firms, markets, families or commodity 
chains. The performance of such institutions has to be “understood in terms of the rules 
that structure them and the goals of the people who develop and enforce the rules” 
(Kaufman 2007). While in Commons’ theory, transactions make the smallest units of 
economic activity, the going concern is a larger unit of economic activity (Commons 1934, 
71). 
The organised collective action is distinguished from the unorganised collective action, 
which is a custom. Since customs are subject to change and lack precision, they cause 
dispute. Customs can be variable practices as well as mandatory customs which have a 
binding effect. A custom being mandatory does not necessitate it being precise or 
organised, but that the consequences of neglecting it are binding. These different types of 
customs are subsumed as working rules (Commons 1934, 80).   
The outcome of a bargaining relationship hinges on the relative economic power of the 
agents involved in the transaction as well as the working rules that limit the exercise of 
power. The outcome of a managerial transaction and rationing transaction hinges on legal 
as well as economic power. In this context, Commons defines bargaining power as “power 
over others as contrasted to power over nature” (Commons 1934, 302-3). This 
differentiation is linked to his distinction between physical and proprietary meaning of 
procession. Only the latter meaning entails the power of individuals to withhold from 
others what is demand by them for their own use, which is bargaining power.   
With the notion of ‘futurity’, risk is an integral part of Commons’ theory. As stated before, 
the enforcement of a working rule creates liberty and security for one, and exposure and 
conformity for the other. Hence, the institutional framework, in which transactions are 
embedded, determines not only the allocation of wealth, but also the allocation of the 
burdens and benefits of wealth creation. This entails risk, which is allocated according to 
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security and conformity, liberty and exposure. Legal control or legal power is the control 
over agents’ future behaviour (Commons 1934, 86). 
Institutional change is initiated by limiting factors, which turn a bargaining transaction into 
a strategic transaction. Strategic transactions aim at changing existing working rules. Limiting 
factors could, for instance, arise due to the ownership of others over scarce resources. 
Along these lines Medema (1992) uses Commons’ framework to explain the decision of 
firms to vertically integrate, that is, to enter into a managerial transaction. The arising 
governance structure of a chain is the product of “the evolutionary process which is 
worked out over time, a many period game characterised by power play” (ibid.). This 
power play is guided by working rules that determine to what extent, and in which manner, 
power can be exercised, and to what extent working rules can be challenged and modified 
by actors.  
6.4 Governance, Transactions and Institutions 
Following Commons’ notion of going concerns, the commodity chain as a whole can be 
understood as an institution, guided by existing working rules, and so can each individual 
firm in the chain. Since a going concern, constituted by a set of transactions, can be 
embedded into a larger going concern, the struggle over the unit of analysis is overcome. 
Further, the shareholder value doctrine can be understood as changing power relationships 
within a company. Shareholders gained legal power due to changes in regulations, and 
financial capital gained economic power in saturated consumer markets. Shareholders 
transform existing working rules in their favour, which results, inter alia, in outsourcing of 
non-core competences.  
Different types of standards can be explained by linking those to Commons’ categories of 
customs, which are differentiated into organised or unorganised, binding or non-binding. 
Private process standards for instance can be unorganised (not written into law), but 
binding. A producer might not find a buyer if discarding private production standards, and 
is consequently excluded from the chain. Raikes, Jensen and Ponte’s (2000) argument that 
branders increasingly control market access through coordination, can hence be 
understood as an increasing economic power of branders (due to for instance market 
concentration), which enables them to shape working rules through the enforcement of 
binding customs.   
Moreover, the fivefold typology of governance structure by Gereffi, Humphrey and 
Sturgeon (2005) can be translated into Commons’ transaction concept. Market and 
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hierarchy are the opposite ends of the typology. These are translated into bargaining 
transactions with equal economic power and managerial transactions. The intermediate 
stages of modular, relational, and captive are bargaining transactions with increasing 
economic power asymmetry, which enables one agent to shape the working rules in his 
favour. Unequal economic power has different origins, for instance asset specificity, 
informational asymmetry, and market dominance. It becomes immediately apparent that 
Commons’ rationing transaction is not accounted for. This relates back to the previous 
critique that GVC analysis only targets one node at a time but not the wider institutional 
context. For instance, product and process standards set far away from the actual point of 
exchange, as in Messner’s (2004, 23-37) network analysis, are not easily understood in the 
framework proposed by Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon (2005).  
The notion of transaction provides a framework in which price formation as well as risk 
allocation process can be jointly understood. A transaction encompasses the terms at which 
a transfer takes place (mode of transfer) as well as the subject of transfer (matter of 
transfer). Both the mode and matter of transfer embedded in a particular contractual 
arrangement are negotiated. The negotiation process is determined by the relative legal and 
economic power of the agents involved as well as existing working rules. Given the 
specificity of a particular negotiation, different outcomes are possible which explains the 
diverse forms chains can take on. Contractual arrangements do not only specify a particular 
price and quantity, but also the terms at which the physical exchange is conducted. These 
terms are linked to uncertainty involved in a transaction, which means they are linked to 
the allocation of risk.  
Power is linked to economic and legal attributes. Asymmetric bargaining power arises from 
unequal economic power due to the presence of limiting factors, that is, ownership over 
scarce resources. Resources can be tangible (e.g., commodities) or intangible (e.g., 
information). Such limiting factors can motivate an actor to engage in strategic transactions 
in order to change existing working rules. Further, asymmetric power in managerial and 
rationing transaction arises due to both asymmetric economic and legal power. In the 
managerial transaction, inferior legal power can be voluntarily (e.g., entrance in an 
employment relationship) or non-voluntarily (e.g., vertical integration through hostile 
takeover). Governance understood as the power to appropriate the main share of value 
creation is the execution of economic power, while governance understood as the power to 
set standards and decide over the modalities of production is the execution of legal power.  
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However, Commons does not elaborate further on the nature and sources of economic or 
legal power. Two concepts, which have been used in the context of chain analysis are 
useful extensions. These are different economic rents as a source of economic power 
(Fitter and Kaplinsky 2001; Kaplinsky and Morris 2000, 25-8) and the differentiation 
between executive, legislative and judicial power as a categorisation of legal power 
(Kaplinsky and Morris 2000, 29-32). Fitter and Kaplinsky (2001) on the understanding of 
governance in the chain literature conclude that: “It is this role of coordination, and the 
complementary role of identifying dynamic rent opportunities and apportioning roles to 
key players which reflects’ an important part of the act of governance”. By combining 
Commons’ framework and the above statement, governance is in the hands of those who 
hold economic (identifying dynamic rents) and legal (coordination) power and the resulting 
ability to shape working rules and consequently allocate the burdens and benefits of wealth 
creation (apportion roles to key players). 
Several sources, linked to economic rents, have been associated with economic power or 
bargaining power. Kaplinsky and Morris (2000) present a comprehensive list of sources of 
economic rents which fall under certain categories: (1) rents can be endogenous to the 
chain and constructed by a single actor (e.g., technology rent) or a group of actors (e.g., 
relational rents), and (2) rents can be exogenous to the chain and be constructed by 
external parties (e.g., financial rents) or nature (e.g., resource rent). They further stress that 
rents are dynamic, which means that economic power is in constant shift. This implies that 
existing working rules are challenged and transformed by shifting power imbalances. 
Importantly Kaplinsky and Morries (2000, 42) stress that while economic rents result in 
surplus generation, one has to look at the income of different labour involved in the 
production process in order to identify the distributional effect of a particular institutional 
structure.    
Maizels (Maizels 1992, 165-73) distinguishes between three different sources of bargaining 
power held by developing host countries or governments vis-à-vis transnational 
corporations. These are factors specific to the commodity, factors specific to the host 
country and factors of international action. His selection of commodity specific factor is 
inspired by Labys (1980). The latter lists export dependence, magnitude of fixed 
investment, nature of technology (e.g., for extraction), control over reserves and 
production, opportunities for processing, material share in product price, obsolescing 
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bargain84, nature of competition, and government learning process. To this list, Maizels 
(1992, 169) adds transparency of world markets, control of marketing and distribution, and 
competition among transnational corporations (TNCs). Factors of international action 
would be either joint action by developing countries (like commodity agreements) or joint 
action by TNCs (like collusion over price or quantity). Country-specific factors involve 
macroeconomic position and degree of corruption. These factors of asymmetric bargaining 
power can be linked to economic rents like information rents (transparency of markets), 
technology rents (nature of technology), etc.  
Kaplinsky and Morris (2000, 31) further contribute to disentangling the complexity of legal 
power. They firstly distinguish between three dimensions of governance which are: 
legislature, i.e., making the law or working rules, executive, i.e., implementing the law or 
working rules and judiciary, i.e., monitoring the conformance to the law or working rules. 
Secondly, the authors stress that these dimensions of governance can be exercised by 
parties internal as well as external to the chain. Thirdly, they assess the strength of 
governance by its depth that is “the extent to which it affects the core activities of 
individual parties in the chain” and pervasiveness that is “how widely over the chain its 
power is exercised, and related to this, whether there are competing bases for power” (ibid, 
32). Who holds these forms of governance or legal power determines not only the 
particular organisational structure of production, but also the terms at which transactions 
take place, the functional division of labour between the segments of the chain, and the 
structure of the price formation and risk allocation process.  
Institutional change for Commons emerges due to limiting factors, which cause agents to 
engage in strategic transaction aimed at changing the existing working rules. Kaplinsky 
(2013) stress the importance of dynamic rents and core competences through for instance 
innovation as the driving forces that shapes and reshapes the organisation structure of 
production chains. Another approach links chain organisation to the financialisation 
literature and ‘shareholder capitalism’ (Palpacuer 2009; Gibbon 2002; Raikes, Jensen and 
Ponte 2000). According to this literature industry restructuring is driven by the increasing 
dominance of shareholder value and relative return on capital employment ratios. In both 
instances, it is economic and legal power that enables agents to shape existing working 
rules and consequently change the organisation structure of the chain. Such institutional 
changes affect both the matter and mode of transaction. Hence not only the subjects of 
                                                 
84 Obsolescing bargaining refers to a shift in bargaining power as for instance after a huger investment by a 
TNC is made. While before the investment the TNC might have had the superior bargaining position, the 
government gains bargaining power after the investment due to the risk attached to it (Maizels 1992, 170).   
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transaction, which are quantity and price are altered, but also the terms of transaction, 
which include risks. For instance, Palpacuer (2009) argues that financialisation leads to the 
transfer of risk from the shareholder to the corporation, which promotes incentives to shift 
risk to employees and suppliers via outsourcing.  
Figure 6.1 combines Commons’ transaction framework with the concepts of economic and 
legal power. The institutional structure is made of different types of transaction, which 
entail different legal and economic power relationships. Asymmetric power relationships 
determine negotiation psychology and strength in influencing both the matter and mode of 
a transaction as well as existing working rules. A change in working rules appears in the 
presence of limiting factors which motivates agents to enter into strategic transactions. The 
working rules in turn determine the limits to the power exerted in negotiation processes. 
Legal power with reference to working rules can be differentiated into power to make 
working rules, power to supervise the conformance to existing working rules and power 
the enforce existing working rules. This complex interplay between different legal and 
economic power relationships defines, not only the mode and matter of a transaction, but 
also the boundaries by which the mode and matter of a transaction can be negotiated.    
Figure 6.1: Transactions, Governance and Economic Rents 
 
Source: Author. 
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6.5 Concluding Remarks 
Commodity and value chain approaches provide a useful framework to understand linkages 
and embedded power relationships within a commodity sector. However, the literature 
struggles with the appropriate unit of analysis and further, does not provide any insights in 
implications of different power relationships for price formation and risk allocation 
processes. In order to compensate for this shortcoming, an institutional theory of price 
and, following existing theoretical contributions, Commons’ concept of transactions is 
used.     
By focusing on transactions instead of exchange, the price formation process is embedded 
into an institutional context, which makes an analysis of price formation outside the market 
possible. Further, the notion of transaction is inherently linked to uncertainty or what 
Commons calls ‘futurity’, which makes risk an essential component.  
Against this background, the price formation process within a commodity chain has to be 
understood in terms of different forms of transactions. Prices can be administered or 
negotiated in a single or repeated bargain among economic equals or non-equals. In order 
to gauge the unequal distribution of economic benefits across the chain, one has to 
consider the distribution of legal and economic power which shapes the modality of 
transactions established in contractual arrangements (formal or informal). In the following, 
we will show on the example of the Ghanaian cocoa sector that price formation and risk 
allocation mechanisms essentially hinge on the institutional setting in which transactions 
take place.  
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Chapter 7 The Case of Ghanaian Cocoa  
7.1 Introduction 
While the literature on cocoa chains is rich, focusing on governance structure and bean 
quality after liberalisation, few studies investigate price formation and risk allocation 
mechanisms. This is despite the fact that price risk has been identified as the most 
substantial risk faced by cocoa farmers across producing countries (WB 2008; 2011). 
Gilbert (2008b) is among the few to consider price formation mechanisms. He notes that 
the futures market plays a decisive role in determining values and value shares in the cocoa 
sector. However, his analysis focuses on the accountancy tasks of calculating value shares 
across the chocolate sector and not on price formation mechanisms in particular. Dana and 
Gilbert (2008, 209-12) investigate price risk management techniques in soft commodities 
including cocoa. Although they provide a comprehensive typology of price risk factors to 
which different stakeholders are exposed to, they fail to account for the role of the 
institutional framework guiding risk allocation and management.  
Therefore, this Chapter 7 provides a systematic analysis of the Ghanaian cocoa sector, 
which links price formation and risk allocation to the evolution of the institutional 
structure of global, regional and national cocoa trade. The analysis is based on semi-
structured interviews conducted during a three month fieldwork in Ghana, as well as in-
person and phone interviews with stakeholders in the US, Germany, and the UK. 
Appendix 7.1 provides an overview of interview partners. Where reference is made to 
information obtained in an interview or an interviewee is quoted, the reference is indicated 
in the form: [‘letter’ ‘number’]. The ‘letter’ refers to the particular sector, for instance 
chocolate manufacturer or farmer, and the ‘number’ is a serial number in the order of the 
dates when the interviews were conducted.  
The Ghanaian phrase ‘Cocoa is Ghana and Ghana is cocoa!’ is exemplary for the status of 
cocoa as a commodity not only in Ghana’s economy but also in the social and political 
realms. About one Million farmers [I2, L4] and their families, together with employees of 
Cocobod, processing companies, hauliers and LBCs—about one third of Ghana’s entire 
population—directly depend on cocoa income [B2, G8, L4]. Further, cocoa constituted 30 
per cent of Ghana’s exports in 2013 and only lost its dominance due to the increasing 
importance of gold and oil exports (Figure 1.5). Until today the cocoa sector remains the 
single most important sector for Ghana in terms of employment, foreign reserve provision 
and revenue generation for the government.  
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The introduction aside, the chapter is structured into four sections. Since institutional 
structures are path dependent, Section 2 commences with the history of the Ghanaian 
cocoa sector and the evolution of its institutional structure. The historical trajectory is 
constantly linked to developments in the global cocoa sector and neighbouring cocoa 
producing countries. Section 3 outlines the methods used for the fieldwork and provides a 
map of today’s cocoa–chocolate chain structure from Ghana’s perspective, in which key 
stakeholders are identified. Section 4 provides a detailed analysis of the mechanisms of 
price formation and risk allocation across the cocoa sector. Towards this aim the different 
settings in which transactions take place and the working rules that shape them, as well as 
asymmetric economic and legal power relationships among stakeholders are unveiled. 
Section 5 concludes by assessing Ghana’s unique institutional structure and ramifications 
for price formation and risk allocation among stakeholders in the cocoa–chocolate 
industry.  
7.2 The History of Cocoa in Ghana 
In the context of cocoa Talbot (2002) argues that the colonial past has shaped the way in 
which cocoa chains are organised. In order to understand the evolution of the Ghanaian 
cocoa–chocolate chain, the following section reviews the history of cocoa in Ghana from 
the arrival of the first bean to the current state of the sector against the background how 
the global cocoa sector has been evolved. The time period under review covers the colonial 
times, the pre-independence period and the aftermath, and the era of structural adjustment 
until today.   
7.2.1 Cocoa under Colonial Power  
According to the most common narrative, cocoa has been brought to Ghana from 
Fernando Po by Tetteh Quashie, a Ga blacksmith, in 1878 (Mikell 1989, 70). However, the 
historical truth of this claim remains unconfirmed as of today and alternative versions have 
been promoted. Indeed, evidence suggests that European Missionaries attempted to 
cultivate cocoa in Ghana in 1857 already, but with limited success (Acquaah 1999, 16-7, 
Gunnarsson 1978, 29). Nevertheless, Quashie, although he might not have been the first, is 
rightly celebrated as the ‘Father of the cocoa Industry in Ghana’ (Acquaah 1999, 21) and 
his farm in Mampong-Akwapim is open to the public with a small museum attached to it85. 
With its second arrival, cocoa was quickly taken up by farmers within the State of 
                                                 
85 At the time of visit the museum was closed due to quarrels with Cocobod.  
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Akwapim86 and moved North-West, reaching Kumasi in 1903. Between 1905 and 1930 
‘cocoa spread like wildfire’ and by 1911 surpassed rubber, timber and gold as the main 
export good (Mikell 1989, 83). 
The rapid expansion of cocoa in Western Africa was accompanied by the emergence of 
large-scale chocolate factories and mills in late 19th century Europe and North America. In 
the early days, cocoa was auctioned in London or Liverpool (Dand 1995, 82). Since 
overseas shipping took time and was associated with great risks, cocoa could only be sold 
at the European ports on arrival. For small drinking chocolate manufacturers this spot sale 
system was sufficient, but larger chocolate factories required more stable supply. 
Improvements in speed and safety of shipping, not least with the development of steam 
engine power, and an increasing supply from the Gold Coast facilitated such stable supply.  
With the new era of cocoa trade, another innovation reached the trading centres in Europe 
and North America; the forward sale. The forward contract system was favoured not only 
because forward contracts mitigated price and supply risk, but also because such system 
was less transparent than the auction system and competitors were left with uncertainty 
over price and volume of trading deals (Dand 1995, 83). With increasing trade volume and 
a demand for standardisation of contracts, three trade associations were formed between 
1924 and 1935. The CMAA in New York, the Cocoa Association (CAL) in London and 
the Association Francaise du Commerce des Cacaos (AFCC) in Paris. All three 
organisations provide standardises contracts as well as arbitration services (ibid, 84). From 
standardised forward contracts, the step towards the first cocoa futures exchange in 1925 
in New York was small. With the new institution in place, the focal point of price 
formation shifted towards New York and even price notations at later founded exchanges 
in London, Liverpool, and Amsterdam followed the American price (Ehrler 1977, 26).  
Since production of cocoa was in the hand of indigenous people, the West African cocoa 
trading system relied to a great extent on middlemen, referred to as brokers. European 
companies never took an active part in cocoa production (Gunnarsson 1978, 51-2)87. 
Nevertheless, the European companies were vital for the rising cocoa sector. Firstly, they 
established the necessary link between the farmer and overseas cocoa markets, and 
secondly, they provided producers with manufacturing imports and capital. Their interests 
were twofold: securing cocoa supply and establishing new markets. The two largest players 
                                                 
86 This is the area around Aburi in Figure 7.5. 
87 An exception was Governor Sir William B. Griffith, who experimented with cocoa plants himself at the 
Botanic Gardens of Aburi, next to Mampong-Akwapim and expanded those to the Aburi Agricultural Station 
which from 1891 sold seeds, pods, and seedlings to farmers. In 1898 Aburi turned into a marketing centre 
which introduced advanced payments for sales of cocoa (Acquaah 1999, 33-8). 
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at the time were the United African Company (UCA), later owned by the Lever Brothers 
(Unilever), and Cadbury (later Cadbury and Fry) owned by the Cadbury Brothers (Acquaah 
1999, 99-100). UCA entertained an import-export business and was the major buyer of 
cocoa in the 1930s with over one-thousand buying points and merchandise outlets. 
Between 1920s and 1930s, 13 foreign firms entered the cocoa trade and went into fierce 
competition with local independent traders (ibid.).  
Beans were brought from the farmers by sub-brokers, who were small petty traders, and 
then sold on the larger brokers, who were large merchants or large farmers themselves. The 
larger brokers then sold the crop on to European firms (Commission on the Marketing of 
West African Cocoa (CMWAC) 1938, 26-8). The brokers were responsible for the 
transportation from the farm to the ports and, in their role as merchants, were supplying 
imported consumer goods to the farmers (Gunnarsson 1978, 52-3). Due to the seasonality 
of the crop and the dual function of the European trading companies, a system of cash 
advances developed. Crop income was condensed into the harvest seasons from October 
to March, which meant that farmers were short in cash during the remaining months. In 
this emerging system, brokers were contracted by the European firms to buy a certain 
amount of cocoa and given cash advances in order to contact sub-brokers and farmers. 
Thereby, European firms bought forward a large amount of cocoa in order to secure 
supply during harvest season.  
The emergence of the advanced cash system and the increasing commercialisation of cocoa 
trade led to an increasing stratification among cocoa farmers, with brokers and larger 
farmers arising as new wealthy strata. Brokers established themselves as money lenders and 
often brought a considerable amount of farms under their control (Ehrler 1977, 57). 
Further, since brokers were the sole link to the overseas market, they had considerable 
power over farm-gate prices (Gunnarsson 1978, 110-2). This increasing power of brokers 
rose to the concern of European firms and was a source of conflict in the 1930s.   
By the 1930s more than 25 per cent, at some locations even up to 50 per cent, of the crop 
was bought forward (Gunnarsson 1978, 117; CMWAC 1938, 31). The respective overseas 
principal informed the European buyer about the price at the exchange. The buyer then 
fixed limits to which he allowed his brokers to buy. These limits were decided upon by 
considering the world price, existing contracts and in-country competition (Ehrler 1977, 
56-7; CMWAC 1938, 33). The broker then received cash advances from the buyer, which 
he passed on to his sub-brokers. The maximum price given to the sub-broker did not 
necessarily match the price given by the buyer. Should the price change, the broker was 
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immediately informed by the buyer and he had to declare the amount of cocoa already 
bought to the former price. However, since he had to inform his sub-brokers, this would 
take time—a variable which could be played by the broker. By pretending he did not reach 
his sub-broker, he could continue to sell the cocoa to the buyer at the previously high price. 
This way brokers would accumulate income during the early time of the season and often 
bought cocoa with their own cash later in the season to sell it to buyers at a higher price 
(Ehrler 1977, 62).  
While local brokers had a substantive influence on prices at farm-gate, world prices could 
at least to some extent be influenced by the large commercial traders. Speculation in 
London and New York, the two leading cocoa futures exchanges, was likelier than in other 
crop markets due to the nature of production and marketing in West Africa. Since cocoa 
was not produced on large European-owned estates, information about the state of the 
cocoa sector was scarce among European firms. As a result, traders often relied on 
guesswork and extrapolation. Gunnarsson (1978, 23-4) argues that the separation of 
producers from European merchants contributed crucially to price fluctuations. The only 
report on cocoa crop forecasts available published by Gill and Duffus—the worlds’ largest 
cocoa dealer at the time—had a decisive and often intended influence on exchange traders’ 
expectations (Kofi 1974, 458-9). Active market manipulation, as for instance in January 
1937, when Hershey Chocolate Corporation attempted to peg the market, was another way 
to influence prices (CMWAC 1938, 8-10). 
The rising power of the middlemen, the increasing importance of the futures market and 
the concentration of the export segment in the hands of a few European and North 
American companies characterised the situation of cocoa trade in the 1930s. Against 
increasing concerns over the quality of the exported cocoa (De Graft-Johnson 1974, 352), 
as well as the growing power of the middlemen, co-operatives were introduced in 1931 
(CMWAC 1938, 40-2). Co-operatives would sell directly to European buyers and receive a 
premium for ensured bean quality. The amount of cocoa marketed through co-operatives 
was minimal in the early days. However, those should play an important role in the days 
prior to independence (Beckman 1974, 368).  
The 1930s marked a time of particularly low cocoa prices. The emerging recession in cocoa 
consuming countries resulted in distress for the cocoa–chocolate industry and European 
buyers respectively. The decreasing farm-gate prices and the oligopoly of European buyers’ 
sparked suspicion among farmers over European buyers colluding to artificially supress 
prices (Mikell 1989, 97). Anger among farmers was further aggravated by the fact that 
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foreign firms, due to their dual role in the economy, not only administered export prices 
but also prices for imported manufactured goods (Acquaah 1999, 100; Ehrler 1977, 142). 
Indeed, during the 1930s, foreign exporters agreed on quota systems and prices among 
them (Gunnarsson 1978, 125-6). The unmasking of the collusion led to a succession of 
cocoa hold ups, which found their climax in 1937 with a boycott of the import stores 
owned by cocoa shippers in addition to a cocoa hold up (Acquaah 1999, 108)88. 
As a response to the hold up, the Nowell Commission—a Parliamentary committee—was 
set up. The commission later condemned the buyers’ monopoly and the unethical action of 
the inland middlemen (Mikell 1989, 99). However, recommendations made were never 
implemented. A few months later, with the outbreak of the Second World War, the British 
government, in need of revenues to finance its war expenses, decided to purchase all cocoa 
beans from its colonies at a fixed price. In 1940 the West African Producer Control Board 
was established to undertake overseas marketing (Acquaah 1999, 111). The local 
Government was empowered to fix prices in consultation with the London authorities 
(Wickizer 1951, 330-1). The handling of the cocoa was divided between those firms already 
in business, referred to as Licenced Buying Agents (LBA), and quotas were allocated 
depending on the firm’s previous performance. LBAs acted as agents for the government 
and were reimbursed for their services (Acquaah 1999, 112). The price paid to the farmers 
was figured by deducing transportation, brokerage and other costs according to a published 
schedule from the controlled price (Wickizer 1951, 330-1).  
After the war, the composition of the board was changed to allow greater producer 
participation and it was renamed into Cocoa Marketing Board (CMB) (Acquaah 1999, 144). 
However, the price setting mechanisms sparked controversies, since the controlled price 
remained conservative. While during the war years the argument that low prices were 
needed in order to compensate for the risk incurred by the CMB was accepted, farmers 
became increasingly vocal against the arrangement thereafter (Wickizer 1951, 335-6).   
The introduction of the CMB was not the first attempt to tap the cocoa industry for 
revenues and the British introduced export duties in 1916 already (Acquaah 1999, 41). 
However, for the first time, the bargaining process between farmers, intermediaries and 
exporters was taken out of the hands of the agents involved and revenues were extracted 
by administered prices. The transaction turned into a rationing transaction between farmers 
and CMB and into a managerial transaction between LBAs and CMB. The introduction of 
this new institutional setup had lasting consequences for the West African cocoa industry. 
                                                 
88 For a detailed report on events see Ehrler (1977) and CMWAC (1938). 
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While farmers received up to 90 per cent of the free on board (FOB)89 price in the 1940s, 
the share decreased to 40 per cent after the introduction of the CMB as depicted in 
Figure 7.1. The structure of this institutional setup remained until today. However, power 
relationships constantly changed and, so too, working rules. 
Figure 7.1: Export Prices and Producer Price Share in Export Prices 
(in £ per ton (left scale) and in % (right scale), 1916–1970) 
 
Source: Acquaah (1999, Table 5.2, 126 ); Western Africa Programmes Department 
(WAPD) (1983, Appendix VI, 36). 
7.2.2 Cocoa under Independence  
Pressure towards higher political self-determination emerged in the Gold Coast in 1941 and 
a new constitution came into force in 1946 (Gocking 2005, 79-81). This development was a 
stepping stone towards parliamentary democracy and the first large scale election of a 
Legislative Council was held in 1951. Kwame Nkrumah, founder of the socialist 
Convention People’s Party (CPP), became the first elected prime minister (Gocking 2005, 
99).  
The development towards a ‘semi-responsible form of government’ was propelled by the 
passing of an ordinance that made the cutting-out of cocoa trees infected with the swollen 
shot virus obligatory in 1946 (Gocking 2005, 93). The virus spread rapidly in the 1930s, not 
least because of the neglect of cocoa farms during the war and chronically low prices. 
However, the ordinance came at a time when prices were finally rising again and hence 
resulted in protests and violent clashes between farmers and cutting-out gangs (Gocking 
2005, 81-2). The revolt quickly spread to urban areas and resulted in similar violent protests 
                                                 
89 FOB stands for free on board which means the seller pays for the loading and transport of the commodity 
to a designated port.  
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that had erupted a decade earlier during the cocoa hold-ups. The colonial government 
reacted by opening up to democratisation embedded in a new constitution.  
While previously the CMB was serving as a tool for revenue extraction, it was heavily 
politicised under Nkrumah. In 1952, right after the election of the first pre-independence 
government, the Cocoa Purchasing Company (CPC) was set up as a state owned buying 
company competing with co-operatives and other LBAs. Especially in the run-up of the 
second election, the CPC provided favours, like inexpensive loans, for those in support of 
the CPP (Frimpong-Ansah 1991, 86).  
All time high cocoa export prices between 1952 and 1955 bestowed a period of 
unprecedented growth on the newly elected government. However, through the action of 
the CPC, the price for cocoa famers was not raised proportionally (Mikell 1989, 162). 
Nkrumah’s early plan was to use the country’s economic resources to create an industrial 
base, which would serve to promote development, but chiefs and farmers in the cocoa belt 
complained that the new state of Ghana was being built on the backs of cocoa farmers. 
Despite rising opposition, Nkrumah and the CPP won the third election in 1956, not least 
because CPP had an advantage in financing and reach through CPC (Mikell 1989, 163). 
After the third election cycle, Ghana won independence as the first West African colony on 
March 6, 1957.  
The same year, the CPC was liquidated due to concerns over corruption. This, however, 
did not end the politicisation of the cocoa sector (Williams 2009). In its place stepped the 
United Ghana Farmers’ Council Co-operative (UGFCC), which was granted a monopoly 
position in cocoa buying in 1961. In the famous Dawn Broadcast, Nkrumah explained that 
all foreign LBAs were expelled and that the UGFCC, which entertained close political ties 
with the CPP, was to become the only recognised farmers’ organisation in the country 
(Mikell 1989, 176-8). As foreign firms increasingly focused on processing they did not mind 
the surrender of their sourcing operations. Their main concern was securing enough cocoa 
at sufficient quality and towards this aim they offered their close collaboration to the 
government (Beckman 1974, 372). Indeed the quality of the cocoa increased under the new 
arrangement (Kotey 1974, 382). 
While to the satisfaction of overseas buyers, farmers were squeezed and their standard of 
living decreased under the new arrangement. The cocoa sector lost attractiveness and 
children from cocoa farmers, who benefitted from schooling, were migrating towards 
urban areas. In 1964 world cocoa prices plummeted, loans could not be repaid, and the 
producer price had to be lowered the following year (Mikell 1989, 186-7). The cocoa sector 
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entered into crisis as many farmers abandoned their farms. A food crisis emerged and 
when foreign lenders refused to issue new loans, Nkrumah’s reign ended in a military coup 
in 1966. From 1947, the year the CMB was established, to the end of the 1964/65 crop 
season, the government collected about 30 per cent of the cocoa export proceeds in export 
duties and other levies (Beckman 1974, 277).  
The coup in 1966 was followed by a general distaste for socialism and negative sentiments 
towards foreigners, which forced migrant wage labour working at cocoa plantations to 
leave the country. Increasing wage labour costs led to further abandonment of cocoa 
farms. The former CMB administrative apparatus was dissolved since associated with 
socialism, the monopoly of the UGFCC lifted and the co-operative system revived (Mikell 
1989, 193). However, debt issues and fierce competition among co-operatives, as well as 
delayed payments, forced many farmers to turn to the state owned Producer Buying 
Agency (PBA) and the monolithic structure was re-established in 1977, when PBA became 
the sole buyer (Laven 2010, 80).   
The turn away from socialism opened the door for the IMF, who provided loans to the 
new government under forced devaluation of the currency and strict austerity conditions 
which included cutting back on subsidies for fertilisers and other cocoa inputs. In 1969 
Ghana returned from its military government to party politics. However, the country still 
struggled and, with the decrease in world prices, the IMF was invited again in 1971, 
enforcing another round of currency devaluation and austerity (Gocking 2005, 158). 
Another coupe took place in 1972, but the economy remained in severe distress. The 
smuggling of cocoa to Ivory Coast and Togo, where producer prices were up to five times 
higher than in Ghana, became a problem. With the decline of the rural infrastructure also 
food production suffered and urban food prices rose. Inflation soared between 1974 and 
1977. Foreign exchange was lacking and imports could not be paid for (Mikell 1989, 202). 
The ‘Operation Feed Yourself’ introduced by the new military regime in order to handle 
the food crisis further incentivised cocoa farmers to turn their back on the cash crop 
(Gocking 2005, 168). Farmers either returned to the home villages, searched for alternative 
wage labour (e.g., in the Nigerian oil sector), or used cocoa plantations for subsistence 
farming.  
A third coup followed in 1979, initiated by Jerry Rawlings (Mikell 1989, 211-3). Rawlings 
pushed for fixed prices to curb inflation, burned down market places which, in his eyes, 
were breading beds for corruption, jailed and executed corrupt civilians, entrepreneurs and 
military officers alike, and dismantled the CMB (Gocking 2005, 180). Later the same year 
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he turned to the revival of party politics and the People’s National Party (PNP) under Hilla 
Limann was elected. The PNP raised the cocoa producer price beyond the international 
market price to encourage production. However, rural infrastructure bottlenecks and 
shortage in wage labour made this policy unsustainable (Mikell 1989, 213). With the elected 
government failing, once again, to manoeuvre the country out of its economic struggle, 
Rawlings, in another coup, took over in 1981.  
By then the cocoa sector occupied more than 50 per cent of the area under cultivation, 
provided employment for 24 per cent of the labour force and accounted for over 60 per 
cent of the total export in Ghana (WAPD 1983). However, the sector was in despair with 
sharply declining real prices since the mid-1950s and subsequently falling production from 
400,000 tonnes to 200,000 between mid-1960s and early 1980s (Figure 7.2). 
Figure 7.2: Ghana Cocoa Production Per Region and Crop Year 
(in thousand tonnes, 1960–2009) 
 
Source: Cocobod Statistical Division. 
Not surprisingly, the impact of the Second World War on the cocoa–chocolate industry in 
Europe and the US was significant. Europe, and also the US, maintained a rationing system 
in the post war period for many commodities including cocoa and chocolate (Wickizer 
1951, 347-8). This made the task of marketing boards during the early post-war years 
easier.  
With former colonies gaining independence, the difficulties faced especially by developing 
countries due to commodity price instability found discussion in the international 
community. During the 1950s and 1960s many countries saw their development plans 
undermined by adverse changes in world commodity prices and repeatedly declared their 
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frustration with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which was pushed 
through foremost by the US as an advocate for free trade (Maizels 1992, 102-5).  
This frustration resulted in the first convention of the United Nations Conference of Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964, which openly questioned the benefits of free trade 
for commodity exporters with reference to Prebisch (1950). A decade earlier, negotiations 
about commodity price stabilisation schemes already began under the auspice of the United 
Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) (Ernst 1982, 122-7). The discussion 
was taken up by UNCTAD, which negotiated the first International Cocoa Agreement 
(ICA) in 1972. The ICCO was established the following year, in order to put the agreement 
in effect (Maizels, Bacon and Mavrotas 1997, 28). Several more agreements in 1975, 1980, 
1986, 1993, 2001 and 2010 followed.  
However, the mandate of the ICCO and the aim of the ICAs changed over the years 
(Maizels, Bacon and Mavrotas 1997, 45-7). The objectives of the early agreements included 
stabilisation of volatile prices, a balanced expansion of the cocoa industry, and an increase 
in income and export earnings for producing countries. The latter point was dropped in the 
1986 agreement and the remaining ones were watered down with the 1993 agreement. 
Thereafter the mandate of the ICCO changed into a consultative board (ICCO 2015). In 
parallel, the tools available to the ICCO eroded. Price quotas were dropped after the 1975 
agreement and buffer stocks were abolished when the 1986 agreement failed only two years 
after its ratification (Maizels, Bacon and Mavrotas 1997, 28).  
The aim of commodity agreements across the board shifted away from the notion of price 
stability towards “developmental” measures like increasing productivity, efficiency and cost 
reduction (Maizels 1992, 137-8). At the same time, other sources, dealing with the 
repercussions of volatile commodity prices, ceased existence as for instance the 
Compensatory Finance Facility of the IMF. The facility was introduced in 1963 in order to 
provide counter cyclical funding for the mitigation of short-term income shocks from low 
commodity prices. In the early 1980s, during a time of particularly low commodity prices, 
conditionalities were attached, and by the late 1980s the facility became fully integrated into 
the IMF. As a result of decreasing prices and a discontinuation of institutional support, 
commodity dependent countries accumulated huge debts.   
7.2.3 Cocoa under Structural Adjustment and Beyond  
Like many other countries during the 1980s, Ghana, once again, reached out to the IMF 
for assistance. Forestalling the IMF’s austerity program, the government drew up an 
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extensive plan for financial reform, which, among other areas, targeted at the cocoa sector 
(Gocking 2005, 194). The CMB was dismantled and replaced by todays Ghana Cocoa 
Board (Cocobod) and the setting of a producer price was passed on from the government 
to a Producer Price Review Committee (PPRC) in order to avoid conflict of interest 
(WAPD 1983, 24). Few years later, the Agricultural Services Rehabilitation Project was 
launched, which aimed at a stepwise increase of the FOB share received by farmers from 
30 to 55 per cent (Quartey 2013). By 1989 prices paid to cocoa farmers had increased 14-
fold. Meanwhile, Cocobod staff was halved by 1986—nearly 25,000 employees were Ghost 
workers (Williams 2009)—and further reduced to one-tenth of the staff number of the 
early 1980s by mid-1990s (Akiyama, et al. 2001). 
After reaching a low in mid-1980s, cocoa production increased again under Rawlings’ reign 
(Figure 7.2). The successful revival of the cocoa sector was the result of several policies, 
like the introduction of new high yielding cocoa hybrids, the provision of mass spraying of 
trees and the allocation of subsidised fertiliser. Those, together with increased producer 
prices, propelled farm yields and triggered an expansion of the cocoa belt towards the 
Western region (Teal, Zeitlin and Maanah 2006).  
In 1991 a new constitution was drawn, the ban on political parties lifted and in January 
1993 the first elected Parliament of the country’s Fourth Republic convened, with Rawlings 
becoming its first president by absolute majority (Gocking 2005, 217). The same year 
stepwise liberalisation of the cocoa sector was launched. In 1992/93 Cocobod partly 
liberalised domestic buying of beans and consequently ceded the PBC’s monopoly position 
and the PBC was privatised in 2000 by listing its shares on the Ghana stock exchange (Ul 
Haque 2004). Especially in the years after liberalisation, local haulage companies went into 
bean sourcing and registered as licenced buying companies (LBCs) with Cocobod (Vigneri 
and Santos 2008). 
As part of the cocoa sector reform in 2000/01, private companies were allowed to export 
up to 30 per cent of their cocoa purchases directly (Akiyama, et al. 2001, 63). However, this 
opportunity was never taken up and evidence suggests that this rout is still blocked 
successfully, although not openly, by Cocobod (Laven 2010, 85-7). Further, the 
government set the new goal for farmers’ income to 70 per cent of cocoa export earnings 
with the intention to link producer prices closer to the world price. Moreover, the trading 
system entertained by the Cocoa Marketing Company (CMC), a Cocobod subsidiary, was 
reformed. With the arrival of electronic trading platforms, real-time financial market data 
became easily available, which enabled the implementation of a forward selling system.  
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Increasing producer prices, price stability and state provision of extension services resulted 
in a steady increase in cocoa production. The trend was further supported by the rising 
competition among LBCs. While those did not compete on prices, they competed over 
volume through service provision to farmers (Vigneri and Santos 2008; Fold 2008), as well 
as prompt payment and credit supply (Anang 2011). Zeitling (2006) presents statistical 
evidence that increased competition among LBCs is associated with output growth. With 
the new millennium, trees planted on virgin forest land in the Western region in the early 
1990s matured, while trees at older plantations were providing higher yields due to 
improved input provision (Figure 7.2).  
Although partial liberalisation promoted productivity, it has also eroded Ghana’s quality 
premium. Since LBCs were motivated to deliver cocoa as quickly as possible in order to 
turn over their loans, beans were often not properly dried and fermented before export 
(Gilbert 1997). However, in contrast to fully liberalised West African neighbours, a 
premium at the world market could be maintained through the strict supervision of 
Cocobod’s Quality Control Division (QCD)—although at a lower level than before (Fold 
and Ponte 2008). Aside from liberalisation, another force played into the erosion of the 
premium, which was the decreasing demand for quality from grinders due to technological 
advances in the processing of cocoa beans (Gilbert 2009).    
The restructuring of the Ghanaian and West African cocoa sector coincided with and in 
many ways facilitated a restructuring of the global cocoa–chocolate industry (Fold 2001). 
During the 1970s to 1990s the industry experienced both increasing vertical integration and 
horizontal concentration in the trading, grinding, and chocolate manufacturing segment. 
Fold (2001) counts more than 200 take-overs among chocolate producers during this time 
period. The restructuring of the industry precipitated new power relationships and led to 
Fold’s (2002) bi-polar description.  
Saturated markets and demographic and social changes in chocolate consuming countries 
brought about by an aging population, fragmentation of tradition households and cultural 
diversity, demanded product innovation and differentiation, which led to an increasing 
focus on branding and marketing by chocolate producers (Fold 2001). Today product 
differentiation is not only driven by competition among snack food providers, but also 
from consumers’ growing concern over health and social and ethical aspects of the product 
and production processes. These developments, in several ways, motivated chocolate 
producers to outsource bean processing. 
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Cocoa bean processing is associated with dirt and dust from roasting, husking, and grinding 
beans. Shifting such activities away from chocolate production sides made it easier to obey 
to stricter sanitation standards. Advancements in process technology further enabled 
codification of the grinding process even up to the production of chocolate itself (Gilbert 
1997). Another factor that played into outsourcing of cocoa processing is the increasing 
attention towards a firm’s financial performance. In particular in the US, a saturated market 
confined the growth of chocolate manufacturing companies to mergers and acquisitions. 
Branders were hence motivated to deliver higher returns on capital employment in order to 
increase shareholder value (Gibbon 2002). As a result, bean sourcing and inventory 
management, which requires high working capital, was outsourced.  
Technological advancements also brought about changes in the trading segment. In search 
for diversification of their product line, players who originally established themselves as 
grain trader, entered into cocoa. Those players introduced bulk shipment and flat storage90, 
which became relevant for cocoa in the late 1990s and eased transportation and storage 
costs (UNCTAD 2008; Fold 2001). This method is intrinsically linked to economics of 
scale. Scale economies arising in transport and storage caused smaller traders to struggle, 
which resulted in a consolidation of the trading sector (Gilbert 1997). Further, increasing 
competition reduced trading margins and forced many to attempt unhedged positions in 
order to increase profitability (International Trade Centre (ITC) 2001, 83). Especially 
smaller traders which were less well-capitalised than their larger counterparts faced 
bankruptcy.  
Under the dominance of few large trading houses, a transition of commodity trading into 
distributive and added-service trading emerged (ITC 2001, 84). Such development 
foremost started in the US with just-in-time delivery under the turn-key system (Sturgeon 
2002, Fold 2001). Just-in-time delivery requires large working capital since the time period 
between buying and selling could be months instead of days as in the previous system. 
Simultaneously, changing banking regulations enabled trader to source working capital 
through futures brokers (ITC 2001, 84). The relationship between banks and commodity 
traders grew closer and today large trading houses have in-house brokers offering hedging 
services to smaller market actors, as well as clients in the chocolate manufacturing and 
grinding business.   
In a similar manner as for the trading segment, the financial marker played a pivotal role in 
the consolidation of the grinding segment. Cocoa prices have always been highly volatile 
                                                 
90 Storage technique where beans are piled up as opposed to beans being stored in jute sacks.  
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and risk management tools like financial derivatives provided a competitive edge to those 
able to use them. These were usually large grinders, due to the costs associated with 
hedging. With their own trading desks in place, these companies were able to manage their 
risk better than smaller companies, and to make significant revenues on non-hedging 
activities, as well as offer those products to their clients against a service charge (Murphy, 
Burch und Clapp 2012). The position of the grinding segment was further strengthened 
with the growing tendency of chocolate manufacturers to outsource processing. Branders 
became increasingly dependent on the skills of their processing companies which provided 
tailor-made intermediate products.  
The trading segment became more concentrated and diversified into various service 
segments including just-in-time delivery, risk management, and ultimately also grinding and 
processing. Decreasing profit margins from traditional commodity trade paired with the 
strengthening of the grinding segment led to an increasing integration of trading and 
processing firms. With the distinction between trading and processing segments blurring, 
Fold (2002) introduced the notion of ‘first-tier suppliers’ for both segments. While the 
trading segment integrated into the grinding segment, traders and grinders alike vertically 
integrated upstream, sourcing their cocoa via subsidiary companies in producing countries.  
The dismantling of trading boards in producing countries and liberalisation of the cocoa 
sector enabled downward penetration of the local cocoa buying sector. One motive for 
vertical integration by first-tier suppliers was increasing risk of non-performance and 
uncompensated losses as well as uncertainty over the quality of the crop after former 
quality control systems and trading boards were dismantled. A related reason was 
increasing demand for speciality beans, following the rise of social and environmental 
standards. Vertical integration enables traders and grinders to secure sufficient supply and 
to monitor compliance with standards in order to fulfil customers’ demands (Fold 2001; 
Laven 2010, 57). Last but not least, the acquisition of information is an essential motive for 
vertical integration. Private knowledge about crop outlook is an important advantage in 
negotiations over trading contracts and further enables grinders and traders not only to 
manage their risk more efficiently but also to benefit from speculative positions in the 
financial exchange (Van Dijk, Berntsen and Berget 2011).  
However, vertical integration played out differently in West African cocoa producing 
countries. Although Ghana opened its internal buying segment to private domestic and 
foreign companies, only few multinational companies entered the sector. In contrast, in 
fully liberalised neighbouring countries the sector was almost completely penetrated by 
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multinational buyers, which ousted domestic companies over credit and cash advantages. 
Figure 7.3 shows the market share of different cocoa sourcing companies in Ghana, Ivory 
Coast, Nigeria and Cameroon. Domestic-owned companies are in stripes. 81 per cent of 
Ghanaian cocoa beans were sourced by domestic companies, while 90 per cent of all 
Ivorian beans were sources by foreign firms in the 2010/11 crop year. 
Figure 7.3: Share in Total Volume of Purchases by Company  
(as of 2011/12 crop year)  
Ghana Ivory Coast 
  
Nigeria Cameroon 
  
Source: George (2012). 
It has to be noted that for Ghana the share by local companies is overestimated as some of 
the major buying companies are joint ventures between local and foreign firms. Among 
those are Akuafo Adamafo, which belongs to the Finatrade Group and is partly Lebanese 
(Sucatrade) owned and Kuapa Kokoo. The latter is a fair trade farmer’s cooperation and 
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gets support from the Fair Trade organisation and other stakeholders91 (George 2012). 
Further, large local buying companies partner with multinational exporters for certification. 
What emerged from this period of horizontal consolidation and vertical integration is a 
complex system of few large first-tier suppliers, which expand into sourcing, certification, 
warehousing, risk management, and even chocolate production. These compete over 
power with multinational branders, that is, large food producers offering a wide variety of 
brand names and chocolate and cocoa-containing confectionary goods (Fold 2002). This 
brought about ‘co-existing collaboration and intensified rivalry’ between large grinders and 
branders within the cocoa chains. Another dominant player emerged which are retailers 
with their own standards and requirements (Fold and Larsen 2011).     
Given the sensitivity of chocolate consumption to business cycles, the recent economic 
depression in Europe and the US has put considerable pressure on the industry and 
contributed to further consolidation through mergers and acquisitions. Today chocolate 
markets are dominated by five companies, which are Kraft (Mondelez), Mars, Nestlé, 
Ferrero and Hershey. Kraft increased its share with the acquisition of Cadbury in 2009. 
The grinding segment is even more concentrated. Until 2010 five companies were 
producing more than half of the semi-finished cocoa products globally. These were Cargill, 
Archer Daniel Midland (ADM), Barry Callebaut, Petra Food and Blommer (Figure 7.4).  
Figure 7.4: Grinders’ and Chocolate Manufacturers’ Market Share  
(as of 2010) 
Grinders’ percentage Share in Global Semi-finished 
Cocoa Products 
Chocolate Manufacturers’ Percentage Share in 
Global Confectionary Market 
  
Source: TCC (2010). 
 
                                                 
91 Kuapa Kokoo is the only Fair Trade certified co-operative in Ghana. In 1997 the cooperative set up a 
chocolate company (today Divine Chocolate) in the UK. In partnership with Twin Trading and with support 
by Body Shop, Christian Aid and Comic relief, the company was formed with Kuapa Kokoo owning a third 
of its shares.  
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Barry Callebaut acquired Pertra Food in 2012 and Cargill bought ADM’s processing and 
chocolate business in 2013 (Reuters 2013). This leaves almost half of the global grinding 
business in the hands of two companies. The trading house Olam entered the grinding 
segment through the acquisition of ADM’s cocoa processing arm in 2014 (Reuters 2014). 
In the same year, another major trading house, Armajaro, sold its cocoa sourcing unit to 
the soft commodity trader Ecom in order to focus on its commodity hedge funds 
(Agrimoney 2014). Olam too stepped up its financial market presence and was fined $3 
million USD for exceeding position limits at six occasions between 2011 and 2013 
(Financial Times 2015). 
Due to innovations in bean processing, most multinational grinding companies depend less 
on quality and origin parameters of the beans than a couple of years ago and processing 
became standardised and codifiable. These technological advances paired with the 
increasing focus of first-tier suppliers on added services and their financial businesses, 
promoted origin processing. While origin processing still faces the disadvantage of not 
being able to blend cocoa from different origin, these aspects became less important and 
the bean processing into cocoa nibs, liquor, powder and butter is now economically viable 
not least due to the substantial tax exemption offered by respective governments. 
Table 7.1: Cocoa Bean Production and Grinding per Country and Region 
(2000 compared to 2013) 
 
 
Cocoa Bean 
Production 
(in thousand tonnes) 
Grinding of Cocoa 
Beans 
(in thousand tonnes) 
Percentage Share 
World Production 
Percentage Share 
World Grinding 
Percentage Share 
National Grinding in 
National Production 
 2000 2013 2000 2013 2000 2013 2000 2013 2000 2013 
Cameroon 115.00 225.00 31.80 30.00 3.74 5.74 1.07 0.74 27.65 13.33 
Ivory Coast 1,403.6 1,445.0 235.00 460.00 45.62 34.18 7.94 11.35 16.74 31.83 
Ghana 436.90 835.40 70.00 225.10 14.20 17.39 2.37 5.56 16.02 26.95 
Nigeria 165.00 225.00 22.00 28.00 5.36 6.47 0.74 0.69 13.33 12.44 
Europe   1,335.3 1,574.5   45.14 38.86   
USA   447.60 411.80   15.13 10.16   
Africa 2,155.6 2,813.2 367.50 754.60 70.06 68.40 12.42 18.62 17.05 26.82 
Americas*  388.90 617.60 404.00 466.00 12.64 14.18 13.66 11.50 103.88 75.45 
Asia & 
Oceania 
532.50 500.10 404.10 845.10 17.31 17.42 13.66 20.86 75.89 168.99 
World 3,077.0 3,931.0 2,958.4 4,052.0       
Note: *without US, Figures for 2012/13 are ICCO estimates. Source: ICCO, Quarterly 
Bulletin of Cocoa Statistics, various volumes.  
From 2000 to 2013 Ivory Coast and Ghana could increase their share in world grinding 
from 7.9 and 2.4 per cent to 11.4 and 5.6 per cent respectively. This amounts to 31.8 and 
27.0 per cent of domestic production respectively (Table 7.1). Ghana could more than 
triple its grinding capacity over the same time period. Whether this development will move 
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West African countries into higher value added and chocolate production viable for the 
global market is, however, questionable [G8].    
7.3 Structure of the Ghanaian Cocoa Sector 
Between October and December 2013 semi-structured interviews at different stakeholder 
levels were conducted in Akra, Tema, Takoradi, Kumasi and cocoa sites around Kumasi. 
Figure 7.5 depicts the locations of the interview sites and the respective cocoa regions in 
Ghana. Appendix 7.2 provides a list of all targeted interview partners and those reached. 
Given the time constraint, only 34 in-depth interviews could be conducted. The interviews 
were focused on four different subjects: price formation, risk management, the role of 
financial markets and regional and global chain structure. These together reveal the 
institutional structure of the chain, mode and matter of transactions within the chain, and 
existing working rules. Interview questions are provided in Appendix 7.6. All interviews 
were recorded and transcribed with permission of the interviewee. If not agreed to the 
recording, hand written notes were taken. Further, each interview partner was asked about 
the level of anonymity he or she would prefer and an agreement was signed before each 
interview; a copy of which can be found in Appendix 7.3.  
Figure 7.5: Map of Ghana’s Main Cocoa Growing Areas and Interview Sites 
 
Notes: Cocoa output figures as of 2009/10 crop year. Source: Cocoa output figures were 
kindly provided by Cocobod Statistical Division, author. 
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Due to time constraints, only chief farmers, but no other cocoa farmers, were interviewed. 
Other stakeholders include local processing companies, LBCs, hauliers, warehousing 
services, extension services, certification officers, and government officials inside and 
outside Cocobod, which include the finance ministry, port officials, quality control division, 
statistical division, shipping office and several traders working for CMC. Further, at the 
international level interviews with chocolate manufacturers, processors and traders in the 
UK, the US and Germany were conducted in the months prior to the fieldwork in Ghana. 
Interviews with companies in Germany and the US were conducted over the phone. 
Private companies were approached via email (see Appendix 7.5) or called on telephone 
numbers found through internet research. Ghanaian government organisations were 
reached through a letter of introduction addressed to the Chief Executive of Ghana Cocoa 
Board (see Appendix 7.4). Further interviews were facilitated via contact established during 
the stay in Ghana and through interviews with European and US companies prior to the 
visit to Ghana, as well as personal relationships.  
The analysis is divided into three different parts. Firstly, the international level is analysed, 
including chocolate manufacturers, processors and traders outside of Ghana, but engaging 
with Ghana for sourcing beans (global marketing). Secondly, Cocobod with its divisions and 
subsidiaries is analysed with a particular focus on CMC, which acts as the trading arm of 
Cocobod (external marketing). Other divisions and subsidies of Cocobod are the Cocoa 
Research Institute of Ghana (CRIG), the Cocoa Swollen Shoot and Virus Disease Control 
Unit (CSSVSC), and the Quality Control Division (QCD). Thirdly, other stakeholders in 
Ghana including hauliers, LBCs, purchasing clerks, and farmers are analysed (internal 
marketing). Here the PPRC—a government associated body—takes a prominent role. The 
interrelationships of all three parts of the analysis are depicted in Figure 7.6.  
Red boxes indicate multinational buyers and processors. Orange boxes indicate local 
stakeholders, which might or might not be associated with multinational buyers and 
processors through vertical integration, joint ventures, project funding, finances and other 
partnerships. Boxes in blue indicate government bodies, which are divisions and 
subsidiaries of Cocobod. Five different arrows indicate flow of beans, information, external 
finances, internal finances and finances between independent but associated entities. 
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Figure 7.6: Ghana’s Cocoa Chain Structure 
 
Note: Red indicates multinational buyers and processors, orange indicates local 
stakeholders and blue indicates government bodies. Source: Author. 
The internal chain structure is further subdivided into different levels, which resemble the 
journey of the cocoa bean from farm to port. Cocoa beans are harvested, dried and 
fermented at farm level, usually in the cocoa villages, which make the centre of a number 
of cocoa plantations located in the adjunct bush. The organisation of farmers in co-
operatives is rare in Ghana and the overwhelming share of cocoa is recovered by 
purchasing clerks, who are hired by a particular LBC. Purchasing clerks are members of the 
cocoa society they are buying from and manage a warehouse in the cocoa village, where the 
beans are dried, checked for quality92, weighted and packed (Figure 7.7). Quality checks at 
this level are mostly concerned with the extent of foreign material and sufficient dryness of 
the beans. The purchasing clerk then brings the cocoa to the respective LBC’s shed at the 
district level. 
 
 
                                                 
92 Although Cocobod refrains from quality control at the society level, purchasing clerks have their own 
mechanisms in place as they are incentivised to deliver sufficiently dried and fermented cocoa to the district 
warehouses [G2]. 
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Figure 7.7: Beans and Scale in a Shed in a Cocoa Village near Kumasi  
      
Note: The cocoa is dried until the shells are crumbly and break easily if squeezing them. In 
the process the bean colour darkens. When it rains beans are covered with corrugated 
sheets or foil. Jute sacks are provided by Cocobod and allocated to purchasing clerks via 
LBCs. Only jute sacks from Cocobod with the print as shown in the picture are accepted 
by CMC. Source: Pictures taken during a cocoa village visit near Kumasi November, 13th 
2013. 
Logistically the country is divided into several cocoa districts, which again are constituted 
by a number of cocoa communities. Cocobod counts 69 cocoa districts [G2]. LBCs split 
these districts into smaller operational units and the number of LBC districts varies 
between 80 and 100 [L1-4]. A district might again consist of 30 to 60 farming communities 
[G2]. LBCs have representatives at the district level (regional depots), which are in charge 
of appointing their purchasing clerks. There the cocoa is checked for its quality by QCD, 
reweighted, and sealed for export [G2]. If the cocoa does not meet the required standards, 
it has to be either redried or is confiscated by QCD without compensation.  
Hauliers are hired by LBCs for transportation of the cocoa from the district to one of the 
three ‘ports’ which are Tema, Takoradi and Kumasi. The latter one is an inland port, 
usually receiving the beans for local processing (smaller beans), while the former two are 
sea ports and beans are usually for export. At the ports the cocoa enters the takeover 
points, which are CMC owned or rented warehouses from where the cocoa has to be taken 
up either by the international buyers or local processors. Before the cocoa enters the 
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warehouse it is checked for quality one more time (Figure 7.8). The cocoa samples taken 
are kept and stored by QCD for insurance reasons in case arbitration is necessary. 
Figure 7.8: Cocoa Bean Sacks to be Offloaded Into a Bulk Warehouse at Takoradi Port 
      
Note: The holes in the cocoa sacks are from “horning”, which refers to a method by QCD 
through which a cocoa sample is taken. A “horn mask” is pushed through the jute sack 
without damaging it. Source: Pictures taken during Takoradi Port visit November, 12th 
2013. 
LBCs work as agents for CMC and LBCs are obliged to deliver their cocoa to the ports 
according to a schedule published by Cocobod prior to the start of the season [G2, H1]. 
Since liberalisation of the internal trading segment, the number of LBCs steadily increased 
from 4 in 1992/93 to 29 registered and active LBCs in 2012/1393. The minimum 
requirement for an LBC to get registered with Cocobod is a buying capacity of 2,000 
tonnes of cocoa. This, at the time of the fieldwork, amounted to cocoa worth $3 million 
USD. These requirements pose barriers to entry. The former state owned PBC still holds 
the majority share in sourced cocoa volume and acts as the buyer of last resort for more 
remote cocoa farms, foremost in the Volta region.  
Ghanaian beans, in contrast to beans from Ivory Coast, are still shipped mainly in jute 
sacks. Only one international company facilitates bulk shipment at Takoradi Port [J3]. The 
reason for the low demand for bulk shipment is that Ghanaian cocoa still fetches a 
premium at the global market and buyers are careful not to mix Ghanaian beans with cocoa 
                                                 
93 According to data kindly provided by Cocobod Statistical Division. 
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from other origins. Further, as grinders might only buy a few tonnes of Ghanaian cocoa for 
flavouring, the volume is often too small for bulk shipment. 
The great majority of cocoa exports arrive in Europe and the US. Those regions accounted 
for 65 per cent of Ghanaian cocoa exported in 2013. Two new trading partners under the 
top ten importers recently emerged which are Malaysia and China. Malaysia has an excess 
capacity for grinding cocoa94 while China made a deal with Ghana over 40,000 tonnes of 
cocoa to be delivered annually from 2005 onwards in return for funding for the Bui hydro 
power plant on the border between the Northern and the Brong Ahafo Region [J2]. The 
greatest importer is the Netherlands with Amsterdam harbour processing most cocoa 
beans globally, replacing the UK as the dominant destination since 2004 (Figure 7.9).   
Figure 7.9: Export Destinations of Raw Ghanaian Beans 
(annually, in percentage shares, 1996-2013) 
 
Source: UN Comtrade (author’s calculation) 
All cocoa has to go through CMC, which acts as the sole seller of Ghanaian cocoa to 
international byers via forward contracts. Smaller beans (referred to as mid-crop95) are sold 
at an up to 20 per cent discount to the local processing sector [G2]. After selling 60 per 
cent of the projected harvest forward, CMC extends cocoa funds to LBCs below market 
rate. The funds are allocated by the respective LBC to the different district officers, who 
then give their purchasing clerks cash advances to buy the cocoa for them. Purchasing 
clerks are further equipped with weights, cocoa sheds, tarpaulin, and jute sacks by the LBC. 
After delivery, cash advances are renewed, commission is paid, and the purchasing clerk 
returns to the society for further purchases. When the LBC delivers the cocoa to one of the 
                                                 
94 Malaysia holds the largest cocoa processing industry in Asia, which processes eight times its domestic 
production. 
95 The division follows the bean size and not the harvest period, although these correlate since mid-crop 
beans are usually smaller. 
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ports, it is compensated by CMC and loans are turned over. LBCs as well as hauliers 
receive a set margin for their services to CMC [H1, G2]. 
Extension services and input supplies are provided by government schemes and 
increasingly also through non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and private companies 
[I2]. While the provision of governmental services varies with election seasons, available 
budget of Cocobod, and changing interests of government stakeholders, NGOs partner 
with foreign buyers for funding. In return those NGOs assist in the execution and 
supervision of standards set by international buyers. The close work with farmers does 
further allow a better information flow towards LBCs and associated multinational buyers 
regarding the forthcoming harvest and potential bottlenecks.   
7.4 Price Formation and Risk Allocation 
Following the structure of the cocoa chain, the analysis of price formation and risk 
allocation is divided into three segments: global marketing, external marketing, and internal 
marketing. In each section the particular institutional structure with existing working rules, 
mode of transfer and matter of transfer is revealed and implications for price formation, as 
well as risk allocation identified.  
7.4.1 Global Marketing: Traders, Grinders and Manufacturers 
Most first-tier suppliers96 and chocolate manufacturers are in a bargaining transaction. 
However, existing working rules limit the negotiation process in several ways. Moreover, 
working rules differ with the matter of transfer. The matter can be raw cocoa beans as well 
as intermediate products like cake, powder, butter and liquor. The physical transformation 
process of cocoa beans is described in Figure 7.10. 
While the price for cocoa liquor is directly based on the bean price, cocoa powder and 
butter are traded independently. The trade with intermediate cocoa products is a relatively 
recent phenomenon and contracts are not as standardised as for cocoa beans (Dand 1995, 
103). For raw cocoa beans, existing working rules, in the form of standardised contracts, do 
not permit much freedom in negotiating prices. With few exceptions in the speciality cocoa 
segment, the bean price is contractually linked to the futures price.  
 
 
                                                 
96 Since the different segments at the international buyer level became increasingly intertwined, traders and 
grinders will be jointly referred to as ‘first-tier suppliers’ where reference is made to both. 
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Figure 7.10: Cocoa Bean Content in Intermediate Products 
  
Note: The circled numbers denote the physical relationship in terms of tonnage. Source: 
Graphic kindly provided in interview [D1]. 
Companies are part of trading associations, which offer standardised forward contracts and 
arbitration services. Cocoa trade, involving Ghanaian beans, is usually based on contracts 
drafted by the Federation of Cocoa Commerce (FCC)97. Two basic contract forms can be 
distinguished: (1) fixed price contracts, in which the price is fixed to the price of the futures 
contract close to maturity plus a premium, and (2) differential contracts, in which the price 
floats with the price of the futures contract plus a premium. Under the former contract 
type, the price risk is with the seller. Since the exchange only trades the ‘generic cocoa 
bean’ the difference of the traded bean to the generic bean has to be negotiated, which is 
the premium98 [D1]. Further, details about bean quality are included in the contracts, and 
delivery point, transportation, and insurance are negotiated [A1, D2]. Regardless of the 
precise contract specification, the price is linked to the futures market [A1]. On the 
example of a large chocolate manufacturer buying cocoa via a differential contract the close 
relationship becomes apparent: 
“The futures and the physical market are the same. Let’s say we are a chocolate company. When 
we are starting to buy beans, we purchase a 3-month forward future and at the same time go to a 
dealer and order 100 tonnes of cocoa beans for 60 over terminal. We have to close the futures at 
some point. So we exchange the futures contract with the dealer for the physical cocoa. The dealer 
                                                 
97 FCC emerged out of the merger of CAL and AFCC in 2002 
98 Premium, differential and market basis are interchangeable.  
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can then decide if he actually wants to take delivery through the futures or close out the position 
before expiration”. [D1] 
Some buyers might opt for a variation of the differential contract, where the timing of the 
price fix is determined by the buyer (or the seller, depending on the contractual 
arrangement) after the contract has been signed:  
“It is all tied to the futures price. So 99 per cent of the sales we make are done on the basis of a 
price that is fixed at a later day. […] If I am selling a year forward […], I will always talk in 
terms of what premium to London the cocoa is. So we might say, I offer you 1,000 tonnes of Ivory 
cocoa for October-November shipment at £30 over December London. This means the premium is 
£30 [over the Liffe contract price maturing in December]”. [D3] 
The price formation process embedded in each transaction is hence determined by the 
existing working rules formalised by FCC. Working rules link the price of the physical bean 
to the price at the futures exchange—the London LIFFE99 exchange for West African 
beans. However, some agents with sufficient economic power can bend existing working 
rules. For example, Nestle occasionally issues a tender and invites offers for a certain 
quantity of cocoa for a certain delivery time at a certain destination, which means they 
operate a Dutch auction [B1]. Nevertheless, such an auction is the exception and most 
transactions are negotiated based on standardised forward contracts.  
Since the price level is set by the exchange, only the premium is left for negotiations. Those 
negotiations are strictly private and terms are undisclosed.  
“The differential is separate and non-public. It is very subjective, based on negotiation. Butter and 
powder markets are even less transparent”. [D1] 
The outcome of negotiations is determined by information asymmetries, as well as other 
sources of economic power. In order to gauge the appropriate premium both parties take 
factors like historical market basis, freight costs, interest, crop forecasts, competition for 
the upcoming crop, and alternative suppliers into consideration. After assessing these 
factors, both parties enter into negotiations [D3].  
In contrast to raw cocoa beans, the prices for butter and powder are fully negotiated if not 
acquired through intra-firm trade. The negotiation process is as opaque as for the premium 
of the raw beans [D2]. Butter and powder prices are noted as ratios to the bean price. 
                                                 
99 In the previous analysis US based ICE cocoa futures were analysed. Although LIFFE would have been the 
better choice, only US based futures exchanges provide trader-position data.  
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These do not necessarily reflect the cocoa bean content and powder and butter prices even 
move in opposite directions as grinders try to offset their prices when either butter or 
powder prices are low. The fact that prices are off-setting is clear evidence for the 
bargaining power of grinders (Figure 7.11). 
Figure 7.11: Cocoa Powder and Butter Ratios at US Markets 
(Oct. 2000–Oct. 2014) 
 
Source: INTL FC Stone, Cocoa Monthly Report, November 2014. 
Butter is an essential ingredient in chocolate, while powder is used for drinking chocolate, 
cookies and other confectionary products. Hence, butter is usually the dominant value 
factor. However, in the aftermath of the financial crisis in 2008 the situation changed. 
Confectionary producers expanded into emerging markets as a coping strategy during the 
recession [D1]. The choice of cookies over chocolate products was mainly driven by 
climate considerations, since regular chocolate melts in hot climates. In addition, the buying 
habits in conventional markets changed in favour of cookies and other bakery products 
since those are cheaper than chocolate [D1]. As a result, the powder ratio increased with a 
decrease in the butter ratio. A similar development is observable during the previous 
recession following the dot-com bubble crash in 2000.  
Prices for intermediate cocoa products are not always negotiated. Especially in the case of 
origin grinding, intra-firm trade is common, where parent companies calculate the price for 
intermediate products regarding the bean content and the processing costs. Companies 
receive the order of how much cocoa they have to process into which intermediate product 
for export. Transactions are hence managerial. The beans used for origin processing are 
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brought by the parent company in negotiations with CMC [C3]. In the 2012/13 crop year 
68 per cent of Ghana’s processed cocoa was transferred via intra-firm trade (Table 7.2).      
Table 7.2: Local Processing Companies in Ghana 
Companies Location 
Date of 
Establis
hment  
Installed 
Capacity2 
as of 
March 2011 
Realised2 
Processing 
(2012/13) 
Products Ownership 
CPC LTD Tema 1965 64,500 21,000 
butter, liquor, cake, 
powder, chocolate 
Former state owned, 
Ghanaian 
WAMCO LTD Takoradi 1947 47,000 - butter, liquor, cake 
Joint venture Ghanaian 
& German company 
BARRY LTD Tema 2000 67,000 63,000 liquor only Foreign 
AFROTROPIC Accra 2007 15,000 - liquor only Ghanaian 
NICHE COCOA* Tema 2007 18,000 26,000 liquor only Ghanaian 
CARGILL Tema 2008 65,000 57,000 butter, cake, powder Foreign 
ADM LTD Kumasi 2008 42,000 31,000 liquor only Foreign 
PLOT Takoradi 2009 32,000 25,000 butter, liquor, cake Ghanaian 
B.D ASSOC.1 Tema  ?  liquor only Ghanaian 
REAL PRODUCTS1 Takoradi  11,200  liquor only 
Joint venture Ghanaian 
& Ecuadorian company 
Ghanaian   129,500 72,000  34% - capacity 32% - realisation 
Joint ventures   58.200 - 16% - capacity 0% - realisation 
Foreign   174,000 151,000 48% - capacity 68% - realisation 
Note: * Before called COMMODITIES LTD, 1 installation of machines in progress, 2 in 
tonnes. Source: Data kindly provided during interview [G8]. 
As outlined in Chapter 6, transactions embed risks. Chocolate manufacturers commonly 
outsource in parts or fully their price risk to their first-tier suppliers. For instance, basis risk 
is transferred to first-tier suppliers while the remaining price variability can either be 
hedged via the exchange by the manufacturer himself (differential contracts) or the first-tier 
supplier offers to take over the hedging (fixed price contracts) as well as exchange rate risk. 
Hence, the allocation of risk exposure is written into the contracts by determining the 
mode of transfer. First-tier suppliers demand a negotiated premium for their risk 
management services to the manufacturers. 
“The only way to insure against the basis risk is forward contracts. The risk is then by the trader. 
However, the trader demands a premium for managing such risk, which makes the purchase of the 
beans more expensive. In return the supply is guaranteed and price risk is managed”. [A1] 
Chocolate manufacturers usually purchase beans from first-tier suppliers 12 to 18 months 
forward. Through the forward buy, the firm can decide early on whether and when to 
hedge. Especially larger manufacturers hedge strategically and lock in prices “at the most 
preferable point in time” and not mechanically at the point when the forward agreement is 
made. Contracts used for such arrangements are differential contracts. The price is floating 
with the price of a particular futures contract until the hedge is placed [A1].  
Especially smaller chocolate manufacturers often lack the capacity to hedge via the 
exchange, and first-tier suppliers offer tailor made long-term risk management 
arrangements—contracts can span over 4 to 5 years [D1]. For instance, a small 
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manufacturer buying curvature, which is chocolate with high cocoa butter content, enters 
into an arrangement with the supplier to fix the price for curvature. The price fixing is 
done in accordance to the particular formula of the required curvature.  
“I can decide how to fix every price that is in that [curvature] formula. So I can say, let’s fix the 
butter price today for the next six months of curvature. And for all the butter that goes into my 
curvature the price is fixed; or let’s fix the sugar price, or the liquor price, or the cocoa bean price. 
And I can choose at any day which prices in my curvature I want to fix from then onwards and 
for how many weeks.” “Behind the scenes [the large processor] is taking care of all the futures and 
handling all that in a way so that they can make money. They ask for a margin for their services 
and make some additional money”. [D2]  
Traders, on the other end of the contract, net their price risk exposure internally and use 
derivative instruments, foremost futures and options, to hedge the residual risk [B1]. The 
task is complicated by the seasonality of the crop. While cocoa is seasonal on the supply 
side, it is less so from the consumption side. Although, there are certain peak times during 
Christmas and Easter, chocolate is consumed throughout the year. Due to seasonality 
factors, suppliers also manage quantity risk for their clients by agreeing to just-in-time 
delivery or similar arrangements.  
“Our customers may ask us […] to deliver the cocoa to a port, it may be FOB it may be CIF, 
they may want us to deliver it just in time and they require us to hold the beans in their warehouse 
and we negotiate a minimum quantity and, perhaps, a maximum quantity that we hold”. [B1] 
Similar to price risk, quantity risk is relatively easily manageable via the financial exchange 
and hence of only minor concern100 for the first-tier suppliers. Of greater concern is basis 
risk, which ultimately remains with the first-tier supplier.  
“The price risk is easy. That is just a matter of buying and selling futures against your cash 
positions. What isn’t so easy is the basis risk; that you cannot hedge.” “We have to buy and store 
cocoa because the crop comes out the three months before March but we are selling the entire year. 
So we don’t have the luxury of buying just in time to get it to our customers. We have to buy when 
the crop is flowing and not when the customer wants to buy.” “We are the ones who manage the 
most of the risk. This is actually why we exist. This is our business”. [D3] 
                                                 
100 Short term quantity risk can be hedged via option trading. 
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Since the cocoa at the exchange is the residual cocoa, the exchange is usually not used by 
chocolate producers or processors for sourcing their cocoa. However, for large trading 
houses the cocoa at the exchange has value when arbitrage can be made [B1].  
“Occasionally we use the futures market actively.” “So the futures market becomes a supplier to us 
or a customer to us”. [B1] 
For strategic hedging, basis risk management and arbitrage trading, information about 
cocoa supply and demand is essential. Through forward sales, high concentration of the 
first-tier supplier segment, and availability of grinding statistics101 first-tier suppliers can 
make an informed prediction about future demand. Future supply, in contrast, is not as 
easily predictable. Especially for the management of basis risk, knowledge about country-
specific supply conditions is, however, essential [D3]. In this context, vertical integration 
into bean sourcing is a strategy used by first-tier suppliers to gain access to information.  
“If you only do external trading you do not know what is happening in the country. But if you 
have your sourcing operation also, you are closer to the farmer, to the producer and you are able to 
have some influence on the trade you are doing eventually. You have a better idea on how the crop 
will look like and how is the weather impact. This is important in order to make better informed 
decisions. One thing is as a trader you would read through say what Reuters would report, here you 
will have your own information sources to tell you this is what the competition is doing this is what 
is happening; so you have a better feel”. [L4] 
Additional information is obtained via external services which might include brokers at 
financial markets, who are not only used for hedging but also information provision [D3]. 
Big trading companies even build their own weather stations [I1] and engage in pod 
counting102 activities [B2] in order to forecast more accurately.  
The only risk that is not yet frequently outsourced by manufacturers to first-tier suppliers is 
quality risk. Technology advances have, to some extent, mitigated such risk. However, 
luxury chocolate still requires high quality beans in order to achieve unique flavouring. 
Chocolate producers, who engage in luxury chocolate production, integrate vertically into 
sourcing in particular regions [A1]. Those engagements are usually confined to South 
America, where the cocoa is of particularly high quality. Another recently developed 
mechanism to mitigate quality risk used by chocolate manufacturers is the purchase of 
beans on ‘in-store-basis’, which means that if the quality of the beans delivered to the 
                                                 
101 Grinding is used as a proxy for consumption, since cocoa is ground for all intermediate products. 
102 Pod counting entails counting the number of pods on a cocoa tree at a randomly selected farm and 
attaching a probability to it for reaching maturity [G2]. 
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buyer’s warehouses is insufficient, the manufacturer can decide against the purchase at the 
expense of the supplier. First-tier suppliers demand a premium for this service [A1]. 
Risk management services offered by first-tier suppliers have become more sophisticated 
and tailored towards clients. Simultaneously, the financial side of the trading, crucial for 
quantity and price risk management, has grown over recent years. New actors, unfamiliar 
with the physical business, like banks, increasingly seek to enter into the commodity 
segment. Two traders reported that they frequently receive calls from banks offering them 
tailored risk management derivative packages [B1, D2]. It is, however, ironic and maybe 
proof of the little understanding of banks about the commodity sector that they approach 
traders, whose very existence is built on the risk management services they provide to their 
clients. While first-tier suppliers would not be potential customers, manufacturers appear to 
take into account these services lured by the complexity of the instruments offered to them 
[D2]. 
Further, hedge funds increasingly build up commodity-specific expertise [D3]. Some of 
these hedge funds are associated with a physical trader, as for instance Amajaro until 
recently. These funds employ traders who are experienced in the commodity business and 
bring along their own industry contacts.  
“Whether it is algorithmic system strategies or macro type guys or much more soft commodity-
specific funds, who come in and out of the market; it is a combination of all of them I must say.” 
“Some of the people that I used to work with in trade houses, ended up in hedge funds, operating 
with similar strategies that the ones we operating here in terms of the speculative activities we do”. 
[B1] 
The fact that hedge funds have substantial knowledge over the market, makes traders in the 
physical business suspicious of changes in positions they do not foresee. As suggested in 
Chapter 3, traders constantly watch position-taking by other traders and try to extract 
information content.  
“It is mainly couple of funds that have most of it. So do you know why they are in there, what are 
they doing, what is their reason for being in cocoa? Is it because they see profit in cocoa, is it 
because they don’t see profit in other market, do they have information we don’t have? This is 
another thing we look at and analyse all the time”. [D3] 
While most interviewees have stressed that the surge in speculative investment has 
provided liquidity and made it easier to find a counterparty for their hedge, they have also 
uttered concern over the impact of speculative traders and over those “absurding the 
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market” [D2]. Traders unanimously agree that speculators have a price impact, both 
positive and negative, given their size relative to the physical market [B1, D1-3]. However, 
opinions are divided regarding implications for smallholder producers. On the one hand, a 
price rise, driven by speculative investments, is perceived as positive for farmers. On the 
other hand, it is stressed that wrong incentives are set for farmers, which leaves them 
disadvantaged in the long-run.  
“If the price goes up quickly it does two things: firstly it takes cocoa away from the factories and 
secondly at the same time tells farmers to plant more cocoa. So it has positive and negative effects. It 
does affect the price of cocoa, depending on what they [speculators] do. If it goes up it is not 
necessarily a bad thing”. [D2] 
The high price level, attributed to the presence of speculators, certainly caused problems 
for the chocolate manufacturing sector at the time the fieldwork was conducted. Chocolate 
manufacturers delayed hedging their exposure. Manufacturers and processors time their 
hedges meticulously in order to lock in the most favourable price. However, this time the 
price did not decrease as expected, which left the industry with an unfavourable price 
cover.    
“Traditionally they [the industry] have long-term risk coverage, but right now they are not well 
covered. This is probably because the market went sideway since March/April. Now the price has 
broken out of this range as funds have taken it up. End-users who were waiting for the price to 
come back to lower level are now without coverage as the price is unlikely to return. So they are in 
trouble”. [D1]  
“In this way the industry might actually end up buying the counter position at such a high price 
and hence suffer. […] They are likely to then pass on the higher price to the consumer and blame 
the speculator for it”. [B1]  
While speculators are not responsible for the low price cover of the industry, they are likely 
to be responsible for the market not behaving in the way expected by the industry. The 
higher price paid by manufacturers is then passed on to consumer in the form of a decrease 
in cocoa content of confectionary products or a decrease in the size of the product [G3, 
B1]. 
With reference to the framework outlined in Chapter 6, the most common form of 
transactions between chocolate manufacturers and first-tier suppliers is a bargaining 
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transaction between legal equals103. Given the strong economic power of both segments, 
the negotiation psychology is one of persuasion. Further, the custom that manufacturers 
compensate first-tier suppliers for their risk management services by a premium, is 
evidence for the bargaining power of the first-tier supplier segment.  
Working rules do not permit negotiation over the cocoa bean price beyond the differential, 
which is driven by origin parameters. The FCC has legislative and judicial power (if its 
arbitration services are used) regarding the working rules for both price formation and 
quality standards. All industry players buying from Ghana are members of the FCC and 
working rules are constantly negotiated within the organisation. Interestingly, not only 
multinational companies acting as first-tier suppliers and chocolate manufacturers are FCC 
members, but also futures exchanges, hedge funds (e.g., Black River Asset Management104), 
futures brokers (e.g., BNP Commodity Futures) and other financial entities; some of which 
are even voting members (FCC 2014). This highlights the increasing legal power of the 
financial segment in commodity sectors.  
Manufacturers are dependent on the risk management services of the first-tier suppliers. 
Those have gained economic power through rents over asymmetric information and 
special skills acquired through their penetration of the souring segment. Another source of 
first-tier supplies’ economic power is scale economies, which have resulted in a 
concentration of the sector. Despite their economic power, suppliers are left with the basis 
risk, which cannot be hedged at the exchange. Superior information about origin 
parameters is essential for mitigating this risk factor. This information is not only used to 
manage risk but also to obtain additional revenue through arbitrage and speculation in the 
futures exchange.  
Since cocoa powder and butter lack futures markets, working rules regarding the price 
formation mechanisms are less formalised and mode and matter of the transaction are 
more open to negotiations. This causes certain problems to price risk management. Such 
risk is dealt with in different ways: (1) intra-firm trade, (2) intermediaries offer to hedge the 
bean content of the product in order to secure a stable price, and (3) grinders offset their 
price risk from processed cocoa by compensating lower powder prices with higher butter 
prices and vice versa.  
                                                 
103 In the case of intra-firm trade these can take on the form of managerial transactions, but those are rare and 
confined to the luxury chocolate segment. 
104 Which is a subsidiary of Cargill (Black River 2014). 
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Chocolate manufacturers’ economic power is linked to their market share, which can be 
considerable in the chocolate and confectionary industry. Economic power enables 
manufacturers to change the mode of transfer so that their price, quantity, and even quality 
risk is managed against a negotiated service charge. Large chocolate manufacturers are 
further able to bend existing working rules and thereby enable smaller suppliers to enter in 
strategic transactions. Smaller suppliers are purposefully used in order to mitigate the 
economic power of large grinders and trading houses (Fold 2001).  
7.4.2 External Marketing: The Cocoa Marketing Company 
Two organisations are crucial for the price formation process in the external and internal 
marketing of Ghanaian cocoa: CMC and PPRC. Any cocoa that is collected105 in Ghana has 
to be sold to CMC for resale to multinational buyers or domestic grinders. In advance of 
the main harvest period, which starts in September and lasts till March, CMC sells forward 
60 per cent of the forecasted cocoa harvest. The residual is sold to the spot market during 
the harvest period. If the world market price during harvest is higher than the price 
obtained during the forward selling period, the additional revenues earned are allocated ex-
post to the farmers. As in the global cocoa market, contracts are based on FCC standards 
and prices are determined by the futures market for the delivery months and a premium.  
On the basis of the forward sales, a projected gross FOB value is estimated as in Equation 
7.1. The projection serves as foundation for calculating the predicted annual cocoa income: 
m	 Ã¾$! Æ ∗ '-! ÒÓd¢¾$Õ ∗ H	~Öy×	! = Ó	~¬¬mÓd¢ (7.1) 
FOB is the projected average FOB price in USD per tonne, ExRate is the projected average 
exchange rate, and CropSize is the projected crop size (main and light crop). The product of 
the three is the gross FOB value. Average FOB and crop size are projected by the statistical 
division of Cocobod based on forward sales and pod counting. The Bank of Ghana is 
responsible for forecasting the exchange rate. Both Cocobod and the Bank of Ghana 
forecasts are usually conservative. Cocobod avoids making false promises, while the Bank 
of Ghana benefits from conservative forecasts since US dollars, which are borrowed by 
CMC against the collateral of their cocoa forward contracts, are transferred to them [G2]. 
In return, the Bank of Ghana provides Ghanaian Cedi to Cocobod which are used to 
extent credit to LBCs for cocoa recovery. The Ghana International Bank in London 
                                                 
105 Not necessary harvested, since smuggled beans from neighbouring Ivory Coast often make their way into 
Ghana. 
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handles most of the Cocobod funds. It receives US dollar as payment for the cocoa from 
buyers at the time the cocoa is shipped. From the US dollar account they pay back loans 
and interest to the international creditors and the residual is transferred back to Cocobod in 
Cedi.  
The forward sale provides Cocobod with several advantages over a spot sale system. 
Firstly, the season’s cocoa income is estimated in advance, which allows for the 
stabilisation of the farm-gate price (see Section 7.4.3). Secondly, forward contracts are used 
as collateral to gain access to more favourable loans at international credit markets. 
Previously, loans were received from the IMF or WB at a 20 to 30 per cent interest rate. 
Loans also came from the private sector conditional on repayment in raw materials, so that 
a considerable amount of the upcoming harvest was tied to private companies for loan 
repayment regardless of the world price [G3]. Since trading partners are well known 
multinational companies, international banks are willing to lend at competitive rates. 
Thirdly, the risk of counterparty default is low, since buyers have time to plan their 
finances [G3]. However, international buyers use the system to their advantage as well. 
Since forward contracts are offered over twelve delivery months they can save storage costs 
[G3]. 
CMC and international buyers are in a bargaining transaction since trading partners are 
legal equals. CMC is registered as a limited company and as such, like its trading partners, a 
member of FCC. The contractual form of any transaction depends on the relative 
economic power of the trading partners as well as existing working rules and the ability to 
influence those. Under FCC working rules, the outcome of the bargaining relationship in 
terms of price depends on three factors: (1) the time at which the contract is agreed upon; 
(2) the futures market price; and (3) the premium which is fetched by Ghanaian beans. Of these 
three factors only two can be negotiated by CMC, since it is not actively trading in the 
exchange. However, CMC can still indirectly influence the price formation process at 
futures markets by entering traders’ expectations regarding cocoa supply. The timing of the 
trade and the premium are negotiable and hence depend on the bargaining power of the 
parties involved. Bargaining power in this context arises from the availability of alternative 
trading partners, asymmetric information about the future crop, and existing working rules 
regarding the mode of transfer.   
Regarding existing work rules, the CMC representative in London is also member of FCC’s 
Contracts and Regulations Committee as well as the arbitration services, which negotiates 
the exact wording of the trading contracts [G1]. CMC has hence judicial power regarding 
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existing working rules. While CMC is a member of FCC, QCD is not—although efforts are 
made to become a member in order to influence quality standards embedded in existing 
contracts [G4]. Arbitration is done by a member of the arbitration panel. The panel 
consists of voting member representatives. Voting members are those who meet the 
requirements of over £500,000 capital assets. If FCC rules against CMC, CMC has the right 
to appeal. The ruling is done according to the FCC rulebook, which is amended if 
unprecedented cases arise [G5]. 
Since CMC is the monopoly seller of Ghanaian cocoa, it has the economic power to both 
influence existing working rules and set new ones. For instance, CMC offers only one 
particular standardised forward contract on the basis of which sales are negotiated. The 
contract, informed by FCC standards, is a fixed price contract based on CIF delivery for 
either Tilbury or Felixstowe UK ports with a French insurance company. Deviations 
regarding insurance type106, destination, and choice of vessel are facilitated against 
administered premiums or discounts as published in a CMC statement, valid from the first 
of October each year until September the coming year (Appendix 7.7, [G5]).   
Prior to negotiation, CMC and buyers conduct extensive research regarding the crop 
outlook. For CMC, the Statistical Division of Cocobod forecasts the size of the upcoming 
crop based on pod counting. In addition, farmers are asked about weather conditions and 
their prediction for the coming harvest. Whilst Pod counting is also entertained by large 
buyers, the exact methods applied differ [G6, B2]. Buyers have their own information 
sources and some even have their own weather stations upcountry. These are, however, of 
limited use in tropical weather [I1]. Extension services using satellite data have recently 
emerged to fill the gap, and farmers, LBCs and multinationals alike take advantage of these 
services [I1]. In addition to the information CMC traders are supplied with, traders look at 
exchange rates, past price trend, and technical indicators [G3, G6]. After information is 
gathered, traders enter into an active bargain over the premium [G6]. The negotiation 
psychology is one of persuasion, as evident from the below statement: 
“At the end of the day I am trying to sell cocoa at the highest possible price and they 
[multinational buyers] are also trying to buy at the lowest possible price. I get on the phone and say 
‘listen it is not raining here, the crop is looking horrible. I don’t think we have enough cocoa for 
                                                 
106 Arrangements offered include “cost, insurance and freight” (CIF), where comprehensive insurance and 
shipping line is organised by the seller, “cost and insurance” (C&I), with comprehensive insurance and 
shipping line organised by the buyer, and “free on board” (FOB), where the buyer organised shipping line 
and insurance. 
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you’. - I am trying to drive up the market. And they are doing the opposite. The truth is 
somewhere in the middle”. [G3]  
Asymmetric information does not only provide advantages in bargaining, but is also used 
to influence traders’ expectation regarding the futures price. Since Ghana is the world’s 
second largest cocoa producer, a credible announcement of a shortage in harvest has a 
twofold effect. It enters expectations about the origin premium, as well as the price level at 
world markets. 
The transaction between CMC and its buyer is initiated by the latter, who sends an offer to 
CMC for review. CMC traders refuse a transaction if there is indication of an upward trend. 
Similarly, they signal to potential buyers that they are considering bids if the price is 
favourable. Hence, the decision over the timing of the trade lies not solely with the buyer. 
“There is always a market base from which you start for the year and your yearly expectations. So 
you would have to be happy with three things to sell: exchange rate […], market health […] – 
some rallies are very weak rallies –, and […] premium. If the premium is 90 you can’t quote it 
for 150. If you have good information that you can push the premium to the limit, you can. But 
not out of the way. So your expectations have to be realistic regarding the market and then you can 
rely on competition to drive it even further up”. [G6] 
Negotiation takes place over the phone between CMC traders and buyers [G3]. Since the 
trader network is closely knit, other traders know when the first bid goes through and more 
bids are rolling in.  
“You know the market also has its own ears; once it goes to the broker to do a hedge, then words 
easily go around, because people normally apply common brokers” […]. “People still use brokers 
[…] because […] you get additional information.” “It is the same broker that works for me and 
my competitors and others. And I expect that he tells me this private information.” “Even if they 
employ their own broker, brokers still talk with the other brokers”. [G6]  
CMC traders use technical indicators on futures prices in order to time their cocoa sales. As 
every seller, they attempt to place their sale in an upward trending market. However, with 
short hedgers entering the market after the first contracts are signed, the trend often 
breaks. If prices fall below a certain threshold, CMC might decide for a sales stop [G6]. 
While CMC does not have access to the information usually provided by brokers, CMC 
traders maintain their own network of personal friends for information provision. This 
network is built during their trainee years, during which they work at various trading desks 
across Europe and the US [G6]. 
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The Ghanaian industry critically relies on the provision of foreign reserves through cocoa 
trade. Because Cocobod needs the forward contracts as collateral for credit provision from 
international banks, it is forced to forward sell even if prices are not favourable. A fact, 
multinational companies are aware of and exploit by attempting to keep prices low during 
the forward selling season [L1, G2]. Although buyers would not approach CMC at the 
beginning of the season when the market is unfavourable, they are in the position to 
pressure CMC later in the year. However, traders also have to meet cocoa quantity targets 
and have to compete with other buyers. This means, they are not unconstrained either.   
Since the differential is the only negotiable aspect of the bean price, maintaining control 
over this variable is crucial. However, the long-term existence of the premium is not 
secured for reasons over which Cocobod has limited control. Since the differential is a 
relative measure, it depends on the quality of non-Ghanaian beans as well. Ivory Coast, for 
instance, already improved its bean quality over recent years [G4]. Further, global demand 
for quality has decreased. Nevertheless, Ghana invests considerable resources in bean 
quality, which is closely monitored by QCD. Enforced standards exceed those specified by 
FCC [G4]. Further, CMC seeks to establish a brand name for Ghanaian cocoa by visiting 
trade shows in East and South East Asia [G3]. In Japan Ghanaian beans already have the 
status of a brand as evident by a chocolate bar named ‘Ghana’ (Figure 7.12).  
Figure 7.12: Japanese Lotte Ghana Chocolate Bar 
   
Source: Www.coolstuffjapan.com. 
Ghana has successfully established collaboration with Japan, a country that maintains 
particular stringent food regulations [G3, G4]. The Japanese government built a research 
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centre in Ghana in order to help reaching the required quality standards, which is a prime 
example for executive governance in the Kaplinsky and Morris (2000, 31) framework.   
Although Ghana itself holds a considerable market power as the seller of 17.4 per cent of 
the world’s cocoa production in 2013 (Table 7.1), the buyer side is getting more 
concentrated which limits the amount of next best buyers and hence the bargaining power 
of CMC over the premium. The number of CMC’s trading partners has decrease 
substantially from about 100 companies twenty years ago to 11 in 2013 [G3].  
Recalling Equation (7.1), Ghana’s total cocoa income depends on three parameters, which 
are FOB price, exchange rate and the crop size. By forward selling, Cocobod is able to lock 
in cocoa revenues for the upcoming harvest early on and this way manage price risk. The 
cocoa not sold forward prior to the crop year serves as risk mitigation and speculation tool. 
On the one hand, it insures against miscalculations in the crop outlook and smuggling. If 
the crop forecast exceeds the harvest, too much of the crop might be sold and CMC has to 
go into arbitration with its buyers. Despite this precautionary measure, such incidence 
caused severe difficulties for Cocobod in 2015 (Terazono 2015). On the other hand, it 
enables CMC to take advantage of price rallies during harvest. However, speculation might 
go wrong and leave CMC with beans from last year.  
Most buyers are open to renegotiating contracts in the case more cocoa was sold than 
produced. Buyers, who are mostly intermediaries, do not always have customers for 
immediate delivery or they might have miscalculated as well. Renegotiating the contracts is 
hence in their interest [G6]. However, as buyers allow renegotiation of contracts without 
penalties, they in return bend existing working rules for which Cocobod does not take 
them to arbitration either. For instance, international buyers save storage cost by leaving 
cocoa in CMC warehouses beyond the actual delivery date. Due to contract specification, 
CMC is paying for the warehousing until shipment. This behaviour has severe 
repercussions for the local cocoa sector during the harvest periods as shall be discussed in 
Section 7.4.3. 
A severe form of quantity risk, which affects Cocobod, is caused by smuggling. If prices 
decrease during the harvest period, Ghanaian farmers receive a higher price than 
neighbouring farmers and hence beans are smuggled into Ghana. Beans are smuggled out 
of Ghana if the price increases during harvest period [B1]. Since Cocobod takes loans on 
the basis of the predicted crop, it might not be able to repay if the harvest falls short of the 
predicted and it is forced to borrow additional money from local sources at higher interest 
rates if the harvest turns out larger than expected [J3, G2]. Although Cocobod tries to 
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account for smuggling in their forecast, this is a difficult task especially in a high inflation 
environment where the real cocoa price deteriorates quickly [G2]; a factor that contributed 
to the problems in 2015. Another problem that arises from smuggling is the loss of the 
quality premium. Ivorian beans are still of lower quality than Ghanaian beans and, when 
smuggled, those former are mixed with the latter. Hence, the premium of Ghanaian beans 
declines, which undermines CMC’s bargaining power over the premium [J2]. 
While through forward selling at least parts of the cocoa revenue is secured, it is secured in 
USD terms. Hence the exchange rate is another risk factor. Exchange rate fluctuations can 
cause difficulties regarding loan repayment as well as cocoa farmers’ real income. During 
the time of the fieldwork, movements in the exchange rate contributed to lower farm-gate 
prices. 
“In Ghana, inflation and bad exchange rate is such a big problem. Farmers earn less and less in 
USD terms and the cost of living increases. This is good for us as buyers but bad for the farmers”. 
[E2] 
However, as shown in Figure 7.13, the major risk to Ghana’s cocoa income originates from 
variations in the FOB price, that is, futures price plus premium. The predicted FOB price 
has been lower during the 2001/02 and 2009/11 seasons than the realised FOB price. An 
interesting observation is that crop size works as an insurance for the export price and vice 
versa in line with Dana and Gilbert’s (2008, 209-10) prediction. Since Ghana is the second 
largest producer globally, a lower than predicted crop size results in a higher export price, 
which then counter balances the negative effect of the lower harvest on total cocoa 
income. 
Large swings in the FOB price might be due to droughts or a decline in the premium due 
to smuggled beans. The 2001/02 crop year witnessed several disruptions. The civil war in 
Ivory Coast left the market in an expectation of supply shortages. However, as shortages 
did not materialise, expectations were revised and prices dropped during the harvest 
period. Hence, CMC lost on the spot market sales relative to the predictions made. Much 
of the crop was smuggled to Ghana which also contributed to the larger than expected 
harvest. Further, speculation in the terminal markets and technical buying were cited as one 
of the main reasons for the high price during the forward sale period (ICCO 2002). 
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Figure 7.13: Predicted and Realised Cocoa Income and Sources of Loss 
(in GHC/tonne) 
 
Notes: The percentages for exchange rate, crop size and FOB price are estimated by 
calculating the realised cocoa income as if the predicted exchange rate, crop size, and 
FOB price were the realised. The difference from the realised for each scenario is then 
normalised by the difference between predicted and realised cocoa income. Source: 
Cocobod Statistical Division, author’s estimation.  
CMC traders and multinational buyers alike have shown concern over the presence of 
speculators. However, since multinational buyers are mostly intermediaries in the global 
industry, they are less concerned with price levels than chocolate manufacturers on the 
consumer side and CMC on the producer side. For CMC the long positions by speculators 
are favourable, but they are afraid that the ‘big elephant’ in the room might liquidate 
positions [G6]. Further, speculators have made it more difficult to gauge the market and to 
time sales accordingly.  
“Now we have specs. They have different models, they have different time frames, they have 
different expectations and they have different indexes; a different approach. So it makes it a lot 
harder to follow fundamentals that are normally theoretical drivers of the market than it used to 
be”. [G6] 
Due to the uncertainty over future production as well as the exchange rate, Cocobod is 
unable to manage its income risk fully, although, forward sales contribute to predictability.  
Figure 7.14 shows how forward sales affect Ghana’s cocoa income in USD terms. In an 
upward trending market, Cocobod outperforms its own prediction—which is not 
surprising since it is incentivised to predict conservatively—but underperforms the market. 
The reverse is true for falling prices. Another implication of the forward sale is that the 
Ghanaian cocoa farmer receives the world prices with a lag. 
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Figure 7.14: CMC Performance of Forward Sales Compared to ICCO World Prices 
(in USD/tonne) 
 
Source: Cocobod Statistical Division; ICCO. 
In summary, CMC and international buyers are in a bargaining transaction. Although 
working rules permit negotiation of the price level, which is fixed to the futures exchange, 
the timing of the trade and the premium is negotiated. The outcome of this negotiation is 
determined by the relative bargaining power of the parties involved, as well as the power to 
influence existing working rules. Ghana as the second biggest producer globally holds 
considerable economic power and can chose, to a certain extent, its trading partners107. An 
additional source of market power is the particular flavour of Ghanaian cocoa beans, which 
is achieved through a more demanding fermentation process compared to Ivorian beans. 
Hence, chocolate producers still rely on Ghanaian beans for blending and flavouring. 
However, buyer power is highly concentrated. Only one cocoa trading company and a 
couple of grinding companies make up the bulk of Ghana’s cocoa bean trade. Further, as 
discussed earlier, Ghana has to sell during a particular time period in order to finance its 
cocoa trade as well as acquire necessary foreign reserves. This makes CMC particularly 
vulnerable to low world market prices during this period.  
7.4.3 Internal Marketing: The Producer Price Research Committee 
At the internal marketing level the PPRC plays a key role in price formation and risk 
allocation along the cocoa chain and all prices and margins earned by different stakeholders 
are administered by the PPRC. The PPRC itself consists of a number of cocoa stakeholders 
including farmers, hauliers, LBCs, representatives from academia and Cocobod. The 
committee is chaired by the Minister of Finance. All present at the negotiations are 
                                                 
107 There was a case when one multinational buyer was refused a contract over a row until it openly 
apologised to the Chairman of Cocobod [G1]. 
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representatives for their respective branch. The committee negotiates the price received by 
the farmers, rates for transportation, commission for LBCs, and other industry costs 
including social support services [G2]. Prior to negotiations, all stakeholders are asked to 
submit an approximation of their costs and a suggested margin. Given the reports from the 
different stakeholders, the final allocation of predicted cocoa income is decided. The last 
word lies with the chair. 
Negotiations take place over the allocation of the (projected) cocoa income or total 
revenue. Figure 7.15 links the outcome of the PPRC negotiations to the price formation 
processes at the global and external marketing level as described in the previous sections. 
The net-FOB is the gross FOB value minus services, which are accounted for as industry 
costs (Kolavalli, et al. 2013). Agreed prices and margins are made public a few days prior to 
the start of the main buying season in October. Those are fixed for the entire crop year, 
however, can be altered during the light crop season if large price swings at the financial 
market occurs. This happened only once during the 2007/08 crop year.  
Figure 7.15: Price Formation in the Ghanaian Cocoa Industry  
 
Source: Author. 
Table 7.3 presents the breakdown of forecasted cocoa income including industry costs. 
From the average FOB, industry costs are subtracted and, since the 1999/00 season, a 
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minimum of 70 per cent of the net-FOB is allocated to farmers. The remaining net-FOB is 
distributed among other stakeholders.  
Table 7.3: Statistics of Projected Net-FOB Sharing 
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Disease and Pest Control 
Jute Sacks 
Farmers’ Scholarship 
CSSVD Essam Project1 
Fertilizer Subsidy Program  
Child Labour Program 
Projected Average 
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(GHC/USD) 
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Producer Price (min 70%) 
Stabilisation Fund 
Buyers’ Margin 
Hauliers’ Cost 
Storage and Shipping Cost 
QCD (Disinfestation, Grading, Sealing, Check Sampling Cost) 
Projected Crop 
Size (tonne) 
Crop Finance 
Scale Inspection & Phytosanitory 
Cocobod 
Farmers’ Housing Scheme 
Replanting 
Farmers’ Pension Scheme 
Cocoa Roads and Export Duty 
Note: 1 Project run by CSSVD in order to contain swollen shoot virus in the Essam 
region. Source: Cocobod Statistical Division. 
Industry costs, since excluded from the negotiation process at PPRC, are prone to 
allocation inefficiencies arising from corruption. For instance, it was claimed that 20 to 30 
per cent losses in industry costs are incurred due to inefficiencies in the implementation of 
mass spraying. Often the implementation of the scheme is given to those with close ties 
with the political body and not those with the means to transport the chemicals or fertiliser 
upcountry. As a result, the process is delayed and the fertiliser arrives too late; maybe in the 
raining season, which means that the fertiliser is washed away without effect [F1]. 
With the introduction of the net-FOB share approach, the share received by the 
government decreased considerably (Figure 7.16). At the end of each season, Cocobod 
deduces its operational costs (trading costs), which are also negotiated by PPRC, and then 
transfers the residual to the Ministry of Finance as an implicit tax. However, given the 
nature of the system, the tax varies with the buffer function Cocobod plays in order to 
secure stable prices for stakeholders in the chain. 
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Figure 7.16: Percentage Share of Government in Total Cocoa Income 
 
Source: Cocobod Statistical Division. 
Figure 7.17 depicts the allocation of the net-FOB value among stakeholder since 1999. 
After farmers, another major share goes to LBCs and Cocobod. Again, the buffer function 
of Cocobod is clearly visible, as the Cocobod share varies with the price level, while the 
producer share varies inversely with the price level.  
Figure 7.17: Different Stakeholders’ Share in Net-FOB 
 
Source: Cocobod Statistical Division 
The 70 per cent rule, that is a minimum 70 per cent share for farmers in net-FOB, is a 
formalised working rule, written into the Ghanaian constitution. Another informal custom 
which benefits the farmers emerged, which is that PPRC cannot reduce the farm-gate price.  
“The price for the farmer changes annually but it has never been down. So we follow this 
convention. In extreme conditions we might have to consider the farm-gate price though. It is 
possible”. [G2] 
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Customs hence permit PPRC to exercise its potential power to decrease the producer 
prices, which is an act of forbearance. This is clearly motivated by the political power of 
cocoa farmers, especially during election years.    
At the level of the PPRC, the transaction process is a rationing one. The price or margin 
earned by different stakeholders in the Ghanaian cocoa chain depends on the bargaining of 
the representatives with authority. However, there are both economic and legal power 
imbalances within the PPRC. Farmers’ bargaining power arises from their large population 
share. This position is strengthened with a democratically elected government. However, 
other stakeholders might entertain close ties with the political elite and exercise power 
through these relationships. Further, the indeterminacy of industry costs leaves freedom to 
the government regarding the allocation of cocoa income. In the following, economic and 
legal power of each stakeholder in the chain will be assessed in regards to income and risk 
in each segment.    
7.4.3.1 Farmers 
The price received by farmers depends on the price negotiated by CMC with external 
buyers, the negotiation process within the PPRC and working rules guiding the negotiation 
process. Existing working rules limit the scope of negotiations by linking the producer 
price to the net-FOB price. Further, customs prevent a decrease in farm-gate prices, which 
means the last season’s nominal price sets the minimum.  
Farmers’ representatives in the PPRC are not democratically elected. Hence, an individual 
farmer has little influence on the choice of her representative and, therefore, the 
negotiation process. Further, despite their political significance, farmers have limited 
economic bargaining power, since, in Commons’ terminology, they cannot easily withhold 
from others what is demanded by them for their own use. Hold ups organised by cocoa 
farmers are constrained, since the crop spoils quickly if not stored properly, and income for 
a year might be lost. Further, the switch to other crops is difficult for farmers since this 
requires investments [F2].  
Usually, farmer representatives are chief famers who are selected by the government [F1]. 
Representatives are not necessarily homogenous in their interests. For instance, a chief 
farmer of Ghana’s Kuapa Kokoo and PPRC representative wishes for cocoa prices to vary 
more strongly with world prices while another farmers’ representative stresses that farm-
gate prices are too low [F1, F2]. The reason for the first farmer’s wish is that Fair Trade 
certified farmers only receive a premium if the Cocobod price is below the Fair Trade 
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minimum price. If this is not the case, farmers do not receive a premium, although they 
incur costs from the certification process, which makes the scheme unattractive [F1].   
Farmers are exposed to a variety of risks, many arising from their low economic and legal 
power. LBCs are prohibited from buying cocoa outside the buying season (twice a year for 
the mid and the main crop), but the cocoa tree produces, with varying degree, throughout 
the year. This is problematic for farmers since those do not have the means to store the 
beans. However, with increasing competition among LBCs over volume, farmers find 
buyers more easily between the buying seasons. They are typically foreign owned LBCs, 
which receive funding independent from Cocobod loans.    
“If season is closed, the farmer does not have an appropriate space to keep it. You cannot allow it 
to go waste. So you holding his property at your warehouse for some time till the season opens. But 
you cannot do anything about it if the season is not open. Because Cocobod will not accept it, you 
will not accept it. But the cocoa will not go to waste”. [L4] 
However, between seasons buying opens opportunities for intermediaries to renegotiate 
prices. Since formalised working rules regarding the price setting mechanism do not extent 
to the months outside the buying season, farmers are offered unfavourable deals for their 
cocoa (see Section 7.4.3.2).  
Quality is another risk factor. If the cocoa is not properly fermented or contains foreign 
material, QCD might reject the cocoa. However, this is less problematic for farmers since 
at the society level, only purchasing clerks check the bean quality. Those can ask farmers to 
redry the cocoa, but they rarely decline the cocoa over quality, since they have the 
opportunity to mix low quality with high quality beans and that way pass QCD tests.  
The most severe risks affecting farmers’ income in the Ghanaian system is quantity risk, 
long term price risk and inflation. While nominal prices don’t decrease they are not 
following up with inflation either. As can be seen from Figure 7.18, inflation has 
continuously reduced real cocoa income since the 2010/11 season. 
Additionally to inflation, volume, and quality risk, farmers struggle with a row of other risk 
factors. One factor mentioned repeatedly during the Ghana Cocoa Platform Stakeholder 
meeting on the 27th and 28th of November 2013, was land grabbing by mining companies, 
facilitated by unclear tenures systems  and corruption in ministries as well as among chiefs. 
Regardless of the great numbers of farmers and their large share in the total population, 
farmers have low executive power and existing working rules are frequently breached by 
other stakeholders to the farmers’ disadvantage.  
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Figure 7.18: Nominal and Real Net-FOB Rate per Cocoa Tonne 
(1999/00-2013/14 season, in GHC) 
Rate per Tonne of Cocoa Nominal Price Rate per Tonne of Cocoa Real Price 
  
Source: Cocobod Statistical Division; IMF, IFS (author’s calculation). 
7.4.3.2 Purchasing Clerk 
Purchasing clerks are one of the few stakeholders in the Ghanaian cocoa chain whose 
margin is not set by the PPRC. They work on a commission basis for LBCs and receive 
cash advances for buying cocoa at the farm level and delivering it to the district level. They 
are in a managerial relationship with LBCs, however with substantial room for bargaining 
before entering into the transaction and with limited judicial and executive governance by 
LBCs. LBCs have only limited power to monitor and deter purchasing clerks from 
breaching contracts.  
Given the limited governance power of LBCs, adverse selection and moral hazard are risk 
factors for LBCs in the selection of purchasing clerks. Different selection strategies are 
maintained by LBCs. District officers, who are in charge of selecting purchasing clerks, are 
usually from the districts they are working in. Hence they entertain personal relationships 
with the communities in the district [L4]. District officers consult with village chiefs or a 
committee of experienced purchasing clerks from the same area over appropriate 
candidates. Candidates from the same community are considered to be less likely to 
abscond with cash advances or move elsewhere. Besides a good reputation, basic education 
is crucial for being selected [L2]. Further, district officers ask friends and relatives, 
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especially those with a cocoa farm, to guarantee with farm land or other property for the 
candidate [L3]. 
The district manager maintains a close relationship with each purchasing clerk and visits 
up-county buying stations regularly to ensure cocoa is only delivered to him and that cash 
advances are given proportionally to the buying capacity [L4]. Especially in times when the 
district officer is short in cash, purchasing clerks might chose to sell to other LBCs 
operating in the area [G2]. For LBCs, the only way of ensuring that purchasing clerks 
exclusively deliver to them, is to ensure constant cash availability [L2, L4]. 
Purchasing clerks hold considerable economic and hence bargaining power vis-à-vis LBCs 
and farmers and are hence in a lucrative position [B2]. They are not only given cash 
advances but also sheds, scales, tarpaulin, and jute sacks by the LBC [L3]. Hence LBCs face 
sunk costs, while they dependent on the purchasing clerk for his relationship with the 
societies. If costs like transportation increase, the purchasing clerk receives compensation.  
“We [LBC] pay them [purchasing clerks] per bag. So when they hear that fuel has gone up they 
also increase their charge. And when they see that inflation has gone up, they also increase their 
change”. [L2] 
Further, purchasing clerks have some leverage over the price at which they buy cocoa 
beans even during the buying season. Through smuggling, they are able to buy cheaper and 
keep the difference for themselves [B2]. Further, farmer representatives uttered complaints 
over rigged scales—a common practice by purchasing clerks to pay farmers less108. 
As mentioned previously, purchasing clerks buy beans throughout the year. Farmers, who 
do not own sheds, are forced to deliver to the purchasing clerk’s sheds for safekeeping—
theft of cocoa beans is common—and appropriate storage to prevent beans from 
moulding. Purchasing clerks exploit this situation and pay less for the cocoa than during 
the season or lend the farmer money for high interest rates—100 per cent is common—
keeping the beans as collateral until the season opens. The purchasing clerk is middle man 
and bank at the same time and is often the wealthiest society member [B2]. 
Although farm-gate prices are administered and the purchasing clerk is in a managerial 
relationship with the LBC, the LBC has limited legal power over the purchasing clerks. 
Further, due to their strong economic power given by their cash availability and their 
                                                 
108 Complaint made by farmer representatives at the Ghana Cocoa Platform stakeholder meeting at Alisa 
Hotel in Accra on November, 27th 2013. 
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linkages with LBCs, they can enter into managerial relationships with farmers through 
money lending activities, which earns them additional income.  
7.4.3.3 Licenced Buying Companies 
LBCs are in a rationing relationship with PPRC, while they are in a managerial relationship 
with CMC as they are licenced to buy the cocoa on CMC’s behalf. At the beginning of the 
season CMC publishes a schedule regarding how much cocoa each LBC has to deliver to 
which port [H1]. Especially domestic LBCs, which have limited access to capital, rely on 
Cocobod for loans to fund their buying operations. LBCs receive a PPRC negotiated 
margin per tonne of cocoa from CMC [L2-4].  
All interviewed LBCs believed to have an influence on the negotiation of the margin, 
although they were not fully satisfied with the outcomes [L1-4]. The manager of PBC is the 
first and the manager of Adwumapa Buyers Limited the second representative to PPRC 
[L3]. Representatives collect estimates over operational costs as well as suggested profit 
margin and forwards those to the PPRC as a basis for negotiations [L2]. While the asked 
profit margin was never approved, profit margins did not decline when world prices 
declined. Hence, LBCs were protected from price volatility [L4]. Although costs have 
increased due to inflation [L2], LBCs refrain from executing bargaining power during 
falling world cocoa prices. This act of forbearance is partly driven by fairness 
considerations [L4]. 
LBCs require cash during the buying seasons to issue advances to the districts and 
purchasing clerks. Cash is provided by Cocobod, which offers loans below market rate. 
Cocobod acquires the necessary funds through forward sales to international buyers. The 
loans are allocated based on the LBC’s previous sales. The main season last for 33 weeks, 
starting in late September, in which LBCs are expected to turn around their funds 2.2 times 
on average. About 60 per cent of the harvest is bought in the first cycle and LBCs are 
supposed to redeem their loans fully in January/February when buying the beans in 
October. The light season only lasts for 10 weeks and loans are usually not turned around 
[G2].   
Revenues received by LBCs hinge on three main factors: 1) the volume of cocoa recovered, 
2) the rate at which loans are turned over in tandem with the interest rate paid, and 3) 
operational costs which are driven by fuel costs and commission paid to purchasing clerks 
[L2].  
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Operational cost increase with volume bought. Hence, LBCs might increase their revenue 
by focusing on districts that produce sufficient cocoa to reach high volume [L4]. Further, 
LBCs try to gain farmers’ loyalty though services. Based on a survey of 441 Ghanaian 
cocoa farmers conducted in 2002 and 2004, Vigneri and Santos (2008) find that the 
selection of a particular LBC—if more than one LBC is active in the district—by a farmer 
is mainly driven by the immediate availability of cash and the provision of credit. In this 
regard, companies associated with a multinational buyer have a competitive advantage. 
Those have access to sufficient credit from abroad, while local companies are forced to 
borrow from local banks at much higher rates if Cocobod funds are insufficient [L2]. LBCs 
which have external linkages are hence able to reach higher volumes. Another obstacle for 
local companies is that, in order to borrow, collateral is needed. While for the former state 
owned PBC the Ministry of Finance serves as a guarantor, other local companies struggle 
to provide such [L2]. 
Availability of cash and credit can bind farmers to certain LBCs. Building of trust through 
reliability is another factor. Especially large LBCs, associated with multinational trading 
houses, can build deeper relationships and dependencies with farmers through provision of 
input factors and credit as well as sale of other products such as staples like rice, and 
biscuits [L4]. Thereby LBCs signal presence in the region and build trust.  
In the current system, LBCs are exposed to several risks. One is inefficiencies in the 
delivery system. At ports, CMC has a certain warehouse capacity. Disruptions at the port 
level prolong offloading, which delays the turn-over of loans. Lower turn-over rates result 
in losses incurred on interest rates [L3] as well as additional costs due to borrowing at 
higher rates from local banks to buy cocoa in order to maintain volume [G2]. During the 
time of the fieldwork in late 2013, several factors caused delays at the ports. Shortly before 
the season started, labourers, hired to offload the cocoa into warehouses at the ports, went 
on strike. Additionally, some of the warehouses were filled with last season’s crop, which 
squeezed warehouse space [L2]. Congested warehouses were blamed on both Cocobod and 
multinational buyer. Cocobod was accused of having speculated on higher prices for the 
spot sale, which did not materialise and resulted in some cocoa remaining unsold. 
Multinational buyers were accused of not taking delivery in breach of their contracts in 
order to avoid storage costs [L2, H1].  
Besides the risk of increasing operational costs and inflation, the issuing of cash advances 
poses another risk. Thefts and attacks on those who carry the cash to the districts—usually 
in heavily guarded trucks—are common [B2]. Further, moral hazard in the selection of 
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purchasing clerks is a threat. Despite guarantees and collateral, purchasing clerks have 
absconded with cash advances [L3]. Such incidences occur particularly frequently when 
purchasing clerks cross borders with the intention to smuggle beans and run into 
difficulties [L3].  
Another risk factor is quality risk. Smuggling is common, especially if prices are more 
favourable in neighbouring countries. This can undermine the quality of the crop received 
by district managers from their purchasing clerks. Since the purchasing clerk buys on behalf 
of the LBC, quality risk and resulting losses remain with the LBC [L4].  
“You fire him, you arrest him, whatever. But you have lost. When quality control confiscates the 
cocoa then it is confiscated and you lost it”. [L3] 
QCD has judicial and executive power at the district level, where quality is monitored and 
cocoa of insufficient quality is confiscated without compensation [G2]. The moment the 
farmer receives cash from the purchasing clerk, the ownership of the cocoa is with the 
LBC until the cocoa is offloaded into a CMC warehouses at the ports [L4]. Any losses that 
are incurred are hence losses to the LBC. Not only low quality can result in losses, but also 
theft and fire [L4].  
7.4.3.4 Hauliers 
Hauliers are in similar transaction relationships as LBCs. They are in a rationing 
relationship with the PPRC and in a managerial relationship with the LBC they are working 
for. They are compensated by volume of cocoa transported, as well as by distance over 
which they transport the beans and the quality of the roads. Prior to negotiations over the 
margin, hauliers are asked to submit a calculation of their costs and a suggested margin. 
The chairman of Global Haulage is the first PPRC representative [H1].      
“The fixed costs include the vehicles, financing charges which we calculate with a 5 year 
amortization period to get the fixed cost. Then we do variable costs which is operational costs, like 
fuel, tarpaulin, maintenance, tyres, salaries and alike. We do this and determine the variable cost 
and we add the two and then determine the price per tonne per mile.” [H1] 
Although costs have increased and inflation has squeezed margins over recent years, 
margins in nominal terms have been stable for the past crop years. However, as cocoa 
prices were declining, hauliers refrain from executing bargaining power. As a result, hauliers 
together with LBCs absorbed the increase in operational costs while Cocobod absorbed 
declining cocoa prices [H1].  
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Usually hauliers are contracted by LBCs for the crop year. The moment the cocoa is loaded 
onto the truck, it is the hauliers’ responsibility if damage is incurred through rain or road 
accidents. Hauliers are reimbursed for each delivery from the district to the port. Their 
revenue hence depends on the turn-around time, that is, how many loadings a particular 
truck can deliver. Complications at ports hence affect them in a similar manner than LBCs 
[H1]. 
Global Haulage in this regard is an interesting case study. In order to minimize costs arising 
from these inefficiencies, they established their own warehouses at the ports as transit 
points. Newer trucks, better suited for the longer distance from the district to the ports, 
can hence quickly return back to the districts while the older trucks are used to bring the 
cocoa from the warehouse to the CMC takeover point. Even if older trucks wait for several 
days at the port before offloading, a high turn-around time can be achieved with the newer 
trucks. At the time of the fieldwork, Global Haulage was in negotiations with CMC over 
CMC accepting delivery to Global Haulage’s warehouses as special offloading. If 
negotiations are successful, CMC would compensate Global Haulage for the cocoa delivery 
after delivery to the Global Haulage warehouse. This is a prime example for limiting factors 
resulting in strategic transactions within Commons’ framework. 
Further Global Haulage owns four LBCs for which it exclusively handles the bean 
transportation. Hence, turn-over of loans by LBCs is another reason for the negotiation 
with CMC. Given the small margins earned by LBCs and hauliers alike, mergers across 
those two sectors are not uncommon [L4]. Given that it was foremost haulage companies 
to move into the buying segment after partial liberalisation, there have long been strong 
linkages between the two segments. Further, Global Haulage works within a conglomerate 
of companies that includes banks and a fuel company. With decreasing margins and high 
interest rates most LBCs and hauliers work foremost for the benefit of the banks. 
However, with the banks being associated with the LBC and haulage business, the 
conglomerate engages in cross-subsidisation [H1]. Operational rents accruing from this 
conglomerate of companies has strengthened Global Haulage’s economic power.   
7.4.3.5 Certification 
Certification is a relatively recent development that in parts circumvents the rationing 
transaction of the PPRC. Stakeholders entering into certification are motivated by the 
possibility to increase economic and legal power. They hence engage in strategic 
transactions. Certificates have become numerous. However, despite the heterogeneity of 
labels, the transaction processes are similar across certificates in the Ghanaian cocoa sector.  
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Usually the LBC is the holder of the certificate [E3]109. The LBC is either directly associated 
with a multinational buyer, who demands certified cocoa, or collaborates with one. The 
collaboration amounts to the buyer financing parts of the operations, like providing inputs 
and hiring extension officers [L2]. Extension officers train the farmers according to the 
requirements of the certificate. Further, the holder of the certificate receives a premium for 
each bag of cocoa produced under the scheme.  
It is the LBC’s responsibility to gather famers under the scheme and compensate them for 
their additional costs. Most LBCs collaborate with NGOs who are associated and/or 
funded with/by them or the multinational buyer [E4]. After the certification guidelines are 
implemented, an external auditor from the certification body checks compliance to the 
standards [L2]. If the standards are met, the LBC receives the certificate and the farmers’ 
cocoa passbooks are replaced in order to distinguish them from the non-certified farmers 
(Figure 7.19). 
Figure 7.19: Cocoa Passbooks of Certified and Non-Certified Farmers 
       
Note: Farmers got recently certified by PBC. The UTZ certification is funded by the 
multinational buyer Touton and implemented by the NGO Solidaridad. The left picture 
shows the former passbook and the right picture the new one. Source: Pictures were taken 
during a cocoa village visit near Kumasi at November, 13th 2013. 
The Certifier and the certified are in a bargaining transaction before entering into a 
managerial transaction with the certifier setting the rules, which the certified has to obey. 
Interestingly, the intermediary, i.e., the LBC, negotiates the certification premium with the 
                                                 
109 Fair Trade is the exception where the certificate is given to the farmers’ co-operative.  
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international buyer, while the farmer is the subordinate who has to obey the rules set by the 
certificate with the LBC holding judicial and executive power over the farmer. The 
certifying body, which is an independent entity such as Fair Trade or Rainforest Alliance, 
holds legislative power. In an attempt to gain legislative power, the industry recently 
developed the UTZ certificate for cocoa, coffee, and tea. The premium received by the 
farmer is subject to negotiations between the LBC and the farmer [L3]. Figure 7.20 shows 
factors that are considered in negotiating the premium [C3]. 
Figure 7.20: Establishing and Negotiating Premium, Factors to consider 
 
Note: The picture is taken from an UTZ certificate guide book to explain the calculation of 
the premium. Source: Picture taken during interview [C3]. 
Due to the lack of a co-operative system in Ghana, with the exception of Kuapa Koko and 
Cocoa Abrabopa, certification in Ghana differs from neighbouring countries like Ivory 
Coast where it is the co-operatives holding the certificate110. Although LBCs are eager to 
stress that they only act as ‘transient partners’ who bring the buyer and the farmer together 
[L4], an UTZ certification officer, working in both Ivory Coast and Ghana, points out that 
the premium for farmers is lower in Ghana than in Ivory Coast since LBCs demand their 
share [E3]. Evidence suggests that also Cocobod demands its share in the certification 
business, since the collaboration between LBCs and multinational buyers has to be 
approved by the board [L3].  
                                                 
110 It has also been pointed out that even under the co-operative system it might not necessarily be the farmer 
who gets the major share of the premium, since chief farmers act in a similar way as the LBC and would 
acquire most of the margin [L3]. 
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Stakeholders enter into certification for different reasons. For chocolate manufacturers the 
main motives are branding and marketing [I2]. Certification serves as a marketing strategy 
to consumers, which builds the narrative of traceability and adds the illusion of a personal 
relationship between the consumer and the cocoa farmer. Interestingly Ghanaian beans 
have always been traceable, since Ghana is the only country where cocoa filled jute sacks 
are sealed upcountry for export [B2]. Each jute sack has a chip with the unique number of 
the buying station where it has been sealed and hence it is traceable up to the society level 
(Figure 7.21). However, Cocobod has no interest in stressing this fact over fears of product 
differentiation where beans from one area are preferred over beans from another [J2].  
Figure 7.21: Cocoa Jute Sack with Chip Number and Shed with Number 
      
Source: Photos taken in warehouses in Tema and in a cocoa shed in a society near Kumasi.  
Grinders and traders enter into certification to gain greater control over the chain and 
achieve a better information flow. Aging farmers, growing practices on virgin forest land, 
and infestation of trees are only a few of the factors which contributed to sustainability 
concerns of the industry which predicts a massive shortage of cocoa beans in the near 
future. Especially the UTZ certificate, under which farmers receive training and extension 
services, grew out of these concerns. However, whether greater control over the growing 
processes is a solution to those problems is questionable [I2]. Another reason for first-tier 
suppliers to enter into certification is quality control. Depending on the certificate’s 
working rules, grinders are able to set quality standards. Further, certification is another 
way to secure supply and in that way sidestep CMC [L3]. Since the certificate is funded by 
the multinational buyer, the cocoa has to be delivered to that buyer and CMC cannot sell it 
to another buyer.   
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LBCs join certification schemes to circumvent PPRC by negotiating additional margins 
with external buyers [L4]. Further, certification is another factor with which traders can 
compete over volume and bind farmers to them. However, securing volume through 
certification also comes with disadvantages. LBCs cannot decline farmers, who seek 
certification, due to concerns over securing the necessary volume. Farmers are hence able 
to use the certification to their own advantage.  
“You cannot decline farmers who want to join the certificate as you want to scale up in future. 
[…] The competition is really high. You really need to make sure that they sell to you. 
Certification is one way of doing it as they waiting for premium”. [E2] 
Therefore, a LBC might be forced to buy more certified cocoa than its buyer demands. In 
some cases the buyer would still step in and buy the additional cocoa at a premium, but this 
depends on demand at the world market. Two certification managers working for 
multinational buyers mentioned that, while the certification project is being implemented 
for at least four years, they only have secured a buyer for the next two or three years [E1, 
E2]. If no buyer for the certified cocoa can be found, the cocoa has to be sold at a regular 
price while produced at a higher cost [E2].  
Another problem is that certification premiums, like quality premiums, are relative. The 
more farmers sign up under the scheme, the smaller the premium, while implementation 
costs are unlikely to decrease. This might leave LBCs with higher costs while manufacturers 
gain higher quality cocoa and more stable supply.  
The farmer holds the greatest risk, with the degree of risk exposure depending on the 
particular certificate. For instance, the enforcement of certain growing practices might 
come at the costs of lower yields or higher risk of tree infestation. In the case of organic 
cocoa production, costs have been too high so that the scheme was dropped soon after its 
implementation [G3]. However, yields took years to recover. Also incidences were reported 
where LBCs renegotiated the certification premium with farmers post-harvest. Since 
farmers already produced under the more costly scheme and cannot turn to another LBC 
for selling their certified beans due to the licence agreement under Cocobod, they are left 
with no choice but selling it for a smaller premium [I1].  
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7.5 Conclusion 
The previous analysis has shown that price formation, as well as stakeholders’ exposure to 
risk factors in commodity sectors depends on the institutional structure, here understood 
as the chain of transactions kept together by working rules.  
In the case of Ghana’s cocoa sector, the institutional structure alters the income received 
and the risk carried by the sector’s stakeholders in a unique way. In most cocoa producing 
countries—e.g., Nigeria and Cameroon—multinational exporters directly negotiate with 
farmers or farmers’ cooperatives. The transaction is a bargaining transaction between 
agents with unequal economic power. In Ghana, however, negotiations takes place 
between multinational exporters and CMC and the bargaining relationship between these 
actors is one between legal and economical equals.  
The bargaining relationship is limited by existing working rules, which determine the price 
level to be set by the London futures exchange. Consequently, only the price differential 
can be negotiated in the bargaining transaction between CMC and buyers. The differential 
is determined by the bargaining power of the parties involved. The bargaining power of 
CMC is immediately linked to tangible and intangible properties of the Ghanaina cocoa 
beans, as well as CMC’s monopoly on Ghanaian beans.  
Although CMC holds equal economic power vis-à-vis multinational buyers, negotiations 
are asymmetric since CMC, in contrast to multinational buyers, does not directly participate 
in the futures exchange. It is hence excluded from a major part of the price formation 
mechanism. However, CMC can indirectly influence the futures market through entering 
traders’ expectations. Since Ghana is the second largest cocoa producer globally, it benefits 
from a quantity-price insurance mechanism through the inverse relationship between 
quantities produced and price received at world markets. 
The role of Cocobod prohibits multinational buyers from downward penetration of the 
local sourcing segment and execution of legal and economic power over cocoa producers. 
This poses limiting factors to multinational buyers. Buyers attempt to circumvent these 
limitations by entering into strategic transaction in the form of extension service provision 
to farmers (usually through NGOs) and, more recently, through certification. In this way, 
buyers undermine Cocobod’s working rules and impose their own product and production 
standards on cocoa farmers—a process that is viewed with suspicion by Cocobod.   
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The working rules, which keep Cocobod with its divisions and subsidiaries and the 
Ghanaian cocoa sector together are rooted in Ghana’s colonial past. With a democratically 
elected government, the collective power of farmers has increased and revenues extracted 
by Cocobod have declined substantially. However, the institutional structure does still 
provide for extraction. This comes foremost in the form of industry costs, which are 
arbitrary and prone to corruption.  
Similar to Ghanaian cocoa farmers, domestic intermediaries like LBCs and hauliers are 
freed from the risk of declining cocoa prices through administered margins. However, they 
carry the risk of increasing operational costs and, since they have only limited control over 
the margins they receive, they are unable to (openly) pass on increasing costs to farmers or 
buyers. Farmers, although enjoying protection from declining world market prices in 
nominal terms, are still exposed to quantity risk and income risk, in particular through 
inflation. Further, farmers have weak bargaining power vis-à-vis intermediaries. Since 
farmers commonly lack storage space and credit, they depend on purchasing clerks. 
Purchasing clerks, through credit provision, often enter into managerial transactions with 
farmer to the purchasing clerks’ benefit. Further, purchasing clerks rig scales to their own 
advantage and LBCs renegotiate the certification premium post-harvest.  
Overall, Ghana reached the goals promoted under the liberalisation doctrine like increasing 
competition, reduced administrative costs, and a high world price share for producers 
(Gilbert 2009), without facing the unintended consequences of other cocoa producing 
countries, like exposure of farmers to price volatility (Dana and Gilbert 2008, Gilbert and 
Varangis 2003) and erosion of the quality premium (Gilbert 1997). However, in order to 
fully assess the costs and benefits of the Ghanaian system, a comparative case study is 
necessary. This has to be left to future research. For preliminary insights, Figure 7.22 shows 
the difference in producer prices received by Ghanaian and Ivorian farmers since 1991. 
During the period of declining price in 2004, Ghana could maintain the farm-gate price 
while Ivorian farmers received less111.  
While Cocobod manages short term price risk through forward sales, the long term price 
risk depends on Ghana’s weight as a producer in the world market as well as Cocobods 
control over the premium received for Ghanaian beans. This depends on quality control as 
well as branding. Although forward selling contributed to greater price stability in the 
Ghanaian cocoa sector, Cocobod is left with considerable exchange rate, inflation, 
                                                 
111 Ul Haque (2004) argues that the income accruing to Ghanaian farmers is commonly underestimated, since 
industry costs, which at least partly benefit farmers, are not accounted for. 
 
283 
premium, quantity and long-term price risk. The future will show how resilient the board is 
against shocks at global cocoa markets and increasing price volatility through 
financialisation. 
Figure 7.22: Producer Prices in Ghana and Ivory Coast 
(USD/tonne) 
 
Source: FAO and ICCO. 
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Chapter 8 Summary, Conclusion and Implications  
8.1 Introduction 
This dissertation presented a detailed analysis of the financialisation of commodity 
derivatives markets and its impact on price formation and risk management mechanisms in 
commodity markets, as well as implications for stakeholders in commodity sectors. 
Financialisation was understood as the increasing inflow of financial liquidity, provided by 
traders without a commercial interest in the physical commodity, into commodity 
derivatives markets. This dissertation focused in particularly on the linkages between 
commodity derivatives and physical markets. It is through these linkages that the 
financialisation of commodity derivatives markets materialises empirically and affects the 
commodity sector as a whole. These linkages were established through arbitrage 
possibilities, traders’ expectations formation and the institutional structure of the 
commodity chain.  
It was argued theoretically and shown empirically that price dynamics in commodity futures 
markets are increasingly driven by speculative liquidity, which causes these markets to 
move away from what is considered market fundamentals. Conflicting price signals 
between physical and derivatives markets then cause anomalies in market basis, 
convergence mechanisms, and also market term structure. These developments do not only 
undermine the price discovery and risk management function of commodity futures 
markets, but also spill over to physical markets through arbitrage mechanisms and traders’ 
expectations formation. Based on the case of the Ghanaian cocoa sector, it has been shown 
that, depending on the institutional setting and existing working rules that guide 
transactions within the sector, price dynamics in cocoa futures markets have direct 
implications for the distribution of cost and benefits among stakeholders in the Ghanaian 
and global cocoa sector.  
This final Chapter 8 is divided into four sections. Following this introduction, Section 2 
summarises key findings and conclusions drawn against the evidence gained to answer the 
research questions posed in Chapter 1. Section 3 discusses implications of the presented 
findings for both economic theory and policy. Section 4 identifies limitations in the study 
and presents an outlook for future research.   
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8.2 Key Findings 
This thesis was structured into 8 chapters. Following a brief summary of the motivation, 
research questions, main contribution, and outline of the thesis in Chapter 1, the next 
Chapter 2 laid out the theoretical framework towards an answer to the overarching 
research question: how, and in what way, are commodity prices affected by the latest episode of 
financialisation? In particular, the framework focused on the effect of financialisation on 
futures markets (Q1) and elaborated on potential spill-over mechanisms to the physical 
market. Towards this goal, the chapter presented a synthesis of two strands of literature: 
theories of price formation in commodity markets and theories of price formation in asset 
markets. The former strand accounts for the interplay between physical and derivatives 
markets, but not for price formation mechanisms in derivatives markets beyond mechanical 
no-arbitrage relationships. The latter strand provides a theory of price formation in 
derivatives markets, but does not account for the commodity-specific interplay between 
physical and derivatives markets. These two strands of literature are synthesised towards a 
hypothesis on price formation in commodity markets, referred to as the ‘financialisation 
hypothesis’.  
Regarding the financialisation hypothesis, this thesis argued that, under uncertainty, 
financial traders engage in extrapolation, herding and portfolio insurance strategies (H1.1). 
If the market weight of traders employing such trading strategies is large enough, prices 
move away from what is considered to be market fundamentals, and commodity futures 
markets behave more like asset markets. This change in price behaviour materialises 
empirically in excessive volatility, and anomalies in market basis and market term structure 
(H1.2). Price dynamics introduced by financial traders, and in particular index traders, spill 
over to physical commodity markets through spatial arbitrage and traders’ expectations 
(H2.1).  
Chapter 3 presented an econometric analysis of assumptions made about traders’ 
behaviour under uncertainty in support of H1.1. The analysis extended to the cocoa, coffee 
and wheat futures markets. Econometric evidence was presented for traders using 
extrapolative, herding and portfolio insurance strategies. By applying rolling window and 
recursive estimation techniques, it was shown that traders change their strategies 
dynamically with market developments, regulations and innovations. These findings 
confirmed the assumptions underlying the financialisation hypothesis, and the econometric 
tests presented set the stage for the preceding empirical analyses in Chapters 4 and 5. 
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Chapter 4 presented an econometric investigation into the cash–futures relationship in light 
of H1.2 and in anticipation of H2.1—taking the cocoa and wheat markets as case studies. 
Both markets exhibited a large market basis and convergence failure in recent years. 
Empirical results suggested that fundamental market factors have lost explanatory power 
regarding the market basis since 2006, while index pressure has altered the short- and long-
run relationships between cash and futures markets significantly. Further, in reference to 
the financialisation hypothesis, it was argued that incidents of limits to spatial arbitrage are 
particularly interesting since, if spatial arbitrage is limited, the extent of the difference in 
price formation mechanisms in the physical and derivatives markets is revealed in the basis 
size at the maturity date of each futures contract. The thesis was able to theoretically and 
empirically link the extent of non-convergence in the wheat and cocoa markets to the 
composition of hedgers and speculators in the respective futures exchanges.  
Chapter 5 presented further evidence in support of H1.2, by analysing futures markets’ 
term structure dynamics—taking the cocoa and coffee markets as case studies. As in the 
previous Chapter 4, evidence suggested that the influence of fundamental market factors 
has weakened in recent years. Further, futures contracts, which are dominated by hedgers, 
tend to be driven by market fundamentals, and those dominated by index traders tend to 
be driven by financial risk variables. The significance of index pressure, especially at the 
tails of the futures curve, strongly supported the conjecture that index traders’ rollovers of 
contracts significantly impact price. Short-dated contracts are known to serve a price 
discover function for the physical market, whereas long-dated contracts provide 
information regarding storage level to market practitioners. Through the information role 
of futures exchanges, the price pressure executed by index traders and speculators enters 
price formation, as well as storage decisions in the physical market through traders’ 
expectations formation. 
The empirical analyses presented in Chapters 4 and 5, although insightful, have been 
constrained by shortcomings in trader-position data as identified in Chapter 3. Only index 
trader position-data was found to be an appropriate approximation of trading strategies. 
For other speculative trader categories the level of aggregation impeded inference about 
these traders’ impact on price dynamics. Although statistical inference was confined to the 
effect of index traders, it should be stressed that the effect of other speculative traders is 
potentially of equal importance. 
Chapter 6 developed a theoretical framework for an institutional theory of price for 
commodity markets. The framework is informed by two strands of literature: 1) chain 
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theories, and 2) institutional theory for price, and in particular, Commons’ (1934) 
transaction theory. In reference to Q2—How, and in what way, do price dynamics in commodity 
futures markets affect commodity sectors and, in particular, commodity producers and producing 
countries?—it was argued that the interrelationship between futures and physical markets 
and its implications can only be fully understood by examining the underlying institutional 
structure, which governs price formation mechanisms across a commodity sector. Chain 
approaches provide a useful framework for understanding linkages and embedded power 
relationships within a commodity sector. However, these approaches do not provide any 
insights on implications of different power relationships for price formation and risk 
allocation processes. An institutional theory for price was used instead from which an 
analytical framework was drafted, which provided an institutional theory for price within 
the chain analogy.     
It was hypothesised that price dynamics in the derivatives markets spill over to the physical 
markets not only through arbitrage and traders’ expectations, but also through the 
underlying institutional framework (H2.1). Further, it was argued that if there are 
asymmetric power relationships within a commodity sector, market risk and price pressure 
are passed on to the weaker end of the commodity chain (H2.2). This weaker end, in the 
case of cash crops like cocoa, is most likely comprised of farmers (H2.3).  
With reference to the framework presented in Chapter 6, Chapter 7 provided a detailed 
analysis of price formation and risk allocation mechanisms in the Ghanaian cocoa sector, 
which served as a case study. The analysis was predominantly informed by material 
collected in semi-structured interviews with stakeholders in the Ghanaian cocoa sector and 
the global cocoa–chocolate industry. The information gathered was used to map the 
institutional structure of the cocoa chain, with working rules guiding transactions within 
the chain. It was shown, in confirmation of H2.1, that under working rules set by the FCC, 
the mode and matter of each transaction involving physical cocoa beans are largely pre-
determined, and therefore, negotiations are limited. Thereby, the futures market is the key 
determining factor of the cocoa bean price level in the physical market. Hence, the physical 
market price is directly linked to the derivatives market. It was confirmed, with reference to 
H2.2, that farmers, who hold the least legal and economic power, definitely occupy the 
weakest end of the commodity chain. However, in the case of Ghana, it was found that 
price pressure and market risk are not directly passed on to cocoa farmers. Hence, H2.3 
was rejected. This outcome arose due to the unique institutional structure of the Ghanaian 
cocoa chain. In the case of Ghana, Cocobod, which holds equal legal and economic power 
vis-à-vis multinational buyers, absorbs, at least partly, price pressure and market risk.     
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8.3 Implications 
In light of the evidence presented in this thesis, I conclude that financial investments by 
traders without a commercial interest in the physical commodity—depending on the 
market weight of these traders and the trading strategies employed—can significantly alter 
price formation mechanisms in commodity futures markets. Since financial investment has 
a direct impact on derivatives markets, but not on physical markets, price dynamics in the 
physical and derivatives markets differ, thereby leading to a volatile and large market basis, 
undermining hedging effectiveness. Further, derivatives markets’ price dynamics spill over 
to the physical market through arbitrage possibilities, traders’ expectations formation and 
the commodity sector-specific institutional structure guiding price formation mechanisms. 
In the case of cocoa, any physical transaction executed in a bargaining relationship is linked 
to the futures exchange through existing working rules. Hence, the price at the cocoa 
futures exchange is a prime determinant for the price paid and received for a cocoa bean in 
the physical market. In the particular case of Ghana, the transaction relationship between 
cocoa farmers and multinational buyers is mediated by Cocobod and CMC in particular. 
Price pressure and market risk is thus not directly passed on to smallholder farmers, but 
partly absorbed by Cocobod. Several implications for theory and policy arise from these 
findings.  
8.3.1 Implications for Theory 
Price dynamics observed in global commodity markets challenge the validity of both 
general equilibrium and rational expectation theories. The discussion in Chapter 2 
highlighted the necessity to consider price formation mechanisms in physical and 
derivatives markets in equal measure, as well as the complex interplay between these 
markets. Existing literature on price formation in commodity and asset markets provides 
only partial theories. These theories are incapable of fully capturing the commodity-specific 
interplay between physical and derivatives markets.   
Although theories on price formation in commodity markets fail to provide an explanation 
for recent price dynamics in commodity derivatives markets, asset-pricing and market 
microstructure theories could help to explain these recent price dynamics. However, asset-
pricing theories cannot provide any guidance on the direction of causation between price 
formation mechanisms in physical and derivatives markets. Econometric evidence 
presented in Chapter 4 highlights this shortcoming in existing theories. For the wheat 
market, the cash market is usually found to lead the futures market. However, the market 
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adjustment after the episode of non-convergence in 2008–09 suggests that, at least during 
this time period, the direction of causation was reversed, as physical wheat prices went 
through the roof, after limits to spatial arbitrage were resolved. This observation calls for a 
deeper analysis of the complex feedback mechanisms between cash and futures markets, 
beyond mechanical arbitrage conditions.  
Further, the findings presented in Chapters 4 and 5 call for a reconsideration of the 
interpretation of market basis and term structure. Although theories based on no-arbitrage 
conditions provide answers for a deviation between cash and futures markets, as well as 
simultaneously traded futures contracts, they are, by and large, based on the assumption 
that general equilibrium conditions in the physical market coincide with consensus 
expectations in the derivatives market. However, inspired by the theory of hedging 
pressure, this thesis puts forward a theory of ‘index pressure’, under which the 
intertemporal price relationship is not only driven by storage availability, but also by the 
micro structure of futures markets. The latter includes the market weight of index and 
other speculative traders. Under this theory, fundamental arbitrage is limited, and dynamic 
feedback mechanisms between derivatives and physical markets exist, which account for 
many of the recently observed anomalies, like large and volatile basis, non-convergence 
between cash and futures markets and exceptionally high market carry.  
The insights gained in Chapter 7, regarding working rules that limit negotiation over matter 
and mode of transactions in the cocoa sector, lead to further questioning of the assumption 
of general equilibrium conditions that underlie price formation in the physical market—an 
assumption that is prevalent in theories on commodity-pricing reviewed in Chapter 2: 
Section 2.2. In the case of cocoa, any transaction that involves the transfer of ownership 
over the physical cocoa bean is linked to the price formed at the cocoa futures exchange. 
The only negotiated part of the bean price received by CMC—the monopoly seller of 
Ghanaian cocoa beans—is the differential or market basis. This linkage between the 
futures and the physical market is institutional, written into FCC standardised forward 
contracts and barely considered in existing theories on price formation in commodity 
markets. 
Price formation mechanisms in chain approaches have been neglected so far. Although 
attempts have been made to disentangle the value added at each node of the chain—e.g., 
Gilbert (2008b)—the mechanisms of value creation are not well understood. Confirmed by 
the empirical evidence presented in Chapter 7, price formation mechanisms are 
institutionally determined by working rules that guide transactions in commodity sectors. 
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Further, it was argued in this thesis, with reference to Kaplinsky and Morris (2000), that an 
analysis of prices paid and received along the commodity chain does not allow for 
inference regarding the burdens and benefits accruing to stakeholders in the commodity 
chain. Instead, one has to look at income received by the stakeholder—that is, the real 
price received with input and labour costs subtracted. This thesis added an additional 
component. With reference to Commons’ (1934) transaction framework, as outlined in 
Chapter 6, it was argued that not only income, but also risk exposure of each stakeholder 
with regard to the factors constituting her income in the long and short-run has to be 
considered.  
8.3.2 Implications for Policy 
With the futures market’s price discovery function undermined, an institutional structure 
that links the commodity price level in the physical market directly to the futures market 
poses problems, especially for commodity producers and producing countries. Cocoa 
producers’ incomes—and, in the case of Ghana, also the income of CMC—are directly 
dependent on the cocoa prices formed in the futures market. While the liquidity provided 
by index traders executes a positive price pressure, that benefits producers, worries arise 
over the consequences of a mass liquidation of index positions, other speculative ones and 
the resulting increased price volatility. Intermediaries, in contrast, are not concerned with 
the price level, but rather the relative price and the proximity of futures and physical 
market prices. Further, if large enough, they benefit from volatile price changes in the 
derivatives market through outright speculation. The close, and institutionally determined, 
relationship between futures and physical market prices is beneficial for intermediaries, as it 
ensures hedging effectiveness for their commercial positions. Despite the close link 
between futures and physical market price still being institutionally determined, it was 
shown in this thesis that hedging effectiveness declined with increasing and volatile markets 
basis. Since the basis risk remains with the intermediary, conflicting price signals in futures 
and physical commodity markets, brought about by financial liquidity, can result in great 
losses. Although index and other speculative traders are valuable liquidity providers, 
liquidity provided by those traders needs to be carefully managed in order to prevent those 
traders from exerting price pressure.  
Liberalisation of commodity markets in the 1980s–90s was partly motivated by the 
conviction that with liberalised commodity sectors, market-based risk management would 
be provided by the private sector. This conviction has not materialised, resulting in the 
direct exposure of commodity producers, including cocoa farmers, to volatile world market 
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prices. Several attempts made by international donors to introduce derivative-based risk 
management tools to farmers were largely unsuccessful. The opening of commodity 
exchanges in commodity producing countries benefitted many except for farmers. For 
instance, the Ethiopian ECX has yet to contribute to a decrease in price risk for 
commodity producers like coffee farmers (Jayne, et al. 2014; Paul 2011). Further, the 
evidence presented in this thesis questions the appropriateness of market-based risk 
management via derivative instruments for smallholder farmers.  
In the particular case of Ghana, CMC manages the price risk on behalf of Ghanaian cocoa 
producers by forward selling the projected annual cocoa harvest. The forward selling works 
similarly to hedging via the exchange, with respect to price risk management, but with the 
important difference that CMC can enter into negotiations over the market basis. 
Multinational buyers are therefore forced into a bargaining transaction with CMC, instead 
of with smallholder farmers. CMC, which holds a monopoly over Ghanaian cocoa, has 
considerable economic power and is thus in equal negotiation positions vis-à-vis buyers. 
With its unique institutional structure, the CMC provides effective price risk management 
for stakeholders in the Ghanaian cocoa sector, and at the same time, is in a powerful 
position to negotiate a premium over the exchange price.  
Farmers and other stakeholders in the sector are still exposed, however, to other risk 
factors including inflation, quantity, quality and long term price risks. Further, cocoa 
farmers are still in a relatively weak bargaining position compared to purchasing clerks and 
LBCs. Farmers’ cooperatives, which are almost absent in Ghana, could potentially increase 
farmers’ negotiation position.  
8.4 Directions for Future Research 
In light of the discussion and evidence presented in this thesis, three areas of future 
research are identified. 
Firstly, an extension of the empirical analysis to other commodity futures markets and 
commodity sectors is desirable. Although the cocoa, coffee and wheat markets are 
interesting comparative case studies, a broadening of the analysis is crucial in order to 
establish whether evidence collected in those markets is representative across commodity 
markets. This is particularly important, given the novelty of the analytical framework used 
to assess the impact of financialisation on price formation mechanisms and the interplay 
between cash and futures markets. Since commodity markets differ greatly due to the 
physical features of their respective commodities, as well as the composition of traders in 
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their markets and industry structures, a set of commodity-specific analyses is necessary, 
before drawing more specific policy advice.  
The second area of research arises from the theoretical deliberations in Chapter 6 and 
analysis provided in Chapter 7. Firstly, a greater integration between existing chain 
approaches with institutional theories of price is desirable. Although a potential framework 
was drafted in Chapter 6, regarding an institutional theory of price, which has been 
amended by contributions to the chain literature, an institutional theory of risk is yet 
incomplete. Although Commons’ (1934) emphasis on ‘futurity’ and the differentiation 
between matter and mode of transaction are important foundations for an institutional 
theory of risk within a transaction framework, the theory needs elaboration.  
Additionally, the theoretical framework stresses that both mode and matter of a transaction 
are determined by the relative power of the agents involved in the going concern, i.e., the 
commodity chain. However, due to time and financial constraints, important stakeholders 
have been excluded from the analysis. Farmers and purchasing clerks have not been 
interviewed in person, since resources were insufficient for funding of a translator and 
additional excursions to cocoa farms. Moreover, consumers and retailers have not been 
considered in the analysis, due to time and space constraints.  
Last but not least, a comparative case study between the institutional structure of the cocoa 
sector in Ghana with neighbouring cocoa producers in Ivory Coast, Nigeria and Cameroon 
would be highly insightful. A comparative analysis would reveal the full implications of the 
country-specific institutional settings on price formation and risk allocation mechanisms 
across cocoa sectors.  
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Appendix 
Appendix Chapter 2 
Appendix 2.1 Discussion on the Validity of Equation (2.1) 
Prove can be given if considering that an investor might hold a commodity over the time 
period t to T and short a futures contract over the same time frame. The stochastic return 
on physical storage plus the return on shorting the commodity yields a non-stochastic 
return, which must equal the risk-free rate times the cash outlay: 
, −  − ,/  ,, − / = (, −  − , = 	
,)  
This is the case as the stochastic element in the return on the shorted futures contract is the 
inverse of the stochastic element in the return on holding the commodity over the same 
time period. Since the two stochastic elements cancel each other out, one is left with a 
certain return. 
However, this is only true if there is convergence between the cash and the futures price at 
maturity, that is: , = . Otherwise the return on shorting a commodity would not 
equal	, − , but	, − ,. For clarification Pindyck (2001) suggests the distinction 
between spot price and cash price. While the spot price is only observable at the point of 
maturity (so that (, = ) holds per definition), the cash price is the continuous price at 
the physical market. 
 
Appendix 2.2 Discussion on Keynes’s Own Rate of Interest 
The own rate of interest as conceptualised by Keynes can best be explained with an 
example. Taking wheat for instance, assume  tons of cocoa now would be worth z tonnes 
of cocoa in a year time. If  > y the own rate of interest is negative and if z >  the rate is 
positive. Hence in cocoa terms HD = H@1  ys with  = H@ and z = H@1  ys = HD. 
The same is rational is applicable to money. Since  USD today are worth z USD in a year 
we can write in money terms	ÚD = Ú@1  yt with  = Ú@ and z = Ú@1  y0 = ÚD. 
Kaldor referred to the convenience yield as the inverse of the own rate of interest, as 
Keynes estimated the own rate of interest in commodity terms, while the convenience yield 
is estimated in money terms. This leads to a switch in signs. Following Keynes example we 
assume that the cash price for wheat is £100/100g and the futures price for a year hence is 
 
320 
£107/100g with a 5 per cent money rate of interest. Hence £100 pounds would yield £105 
in a year time. However, this £105 would only buy 98.13g wheat in a year time as then 
wheat is at £107 per 100g. The wheat rate of interest is thus -1.87 per cent. One could 
understand this as an appreciation of wheat terms against money terms. Putting the 
Equation in money terms only, the sign would switch as money depreciates against wheat: 
£107 = £100(1+0.05)(1+0.0187), with 1.87 per cent being the inverse of the wheat rate of 
interest.       
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Appendix 2.3 Empirical Studies on Price Level and Volatility 
Source Evidence Markets Methodology Notes 
Amanor-Boadu 
and Zereyesus 
(2009) 
No Evidence for 
speculators driving 
price changes. 
Corn, wheat, and soybeans 
N/A 
OLS and ARIMA(2,1,2) models, regressing 
OI of non-commercial traders on prices (all in 
first differences). 
Coefficients are all negative and only slightly 
significant for corn. 
Amenc, Maffei 
and Till (2008) 
Fundamentals only 
behind the price 
level. 
Crude oil Qualitative data analysis  Fundamental variables are the major source of the 
price spike in 2008.  
Basu, Oomen and 
Stremme (2010) 
Information on 
speculative activity 
helps to time the 
market. 
Oil, copper 
10/1992-05/2006 (weekly) 
Designing a dynamically managed strategy 
with changing portfolio weights of S&P 500, 
T-bills, copper, and oil. 
Non-commercial, commercial, and non-
reporting share of long positions in total open 
interest (hedging pressure) are considered as 
predictive variables. 
Incorporating the predictive variables, one yields 
returns more than 12 times higher than if excluding 
those information. 
Non-commercial net-long positions are positively 
related to the weight of oil and copper in the 
portfolio.  
The strategy exits the copper market completely 
when hedging pressure fell.  
Beckmann, Belke 
and Czudaj (2014) 
Global liquidity has 
an impact on 
commodity price 
level. 
Commodity Research Bureau 
(CRB) indices (total, foodstuff, 
metals, raw materials) 
01/1980-06/2012 (monthly) 
Markov switching VECM in order to test 
the effect of global liquidity on global 
commodity prices in different market regimes.  
Approximate global liquidity with first 
principal component of money supply in US 
and other European countries.  
Find a significant long-run relationship between 
global liquidity and commodity prices. 
The underlying relationships are indeed characterized 
by regime-dependence, implying that the impact of a 
global liquidity measure on prices varies over time. 
Bicchetti and 
Maystre (2013) 
Evidence for high 
frequency trader 
enhancing co-
movement 
between 
commodity and 
stock markets. 
WTI oil, corn, wheat, sugar, 
soybeans, and live cattle  
1997-2011 (intraday) 
Analyse the intraday co-movements between 
commodity returns and stock market (S&P 
500 futures) returns. 
Compute rolling correlations with different 
frequencies (1-hour, 5-minute, 10-seconds). 
Find a synchronized structural break which starts in 
the course of 2008 and continues thereafter. 
They conclude that this is consistent with the idea 
that recent financial innovations on commodity 
futures exchanges, in particular the high frequency 
trading activities and algorithm strategies have an 
impact on these correlations. 
 
 
322 
Bos and van der 
Molen (2012) 
Both fundamentals 
and speculation 
affect price level.  
Coffee 
N/A 
Nonparametric analysis; 
Extensive dataset on supply, demand, 
inventories, other ‘fundamentals’, commercial 
and non-commercial open interest.  
 
At most times demand and supply, combined with 
other 'fundamentals' explains (close to) 100% of the 
coffee price. 
However, inefficiencies are contributable to long and 
short position of non-commercial speculators.  
Brunetti and 
Reiffen (2014) 
Index traders’ 
positions have an 
impact on the term 
structure  
Corn, soybeans, and wheat 
07/2003-12/2008 (daily) 
Two-step regression: 1) hedging cost on risk-
free rate and days till maturity and 2) constant 
(average cost of hedging) and s.d. of the error 
term on index traders’ positions and hedgers’ 
cash positions.  
Using a non-public dataset containing daily 
traders’ positions of hedgers and index traders 
(approximated by swap traders). 
Hedging costs defined as '< − < <⁄  
with '< taken as an unbiased proxy for '<. 
Find that the roll of index traders increases the spread 
between the maturing and the next-to-maturity 
contract. 
Further they find that the price of hedging (which 
really is the inverse of holding a long position) 
decreases – assuming that hedgers are all short in the 
market 
Brunetti, 
Büyükşahin and 
Harri (2010) 
Speculative trading 
reduces price 
volatility. 
Crude oil, natural gas, corn 
01/2005-03/2009 (daily) 
 
Non-public data on daily positions of 
individual traders (CFTC large trader reporting 
system); 
Granger non-causality testes between 
realised volatility, swap dealers, and money 
managers; 
Impulse response analysis. 
The trading activities of swap dealers as well as hedge 
funds in all markets considered stabilize prices. 
Büyükşahin and 
Robe (2011) 
Evidence for 
speculation 
increasing co-
movement. 
1) S&P GSCI energy index, 
S&P 500 
01/1991-05/2011 (weekly 
returns) 
2) Crude oil, heating oil, and 
natural gas,  
07/2000-03/2010 (daily) 
Non-public data on daily positions of 
individual traders (CFTC large trader reporting 
system). 
1) Dynamic conditional correlation between 
S&P GSCI energy index and S&P 500 index 
weekly returns. 
2) Auto regressive distributed lag model.  
Besides fundamentals, variations in the composition 
of open interest by hedge funds being active in both 
the commodity and equity markets explain 
fluctuations in the strength of energy-equity return 
linkages. 
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Büyükşahin and 
Robe (2014) 
Evidence for 
speculation 
increasing co-
movement. 
Wheat, corn, soybeans, coffee, 
sugar, cocoa, lean hogs, live 
cattle, feeder cattle, heading oil, 
crude, oil, natural gas, copper, 
gold, silver 
07/2000-03/2010 (daily) 
Non-public data on daily positions of 
individual traders (CFTC large trader reporting 
system). 
Auto regressive distributed lag model. 
Besides fundamentals, variations in the composition 
of open interest by hedge funds being active in both 
the commodity and equity markets explain 
fluctuations in the strength of energy-equity return 
linkages. 
No evidence can be found for an impact of index 
traders on cross-market linkages. 
Cifarelli and 
Paladino (2010) 
Evidence for the 
impact of 
speculative 
activities on price 
level. 
Crude oil (WTI) 
10/1992-06/2008 (weekly) 
Looking for positive feedback trading patterns 
in price data by employing a multivariate 
CAPM with GARCH-M specifications and 
controlling for stock prices and exchange 
rates.  
Positive feedback trading strategies may have caused 
considerable departure of the crude oil futures price 
from its fundamental value. 
Coakley, Kellard 
and Tsvetanov 
(2015) 
Evidence for 
bubble behaviour 
in the oil market. 
WTI crude oil 
09/1995-04/2012 (monthly) 
Recursive unit root (ADF) tests over 
continuous series (closing prices of the last 
business day of each month) of simultaneous 
traded contracts with different maturity dates.  
All series exhibit periods of bubble behaviour that 
end in late 2008.  
The dating algorithms establish that the bubbles in 
longer-dated contracts start much earlier and are 
longer lasting than the bubble in the spot contract. 
Gilbert (2008a) Some evidence for 
the impact of 
speculative 
activities on price 
level and price 
changes.  
1) Nickel, copper, zinc, lead, 
tin, and aluminium / LME 
02/2003-08/2008 (daily)  
2) Corn, soybean, soybean oil, 
wheat /CBOT 
01/2007-08/2008 (weekly) 
1) Unit root tests. 
2) Granger non-causality tests (returns, 
weekly changes in CIT index and non-
commercial traders’ open interest) 
 
Finds explosive bubble behaviour in metal markets 
(all despite lead). 
Index investment is found to have a persistent effect 
on soybean futures returns. 
 
 
 
Gilbert (2010b) Some evidence for 
the impact of 
speculative 
activities on price 
level and price 
changes.  
Crude oil, aluminium, copper, 
nickel, wheat, corn, and 
soybeans 
WTI, LME, CBOT  
01/2000-06/2009 (monthly 
average), 01/2006-12/2008 
(daily), 01/2000-12/2008 (daily 
for metals). 
Rolling unit root tests.  
Granger non-causality tests (log returns and 
Corazzolla index for index traders’ net OI 
based on information on agricultural 
commodity markets). 
3 stage least square regression analysis 
(dlog futures prices, market fundamentals, 
Corazzolla index)  
Finds significant evidence for explosive bubble 
behaviour in the copper and soybean market.  
Index based investments are found to have a 
permanent price impact on oil and metal prices over 
2006-2008, however, evidence is weaker for grain 
prices. 
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Gomez, et al. 
(2014) 
Excessive 
speculation led to 
increase in co-
movement across 
commodities.  
Aluminium, bananas, barley, 
beef, coal, coffee, copper, 
cotton, gold, hides, lamb, lead, 
maize, natural gas, nickel, palm 
oil, crude oil, rice, rubber, 
silver, soybeans, soybean meal, 
soybean oil, sugar, tea, tin, 
tobacco, wheat, wool, zinc 
12/1992-07/2010 (monthly) 
Network analysis: Ordered correlation 
matrix, ordered according to closeness 
relation among its elements. Then construct a 
hierarchical network from it. 
While there is no persistent increase in co-movement, 
from mid-2008 to end of 2009 co-movement almost 
doubled. 
They conclude that speculation and uncertainty are 
drivers of the sharp slump in commodity price 
synchronisation. 
Holt and Irwin 
(2000) 
No evidence for 
CTAs and hedge 
funds acting as 
noise traders. 
Evidence for 
positive effect on 
volatility.  
Coffee, copper, corn, cotton, 
gold, live hog, natural gas, 
crude oil, soybeans. 
CSCE, COMEX, CBOT, 
NYCE, CME, NYMEX 
04/1994-10/1994 (daily)  
Simple OLS regression between volatility 
(daily standard deviation/Parkinson’s extreme 
value estimator) and non-commercial traders’ 
positions 
Variance ratio tests to identify noise trading 
periods. 
OLS regression between net positions and 
prices: testing for positive feedback trading.  
Find a positive relationship between trading volume 
of large hedge funds and CTA's on market volatility. 
Only evidence for noise in the gold market.  
No evidence for destabilizing positive feedback 
trading by CTAs’ and hedge funds.  
 
 
 
ICCO (2006) Fundamentals only 
behind the price 
level. 
Cocoa 
NYBOT, LIFFE 
01/1986-12/2005 (daily) 
 
VECM between spot and futures prices at the 
LIFFE and NYBOT;  
VAR and impulse response analysis 
incorporating returns, price volatility, and 
investment positions of different trader types. 
LIFFE and NYBOT instantaneously incorporate new 
market information and the price discovery process is 
efficient. 
Speculation reduces price volatility and had on 
average a slightly negative price impact. 
Irwin and 
Sanders (2010) 
Influence of 
speculation on 
price changes 
insignificant and 
negative on 
volatility.  
Corn, soybeans, soybean oil, 
wheat, cotton, live cattle, feeder 
cattle, lean hogs, coffee, sugar, 
cocoa, crude oil, natural gas 
CBOT, KCBOT, NYBOT, 
CME 
07/2006-12/2009 (weekly) 
Granger non-causality tests between 
returns/implied volatility/realised volatility 
and net-long index open interest/percentage 
long of index in total OI long/Working’s 
speculative index  
Using DCOT (swap dealers) and COT/CIT 
(index traders) data on open interest.  
There is not significant relationship between index 
open interest and returns. 
For a few markets a negative and significant 
relationship between index investment and volatility 
is found.  
Working’s T-index appears to be positively related to 
market volatility. 
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Irwin and 
Sanders (2012) 
Influence of 
speculation 
insignificant for 
price level and 
volatility. 
Corn, soybeans, soybean oil, 
wheat, cotton, live cattle, feeder 
cattle, lean hogs, coffee, sugar, 
cocoa, crude oil (WTI), gas 
(RBOB), heating oil, natural 
gas, gold, silver, copper 
12/2007-04/2011 (quarterly) 
Cross-sectional analysis: relationship 
between quarterly returns/implied 
volatility/realised volatility and growth rate of 
net-long open interest/growth rate of net-long 
notional value of index investors (lagged and 
contemporaneous). 
CFTC larger trader reporting system, special 
call for index investment data 
Very little evidence for the impact of index traders 
positions on returns and volatility.  
 
Juvenal and 
Petrella (2011) 
Both speculation 
and fundamentals 
behind price 
changes and co-
movement.  
Crude oil, various variables 
covering market fundamentals. 
NYMEX 
01/1971-12/2009 (quarterly) 
Factor augmented VAR model and impulse 
response analysis: 
1) Estimating unobserved factors and factor 
loadings using principal component methods; 
2) Use estimated factors to estimate augment 
the conventional four variable VAR model.  
Global demand shocks account for the largest and 
speculative demand for the second largest diver of 
price fluctuations and co-movement across 
commodities. 
Between 2004 and 2008 financial speculation played a 
highly significant role. 
Karstanje, Wel 
and Dijk (2013) 
Significant term 
structure  co-
movement across 
commodities 
Brent crude oil, WTI crude oil, 
gas oil, heating oil, natural gas, 
gasoline, gold, silver, 
aluminium, copper, lead, nickel, 
zinc, cocoa, coffee, cotton, 
sugar, corn, soybeans, feeder 
cattle, lean hogs 
01/1995-09/2012 (monthly) 
Extended Nelson and Siegel yield curve 
factor model in order to extract level, slope, 
and curvature factors for each commodity.  
Assess the degree of co-movement across 
term structure factors of different 
commodities by distinguishing between global, 
sector and idiosyncratic components in rolling 
principal component analysis.  
Find co-movement in common factors of commodity 
futures curves.  
For the level factor, the co-movement is mostly due 
to a global level component. 
For the slope and curvature factors the co-movement 
is both due to a global and sector speciﬁc 
component. 
 
Kaufmann (2011) Both speculation 
and fundamentals 
behind price level. 
Crude oil Co-integration analysis between WTI crude 
oil futures and Dubai-Fateh spot prices.  
Co-integrating relationship between 
market fundamental factors and the near 
month WTI crude oil contract. 
Finds repeated and extended breakdowns of the co-
integrating relationship between spot and futures 
prices starting from 2004. 
Find that the co-integrating relationship between 
crude oil futures and fundamental variables breaks 
down between 2007 and 2008. 
Kesicki (2010) Speculation only 
minor transitory 
effect on price 
level.  
Crude oil (WTI) 
NYMEC, ICE London 
2003-2008 
Qualitative data analysis. Speculation played only a limited and temporary role 
in accelerating price movements.  
 
326 
Lagi, et al. (2011) Evidence for the 
impact of 
speculative 
activities on price 
level. 
Food prices  
FAO food index  
01/2004-04/2011 
Constructing a dynamic structural model 
allowing for trend-following behaviour. 
The dominant causes of price increases are investor 
speculation (price spikes) and ethanol conversion 
(underlying price trend).  
A structural break is found in 2000 where prices 
stopped to follow supply and demand relations. 
Liao-Etienne, 
Irwin and Garcia 
(2012) 
Evidence for 
bubble in grain 
markets. Partial 
evidence for link to 
index traders.  
Corn, soybeans, KCBT wheat, 
and CBOT wheat 
01/2004-02/2012 (weekly) 
Firstly identifies periods of explosive growth 
with recursive unit root (ADF) tests.  
Secondly identify periods of explosive growth 
with dummy variable and test effect of 
changes in index net-long positions on returns 
in Granger non-causality framework.   
Identify periods of explosive growth between the end 
of 2007 and first half of 2008 as well as second half 
of 2010.  
Find Granger causality for CBOT wheat in explosive 
and non-explosive periods. No Granger causality can 
be found for other commodities. 
Liao-Etienne, 
Irwin and Garcia 
(2014) 
No evidence for 
‘new’ kind of 
speculative 
bubbles. 
Corn, soybeans, soybean oil , 
wheat (CBOT and KCBT), 
feeder cattle, live cattle, lean 
hogs, cocoa, coffee, cotton, and 
sugar 
1970-2011 (daily) 
Identifying periods of explosive growth with 
recursive unit root (ADF) tests on individual 
futures contracts.  
All markets experience bubbles.  
Bubble episodes represent a very small portion 
between 1.5 and 2% of price behaviour during the 
42-year period.  
Most bubbles are short-lived with 80–90% lasting 
fewer than 10 days. 
Explosive periods did not become more common or 
longer lasting.  
Manera, Nicolini 
and Vignati 
(2013) 
Evidence for short-
term speculation 
increasing 
volatility, but long-
term speculation 
decreasing 
volatility. 
WTI crude oil, heating oil, 
gasoline, natural gas, cocoa, 
coffee, corn, oats, soybean oil, 
soybeans, wheat  
1986 – 2010 (weekly) 
 
Distinguishes between short-run 
(volume/open interest) and long-run 
speculation (Working’s T-index, market share 
of non-commercials, net-long positions of 
non-commercials) indices. 
Return-GARCH model with macro factors 
(S&P 500, T-bill, Junk Bond Yields) in the 
mean Equation and speculation variables in 
GARCH Equation. 
Speculation significantly affects the volatility of 
returns: The scalping (short-term) index has a 
positive and significant coefficient in the variance 
Equation and the other long-term speculation indices 
have negative and partly significant coefficients. 
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Maurice and 
Davis (2011) 
No evidence for 
speculation driving 
price changes and 
co-movement. 
Cocoa, arabica coffee, robusta 
coffee 
LIFFE, ICE 
01/1990-09/2011 (monthly) 
Granger non-causality tests investigating the 
impact of oil futures returns on cocoa and 
coffee futures returns;  
Co-integration analysis between coffee / 
cocoa futures prices and oil futures prices. 
Co-integration analysis and ECM between 
coffee / cocoa futures and spot prices. 
Oil prices are found to Granger-cause coffee as well 
as cocoa prices; 
Only cocoa prices are co-integrated with oil prices. 
Cocoa and coffee markets are efficient despite 
speculative activity with a high speed of adjustment 
between futures and spot prices.  
Mayer (2009) Evidence for the 
impact of index 
positions on price 
changes. 
Maize, wheat, soybeans, 
soybean oil, copper, gold, crude 
oil, natural gas. 
CBOT, KCBOT 
01/2002-06/2008 (weekly) 
1) Regressing by OLS share of net non-
commercial traders / share of net index 
traders in total open interest on indicators 
related to returns diversification 
considerations. 
2) Granger non-causality of share of net 
non-commercial and share of net index traders 
in total open interest on returns.  
Index as well as non-commercial traders follow 
returns; index positions are also influenced by roll 
yields.  
Evidence for changes in the position of index traders 
causing price changes for soybeans, soybean oil, 
copper and crude oil. 
 
Mou (2011) Finds prolonged 
impact of index roll 
on commodity 
term structure 
WTI crude oil, heating oil, 
gasoline, live cattle, soybean 
meal, pork belly, propane and 
copper. 
01/1980-03/2010 (annual 
average) 
Panel regression: Regressing the annual 
average of the difference in the roll yields 
during the S&P GSCI index roll and else on 
different commodities with dummies 
indicating if the commodity is indexed plus 
control variables for commodity specific 
fundamentals. 
Designs two trading strategies which makes 
use of the roll impact (calendar spread) of 
index investors.  
Finds that on average the roll yield is deflated by 0.36 
percent after a commodity is included in the S&P 
GSCI which implies that the roll has a significant 
price impact.  
Both trading strategies yield a significant increase in 
excess returns and experience a highly significant 
surge in the ‘Sharpe’ ratios after 2000.  
Ncube, Tessema 
and Gurara (2014) 
No evidence for 
excessive co-
movement 
between oil and 
grains/softs. 
1) Coffee, cotton, cocoa,  
2) Wheat, corn, and palm-oil 
Analyse co-movement between two groups of 
commodities and crude oil. 
Account for fundamentals in multivariate 
GARCH framework and explore remaining 
time-varying pair-wise covariance i.e. co-
movement between commodity pairs.  
Joint movement in commodity prices is explained by 
common macroeconomic variables with the 
exception of periods of economic downturn.  
This is explained by changing expectations. 
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Power and 
Turvey (2011) 
No evidence for 
the impact of 
speculative 
activities on price 
volatility.  
Corn, soybeans, wheat, live 
cattle. 
CBOT, CME 
01/1998-12/2006 
Two stage least square model to analyse 
relationship between the trading volume of 
index traders (wavelet transformation of total 
futures volume excluding variations with a 
time horizon of less than one month) and 
price volatility (absolute returns). 
No evidence for the impact of long-term index 
investment on price volatility for corn, soybeans and 
wheat; some evidence found for live cattle.  
 
 
Redrado, et al. 
(2009) 
Speculation can 
cause prices level 
to deviate from 
fundamental value 
for a prolonged 
period of time. 
IFS aggregate food and 
aggregate metal index  
01/1973-05/2008 (monthly) 
 Smooth transition VAR models (STAR), 
with the no-linear transition function being 
determined by the size of the misalignment of 
the current price regarding its fundamental 
value.  
Very large misalignments tend to be corrected 
relatively fast, while smaller misalignments persist 
over time without any endogenous correction in 
place. 
Those smaller misalignments are probably driven by 
market sentiments  
Robles, Torero 
and von Braun 
(2009) 
Speculation might 
have an impact on 
price changes. 
Wheat, maize, soybeans, rice. 
CBOT 
01/2002-05/2008 (monthly) 
Speculation indicators: ratio of volume to OI, 
ratio between commercial and non-
commercial traders, net index traders’ 
positions.  
Rolling Granger non-causality tests between 
commodity prices and speculation indicators. 
Speculation indicators are relatively stable over time. 
Some evidence for past values of speculative 
indicators being positively correlated with price 
changes. 
Speculation might be a consequence rather than a 
cause.  
Sanders, Irwin 
and Merrin (2010) 
Speculation was 
not excessive over 
the last decade.  
Corn, soybeans, soybean oil, 
wheat, cotton, live cattle, feeder 
cattle, lean hogs 
CBOT, KCBOT 
Assessing the ‘adequacy of speculation’ by 
Working’s T-Index (estimated with COT, 
COT/CIT and CFTC bank participation 
report. 
Speculation on commodity futures markets was not 
particularly high over the last years in historical 
comparison.  
Schulmeister 
(2009) 
Evidence for the 
profitability of 
noise traders.  
Oil, corn, wheat, rice. 
1994-2008 
Investigating the performance of 1092 popular 
technical trading strategies and their 
potential price impact. 
Technical trading strategies were highly profitable.  
Market entrance and exit impulses are given almost 
simultaneously across all strategies.  
High potential price impact.  
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Silvennoinen and 
Thorp (2013) 
Evidence for 
speculation 
increasing co-
movement 
 
Corn, soybeans, soybean oil, 
wheat, lean hogs, live cattle, 
pork bellies, coffee, cotton, 
orange juice, sugar, gold, 
platinum, silver, aluminium, 
copper, nickel, lead, tin, zinc, 
brent oil, crude oil, heating oil, 
natural gas 
CBT, CME, CSCE, NYCE, 
COMEX, LME, NYMEX 
05/1990-07/2009 (weekly) 
Time-varying (double) smooth transition 
conditional correlation GARCH ([D]SCC-
GARCH) models, logistic transition functions 
are conditioned on time, expected stock 
volatility (VIX) and non-commercial traders’ 
OI. 
 
Correlation between equity and commodity returns 
has increased for almost all commodities over time. 
This is more pronounced for commodities included 
in the major indices.   
Observe higher and more variable correlations when 
expected stock volatility is high.  
 
 
 
Singleton (2014) Evidence for the 
impact of 
speculative 
activities on oil 
price changes. 
Crude oil 
09/2006-01/2010 (weekly) 
OLS regression: Including contracts of all 
maturities; 
Regressing the excess returns against returns 
on own lags, S&P500, MSCI Emerging Asia 
indices, overnight repo positions, thirteen-
week change in positions of index investors 
and managed-money spread positions, 
aggregate open interest, and convenience yield.  
 
The intermediate-term growth rates of index 
positions and managed-money spread positions had 
the largest impacts on futures prices. 
Found statistically significant predictive powers of 
changes in the index investor and managed money 
spread positions on excess returns.   
Increases in flows into index funds over the 
preceding three months predict higher subsequent 
futures prices. 
Stoll and Whaley 
(2011) 
No evidence for 
index traders 
affecting price 
changes (but non-
commercial traders) 
 
Cocoa, coffee, corn, cotton, 
wheat, soybean oil, crude oil, 
heating oil, natural gas, feeder 
cattle, lean hogs, live cattle, 
gold, and silver 
01/2006-07/2009 
(daily)/(weekly) 
 
 
Comparing contemporaneous correlation of 
futures prices for indexed commodities; 
OLS regression calendar spread on index 
investment during times of rollover;  
Granger non-causality between index 
investment flows (dollar value) and 
commodity returns; 
OLS regressing weekly futures returns on 
contemporaneous non-commercial and index 
trader flows. 
Prices of non-indexed commodities and commodities 
without futures markets behave similar to indexed 
commodities (only graphical comparison). 
Impact of index investment on calendar spread only 
high and significant for crude oil.  
Granger causality tests only significant for cotton, 
soybeans, and soybean oil.   
Non-commercial open interest across commodities is 
positively correlated with returns.  
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Tang and Xiong 
(2012) 
Evidence for 
speculation 
increasing co-
movement 
Corn, wheat, soybean, soybean 
oil, soybean meal, live cattle, 
lean hogs, feed cattle, gold, 
silver, copper, coffee, cocoa, 
cotton, sugar, rice, oat, orange 
juice, lumber, platinum, 
palladium, pork belly  
01/1998-10/2009 (monthly) 
Panel regression with indexed and off-index 
commodity returns on the oil returns and a set 
of control variables (Morgan Stanley emerging 
market equity index, global shipping index, 
returns on the S&P500, JP Morgan Treasury 
bond index, US dollar index, CPI inflation 
rate) and a dummy for a structural break in 
2004. 
Futures prices of different commodities became 
increasingly correlated with each other and this trend 
was significantly more pronounced for indexed 
commodities.  
Correlation between non-energy commodities and oil 
increased significantly after 2004 and is stronger for 
index than for off-index commodities.  
Timmer (2009) Speculation only 
indirect impact on 
rice price level. 
Rice, wheat, corn 
N/A 
VAR models to assess the impact of other 
commodity prices, oil prices and exchange rate 
movement on commodity futures returns. 
In the short-run, wheat and corn price dynamics are 
almost certainly caused by financial speculators. 
Rice is only affected through the speculation in other 
commodity markets which leads to hoarding as the 
rice futures market. 
Vansteenkiste 
(2009) 
Strong common 
macro-economic 
factors are behind 
co-movement. 
Cocoa, coffee, tea, coconut/ 
groundnut/ palm/ linseed/ 
soybean oil, soybeans, copra, 
maize, rice, wheat, sugar, 
cotton, jute, rubber, wool, 
timber, aluminium, copper, 
lead, nickel, tin, and zinc  
01/ 1957-05/2008 (quarterly) 
Dynamic common factor analysis, 
employing Kalman filter techniques; 
Does not account for potential speculative 
impact. 
Separating common and idiosyncratic factors for each 
commodity market it is found that there exists one 
common significant factor which has become 
increasingly important in driving non-fuel commodity 
prices: oil prices, USD exchange rates, US real 
interest rates, and global demand.  
Vansteenkiste 
(2011) 
Significant impact 
of speculators on 
price level. 
WTI crude oil 
01/1992 – 04/2011 (monthly) 
Two-Regime Markov-switching model; 
switching between “fundamental-based” and 
“chartist-based” regimes. 
Regime switch is conditioned on degree of 
speculative activity measured by Working’s T-
index. 
An increase in speculative activity increases the 
probability of remaining in the chartist regime.  
And the probability of being in this regime has 
significantly increased and from 2004 onwards the 
chartist regime appears to have prevailed. 
Yung and Liu 
(2009) 
Evidence for the 
impact of 
speculative 
activities on price 
changes. 
Copper, gold, silver, crude oil, 
natural gas, and unleaded gas 
VECM; Daily return and turnover 
 
 
Find relatively strong and consistent evidence of 
overconfident trading among futures speculators 
only. 
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Appendix Chapter 3 
Appendix 3.1: Overview CFTC Traders’ Positions Reports 
CFTC Trader’s Positions Data Sets 
 Trader Categories   Definition  Investors  Classification  
Commitment of Trader Report [COT] 
Availability: Futures only, 
futures-and-options 
combined | January 1986 
Frequency: Monthly (till 
1992), Weekly (thereafter) 
Commercial  
Entity that it is commercially engaged in business activities 
hedged by the use of the futures or option markets. 
Producers; Users, Intermediaries; 
Swap dealers (index and non-
index) 
Hedgers, active informed, 
active uninformed, 
passive uninformed 
Non-Commercial 
Entity that is not trading in commodity futures for the 
purpose of hedging.  
All but the above (index and 
non-index) 
Active informed, active 
uninformed, passive 
uninformed 
Non-Reportable  
Traders whose trading exposure is below a reporting level 
set by the CFTC. 
All traders below reportable level 
Active informed, active 
uninformed, passive 
uninformed 
Index Trader Supplement [CIT]1 
Availability: Futures-and-
options combined | 
(backdated January 3, 2006) 
Frequency: Weekly 
Commercial  See COT exl. index See COT exl. index 
Hedgers, active informed, 
active uninformed 
Non-Commercial See COT exl. index See COT exl. index 
Active informed, active 
uninformed 
Non-Reportable  See COT See COT 
Active informed, active 
uninformed, passive 
uninformed 
Index Trader 
Traders which entertain a passive strategy seeking exposure 
to commodity price movements by investing in a broad 
index of commodities, a sub-index of related commodities, 
or a single commodity index.  
Index funds, swap dealers, 
pension and endowment funds 
(typically gain exposure through 
swap dealers), hedge funds and 
mutual funds. Also included are 
exchange traded funds and notes 
(ETFs and ETNs) and exchange 
traded products (ETPs).  
Passive uninformed 
Index Investment Data [IID]2 
 
Availability: Futures, 
Index Trader See CIT See CIT Passive uninformed 
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Options and OTC 
Frequency: Monthly 
 
Disaggregated Commitment of Trader Report [DCOT] 
Availability: Futures only, 
futures-and-options 
combined | September 4 
2009 (backdated: June 13, 
2006) 
Frequency: Weekly 
Producer/ Merchants/ 
Processor/ User 
Entities that predominantly engage in the production, 
packaging, and handling of the physical commodity. Use 
the futures market to hedge.  
Producers; merchants; 
processors; users. 
Hedgers, active informed 
Swap Dealer 
Deals primarily in swaps and use the futures market to 
manage or hedge their risk.  
Swap traders (often facilitating 
index investment for their clients) 
Passive uninformed, 
active uninformed 
Money Manager 
Managing and conducting organised futures trading on 
behalf of clients. 
CTAs; CPOS; and unregistered 
funds. 
Active uninformed; active 
informed 
Other Reportable 
Every other reportable trader that is not placed into one of 
the other three categories. 
All but the above (e.g. pension 
and investment funds, 
investment banks). 
Passive uninformed, 
active informed, active 
uninformed 
Traders in Financial Futures Report [TFF] 
 
Availability: Futures only, 
futures-and-options 
combined | (backdated: 
June 13 2006) 
Frequency: Weekly 
*Only commodity indices 
but not single commodity 
market. 
Dealer/ Intermediary 
Agents that design various financial assets which they sell 
to clients. Risks are offset across markets and clients; 
futures are part of the risk management.  
Lager banks; dealers in securities, 
swaps and other derivatives.  
Passive uninformed, 
“hedgers”  
Asset Manager/ 
Institutional 
Institutional investors  
Pension funds; endowments; 
insurance companies; mutual 
funds. 
Passive uninformed 
Leveraged Fund 
Entities which employ strategies which involve outright 
positions; arbitrage within and across markets on their 
behalves or behalves of speculative clients.  
Hedge funds; various types of 
money managers like CTAs, 
CPOs, or unregistered funds.  
Active uninformed, active 
informed 
Other Reportable 
Mostly traders who use the market to hedge business risk 
(foreign exchange, equities, interest rate). 
Corporate treasuries; central 
banks; mortgage originators; 
credit unions. 
Passive uninformed, 
active informed, active 
uninformed 
Large Trader Net Position Changes  
 
Availability: Futures net 
position changes January 
2009 to May 2011 
Frequency: Weekly3 
 
Same as DCOT Same as DCOT Same as DCOT Same as DCOT 
Note: The COT/CIT/DCOT/TFF reports provide a breakdown of each Tuesday's open interest for markets in which 20 or more traders hold positions equal to or above the 
reporting levels established by the CFTC. A trading entity generally gets classified by filing a statement with the Commission, on CFTC Form 40: Statement of Reporting Trader. 
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COT/DCOT data are available for futures and options and futures combined.  
1 The long report, in addition to the information in the short report, also groups the data by crop year, where appropriate, and shows the concentration of positions held by the largest 
four and eight traders. The Supplemental report is published for futures and options combined in selected agricultural markets and, in addition to showing all the information in the 
short format, shows positions of Index Traders. 
2 In contrast to the CIT report the IID report shows index based positions only. If the preponderance of a trader’s trading is index related all her positions are classified as index 
positions in the CIT report. Hence the CIT report might under/overstate the true index based positions. The IID data is based on a “special call” for index traders and shows only 
those positions purely linked to index trading.  
3 Simple weekly average of the aggregated daily net positions of reportable traders. 
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Appendix 3.2: Technical Overview over Empirical Literature 
Study Frequency Dependent (Y) Independent (X) 
Sanders, Boris, and 
Manfredo (2004) 
Weekly  Û_Ö}!>, = W2wÜ®,$uÝ2®,W2wÜ®,uÝ2®,, with 
i={com, ncom} 
• - = ln	 
¤
È¤¤ , returns 
Domanski and 
Heath (2007) 
Monthly  Û_Ö}!>, = W2wÜ®,$uÝ2®,F , with 
i=ncom 
Return 
• -@ = 
¤$
È¤¤
È¤¤ , returns 
• -~ÛÛ = ∑ 
È®¤ $
È®ß
È®¤@D>_] , average size of the roll return over the previous 12 months. 
• l~Û = à∑ 4È®ß8á®âá $4?ß8D]$@ , volatility defined as the 20 months standard deviation of three-month futures 
returns.  
• J! = ∑ 	QãQ_@ , with r=three-month interest rate and j={Canada, Germany, Japan, Sweden, UK, US}. 
Diversification  
• H~		 = ∑ (4È®¤äá®âá $4?¤0IÈ®$0I?????)à∑ 4È®¤äá®âá $4?¤8∑ 0IÈ®$0I?????8äá®âá , correlation between returns and Morgan Stanley world equity 
price index over the last 5 years.  
• JÛ = «~w2t − «~»fW , inflation expectations defined as the difference between nominal and real 
10=year US bonds.  
Mayer (2009) Monthly  Û_Ö}!>, = W2wÜ®,$uÝ2®,F , with 
i={ncom, index} 
Return 
• -@ = 
¤$
È¤¤
È¤¤ , returns 
• -~ÛÛ = ∑ 
È®¤ $
È®ß
È®¤@D>_] , average size of the roll return over the previous 12 months. 
• l~Û = à∑ 4È®ß¤8®âá $4?ß8@D$@ , volatility defined as the 12 months standard deviation of three-month futures 
returns.  
• J! = ∑ 	QãQ_@ , with r=three-month interest rate and j={Canada, Germany, Japan, Sweden, UK, US}. 
Diversification 
• H~		 = ∑ (4È®¤¤8®âá $4?¤I:È®$I:????)à∑ 4È®¤¤8®âá $4?¤8∑ I:È®$I:????8¤8®âá , correlation between returns and Standard and Poor 500 equity 
price index over the last year.  
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• JÛ = «~w2t − «~»fW , inflation expectations defined as the difference between nominal and real 
10=year US bonds. 
• Euro-Dollar exchange rate. 
Mayer (2012) Monthly  Û_Ö}!>, = W2wÜ®,$uÝ2®,F , with 
i={ncom, index} 
Return 
• -@ = åæ	
¤ 
È¤¤ç åæ	
È¤¤  , returns 
• -~ÛÛ = ∑ åæ	
È®¤ 
È®ßç åæ	
È®¤ @D>_] , average size of the roll return over the previous 12 months. 
• l~Û = à∑ 4È®ß¤8®âá $4?ß8@D$@ , volatility defined as the 12 months standard deviation of three-month futures 
returns 
• J! = ∑ 	QãQ_@ , with r=three-month interest rate and j={Canada, Germany, Japan, Sweden, UK, US} 
Diversification  
• H~		 = ∑ (4È®¤¤8®âá $4?¤4È®Eè$4?Eè)à∑ 4È®¤¤8®âá $4?¤8∑ 4È®Eè $4?Eè8¤8®âá , correlation between returns and Standard and Poor 500 equity 
price index returns over the last year.  
• JÛ = «~w2t − «~»fW , inflation expectations defined as the difference between nominal and real 
10=year US bonds. 
• US-Dollar exchange rate index (geometrically weighted index of currencies of major trading partners). 
McAller and 
Radalji (2013) 
Weekly  Û>, = Û~é>, − ¬{~	!>,, with 
i=nrep 
• - = ln	 
¤
È¤¤ , returns 
• mJ = ∑uÝ2®,∑ W2wÜ®,D∗∑ uê»fë®,D , total open interest. 
Intentional herding 
• Ûws2t,$@, lagged net-long positions of commercial traders.  
Wang (2003) Monthly ∆Û>,@, with i={com, ncom} Investor sentiments 
• ∆¬y , which is the change in the Consensus Index published by Consensus Inc. 
Return 
• -@ = 
¤$
È¤¤
È¤¤ , with (t-1) being one month lag.  
Common information variables 
• Expected inflation = monthly yield on 3-months T-bills 
• Premium of default risk = Monthly yield on Moody’s BBA-rated long-term minus AAA-rated corporate 
bonds.  
• Signal for risk premium = Monthly dividend yield on the S&P 500 index. 
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Rouwenhorst and 
Tang (2012) 
Weekly [ = ∆wW®,FÈ¤ , with i={com, 
ncom| com, mm, swap, other | 
com, ncom, index} 
• -@ = 
¤$
È¤¤
È¤¤ , excess returns with @ being the nearest to maturity contract not maturing in month t.  
• ¬y¬ = ∑ 
È®¤ $
È®8
È®¤|D>_] , annualised percentage price difference between the front month and the next to 
maturity month as a proxy for the average market basis.  
Note: com refers to commercial trader or producer and consumer in the DCOT report, ncom refers to non-commercial traders in the COT and CIT report, mm stand for money 
managers, swap for swap traders, and others for other non-commercial traders in the DCOT report, index stands for index traders as in the CIT supplement.  
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Appendix 3.3: Extrapolative Trading Indicators and Index Creation 
Technical traders look at a variety of different indicators. However, most indicators are 
based on settlement prices, open interest and volume which are provided by the respective 
exchanges. Indicators aim at identifying trends in the data that is regularities which 
historically coincided with the market moving in a particular direction. Predicting this 
direction gives the trader an edge over others. In order to develop a variable that captures 
extrapolation and could be used in a time series analysis, four different indicators, two 
based on past prices and two on open interest and volume data, are used. The timing of 
buy and sell-signals based on these indicators is then captured in a single variable. While 
those indicators cannot do justice to highly complex trading algorithms, they are believed 
to still serve as benchmark indicators considered by many market practitioners.  
Relative Strength Index: 
Relative strength [RS] is a measure which captures the ratio between the average of closing 
prices on days which saw a rise and the average of closing prices on days which saw a fall. 
Exponential moving averages are commonly used.  
- = 90R_U:Ê90R_ìÌíÊ  
With the exponential moving average of closing prices above ['ÚÁ_¾<] and below 
['ÚÁ_Lm q] the previous closing price: 
'ÚÁ_¾< = ∑ (>>_] ∗ $>),  
'ÚÁ_Lm q = ∑ (QQ_] ∗ z$Q).  
 is the number of trading days over which the exponential moving average is calculated 
and w are exponentially declining weights. For the calculation of the indicator  = 10, 
which means that the exponential moving average is calculated over the last 10 trading 
days.  and z are the closing prices chosen as following:  
 = î|∆Ö|, y	Ö − Ö$@ > 00,																y	Ö − <$@ ≤ 0 
z = î|∆Ö|, y	Ö − Ö$@ < 00,																y	Ö − <$@  0 
The relative strength index [RSI] standardises the RS so that RSI ∈ (0; 100). 
-J = 100 − @]]@4IÊ  
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As a rule of thumb, traders assume lower and upper boundaries, commonly define at [20; 
80]. If the RSI crosses the upper threshold the asset is through to be over-bought. If the 
lower threshold is crossed the asset is thought to be over-sold. The former amounts to a 
sell-signal and the latter to a buy-signal. Hence, whenever the RSI is greater than 80 a sell-
signal is counted for and if it is lower than 20 a buy-signal is counted for.  
 = î1, y	-J ≤ 200, y	-J > 20  
 = î1, y	-J  800, y	-J < 80  
The below graphic depicts the RSI for cocoa from mid-January 2006 to end of February 
2006. The line in light grey is the RSI while the strait lines at 20 and 80 represent the 
boundaries.  
 
 
Moving Average Convergence Divergence: 
Similarly to the RSI the Moving Average Convergence Divergence [MACD] signals 
whether the market is over-bough or over-sold. MACD is calculated by the difference 
between two exponential past price averages over different time periods.  'ÚÁ = ∑ (>>_] ∗ Ö$>)  
ÚÁHL = 'ÚÁòóó − 'ÚÁóòôõö  
with Ö	being the closing price at a particular point in time. For the calculation of the 
indicator utfWW is chosen to be 12 days and WfÜ» is chosen to be 26 days. The MACD is 
then plotted against its own 9-day exponential moving average, which is commonly 
referred to as the “signal line”. If the MACD crosses its signal line from below it is 
considered to be a bullish signal. If it crosses from above it is considered to be bearish. The 
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buy and sell indicator is then estimated from the difference between the MACD and its 
signal line [L = ÚÁHL − 'ÚÁ÷).  
 = î1, y	L > 0		L$@ < 00,					~!{	y¬																				  
 = î1, y	L < 0		L$@ > 00,						~!{	y¬																			  
The indicators are hence only picking up the moment at which the signal line is crossed. 
An example from the cocoa market is depicted below. 
 
 
Open Interest Momentum 
In combination with prices indices, open interest and volume data are almost always 
considered in addition. Open interest only varies if a new contract is created or an old 
ceases to exist, but not if contracts which had previously been in the market are resold or 
rebought (this is captured by volume). In many markets, especially in commodity markets, 
open interest is highly cyclical as hedgers enter the market in particular months. Hence, a 
good way to see whether open interest is particularly high or low is to plot open interest 
against its 5-year seasonal average. A particularly low open interest signals that a current 
price trend is likely to come to an end soon, while a relatively high open interest signals 
support for the present trend. The support is estimated taking on one if current open 
interest is above its 5-year seasonal average and zero otherwise.  
nÖF = ø1, y ∑ F®,ù®â¤| < mJ@,0,							~!{	y¬							  
with i indicating the particular year and t the particular day of the year. If the buy or sell 
indicator is positive, the open interest support is added to the indicator. If there is no buy 
or sell-signal, the open interest support is not added. The graphic below shows open 
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interest and the 5 year seasonal average for the cocoa market over the time period 
December 2010 to December 2011.  
 
 
Volume Oscillator 
Volume data, similar to open interest, gives important additional information about 
whether a current trend is supported. A commonly used index is the volume oscillator 
which is the simple difference between a shorter and a longer exponential moving average. 'ÚÁ = ∑ (>>_] ∗ lÚ$>)  
lm = 'ÚÁòóó − 'ÚÁóòôõö   
As for MACD, 12 and 26 days are chosen for the small and large period exponential 
moving average. The volume oscillator, similar to the MACD, is then compared to its 9-day 
exponential moving average. If the current volume is above the signal line, it is considered 
as support for the current price trend. The difference between the two trends [L = lm −'ÚÁ÷) is then used to calculate the support indicator. 
 nÖú0 = î1, yL < 0			0, ~!{	y¬ 
If the support indicator coincides with a buy or sell-signal, it is added to the indicator.  
 
100
120
140
160
180
200
220
T
h
o
u
sa
n
d
s
Open Interest Momentum Cocoa Example 
(Dec. 31st 2010 to Dec. 29th 2011)
OI
5-year seasonal
OI average
-20000
-15000
-10000
-5000
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
Volume Oscillator Cocoa Example
(Jun. 11th 2014 to Sep. 24th 2014)
Volume
Signal Line
 
341 
Appendix 3.4: Recursive Coefficient Estimates Equations 3.6-7 
Figure 3.4.1: Contemporaneous Estimation Rolling Coefficients Cocoa 
 
Source: author’s estimation. 
 
Figure 3.4.2: Contemporaneous Estimation Rolling Coefficients Wheat 
 
Source: author’s estimation. 
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Figure 3.4.3: Contemporaneous Estimation Rolling Coefficients Coffee 
 
Source: author’s estimation. 
 
Figure 3.4.4: Recursive Coefficients for Buy and Sell Indicators Cocoa  
 
Source: author’s estimation. 
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Figure 3.4.5: Recursive Coefficients for Buy and Sell Indicators Wheat 
 
Source: author’s estimation. 
 
Figure 3.4.6: Recursive Coefficients for Buy and Sell Indicators Coffee 
 
Source: author’s estimation.  
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Appendix 3.5: Rolling Window Coefficient Estimates Equation 3.7 
 
Figure 3.5.1: Rolling 500-Days Window Coefficient Estimates for Buy and Sell 
Indicators Wheat 
 
 
 
Source: author’s estimation. 
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Appendix 3.6: Correlation of Large Traders’ Positions 
Table 3.6.1a: Correlation Net-long Positions DCOT Wheat 2006 -2014 
Net-long pm swap mm other nrep lt_4 lt_8 
pm        
swap -0.70       
mm -0.76 0.13      
other 0.39 -0.30 -0.56     
nrep 0.20 -0.47 -0.09 0.31    
lt_4 0.29 0.22 -0.39 -0.29 -0.43   
lt_8 0.06 0.47 -0.30 -0.40 -0.41 0.88  
Table 3.6.1b: Correlation Long and Short Positions DCOT Wheat 2006 -2014 
      short 
long 
pm swap mm other nrep lt_4 lt_8 
pm 
 
0.20 -0.50 0.23 0.63 0.95 0.92 
swap 0.11 
 
-0.02 -0.06 0.10 0.28 0.30 
mm 0.11 -0.32 
 
-0.16 -0.25 -0.35 -0.22 
other 0.54 -0.25 0.53         0.03 0.21 0.18 
nrep 0.43 0.41 0.28 0.42    0.54 0.52 
lt_4 0.15 0.96 -0.33 -0.25 0.42         0.97 
lt_8 0.21 0.97 -0.28 -0.17 0.43 0.97     
 
 Table 3.6.2a: Correlation Net-long Positions DCOT Cocoa 2006 -2014 
Net-long pm swap mm other nrep lt_4 lt_8 
pm        
swap -0.16       
mm -0.97 -0.03      
other 0.16 0.17 -0.31     
nrep -0.83 0.13 0.78 -0.22    
lt_4 0.66 -0.05 -0.66 0.20 -0.62   
lt_8 0.78 -0.09 -0.74 0.10 -0.73 0.92  
Table 3.6.2b: Correlation Long and Short Positions DCOT Cocoa 2006 -2014 
      short 
long 
pm swap mm other nrep lt_4 lt_8 
pm  0.13 -0.16 0.66 -0.08 0.77 0.86 
swap 0.13  0.22 0.32 0.31 0.27 0.44 
mm -0.37 0.20  -0.18 0.57 -0.09 0.03 
other 0.22 0.19 0.47  -0.07 0.63 0.62 
nrep -0.09 0.32 0.72 0.42  -0.18 0.04 
lt_4 0.46 0.49 0.17 0.30 0.26  0.91 
lt_8 0.62 0.48 0.20 0.35 0.28 0.94  
 
Table 3.6.3a: Correlation Net-long Positions DCOT Coffee 2006 -2014 
Net-long pm swap mm other nrep lt_4 lt_8 
pm        
swap -0.34       
mm -0.87 -0.11      
other -0.04 0.12 -0.24     
nrep -0.63 0.31 0.42 0.18    
lt_4 0.39 0.05 -0.40 -0.04 -0.34   
lt_8 0.37 0.07 -0.38 -0.06 -0.37 0.94  
Table 3.6.3b: Correlation Long and Short Positions DCOT Coffee 2006 -2014 
      short 
long 
pm swap mm other nrep lt_4 lt_8 
pm  0.24 -0.54 0.10 -0.48 0.73 0.81 
swap -0.32  -0.55 -0.35 -0.39 -0.22 -0.13 
mm -0.05 0.37  0.17 0.54 -0.28 -0.24 
other 0.24 0.11 0.05  0.00 0.17 0.17 
nrep -0.14 0.23 0.22 0.50  -0.31 -0.30 
lt_4 -0.10 0.46 0.13 0.47 0.33  0.96 
lt_8 -0.13 0.57 0.21 0.39 0.31 0.96  
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Table 3.6.4a: Correlation Net-long Positions COT Wheat 1993-2014 
 
com ncom nrep lt_4 lt_8 
com 
     
ncom -0.91 
    
nrep -0.61 0.22 
   
lt_4 0.82 -0.59 -0.79 
  
lt_8 0.83 -0.59 -0.83 0.95 
 
Table 3.6.4b: Correlation Long and Short Positions COT Wheat 1993 -2014 
      short 
long 
com ncom nrep lt_4 lt_8 
com 
 
0.41 0.60 0.91 0.94 
ncom 0.60 
 
0.01 0.26 0.34 
nrep -0.04 0.34 
 
0.67 0.69 
lt_4 0.93 0.64 0.14 
 
0.99 
lt_8 0.96 0.67 0.06 0.99 
 
 
Table 3.6.5a: Correlation Net-long Positions COT Cocoa 1993-2014 
 
com ncom nrep lt_4 lt_8 
com      
ncom -0.98     
nrep -0.39 0.18    
lt_4 0.58 -0.61 -0.02   
lt_8 0.69 -0.69 -0.19 0.93  
Table 3.6.5b: Correlation Long and Short Positions COT Cocoa 1993 -2014 
      short 
long 
com ncom nrep lt_4 lt_8 
com  0.36 -0.15 0.86 0.93 
ncom 0.29  0.01 0.35 0.46 
nrep -0.36 -0.02  -0.20 -0.18 
lt_4 0.71 0.32 0.02  0.95 
lt_8 0.85 0.50 -0.17 0.93  
 
Table 3.6.6a: Correlation Net-long Positions COT Coffee 1993-2014 
 
com ncom nrep lt_4 lt_8 
com      
ncom -0.98     
nrep -0.25 0.06    
lt_4 0.27 -0.19 -0.46   
lt_8 0.21 -0.09 -0.63 0.90  
Table 3.6.6b: Correlation Long and Short Positions COT Cocoa 1993 -2014 
      short 
long 
com ncom nrep lt_4 lt_8 
com  0.43 -0.20 0.89 0.94 
ncom 0.84  0.10 0.44 0.51 
nrep -0.45 -0.26  -0.20 -0.19 
lt_4 0.89 0.85 -0.35  0.98 
lt_8 0.93 0.89 -0.40 0.99  
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Appendix 3.7: Augmented Dickey Fuller Test Results 
 
Table 3.7.1: Augmented Dickey Fuller Test Wheat 
 Lags t-test AIC- up to 12 lags 
CIT: ADF tests (T=102, Constant; 5%=-2.89 1%=-3.50) 
Commercial 0 -3.400* -6.071 
Non-commercial 0 -3.953** -6.252 
Index trader 0 -4.012** -6.621 
DCOT: ADF tests (T=97, Constant; 5%=-2.89 1%=-3.50) 
Producer/Merchants 0 -3.098* -5.824 
Managed Money 0 -3.802** -5.630 
Other non-commercial 0 -3.807** -7.834 
Swap trader 0 -2.322 -7.016 
IID: ADF tests (T=49, Constant; 5%=-2.92 1%=-3.57) 
Index trader 0 -2.955* -6.616 
Note: Estimated as net-long traders’ positions normalised by total OI; null hypothesis is that the variable 
has a unit root; * indicates significant at the 5 % level and ** indicates significant at the 1 % level; lag 
length is determined by AIC with a maximum lag length of 12 months.   
 
 
 
Table 3.7.2: Augmented Dickey Fuller Test Cocoa 
 Lags t-test AIC- up to 12 lags 
CIT: ADF tests (T=102, Constant; 5%=-2.89 1%=-3.50) 
Commercial 0 -3.105*       -5.378 
Non-commercial 0 -2.609        -5.652   
Index trader 0 -3.014*       -7.744   
DCOT: ADF tests (T=97, Constant; 5%=-2.89 1%=-3.50) 
Producer/Merchants 0 -2.571        -5.413 
Managed Money 2 -2.943*       -5.563   
Other non-commercial 0 -3.144*       -8.654   
Swap trader 0 -3.720**      -8.095   
IID: ADF tests (T=49, Constant; 5%=-2.92 1%=-3.57) 
Index trader 0 -3.368*       -7.985   
Note: Estimated as net-long traders’ positions normalised by total OI; null hypothesis is that the variable 
has a unit root; * indicates significant at the 5 % level and ** indicates significant at the 1 % level; lag length 
is determined by AIC with a maximum lag length of 12 months.   
 
 
 
Table 3.7.3: Augmented Dickey Fuller Test Coffee 
 Lags t-test AIC- up to 12 lags 
CIT: ADF tests (T=102, Constant; 5%=-2.89 1%=-3.50) 
Commercial 0 -2.578        -5.468   
Non-commercial 0 -2.537        -5.690   
Index trader 0 -3.303*       -6.897   
DCOT: ADF tests (T=97, Constant; 5%=-2.89 1%=-3.50) 
Producer/Merchants 0 -2.445        -5.235   
Managed Money 0 -2.714        -5.248   
Other non-commercial 1 -4.816**      -7.737   
Swap trader 3 -2.568 -6.981 
IID: ADF tests (T=49, Constant; 5%=-2.92 1%=-3.57) 
Index trader 0 -3.092*       -7.194   
Note: Estimated as net-long traders’ positions normalised by total OI; null hypothesis is that the variable 
has a unit root; * indicates significant at the 5 % level and ** indicates significant at the 1 % level; lag 
length is determined by AIC with a maximum lag length of 12 months.   
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Appendix 3.8: Full Estimation Results Heterogeneity 
Table 3.8.1a: Heterogeneity Results Wheat  
 Return Roll Volatility Interest  Correlation Inflation Ex.-rate Adj. R2 AR(1) r2 
CIT (Jan. 2006 – Oct. 2014) 
Com -0.323 
[0.205] 
2.229 
[1.280] 
0.278 
[1.008] 
-0.015** 
[0.006] 
-0.032 
[0.020] 
-0.004 
[0.005] 
-0.000 
[0.001] 
0.735 0.3936 
Ncom 0.631** 
[0.189] 
-0.698 
[1.145] 
0.541 
[1.139] 
0.004 
[0.004] 
0.007 
[0.018] 
-0.005 
[0.005] 
0.001 
[0.001] 
0.662 0.2897 
Index -0.396* 
[0.192] 
-2.706** 
[0.823] 
-1.138 
[0.781] 
0.020** 
[0.005] 
0.030* 
[0.012] 
0.012* 
[0.005] 
-0.000 
[0.001] 
0.663 0.2743 
DCOT (Jun. 2006 – Oct. 2014) 
Pm -0.703** 
[0.222] 
2.113 
[1.601] 
-0.389 
[1.614] 
-0.019** 
[0.007] 
-0.034 
[0.028] 
-0.004 
[0.007] 
0.002 
[0.002] 
0.708 0.2318 
Mm 0.909** 
[0.251] 
1.072 
[1.273] 
0.556 
[1.735] 
0.009 
[0.007] 
0.034 
[0.030] 
-0.001 
[0.008] 
0.000 
[0.001] 
0.637 0.2733 
Other -0.097 
[0.118] 
-0.026 
[0.494] 
0.115 
[0.439] 
-0.011** 
[0.003] 
-0.014 
[0.009] 
-0.008** 
[0.003] 
0.000 
[0.001] 
0.655 0.2411 
Swap -0.262 
[0.169] 
-4.086** 
[1.127] 
-0.698 
[0.869] 
0.030** 
[0.008] 
0.017 
[0.015] 
0.018* 
[0.007] 
-0.002* 
[0.001] 
0.801 0.2225 
IID (Jun. 2010 – Oct. 2014) 
Index -0.110 
[0.300] 
-10.89* 
[4.241] 
-4.068 
[3.195] 
0.003 
[0.056] 
-0.048* 
[0.023] 
-0.051 
[0.033] 
-0.002 
[0.004] 
0.643 AR(0) 
 
Table 3.8.1b: Heterogeneity Results Wheat Passive Trader Stronger Assumptions 
 Return Roll Volatility Interest  Correlation Inflation Ex.-rate Adj. R2 AR(1) r2 
CIT (Jan. 2006 – Oct. 2014) 
Index 0.130 
[0.434] 
-3.248** 
[0.835] 
-0.620 
[0.890] 
0.020** 
[0.005] 
0.007 
[0.009] 
0.012* 
[0.005] 
-0.001 
[0.001] 
0.609 0.3427 
DCOT (Jun. 2006 – Oct. 2014) 
Swap 0.074 
[0.304] 
-4.795** 
[1.133] 
-0.199 
[1.026] 
0.028** 
[0.009] 
-0.006 
[0.011] 
0.017* 
[0.007] 
-0.002* 
[0.001] 
0.776 0.2164 
IID (Jun. 2010 – Oct. 2014) 
Index -0.705 
[1.048] 
-12.34** 
[4.485] 
-4.925 
[3.555] 
-0.029 
[0.062] 
0.019 
[0.022] 
-0.050 
[0.036] 
-0.003 
[0.004] 
0.630 AR(0) 
Notes: Newey-West robust standard error, lag truncation 12. All independent variables are lagged once and the regression is 
estimated as an AR(1) process (the lag is excluded if found insignificant). Residuals are tested for normality, autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity. The null hypothesis of spherical residuals cannot be rejected at the 5 % level in all cases. * indicates significance at 
the 1 % level, and ** at the 5% level respectively.  
 
Table 3.8.2a: Heterogeneity Results Cocoa  
 Return Roll Volatility Interest  Correlation Inflation Ex.-rate Adj. R2 AR(1) r2 
CIT (Jan. 2006 – Oct. 2014) 
Com 0.087 
[0.813] 
22.54 
[15.77] 
-11.19* 
[5.018] 
0.015 
[0.010] 
0.093* 
[0.043] 
0.003 
[0.012] 
-0.001 
[0.002] 
0.684 0.5598 
Ncom 0.107 
[0.602] 
-12.87 
[13.59] 
7.462 
[4.576] 
-0.009 
[0.008] 
-0.077 
[0.041] 
-0.004 
[0.010] 
0.002 
[0.002] 
0.753 0.6132 
Index -0.055 
[0.117] 
-5.266 
[4.100] 
1.269 
[1.498] 
-0.003 
[0.003] 
0.008 
[0.011] 
0.003 
[0.003] 
-0.003** 
[0.001] 
0.822 0.2458 
DCOT (Jun. 2006 – Oct. 2014) 
Pm -0.229 
[0.893] 
27.34 
[15.96] 
-10.04 
[5.616] 
0.016 
[0.010] 
0.098* 
[0.044] 
-0.004 
[0.013] 
-0.003 
[0.002] 
0.714 0.5531 
Mm 0.348 
[0.674] 
-18.81 
[14.19] 
6.562 
[5.428] 
-0.012 
[0.008] 
-0.076 
[0.041] 
-0.001 
[0.011] 
0.003 
[0.002] 
0.753 0.6220 
Other 0.193 
[0.097] 
-1.288 
[2.268] 
-1.067 
[0.978] 
-0.002 
[0.002] 
0.007 
[0.006] 
0.004* 
[0.002] 
0.000 
[0.000] 
0.618 0.2603 
Swap -0.156 
[0.143] 
-3.211 
[3.477] 
1.835 
[1.199] 
0.000 
[0.002] 
-0.008 
[0.009] 
0.004 
[0.003] 
-0.001 
[0.001] 
0.663 0.5182 
IID (Jan. 2010 – Oct. 2014) 
Index -0.024 
[0.337] 
-14.15* 
[6.976] 
-2.039 
[1.924] 
0.038* 
[0.019] 
0.049** 
[0.011] 
0.038 
[0.025] 
0.003 
[0.002] 
0.633 AR(0) 
 
Table 3.8.2b: Heterogeneity Results Cocoa Passive Trader Stronger Assumptions 
 Return Roll Volatility Interest  Correlation Inflation Ex.-rate Adj. R2 AR(1) r2 
CIT (Jan. 2006 – Oct. 2014) 
Index 0.091 
[0.157] 
-4.585 
[3.421] 
1.153 
[1.171] 
-0.001 
[0.004] 
0.014* 
[0.007] 
0.004 
[0.002] 
-0.004** 
[0.001] 
0.843 0.2571 
DCOT (Jun. 2006 – Oct. 2014) 
Swap -0.063 
[0.206] 
-0.973 
[3.380] 
0.955 
[0.862] 
0.002 
[0.003] 
0.004 
[0.003] 
-0.001 
[0.001] 
0.001 
[0.001] 
0.658 0.4780 
IID (Jun. 2010 – Oct. 2014) 
Index 
0.096 
[0.500] 
-19.26* 
[9.720] 
-1.850 
[2.619] 
0.0004 
[0.019] 
0.032** 
[0.006] 
0.015** 
[0.005] 
-0.002 
[0.001] 
0.713 AR(0) 
Notes: Newey-West robust standard error, lag truncation 12. All independent variables are lagged once and the regression is 
estimated as an AR(1) process (the lag is excluded if found insignificant). Residuals are tested for normality, autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity. The null hypothesis of spherical residuals cannot be rejected at the 5 % level in all cases. * indicates significance at 
the 1 % level, and ** at the 5% level respectively.  
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Table 3.8.3a: Heterogeneity Results Coffee 
 Return Roll Volatility Interest  Correlation Inflation Ex.-rate Adj. R2 AR(1) r2 
CIT (Jan. 2006 – Oct. 2014) 
Com -0.030 
[0.318] 
12.78* 
[4.940] 
-1.531 
[1.680] 
-0.000 
[0.010] 
-0.027* 
[0.013] 
-0.006 
[0.010] 
0.004 
[0.003] 
0.718 0.6070 
Ncom 0.059 
[0.368] 
-4.783 
[3.837] 
0.716 
[1.784] 
0.003 
[0.009] 
0.016 
[0.015] 
0.004 
[0.008] 
-0.001 
[0.002] 
0.684 0.5729 
Index -0.102 
[0.190] 
-8.698** 
[1.959] 
0.259 
[0.914] 
-0.005 
[0.003] 
0.007 
[0.008] 
0.006 
[0.004] 
-0.004** 
[0.001] 
0.682 0.4721 
DCOT (Jun. 2006 – Oct. 2014) 
Pm 0.168 
[0.457] 
11.13* 
[5.153] 
-0.243 
[2.070] 
0.007 
[0.012] 
-0.024 
[0.017] 
0.003 
[0.012] 
0.003 
[0.003] 
0.752 0.5927 
Mm 0.396 
[0.499] 
-5.545 
[4.573] 
3.028 
[2.328] 
0.007 
[0.012] 
0.022 
[0.020] 
0.006 
[0.012] 
-0.002 
[0.003] 
0.686 0.5313 
Other -0.125 
[0.134] 
-0.871 
[1.348] 
-0.275 
[0.540] 
-0.003 
[0.002] 
0.005 
[0.006] 
-0.003 
[0.003] 
0.001 
[0.001] 
0.525 0.5675 
Swap -0.101 
[0.155] 
-5.794** 
[1.989] 
-1.515 
[0.947] 
-0.003 
[0.003] 
-0.002 
[0.008] 
0.001 
[0.004] 
-0.003** 
[0.001] 
0.807 0.5816 
IID (Jun. 2010 – Oct. 2014) 
Index -0.404* 
[0.154] 
-7.670 
[5.000] 
0.992* 
[0.369] 
-0.015 
[0.041] 
-0.037* 
[0.018] 
-0.022 
[0.027] 
-0.006 
[0.004] 
0.553 0.4233 
 
Table 3.8.3b: Heterogeneity Results Coffee Passive Trader Stronger Assumptions 
 Return Roll Volatility Interest  Correlation Inflation Ex.-rate Adj. R2 AR(1) r2 
CIT (Jan. 2006 – Oct. 2014) 
Index 0.153 
[0.296] 
-11.27** 
[1.648] 
1.448 
[0.799] 
-0.000 
[0.003] 
0.009** 
[0.003] 
0.030* 
[0.008] 
-0.005** 
[0.001] 
0.714 0.5273 
DCOT (Jun. 2006 – Oct. 2014) 
Swap 0.248 
[0.304] 
-7.985** 
[1.940] 
-0.705 
[0.760] 
0.001 
[0.003] 
0.021* 
[0.009] 
0.003 
[0.003] 
-0.004** 
[0.001] 
0.820 0.5890 
IID (Jun. 2010 – Oct. 2014) 
Index 
0.405 
[0.596] 
-0.670 
[5.713] 
0.609 
[0.476] 
-0.035 
[0.044] 
-0.013 
[0.025] 
-0.034 
[0.031] 
-0.005 
[0.004] 
0.402 0.5165 
Notes: Newey-West robust standard error, lag truncation 12. All independent variables are lagged once and the regression is 
estimated as an AR(1) process (the lag is excluded if found insignificant). Residuals are tested for normality, autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity. The null hypothesis of spherical residuals cannot be rejected at the 5 % level in all cases. * indicates significance at 
the 1 % level, and ** at the 5% level respectively.  
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Appendix 3.9: Rolling Window Coefficient Estimates Heterogeneity 
 
Table 3.7.1: Rolling Window Coefficient Estimates Heterogeneity Wheat 
  
  
  
  
Notes: Rolling window of 60 months (5 years) is used; dotted lines represent the 5 % significance interval 
(1ûü+/-2*SE). 
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Table 3.7.2: Rolling Window Coefficient Estimates Heterogeneity Cocoa 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Rolling window of 60 months (5 years) is used; dotted lines represent the 5 % significance interval 
(1ûü+/-2*SE). 
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Table 3.7.3: Rolling Window Coefficient Estimates Heterogeneity Coffee 
  
  
  
  
Notes: Rolling window of 60 months (5 years) is used; dotted lines represent the 5 % significance interval 
(1ûü+/-2*SE). 
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Appendix 3.10: Rolling Window Coefficient Estimates Heterogeneity Alternative 
Table 3.8.1: Rolling Window Coefficient Estimates Heterogeneity Alternative Variables Wheat  
 
Notes: Rolling window of 60 months (5 years) is used; dotted lines represent the 5 % significance interval 
(1ûü+/-2*SE). 
 
Table 3.8.2: Rolling Window Coefficient Estimates Heterogeneity Alternative Variables Cocoa 
  
Notes: Rolling window of 60 months (5 years) is used; dotted lines represent the 5 % significance interval 
(1ûü+/-2*SE). 
 
Table 3.8.3: Rolling Window Coefficient Estimates Heterogeneity Alternative Variables Coffee  
  
Notes: Rolling window of 60 months (5 years) is used; dotted lines represent the 5 % significance interval 
(1ûü+/-2*SE). 
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Appendix Chapter 4 
Appendix 4.1 Empirical Studies on Lead–Lag Relationship 
Source Evidence Markets Methodology Notes 
(Asche and 
Guttormsen 2002) 
Futures market 
leading 
Gas oil, other oil derivatives, crude 
oil 
International Petroleum Exchange 
04/1981-09/2001 (monthly) 
Multivariate Johansen VECM models 
Futures lead spot prices; futures with longer time to 
expiration lead futures with shorter time to 
expiration; always the longest contract binds the price 
series in the long-run. 
(Baldi, Peri and 
Vandone 2011) 
Futures market 
leading  
Corn, soybeans 
CBOT for futures and USDA for 
spot 
01/2004-09/2010 (weekly) 
Co-integration tests using Keiryval and 
Perron’s (2009) methodology to test for 
structural breaks  
Granger non-causality tests  using Toda 
and Yamamoto’s (1995) methodology  
Normally spot prices are discovered in the futures 
market, but in more volatile times there is some bi-
directional effect 
(Crain and Lee 
1996) 
Futures market 
leading  
Wheat 
Kansas City Board of Trade for spot 
and CBOT for futures prices 
01/1950-12/1993 (daily) 
Granger non-causality tests (price 
volatility) 
Find that the futures volatility causes the spot 
volatility. However, findings are not robust through 
time 
(Garbade and 
Silber 1983) 
Futures markets 
leading  
Wheat, corn, oats, frozen orange 
juice concentrates, copper, gold, 
silver 
CBOT, New York Cotton Exchange 
and ComEX. 
ECM  
High importance of futures market in determining 
spot prices founds; lesser importance of futures 
markets for oats due to smaller market size and lower 
liquidity.   
(Hernandez and 
Torero 2010) 
Futures market 
leading 
Corn, wheat, soybeans 
FAO for spot Kansas City Board of 
Trade for futures prices 
01/1994-06/2009 (weekly) 
Linear and non-linear Granger non-
causality test (returns and price volatility) 
The results indicate that spot prices are generally 
discovered in futures markets. In particular, we find 
that changes in futures prices lead changes in spot 
prices more often than the reverse 
(Ivanov and Cho 
2011) 
Futures market 
leading 
42 different futures contracts 
including currencies, equities, and 
VECM All futures price leading cash prices with cocoa and 
sugar having the minimum information share of 
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commodities. slightly more than 50 percent and crude oil and 
natural gas the highest with 100 percent.  
(Kuiper, Pennings 
and Meulenberg 
2002) 
Futures market 
leading  
Potatoes 
CBOT and Amsterdam Exchange 
12/1989-04/1992 (weekly) 
VECM 
Reveals that the spot price adjusts fully to its new 
equilibrium level if the price-discovery function of 
the futures market works well. 
(Lagi, et al. 2011) Bidirectional  Food prices (index) Granger non-causality tests Bidirectional 
(Mahalik, Acharya 
and Babum 2009) 
Bidirectional 
Energy, agricultural, aggregate 
commodities, and metal future price 
indices  
Multi Commodity Exchange 
Mumbai 
06/2005-12/2008 (daily) 
 
Johansen co-integration analysis; VECMs; 
exponential general autoregressive 
conditional heteroscedasticity 
All despite the metal price index serve as a source of 
price discovery for the spot market; volatility spills 
from the futures to the spot market for all indices 
despite the agricultural one. 
(Mohan and Love 
2004) 
Cash market 
leading 
Coffee 
LIFFE and NYBOT 
03/1991-05/2003 (daily) 
Granger non-causality tests (price changes)  
Results demonstrate that changes in spot prices are 
not explained by changes in futures prices. It 
emerges, futures prices tend to adapt to the prevailing 
spot prices. 
(Quan 1992) 
Cash market 
leading 
Crude oil ECM 
Critique on earlier studies ignoring unit root of price 
time series  
(Silvapulle and 
Moosa 1999) 
Bidirectional Crude oil 
Linear and non-linear Granger non-
causality tests 
Linear causality tests reveal that futures prices lead 
spot prices, but non-linear causality tests reveals a 
bidirectional effect; suggesting that both markets 
react to new information simultaneously and the 
pattern of lead and lags changes over time. 
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Appendix 4.2 Unit-Root Test Results 
MacKinnon (1996) critical values are used since under the null hypothesis of a unit root the 
test statistic does not follow a conventional student t-distribution. If the test-statistic is 
greater than the MacKinnon critical value the null hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected. 
The length of time lags included in the test is determined by SIC allowing for a maximal lag 
length of 12. 
Table 4.2.1: Cocoa Apr 1995 – Dec 2013 Dataset (N=225) 
Annual Difference ADF Unit Root test (null hypothesis: time series has a unit root) 
Series Level First difference 
t-statistic (lag) Intercept Intercept & Trend Intercept Intercept & Trend 
L(Fcont) -2.838212 (12) -2.842529 (12) -4.970755 (11)** -4.956381 (11)** 
L(Fwa) -2.879569 (12)* -2.896351 (12) -5.054187 (11)** -5.033493 (11)** 
L(Spot) -2.796155 (12) -2.797591 (12) -5.099411 (11)** -5.079757 (11)** 
Inventory -2.446942 (12) -2.491171 (12) -7.212567 (11)** -7.188203 (11)** 
S*LIBOR -3.152530 (13)* -3.173039 (13) -4.979253 (12)** -4.966000 (12)** 
Hcom -3.264164 (12)* -3.367493 (12) -7.329625 (11)** -7.344799 (11)** 
SPcor -4.580383 (2)* -4.650880 (2)** -3.914420 (13)** -3.896969 (13)* 
MacKinnon (1996) critical values & SIC lag length (max 12). 
 
Table 4.2.2: Cocoa Apr 1995 – Dec 2005 Dataset (N=130) 
Annual Difference ADF Unit Root test (null hypothesis: time series has a unit root) 
Series Level First difference 
t-statistic (lag length) Intercept Intercept & Trend Intercept Intercept & Trend 
L(Fcont) -2.642541 (12) -2.633335 (12) -2.777655(11)* -2.763464 (11) 
L(Fwa) -2.298381 (12) -2.322437 (12) -3.381240 (11)* -3.363441 (11) 
L(Spot) -2.471012 (12) -2.477842 (12) -3.109759 (11)* -3.092464 (11) 
Inventory -1.336645 (0) -1.304783 (0) -4.752534 (11)** -4.929972 (11)** 
S*LIBOR -3.543007 (3)** -3.505622 (3)* -4.629361 (1)** -4.602582 (1)** 
Hcom -3.769475 (4)** -4.040982 (4)* -10.87679 (1)** -10.83661 (1)** 
SPcor -3.542476 (1)** -3.528431 (1)* -2.326695 (0) 1 -2.270301 (0) 1 
MacKinnon (1996) critical values & SIC lag length (max 12). 
1 Stationary at the second difference but not the first. 
 
Table 4.2.3: Cocoa Jan 2006 – Dec 2013 Dataset (N=95) 
Annual Difference ADF Unit Root test (null hypothesis: time series has a unit root) 
Series Level First difference 
t-statistic (lag length) Intercept Intercept & Trend Intercept Intercept & Trend 
L(Fcont) -2.260587 (1) -2.539078 (1) -14.25156 (0)** -14.17185 (0)** 
L(Fwa) -3.205626 (0)* -3.668145 (0)* -12.30851 (0)** -12.24079 (0)** 
L(Spot) -2.780868 (0) -3.210663 (0) -12.04556 (0)** -11.98014 (0)** 
Inventory -2.474973 (1) -2.427914 (1) -7.909684 (0)** -7.905395 (0)** 
S*LIBOR -2.390287 (3) -2.368510 (3) -3.571909 (2)** -3.557778 (2)* 
Hcom  -2.754671 (0) -2.744246 (0) -5.192774 (11)** -5.265083 (11)** 
Hcom (CIT) -2.526528 (0) -2.503431 (0) -9.926421 (0)** -9.955265 (0)** 
Hix -2.861929 (0) -2.882730 (0) -10.46323 (0)** -10.39681 (0)** 
% index -2.800528 (0) -3.136932 (0) -10.05964 (0)** -9.996625 (0)** 
SPcor -3.152278 (2)* -3.253918 (2) -2.698505 (1) 1 -2.654472 (1) 1 
MacKinnon (1996) critical values & SIC lag length  
The Philips-Perron test was run in addition but results remain the same. 
1 Stationary at the second difference but not the first. 
 
Table 4.2.4: Wheat Apr 1995 – Dec 2013 Dataset (N=225) 
Annual Difference ADF Unit Root test (null hypothesis: time series has a unit root) 
Series Level First difference 
t-statistic (lag) Intercept Intercept & Trend Intercept Intercept & Trend 
L(Fcont) -2.468179 (12) -2.521047 (12) -7.309582 (11)** -7.298095 (11)** 
L(Fwa) -2.486915 (12) -2.532291 (12) -7.310294 (11)** -7.300021 (11)** 
L(Spot) -2.746444 (12) -2.843293 (12) -6.860696 (11)** -6.848529 (11)** 
Inventory -3.521571 (4)** -3.597126 (4)* -4.783082 (3)** -4.799553 (3)** 
S*LIBOR -2.784594 (12) -2.769057 (12) -6.325895 (11)** -6.308292 (11)** 
Hcom -3.698859 (13)** -3.682720 (13)* -6.780324 (12)** -6.776407 (12)** 
SPcor -4.002363 (1)** -4.042189 (1)** -3.995553 (0)** -3.982472 (0)* 
MacKinnon (1996) critical values & SIC lag length. 
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Table 4.2.5: Wheat Apr 1995 – Dec 2005 Dataset (N=130) 
Annual Difference ADF Unit Root test (null hypothesis: time series has a unit root) 
Series Level First difference 
t-statistic (lag length) Intercept Intercept & Trend Intercept Intercept & Trend 
L(Fcont) -3.329842 (0)* -3.853005 (0)* -5.884460 (11)** -5.878193 (11)** 
L(Fwa) -3.344109 (0)* -3.853488 (0)* -10.83630 (0)** -10.91470 (0)** 
L(Spot) -3.211344 (0)* -3.610502 (0)* -9.629880 (1)** -9.630985 (1)** 
Inventory -2.597380 (4) -3.046844 (4) -3.812335 (3)** -3.815935 (3)* 
S*LIBOR -3.520096 (3)** -3.453044 (3)* -7.068674 (0)** -7.038682 (0)** 
Hcom -6.211783 (0)** -6.170652 (0)** -11.67557 (1)** -11.62031 (1)** 
SPcor -3.093906 (4)* -4.071344 (4)** -2.712088 (2)1 -2.648988 (2)1 
MacKinnon (1996) critical values & SIC lag length. 
1 Second difference stationary 
 
Table 4.2.6: Wheat Jan 2006 – Dec 2013 Dataset (N=95) 
Annual Difference ADF Unit Root test (null hypothesis: time series has a unit root) 
Series Level First difference 
t-statistic (lag length) Intercept Intercept & Trend Intercept Intercept & Trend 
L(Fcont) -2.112032 (0) -2.316606 (0) -9.110963 (0)** -9.079057 (0)** 
L(Fwa) -2.060992 (0) -2.291340 (0) -5.190578 (11)** -5.195496 (11)** 
L(Spot) -2.286667 (0) -2.340201 (0) -8.683434 (0)** -8.651932 (0)** 
Inventory -2.471977 (4) -2.479974 (4) -2.718095 (3)1 -2.723864 (3)1 
S*LIBOR -3.538208 (7)** -3.532991 (7)* -3.054913 (2)* -3.042925 (2)3 
Hcom  -3.056045 (0)* -3.178410 (0) -10.23419 (0)** -10.21242 (0)** 
Hcom (CIT) -4.919752 (11)** -4.972316 (11)** -2.352280 (11)4 -2.463495 (11)4 
Hix -3.154325 (0)* -3.141475 (0) -7.221887 (2)** -7.209117 (2)** 
% index -2.882625 (0) -3.651163 (0)* -9.236663 (0)** -6.144991 (11)** 
SPcor -2.959421 (1)* -3.393921 (1) -2.598476 (0)2 -2.661874 (0)2 
MacKinnon (1996) critical values & SIC lag length. The Philips-Perron test was run in addition but results remain the same. 
1 Second difference stationary. 
2 Second difference stationary.  
3 Second difference stationary. 
4 Second difference stationary. 
 
Appendix 4.3 Granger Non-causality Test Results 
 
Table 4.3.1: Granger Non-Causality Test 
Null  (Monthly Level - fcont)  (Monthly Level fwav) 
S does not Granger Cause F         
F does not Granger Cause S  Chi-Square Probability Lags  Chi-Square Probability Lags 
Cocoa 
Apr. 1995 – Dec. 2013 S – F 0.020033 0.8874 1  0.092002 0.7616 1 
 F – S  1187.286 0.0000 1  0.099083 0.7529 1 
Apr. 1995 – Dec. 2005 S – F 0.144488 0.7039 1  0.055035 0.8145 1 
 F – S  1099.446 0.0000 1  0.003618 0.9520 1 
Jan. 2006 – Dec. 2013 S – F 0.769370 0.3804 1  0.081765 0.7749 1 
 F – S  343.5164 0.0000 1  0.060903 0.8051 1 
Wheat 
Apr. 1995 – Dec. 2013 S – F 2.867710 0.0904 1  2.853607 0.0912 1 
 F – S  0.127385 0.7212 1  0.206659 0.6494 1 
Apr. 1995 – Dec. 2005 S – F 1.708850 0.1911 1  1.547999 0.2134 1 
 F – S  1.264815 0.2607 1  1.160050 0.2815 1 
Jan. 2006 – Dec. 2013 S – F 5.164511 0.0231 1  5.352980 0.0207 1 
 F – S  0.609294 0.4351 1  0.676684 0.4107 1 
 
  
 
360 
Appendix 4.4 Co-integration Analysis CRADF and KPSS 
 
Table 4.4.1: Cocoa Co-integration Regression ADF/PP/KPSS 
 Fcont-Spot Fwa-Spot 
 Forward (Y=S) Backward (Y=F) Forward (Y=S) Backward (Y=F) 
April 1996 – Dec 2013 
Coefficient (1&4) 0.792006 0.956182 0.979233 0.969802 
ADF/PP Test-statistic 
p-value* 
-4.447418 
0.0000 
-4.641020 
0.0000 
-5.328209H 
0.0000 
-5.527037H 
0.0000 
KPSS LM-statistic** 0.115232 0.070190 0.054679 0.057703 
April 1996 – Dec 2006 
Coefficient (3&4) 0.804599 1.016781 0.967508 1.016582 
ADF/PP Test-statistic 
p-value* 
-3.286757 
0.0012 
-3.044623 
0.0026 
-3.105947H 
0.0021 
-3.246289H 
0.0014 
KPSS LM-statistic** 0.101524 0.107217 0.230377 0.237843 
Jan 2006 – Dec 2013 
Coefficient (5&6) 0.757801 0.820546 1.008815 0.868620 
ADF/PP Test-statistic 
p-value* 
-5.332587 
0.0000 
-9.898409 
0.0000 
-3.989571H 
0.0001 
-4.336929H 
0.0000 
KPSS LM-statistic** 0.498298 0.242214 0.080094 0.068558 
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values are reported. 
**Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (1992, Table 1)   
1% level   0.739000 
5% level   0.463000 
10% level   0.347000  
H PP instead since heteroscedasticity is detected.  
***Schwarz information criteria is used to detect lag length. 
 
 
Table 4.4.2: Wheat Co-integration Regression ADF/PP/KPSS 
 Fcont-spot Fwav-spot 
 Forward (Y=S) Backward (Y=F) Forward (Y=S) Backward (Y=F) 
April 1996 – Dec 2013 
Coefficient (1&2) 1.072399 0.810777 1.118556 0.762998 
ADF/PP Test-statistic 
p-value* 
-2.533986 
0.0113 
-4.993759H 
0.0000 
-2.507929 
0.0121 
-2.362553 
0.0179 
KPSS LM-statistic** 0.110453 0.129696 0.119557 0.139069 
April 1996 – Dec 2005 
 Coefficient (3&4) 1.047145 0.811107 1.098843 0.758269 
ADF/PP Test-statistic 
p-value* 
-3.717532 
0.0003 
-3.823864 
0.0002 
-3.514283 
0.0006 
-3.674699 
0.0003 
KPSS LM-statistic** 0.128222 0.041650 0.154374 0.047655 
Jan 2006 – Dec 2013 
Coefficient (5&6) 1.088462 0.799148 1.133814 0.752263 
ADF/PP Test-statistic 
p-value* 
-3.352343 
0.0010 
-3.213816 
0.0016 
-3.169607 
0.0018 
-2.995386 
0.0031 
KPSS LM-statistic** 0.480372 0.605599 0.508324 0.654796 
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values are reported. 
**Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (1992, Table 1)   
1% level   0.739000 
5% level   0.463000 
10% level   0.347000  
H PP instead since heteroscedasticity is detected.  
***Schwarz information criteria is used to detect lag length. 
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Appendix 4.5 Derivation of an ECM from an ARDL Model 
If there is an equilibrium relationship between the futures and the cash market price, 
following Equation 4.1, the long-run relationship between the two time series can be 
written as following:  = x@  xD. The deviation in each time period from the 
equilibrium is hence given by:  − x@ − xD = . If modelling the relationship between 
the two time series as a simple autoregressive distributed lag model [ARDL] the past 
period’s long-term equilibrium error can be incorporated by transforming the model into 
an unrestricted ECM. For an ARDL(1,1): 
   = 1]  1@$@  1D  1i$@  `. 
∴  = 1]  1@$@  1D  1i$@  `	| ± $@  
∴ ∆ = 1]  1@ − 1$@  1D  1i$@  `| ± 1D$@  
∴ ∆ = 1]  1@ − 1$@  1D∆  1i  1D$@  `  
With rearranging one gets: 
∴ ∆ = 1D∆  1@ − 1($@ − á@$¤− ß8@$¤ $@)  `  
∴ ∆ = 1D∆  *($@ − x@ − xD$@)  `  
With	 á@$¤ = x@, ß8@$¤ = xD, and	1@ − 1 = *. The [.] enclose the long-run 
equilibrium error for the last time period. This way the long-run coefficients are nested in 
the error correction term.   
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Appendix 4.6 Co-integration ECM t-test Results 
 
Table 4.6.1: Cocoa Co-integration ECM t-test Results 
 (fcont-spot) (fwa-spot) 
April 1996 – Dec 2013 
 Forward (Y=S) Backward (Y=F) Forward (Y=S) Backward (Y=F) 
 ECM(2) n: 210 ECM(0) n: 212 ECM(6) n:206 ECM(6) n:206 
Critical value for 
n=250: -3.25^ 
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
 -0.545931 -7.03678 -0.634101 -3.611841 -0.276555 -5.357284 -0.307334 -5.497186 
AR 1-6 test:1          
Normality test:2  
Hetero test:3       
1.374919 [0.2264] 
28.00693 [0.0000]** 
0.392470 [0.9061] 
0.794580 [0.5751] 
1.005465 [0.6049] 
0.430333 [0.7315] 
2.757757 [0.0137]* 
36.58527 [0.0000]** 
2.788209 [0.0006]** 
2.404889 [0.0292]* 
24.56825 [0.0000]** 
3.077955 [0.0002]** 
April 1996 – Jan 2006 
 ECM(1) n:115 ECM(0) n: 116 ECM(4) n:112 ECM(3) n:113 
Critical value for 
n=100: -3.27^ 
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
 -0.760347 -8.67657 -1.321752 -4.288075 -0.122314 -2.355222 -0.128270 -2.433113 
AR 1-6 test:1          
Normality test:2  
Hetero test:3       
2.000567 [0.0712] 
4.243652 [0.1198] 
0.713926 [0.6141] 
1.020394 [0.4162] 
3.286464 [0.1934] 
0.324545 [0.8076] 
2.088020 [0.0618] 
0.780011 [0.6771] 
1.770173 [0.0692] 
1.120004 [0.3564] 
2.134687 [0.3439] 
1.703589 [0.0975] 
Feb 2006 – Dec 2013 
 ECM(1) n:96 ECM(0) n: 96 ECM(5) n:96 ECM(5) n:96  
Critical value for 
n=100: -3.27^ 
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
 -0.666480 -7.41894 -0.366582 -1.678772 -0.240532 -2.881594 -0.284805 -3.112506 
AR 1-6 test:1          
Normality test:2  
Hetero test:3       
2.077681 [0.0644] 
3.076503 [0.2148] 
1.905815 [0.1011] 
0.913575 [0.4892] 
0.180637 [0.9136] 
0.324052 [0.8080] 
2.082063 [0.0651] 
0.696469 [0.7059] 
2.637063 [0.0040]** 
0.963196 [0.4559] 
0.045545 [0.9775] 
2.060837 [0.0254]* 
^ Banerjee, Dolado, and Mestre (1998) five percent critical values are used, which is -3.23 for a dataset of 500 and -3.27 for a sample 
of 100 with one regressor; 1 Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM F-test; 2 Jarque-Bera normality test; 3 Breusch-Pegan-Godfrey F-
test. 
 
Table 4.6.2: Wheat Co-integration ECM t-test Results 
 (fcont-spot) (fwa-spot) 
April 1996 – Dec 2013 
 Forward (Y=S) Backward (Y=F) Forward (Y=S) Backward (Y=F) 
 ECM(0) n: 212 ECM(0) n: 212 ECM(0) n: 212 ECM(0) n: 212 
Critical value for 
n=250: -3.25^ 
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
 -0.205749 -4.80273 -0.208186 -5.098849 -0.185943 -4.514275 -0.191189 -4.847591 
AR 1-6 test:1          
Normality test:2  
Hetero test:3       
1.989192 [0.0692] 
51.14572 [0.0000]** 
1.099934 [0.3618] 
1.567979 [0.1587] 
10.25742 [0.0059]** 
1.404624 [0.2055] 
1.348987 [0.2375] 
64.14658 [0.0000]** 
0.885589 [0.4918] 
1.163294 [0.3278] 
13.43940 [0.0012]** 
1.485614 [0.1962] 
April 1996 – Jan 2006 
 ECM(0) n: 116 ECM(0) n: 116 ECM(3) n: 113 ECM(3) n: 113 
Critical value for 
n=100: -3.27^ 
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
 -0.233342 -3.84292 -0.220905 -3.588450 -0.199626 -2.658844 -0.266778 -3.340571 
AR 1-6 test:1          
Normality test:2  
Hetero test:3       
1.176178 [0.3259] 
1.030959 [0.5972] 
1.393636 [0.2333] 
0.861866 [0.5261] 
0.213259 [0.8989] 
1.180811 [0.3241] 
1.715540 [0.1261] 
1.145193 [0.5641] 
0.602479 [0.6981] 
1.560768 [0.1675] 
0.084717 [0.9585] 
0.455550 [0.8083] 
Feb 2006 – Dec 2013 
 ECM(0) n: 96 ECM(0) n: 96 ECM(0) n: 96 ECM(0) n: 96  
Critical value for 
n=100:-3.27^ 
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
 -0.200698 -3.15911 -0.208593 -3.519369 -0.184829 -3.045461 -0.189252 -3.372875 
AR 1-6 test:1          
Normality test:2  
Hetero test:3       
1.321826 [0.2571] 
9.433037 [0.0090]** 
0.614440 [0.7817] 
1.381431 [0.2316] 
0.721478 [0.6972] 
0.647922 [0.6638] 
2.093361 [0.0624] 
11.0.6657 [0.0040]** 
0.530714 [0.7525] 
1.229854 [0.2993] 
1.478366 [0.4775] 
0.682264 [0.6380] 
^ Banerjee, Dolado, and Mestre (1998) five percent critical values are used, which is -3.23 for a dataset of 500 and -3.27 for a sample 
of 100 with one regressor; 1 Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM F-test; 2 Jarque-Bera normality test; 3 Breusch-Pegan-Godfrey F-
test. 
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Appendix 4.7 Cocoa Unrestricted ECM Estimation Results 
Table 4.7.1: Cocoa ECM Estimation Results Fcont Index and Hedging Pressure (D12) 
April 1995 – Dec 2013 
 Forward (Y=S) Backward (Y=F) 
 ECM(0) ECM(0) 
 Coeff.     t-val.  p-val.   part-r Coeff.     t-val.  p-val.   part-r 
 
X 
DSLIBOR      
DInventory   
DInvent_1      
DSPCOR3Y   
Dcom_H  
 
Y_1                   
X_1               
SLIBOR_1         
Inventory_1      
SPCOR3Y_1    
com_H_1              
  
 0.0480472   2.23  0.0268*  0.0245 
 0.195809    1.74  0.0831   0.0151 
 0.0052288  0.569  0.5698   0.0016 
-0.0447380  -4.81  0.0000** 0.1048 
 0.0155263  0.404  0.6865   0.0008 
-0.0386280  -1.38  0.1703   0.0095 
 
-0.828776   -30.0  0.0000** 0.8199 
0.777947    29.9  0.0000** 0.8187 
-0.029157  -0.732  0.4652   0.0027 
0.013486    3.10  0.0022** 0.0463 
-0.0137598  -2.31  0.0218*  0.0263 
0.0066014  0.399  0.6902   0.0008 
  
 0.510390    2.23  0.0268*  0.0245 
-0.409797   -1.11  0.2668   0.0062 
 0.0279514  0.935  0.3509   0.0044 
 0.0101808  0.318  0.7507   0.0005 
 0.142268    1.14  0.2559   0.0065 
 0.116026    1.27  0.2065   0.0080 
 
-0.715061   -3.71  0.0003** 0.0651 
 0.617255    2.98  0.0033** 0.0428 
-0.265640   -2.06  0.0403*  0.0211 
 0.002608   0.180  0.8575   0.0002 
 0.0259035   1.32  0.1872   0.0088 
-0.0185584 -0.344  0.7310   0.0006 
 
AR 1-7:      
ARCH 1-7:    
Normality:  
Hetero:      
RESET23:      
 
 F(7,191)  =   2.2435 [0.0325]*  
 F(7,184)  =  0.77750 [0.6069]   
 Chi^2(2)  =   3.8508 [0.1458]   
 F(24,173) =  0.75511 [0.7878]   
F(1,197)  = 0.000621 [0.9802] 
 
 F(7,191)  =   1.9575 [0.0628]   
 F(7,184)  =   2.8531 [0.0075]** 
 Chi^2(2)  =  0.83910 [0.6573]   
 F(24,173) =   1.1916 [0.2555]   
 F(1,197)  =  0.47139 [0.4932]   
April 1995 – Dec 2005 
 ECM(0) ECM(0) 
 
Coeff.     t-val.  p-val.   part-r Coeff.     t-val.  p-val.   part-r 
 
X 
DSLIBOR      
DInventory   
DInvent_1      
DSPCOR3Y   
Dcom_H  
 
Y_1                   
X_1               
SLIBOR_1         
Inventory_1      
SPCOR3Y_1    
com_H_1              
  
 0.0707134   3.07  0.0027** 0.0847 
 0.388703    2.28  0.0246*  0.0486 
 0.0136951   1.25  0.2136   0.0151 
-0.0242812  -2.34  0.0211*  0.0511 
 0.0257031  0.333  0.7395   0.0011 
 0.0060664  0.222  0.8247   0.0005 
 
-0.920306   -28.4  0.0000** 0.8876 
0.829620    27.8  0.0000** 0.8834 
-0.0332563 -0.719  0.4739   0.0050 
0.0113786   1.98  0.0509   0.0369 
-0.0128198  -1.30  0.1956   0.0164 
0.0645971   2.94  0.0041** 0.0781 
  
 1.19812     3.07  0.0027** 0.0847 
-0.184732  -0.257  0.7976   0.0006 
 0.08888     2.00  0.0486*  0.0376 
 0.012458   0.285  0.7765   0.0008 
 0.868015    2.84  0.0054** 0.0733 
 0.161968    1.46  0.1487   0.0203 
 
-1.34485    -4.02  0.0001** 0.1370 
 1.35043     3.60  0.0005** 0.1128 
-0.284481   -1.51  0.1350   0.0218 
 0.024497    1.02  0.3105   0.0101 
 0.016332   0.400  0.6899   0.001 
 0.077747   0.828  0.4095   0.0067 
 
AR 1-7:      
ARCH 1-7:    
Normality:  
Hetero:      
RESET23:      
 
 F(7,95)   =  0.89472 [0.5140]   
 F(7,88)   =   1.8913 [0.0804]   
 Chi^2(2)  =   10.835 [0.0044]** 
 F(24,77)  =  0.50279 [0.9700]   
F(1,101)  =  0.20062 [0.6552]   
 
 F(7,95)   =  0.92780 [0.4888]   
 F(7,88)   =  0.80180 [0.5879]   
 Chi^2(2)  =   3.2275 [0.1991]   
 F(24,77)  =  0.98471 [0.4953]   
 F(1,101)  =  0.48238 [0.4889] 
Jan 2006 – Dec 2013 
 ECM(0) ECM(0) 
 Coeff.     t-val.  p-val.   part-r Coeff.     t-val.  p-val.   part-r 
 
X 
DSLIBOR      
DInventory   
DInvent_1      
DSPCOR3Y   
Dcom_H  
 
Y_1                   
X_1               
SLIBOR_1         
Inventory_1      
SPCOR3Y_1    
com_H_1              
  
 0.0131131   0.347  0.7294   0.0014 
 0.0304140   0.190  0.8496   0.0004 
-0.0068618  -0.459  0.6476   0.0025 
-0.0642402   -4.31  0.0000** 0.1830 
 0.0105891   0.204  0.8388   0.0005 
-0.0423313  -0.745  0.4584   0.0066 
 
-0.746885    -16.5  0.0000** 0.7672 
0.767344     15.5  0.0000** 0.7442 
-0.0309593  -0.466  0.6425   0.0026 
0.0211257    3.10  0.0026** 0.1038 
-0.0182976   -2.27  0.0258*  0.0585 
0.0022974  0.0768  0.9390   0.0001 
  
 0.110502   0.347  0.7294   0.0014 
-0.429558  -0.930  0.3551   0.0103 
-0.040418  -0.935  0.3527   0.0104 
 0.020773   0.435  0.6650   0.0023 
 0.032537   0.216  0.8296   0.0006 
-0.136204  -0.826  0.4110   0.0082 
 
-0.595306   -2.16  0.0338*  0.0532 
 0.365191    1.36  0.1778   0.0218 
-0.332561   -1.75  0.0832   0.0357 
-0.007821  -0.375  0.7089   0.0017 
 0.023020   0.960  0.3398   0.0110 
-0.099392   -1.15  0.2519   0.0158 
 
AR 1-7:      
ARCH 1-7:    
Normality:  
Hetero:      
RESET23:      
 
 F(6,77)   =  0.94828 [0.4659]   
 F(6,71)   =   1.0247 [0.4165]   
 Chi^2(2)  =   1.3008 [0.5218]   
 F(24,58)  =  0.83711 [0.6774]   
F(1,82)   = 0.066952 [0.7965]   
 
 F(6,77)   =  0.80505 [0.5691]   
 F(6,71)   =   1.9456 [0.0852]   
 Chi^2(2)  =  0.20214 [0.9039]   
 F(24,58)  =  0.85387 [0.6571]   
 F(1,82)   = 0.016640 [0.8977]   
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Table 4.7.1: Cocoa ECM Estimation Results Fcont Index and Hedging Pressure (D12) (cont.) 
Jan 2006 – Dec 2013 (alternative) 
 ECM(0) ECM(0) 
 
Coeff.     t-val.  p-val.   part-r Coeff.     t-val.  p-val.   part-r 
 
X 
DSLIBOR      
DInventory   
DInvent_1      
DSPCOR3Y   
DH_index 
DH_com                      
             
Y_1                   
X_1               
SLIBOR_1         
Inventory_1      
SPCOR3Y_1    
H_index_1 
H_com_1                     
  
 0.0018647  0.0447  0.9645   0.0000 
 0.0603900   0.362  0.7188   0.0019 
-0.0116263  -0.643  0.5224   0.0061 
-0.0648576   -3.62  0.0006** 0.1635 
-0.0322455  -0.474  0.6369   0.0033 
 0.123562    0.808  0.4220   0.0096 
-0.0891571 -1.07  0.2881   0.0168 
 
-0.748587    -15.6  0.0000** 0.7843 
0.768254     13.4  0.0000** 0.7269 
-0.0268453  -0.245  0.8070   0.0009 
0.0126079    1.66  0.1022   0.0394 
-0.0330315   -2.94  0.0045** 0.1141 
 0.349222     2.66  0.0097** 0.0956 
-0.126814 -2.32  0.0236*  0.0742 
  
 0.01599   0.0447  0.9645   0.0000 
-0.37991   -0.780  0.4384   0.0090 
-0.08159    -1.56  0.1224   0.0352 
 0.01723    0.300  0.7648   0.0013 
 0.29782     1.52  0.1335   0.0333 
-0.58415    -1.32  0.1930   0.0252 
-0.06997   -0.285  0.7767   0.0012 
 
-0.64806    -2.07  0.0419*  0.0603 
 0.28617    0.953  0.3441   0.0134 
-0.92143    -3.07  0.0031** 0.1233 
-0.01683   -0.743  0.4599   0.0082 
 0.05724     1.67  0.0995   0.0400 
-0.46268    -1.16  0.2515   0.0196 
-0.13578   -0.819  0.4155   0.0099 
 
AR 1-7:      
ARCH 1-7:    
Normality:  
Hetero:      
RESET23:      
 
 F(5,62)   =   1.7117 [0.1452]   
 F(5,57)   =   1.0332 [0.4070]   
 Chi^2(2)  =  0.89128 [0.6404]   
 F(28,38)  =  0.84727 [0.6725]   
F(1,66)   = 0.075850 [0.7839]   
 
 F(5,62)   =   1.3089 [0.2719]   
 F(5,57)   =   1.1544 [0.3428]   
 Chi^2(2)  =  0.44840 [0.7992]   
 F(28,38)  =  0.48171 [0.9763]   
 F(1,66)   = 0.027575 [0.8686] 
Notes: ** indicates significance at the 1% level, * indicates significance at the 5% level.  
D12 indicates annual differences, D indicates first difference, _1 indicates lagged one period; SLIBOR is 
the cash price times interest rate, Inventory is level of inventories; SPCOR3Y is systematic risk; com_H is 
hedging pressure using the COT data; H_com is hedging pressure using CIT data; H_index denotes index 
pressure using CIT data. 
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Table 4.7.2: Cocoa ECM Estimation Results Fwa Index and Hedging Pressure (D12) 
April 1995 – Dec 2013 
 Backward (Y=F) Forward (Y=S) 
 ECM(6) ECM(6) 
 Coeff.     t-val.  p-val.   part-r Coeff.     t-val.  p-val.   part-r 
 
X 
DSLIBOR      
DInventory   
DInvent_1      
DSPCOR3Y   
Dcom_H  
 
Y_1                   
X_1               
SLIBOR_1         
Inventory_1      
SPCOR3Y_1    
com_H_1              
  
 0.99718    37.7   0.0000** 0.9001 
 0.00001    0.03   0.9773   0.0000 
 0.02972    3.79   0.0002** 0.0834 
0.02530    3.13   0.0021** 0.0585 
-0.15305   -1.61   0.1092   0.0162 
-0.00465   -0.19   0.8507   0.0002 
 
-0.29952   -4.83   0.0000** 0.1286 
0.29388    4.70   0.0000** 0.1226 
0.00017    0.41   0.6843   0.0010 
0.00136    0.32   0.7526   0.0006 
 0.00670    0.66   0.5081   0.0028 
-0.01142   -0.55   0.5837   0.0019 
  
 0.90262    37.7   0.0000** 0.9001 
 0.00031    0.32   0.7514   0.0006 
-0.02691   -3.59   0.0004** 0.0755 
-0.02325   -3.02   0.0029** 0.0546 
 0.15118    1.67   0.0962   0.0174 
-0.03654   -1.57   0.1181   0.0154 
 
-0.28637   -4.83   0.0000** 0.1286 
 0.27867    4.71   0.0000** 0.1230 
-0.00041   -1.04   0.3008   0.0068 
-0.00264   -0.64   0.5208   0.0026 
-0.00238   -0.25   0.8048   0.0004 
-0.00785   -0.40   0.6925   0.0010 
 
AR 1-7:      
ARCH 1-7:    
Normality:  
Hetero:      
RESET23:      
  
 F(7,151)  =   1.5247 [0.1629]   
 F(7,144)  =   4.8553 [0.0001]** 
 Chi^2(2)  =   9.7494 [0.0076]** 
 F(94,63)  =  0.51090 [0.9985]   
F(1,157)  = 0.016204 [0.8989]   
  
 F(7,151)  =   1.8551 [0.0808]   
 F(7,144)  =   6.0720 [0.0000]** 
 Chi^2(2)  =   10.760 [0.0046]** 
 F(94,63)  =  0.47668 [0.9995]   
 F(1,157)  =  0.34669 [0.5568]   
April 1995 – Dec 2005 
 ECM(0) ECM(0) 
 
Coeff.     t-val.  p-val.   part-r Coeff.     t-val.  p-val.   part-r 
 
X 
DSLIBOR      
DInventory   
DInvent_1      
DSPCOR3Y   
Dcom_H  
 
Y_1                   
X_1               
SLIBOR_1         
Inventory_1      
SPCOR3Y_1    
com_H_1              
  
 1.04663    57.6   0.0000** 0.9662 
 0.00088    1.03   0.3029   0.0091 
-0.00037   -0.07   0.9475   0.0000 
0.01515    2.87   0.0050** 0.0661 
-0.06407   -1.26   0.2102   0.0135 
-0.02224   -1.51   0.1336   0.0193 
 
-0.22851   -4.08   0.0001** 0.1257 
0.23403    4.09   0.0001** 0.1262 
0.00072    2.15   0.0338*  0.0383 
0.00032    0.15   0.8850   0.0002 
 0.00143    0.23   0.8166   0.0005 
-0.00304   -0.24   0.8075   0.0005 
  
 0.92318    57.6   0.0000** 0.9662 
-0.00039   -0.49   0.6233   0.0021 
 0.00160    0.31   0.7583   0.0008 
-0.01307   -2.62   0.0100** 0.0558 
 0.09105    1.92   0.0568   0.0309 
 0.01176    0.85   0.3998   0.0061 
 
-0.21879   -4.07   0.0001** 0.1251 
 0.21039    3.99   0.0001** 0.1208 
-0.00073   -2.33   0.0215*  0.0447 
 0.00042    0.20   0.8419   0.0003 
 0.00001    0.01   0.9908   0.0000 
 0.00773    0.66   0.5092   0.0038 
 
AR 1-7:      
ARCH 1-7:    
Normality:  
Hetero:      
RESET23:      
  
 F(7,109)  =   1.7895 [0.0965]   
 F(7,102)  =  0.77159 [0.6124]   
 Chi^2(2)  =   3.9532 [0.1385]   
 F(24,91)  =  0.53018 [0.9609]   
F(1,115)  =   1.3857 [0.2416] 
  
 F(7,109)  =   2.1633 [0.0430]*  
 F(7,102)  =  0.58616 [0.7658]   
 Chi^2(2)  =   1.9131 [0.3842]   
 F(24,91)  =  0.60857 [0.9170]   
 F(1,115)  =   2.6111 [0.1089] 
Jan 2006 – Dec 2013 
 ECM(0) ECM(0) 
 Coeff.     t-val.  p-val.   part-r Coeff.     t-val.  p-val.   part-r 
 
X 
DSLIBOR      
DInventory   
DInvent_1      
DSPCOR3Y   
Dcom_H  
 
Y_1                   
X_1               
SLIBOR_1         
Inventory_1      
SPCOR3Y_1    
com_H_1              
  
 0.96879   17.3   0.0000** 0.8134 
-0.00053  -0.31   0.7543   0.0014 
 0.08682   4.88   0.0000** 0.2563 
0.04358   2.30   0.0245*  0.0712 
-0.10044  -1.74   0.0868   0.0419 
 0.01942   0.61   0.5458   0.0053 
 
-0.58491  -6.12   0.0000** 0.3516 
0.53708   5.67   0.0000** 0.3177 
-0.00033  -0.61   0.5440   0.0054 
0.01620   1.95   0.0551   0.0523 
 0.03711   3.19   0.0021** 0.1285 
0.04303   0.65   0.5199   0.0060 
  
 0.83958    17.3   0.0000** 0.8134 
-0.00026   -0.16   0.8702   0.0004 
-0.06589   -3.76   0.0003** 0.1703 
-0.05442   -3.18   0.0022** 0.1280 
 0.08502    1.57   0.1201   0.0346 
-0.04480   -1.53   0.1317   0.0326 
 
-0.50797   -5.80   0.0000** 0.3279 
 0.53533    5.96   0.0000** 0.3398 
 0.00010    0.20   0.8404   0.0006 
-0.01465   -1.89   0.0627   0.0493 
-0.02981   -2.70   0.0087** 0.0957 
-0.16511   -2.81   0.0065** 0.1024 
 
AR 1-7:      
ARCH 1-7:    
Normality:  
Hetero:      
RESET23:      
  
 F(5,64)   =   1.7297 [0.1405]   
 F(5,59)   =  0.78556 [0.5642]   
 Chi^2(2)  =   1.4121 [0.4936]   
 F(24,44)  =  0.52507 [0.9535]   
F(1,68)   =  0.31309 [0.5776] 
  
 F(5,64)   =   2.1903 [0.0661]   
 F(5,59)   =  0.44958 [0.8119]   
 Chi^2(2)  =   1.6767 [0.4324]   
 F(24,44)  =  0.91597 [0.5817]   
 F(1,68)   =0.0088272 [0.9254] 
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Table 4.7.2: Cocoa ECM Estimation Results Fwa Index and Hedging Pressure (D12) (cont.) 
Jan 2006 – Dec 2013 (alternative) 
 ECM(0) ECM(0) 
 
Coeff.     t-val.  p-val.   part-r Coeff.     t-val.  p-val.   part-r 
 
X 
DSLIBOR      
DInventory   
DInvent_1      
DSPCOR3Y   
DH_index 
DH_com     
DCITindpct                  
             
Y_1                   
X_1               
SLIBOR_1         
Inventory_1      
SPCOR3Y_1    
H_index_1 
H_com_1     
CITindpct_1            
  
 0.95903    18.3   0.0000** 0.8378 
-0.00237   -1.32   0.1914   0.0261 
 0.09257    5.26   0.0000** 0.2983 
0.04987    2.73   0.0082** 0.1027 
-0.24717   -3.30   0.0016** 0.1436 
 0.37001    2.63   0.0106*  0.0963 
-0.16659   -2.09   0.0405*  0.0630 
0.05982 0.14   0.8903   0.0003 
 
-0.66702   -7.02   0.0000** 0.4314 
0.69537    6.55   0.0000** 0.3974 
0.00058    0.86   0.3943   0.0112 
0.02385    2.51   0.0145*  0.0885 
 0.01686    1.30   0.1979   0.0254 
 0.44058    2.97   0.0042** 0.1195 
-0.07023   -1.19   0.2373   0.0214 
-0.64819  -1.36   0.1782   0.0277 
  
 0.87356    18.3   0.0000** 0.8378 
 0.00208    1.22   0.2285   0.0222 
-0.07740   -4.39   0.0000** 0.2290 
-0.05805   -3.42   0.0011** 0.1528 
 0.24779    3.50   0.0009** 0.1584 
-0.42579   -3.25   0.0018** 0.1400 
 0.03770    0.48   0.6324   0.0035 
 0.03294    0.08   0.9366   0.0001 
 
-0.69002   -7.00   0.0000** 0.4296 
 0.61297    6.58   0.0000** 0.4000 
-0.00108   -1.71   0.0926   0.0429 
-0.02631   -2.95   0.0044** 0.1182 
-0.00916   -0.73   0.4654   0.0082 
-0.45698   -3.27   0.0017** 0.1412 
 0.01369    0.24   0.8103   0.0009 
 0.95477    2.14   0.0358*  0.0660 
 
AR 1-7:      
ARCH 1-7:    
Normality:  
Hetero:      
RESET23:      
  
 F(5,60)   =   1.5350 [0.1926]   
 F(5,55)   =  0.87642 [0.5030]   
 Chi^2(2)  =  0.43727 [0.8036]   
 F(32,32)  =  0.50617 [0.9708]   
F(1,64)   =  0.39230 [0.5333] 
  
 F(5,60)   =   1.8110 [0.1243]   
 F(5,55)   =  0.65157 [0.6615]   
 Chi^2(2)  =  0.20259 [0.9037]   
 F(32,32)  =  0.60316 [0.9209]   
 F(1,64)   = 0.095879 [0.7578] 
Notes: ** indicates significance at the 1% level, * indicates significance at the 5% level.  
D12 indicates annual differences, D indicates first difference, _1 indicates lagged one period; SLIBOR is 
the cash price times interest rate, Inventory is level of inventories; SPCOR3Y is systematic risk; com_H is 
hedging pressure using the COT data; H_com is hedging pressure using CIT data; H_index denotes index 
pressure using CIT data. 
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Appendix 4.8 Wheat Unrestricted ECM Estimation Results 
Table 4.8.1: Wheat ECM Estimation Results Fcont Index and Hedging Pressure (D12) 
April 1995 – Dec 2013 
 Forward (Y=S) Backward (Y=F) 
 ECM(0) ECM(0) 
 Coeff.     t-val.  p-val.   part-r Coeff.     t-val.  p-val.   part-r 
 
X 
DSLIBOR      
DInventory   
DInventory_
1       
DSPCOR3Y   
Dcom_H  
 
Y_1                   
X_1               
SLIBOR_1         
Inventory_1      
SPCOR3Y_1    
com_H_1              
  
 1.05204    20.1  0.0000** 0.6717 
 0.41049    1.65  0.1012   0.0135 
-180.879   -1.01  0.3130   0.0051 
 41.3408   0.238  0.8125   0.0003 
-0.06107  -0.738  0.4616   0.0027 
 0.11527    1.07  0.2852   0.0058 
 
-0.255189  -5.55  0.0000** 0.1344 
 0.192833   3.29  0.0012** 0.0519 
-0.008029 -0.119  0.9052   0.0001 
-17.4116  -0.548  0.5842   0.0015 
 0.035349   2.32  0.0213*  0.0265 
-0.119879  -1.02  0.3111   0.0052 
  
 0.63843     20.1  0.0000** 0.6717 
 0.05107    0.261  0.7942   0.0003 
 110.325    0.791  0.4298   0.0032 
-5.33073  -0.0393  0.9687   0.0000 
 0.02428    0.376  0.7073   0.0007 
-0.47735    -6.21  0.0000** 0.1629 
 
-0.23721    -5.43  0.0000** 0.1295  
 0.18782     5.20  0.0000** 0.1200 
 0.05877     1.12  0.2625   0.0063 
 5.80505    0.234  0.8149   0.0003 
 0.00222    0.185  0.8537   0.0002 
-0.18618    -2.04  0.0427*  0.0206 
 
AR 1-7:      
ARCH 1-7:    
Normality:  
Hetero:      
RESET23:      
 
 F(7,191)  =   1.4006 [0.2071]   
 F(7,184)  =   4.0754 [0.0004]** 
 Chi^2(2)  =   26.114 [0.0000]** 
 F(24,173) =   2.6366 [0.0002]** 
F(1,197)  =   1.1595 [0.2829] 
 
 F(7,191)  =   1.5238 [0.1613]   
 F(7,184)  =   1.9640 [0.0622]   
 Chi^2(2)  =   9.8783 [0.0072]** 
 F(24,173) =   1.2630 [0.1962]   
 F(1,197)  =   3.5457 [0.0612] 
April 1995 – Dec 2005 
 ECM(0) ECM(0) 
 
Coeff.     t-val.  p-val.   part-r Coeff.     t-val.  p-val.   part-r 
 
X 
DSLIBOR      
DInventory   
DInventory_
1       
DSPCOR3Y   
Dcom_H  
 
Y_1                   
X_1               
SLIBOR_1         
Inventory_1      
SPCOR3Y_1    
com_H_1              
  
 0.946981      12.0  0.0000** 0.5854 
 1.09732       3.28  0.0014** 0.0953 
-66.2447     -0.387  0.6992   0.0015 
 57.4140      0.360  0.7197   0.0013 
-0.00447283  -0.046  0.9639   0.0000 
 0.0862607    0.824  0.4117   0.0066 
 
-0.323484     -4.28  0.0000** 0.1520 
 0.335518      3.38  0.0010** 0.1005 
-0.0222340   -0.254  0.8002   0.0006 
-36.1545     -0.843  0.4014   0.0069 
 0.00898877   0.547  0.5856   0.0029 
 0.0778520    0.664  0.5084   0.0043 
  
 0.61822     12.0  0.0000** 0.5854 
-0.21245   -0.749  0.4555   0.0055 
-50.4407   -0.365  0.7158   0.0013 
 24.4995    0.190  0.8497   0.0004 
 0.08456     1.07  0.2877   0.0111 
-0.41632    -5.61  0.0000** 0.2361 
 
-0.35127    -4.55  0.0000** 0.1688 
 0.22487     3.60  0.0005** 0.1125 
-0.01244   -0.176  0.8609   0.0003 
 1.59779   0.0459  0.9635   0.0000 
 0.01033    0.779  0.4376   0.0059 
-0.27862    -3.07  0.0028** 0.0844 
 
AR 1-7:      
ARCH 1-7:    
Normality:  
Hetero:      
RESET23:      
 
 F(7,95)   =   1.3715 [0.2264]   
 F(7,88)   =   1.0108 [0.4293]   
 Chi^2(2)  =   6.6760 [0.0355]*  
 F(24,77)  =   1.1321 [0.3318]   
F(1,101)  =  0.64224 [0.4248]   
 
 F(7,95)   =   1.2079 [0.3061]   
 F(7,88)   =   1.8909 [0.0805]   
 Chi^2(2)  =   12.134 [0.0023]** 
 F(24,77)  =  0.67375 [0.8616]   
 F(1,101)  = 0.075915 [0.7835] 
Jan 2006 – Dec 2013 
 ECM(2) ECM(2) 
 Coeff.     t-val.  p-val.   part-r Coeff.     t-val.  p-val.   part-r 
 
X 
DSLIBOR      
DInventory   
DInventory_
1       
DSPCOR3Y   
Dcom_H  
 
Y_1                   
X_1               
SLIBOR_1         
Inventory_1      
SPCOR3Y_1    
com_H_1              
  
 1.21831       13.3  0.0000** 0.7261 
-0.0508053   -0.122  0.9032   0.0002 
-372.452     -0.770  0.4438   0.0088 
-295.549     -0.593  0.5550   0.0052 
 0.0768687    0.344  0.7322   0.0018 
 0.708120      1.98  0.0514   0.0554 
 
-0.298942     -3.31  0.0015** 0.1402 
 0.194318      1.58  0.1179   0.0361 
 0.424972      1.99  0.0507   0.0558 
 122.489       1.37  0.1748   0.0273 
-0.0125249   -0.274  0.7849   0.0011 
 0.0890100    0.264  0.7929   0.0010 
  
 0.59599     13.3  0.0000** 0.7261 
 0.25604    0.885  0.3795   0.0115 
 359.169     1.07  0.2901   0.0167 
 285.773    0.822  0.4139   0.0100 
-0.30222    -1.99  0.0511   0.0556 
-1.16294    -5.43  0.0000** 0.3057 
 
-0.26847    -3.31  0.0015** 0.1409  
 0.21408     3.40  0.0011** 0.1470 
-0.36932    -2.51  0.0144*  0.0862 
-145.985    -2.40  0.0191*  0.0793 
 0.06837     2.21  0.0302*  0.0682 
-0.53593    -2.36  0.0212*  0.0768 
 
AR 1-7:      
ARCH 1-7:    
Normality:  
Hetero:      
RESET23:      
 
 F(5,62)   =   2.3852 [0.0482]*  
 F(5,57)   =   2.0010 [0.0922]   
 Chi^2(2)  =   2.8013 [0.2464]   
 F(32,34)  =   1.2467 [0.2638]   
F(1,66)   =  0.43520 [0.5117] 
 
 F(5,62)   =   1.7233 [0.1425]   
 F(5,57)   =   1.7151 [0.1459]   
 Chi^2(2)  =   1.2925 [0.5240]   
 F(32,34)  =  0.66429 [0.8761]   
 F(1,66)   =   1.2504 [0.2675] 
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Table 4.8.1: Wheat ECM Estimation Results Fcont Index and Hedging Pressure (D12) (cont.) 
Jan 2006 – Dec 2013 (alternative) 
 ECM(2) ECM(0) 
 
Coeff.     t-val.  p-val.   part-r Coeff.     t-val.  p-val.   part-r 
 
X 
DSLIBOR      
DInventory   
DInventory_
1       
DSPCOR3Y   
DH_index 
DH_com     
DCITindpct                  
             
Y_1                   
X_1               
SLIBOR_1         
Inventory_1      
SPCOR3Y_1    
H_index_1 
H_com_1     
CITindpct_1                  
  
 1.12755       13.7  0.0000** 0.7553 
-0.0241697  -0.0547  0.9566   0.0000 
-556.897      -1.10  0.2771   0.0193 
-334.802     -0.620  0.5375   0.0063 
 0.110562     0.526  0.6007   0.0045 
 0.0354718   0.0961  0.9237   0.0002 
 14.4001      0.551  0.5838   0.0049 
-0.643035     -1.12  0.2683   0.0201 
 
-0.317349     -3.18  0.0023** 0.1423 
 0.221265      1.83  0.0726   0.0519 
 0.355573      1.53  0.1320   0.0368 
 86.0659      0.984  0.3290   0.0156 
-0.0041532  -0.0873  0.9307   0.0001 
 0.120997     0.223  0.8239   0.0008 
 30.2634      0.850  0.3989   0.0117 
 0.184712     0.281  0.7799   0.0013 
  
 0.66793     14.1  0.0000** 0.7544 
 0.09399    0.286  0.7755   0.0013 
 790.772     2.15  0.0357*  0.0661 
 41.3145    0.108  0.9142   0.0002 
-0.16204    -1.02  0.3100   0.0158 
-0.03159   -0.123  0.9022   0.0002 
-40.4234    -2.15  0.0351*  0.0665 
 0.53503     1.24  0.2202   0.0230 
 
-0.26376    -3.35  0.0014** 0.1469 
 0.25698     4.00  0.0002** 0.1974 
-0.20419    -1.21  0.2304   0.0221 
-48.1383   -0.728  0.4690   0.0081 
 0.03876     1.09  0.2807   0.0179 
-0.79884    -1.99  0.0509   0.0574 
-38.7652    -1.51  0.1368   0.0337 
 0.01180   0.0233  0.9815   0.0000 
 
AR 1-7:      
ARCH 1-7:    
Normality:  
Hetero:      
RESET23:      
 
 F(5,56)   =   2.3218 [0.0550]   
 F(5,51)   =   1.6441 [0.1652]   
 Chi^2(2)  =   2.9320 [0.2308]   
 F(40,20)  =  0.92051 [0.6011]   
F(1,60)   =  0.32454 [0.5710] 
 
 F(5,60)   =   3.3262 [0.0102]*  
 F(5,55)   =  0.34166 [0.8854]   
 Chi^2(2)  =   1.4046 [0.4954]   
 F(32,32)  =  0.75966 [0.7794]   
 F(1,64)   =  0.40121 [0.5287]   
Notes: ** indicates significance at the 1% level, * indicates significance at the 5% level.  
D12 indicates annual differences, D indicates first difference, _1 indicates lagged one period; SLIBOR is 
the cash price times interest rate, Inventory is level of inventories; SPCOR3Y is systematic risk; com_H is 
hedging pressure using the COT data; H_com is hedging pressure using CIT data; H_index denotes index 
pressure using CIT data. 
Residuals were tested for non-stationarity with ADF without intercept and found stationary in all cases.  
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Table 4.8.2: Wheat ECM Estimation Results Fwa Index and Hedging Pressure (D12) 
April 1995 – Dec 2013 
 Forward (Y=S) Backward (Y=F) 
 ECM(0) ECM(0) 
 Coeff.     t-val.  p-val.   part-r Coeff.     t-val.  p-val.   part-r 
 
X 
DSLIBOR      
DInventory   
DInventory_
1       
DSPCOR3Y   
Dcom_H  
 
Y_1                   
X_1             
SLIBOR_1         
Inventory_1      
SPCOR3Y_1    
com_H_1              
  
 0.59712   20.0  0.0000** 0.6689 
 0.07436   0.41  0.6862   0.0008 
 0.00009   0.69  0.4938   0.0024 
 0.00003   0.26  0.7943   0.0003 
-0.00261  -0.04  0.9657   0.0000 
-0.50642  -7.03  0.0000** 0.1999 
 
-0.21561  -5.30  0.0000** 0.1244 
 0.16811   5.12  0.0000** 0.1168 
 0.06055   1.22  0.2226   0.0075 
 0.00002   0.89  0.3743   0.0040 
-0.00015  -0.01  0.9897   0.0000 
-0.18456  -2.17  0.0309*  0.0233 
  
 1.12013   20.0  0.0000** 0.6689 
 0.38170   1.52  0.1290   0.0116 
-0.00016  -0.91  0.3623   0.0042 
-0.00001  -0.04  0.9714   0.0000 
-0.03236  -0.39  0.6974   0.0008 
 0.17977   1.64  0.1022   0.0134 
 
-0.24628  -5.53  0.0000** 0.1336 
 0.18157   3.13  0.0020** 0.0470 
-0.01043  -0.15  0.8783   0.0001 
-0.00003  -1.01  0.3136   0.0051 
 0.03754   2.48  0.0140*  0.0301 
-0.11101  -0.95  0.3455   0.0045 
 
AR 1-7:      
ARCH 1-7:    
Normality:  
Hetero:      
RESET23:      
 
 F(7,191)  =   1.0665 [0.3866]   
 F(7,197)  =   1.1824 [0.3145]   
 Chi^2(2)  =   9.1659 [0.0102]*  
 F(24,186) =   1.5107 [0.0679]   
F(2,196)  =   2.2110 [0.1123] 
 
 F(7,191)  =  0.92589 [0.4876]   
 F(7,197)  =   2.6704 [0.0116]*  
 Chi^2(2)  =   29.692 [0.0000]** 
 F(24,186) =   3.3065 [0.0000]** 
 F(2,196)  =   1.0467 [0.3531]   
April 1995 – Dec 2005 
 ECM(0) ECM(0) 
 
Coeff.     t-val.  p-val.   part-r Coeff.     t-val.  p-val.   part-r 
 
X 
DSLIBOR      
DInventory   
DInventory_
1       
DSPCOR3Y   
Dcom_H  
 
Y_1                   
X_1               
SLIBOR_1         
Inventory_1      
SPCOR3Y_1    
com_H_1              
  
 0.58854   11.8  0.0000** 0.5761 
-0.16368  -0.60  0.5513   0.0035 
-0.00004  -0.26  0.7924   0.0007 
 0.00005   0.36  0.7205   0.0012 
 0.03823   0.51  0.6133   0.0025 
-0.44183  -6.21  0.0000** 0.2721 
 
-0.30121  -4.06  0.0001** 0.1377 
 0.18120   3.04  0.0030** 0.0823 
 0.01643   0.24  0.8110   0.0006 
 0.00002   0.66  0.5124   0.0042 
 0.01125   0.88  0.3792   0.0075 
-0.26718  -3.08  0.0026** 0.0846 
  
 0.97881   11.8  0.0000** 0.5761 
 1.07899   3.20  0.0018** 0.0904 
-0.00008  -0.46  0.6498   0.0020 
 0.00004   0.24  0.8108   0.0006 
 0.03445   0.35  0.7241   0.0012 
 0.12037   1.13  0.2631   0.0121 
 
-0.30171  -4.05  0.0001** 0.1372 
 0.31540   3.21  0.0018** 0.0908 
-0.05230  -0.59  0.5546   0.0034 
-0.00006  -1.34  0.1821   0.0172 
 0.00714   0.43  0.6657   0.0018 
 0.08308   0.71  0.4773   0.0049 
 
AR 1-7:      
ARCH 1-7:    
Normality:  
Hetero:      
RESET23:      
 
 F(7,96)   =   1.7471 [0.1071]   
 F(7,102)  =   1.8168 [0.0919]   
 Chi^2(2)  =   13.456 [0.0012]** 
 F(24,91)  =   1.0799 [0.3818]   
F(2,101)  =  0.19502 [0.8231]   
 
 F(7,96)   =   2.0725 [0.0538]   
 F(7,102)  =   1.1383 [0.3453]   
 Chi^2(2)  =   6.6152 [0.0366]*  
 F(24,91)  =   1.5458 [0.0731]   
 F(2,101)  =   1.3586 [0.2617]   
Jan 2006 – Dec 2013 
 ECM(3) ECM(3) 
 Coeff.     t-val.  p-val.   part-r Coeff.     t-val.  p-val.   part-r 
 
X 
DSLIBOR      
DInventory   
DInventory_
1       
DSPCOR3Y   
Dcom_H  
 
Y_1                   
X_1               
SLIBOR_1         
Inventory_1      
SPCOR3Y_1    
com_H_1              
  
 0.54996   12.0  0.0000** 0.6899 
-0.04270  -0.15  0.8842   0.0003 
 0.00017   0.65  0.5153   0.0065 
-0.00030  -0.95  0.3474   0.0136 
-0.05296  -0.32  0.7470   0.0016 
-1.18263  -6.10  0.0000** 0.3641 
 
-0.20073  -2.95  0.0045** 0.1177 
 0.26324   4.95  0.0000** 0.2737 
-0.77632  -4.89  0.0000** 0.2688 
-0.00024  -4.01  0.0002** 0.1981 
 0.11024   3.22  0.0020** 0.1377 
-0.32298  -1.33  0.1867   0.0267 
  
 1.25436    12.0  0.0000** 0.6899 
 0.22842    0.52  0.6056   0.0041 
-0.00027   -0.67  0.5051   0.0069 
 0.00051    1.08  0.2843   0.0176 
-0.28236   -1.15  0.2526   0.0201 
 0.65938    1.84  0.0700   0.0496 
 
-0.44893   -5.90  0.0000** 0.3490 
 0.18238    1.70  0.0937   0.0426 
 1.04116    4.18  0.0001** 0.2120 
 0.00029    3.15  0.0025** 0.1325 
-0.05450   -0.99  0.3275   0.0148 
-0.08422   -0.23  0.8208   0.0008 
 
AR 1-7:      
ARCH 1-7:    
Normality:  
Hetero:      
RESET23:      
 
 F(6,59)   =   1.3596 [0.2459]   
 F(6,83)   =  0.95033 [0.4640]   
 Chi^2(2)  =  0.93541 [0.6264]   
 F(58,36)  =  0.82839 [0.7427]   
F(2,63)   =   1.6627 [0.1978] 
 
 F(6,59)   =  0.39088 [0.8820]   
 F(6,83)   =  0.71737 [0.6367]   
 Chi^2(2)  =   4.2420 [0.1199]   
 F(58,36)  =   1.0750 [0.4147]   
 F(2,63)   =  0.62854 [0.5367] 
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Table 4.8.2: Wheat ECM Estimation Results Fwa Index and Hedging Pressure (D12) (cont.) 
Jan 2006 – Dec 2013 (alternative) 
 ECM(1) ECM(0) 
 
Coeff.     t-val.  p-val.   part-r Coeff.     t-val.  p-val.   part-r 
 
X 
DSLIBOR      
DInventory   
DInventory_
1       
DSPCOR3Y   
DH_index 
DH_com     
DCITindpct                  
             
Y_1                   
X_1               
SLIBOR_1         
Inventory_1      
SPCOR3Y_1    
H_index_1 
H_com_1     
CITindpct_1                  
  
 1.27021       11.8  0.0000** 0.6891 
-0.0225032  -0.0517  0.9589   0.0000 
-480.469     -0.915  0.3638   0.0131 
-335.788     -0.650  0.5181   0.0067 
 0.272620      1.09  0.2790   0.0186 
 0.226196     0.612  0.5429   0.0059 
 42.7663       1.19  0.2385   0.0220 
-1.03857      -1.73  0.0880   0.0455 
 
-0.347108     -3.61  0.0006** 0.1716 
 0.343820      2.45  0.0171*  0.0869 
 0.287674      1.24  0.2203   0.0238 
 96.7295      0.958  0.3417   0.0144 
 0.00791714   0.163  0.8709   0.0004 
 0.606612      1.08  0.2846   0.0182 
 56.6228       1.04  0.3027   0.0169 
-0.573913     -1.22  0.2274   0.0230 
  
 0.54297     11.7  0.0000** 0.6784 
 0.12672    0.450  0.6544   0.0031 
 709.882     2.16  0.0344*  0.0670 
 42.7790    0.134  0.8935   0.0003 
-0.50347    -3.32  0.0015** 0.1451 
-0.34728    -1.44  0.1533   0.0311 
-50.8062    -2.23  0.0292*  0.0711 
 0.97862     2.54  0.0136*  0.0901 
 
-0.42374    -5.54  0.0000** 0.3204 
 0.23590     4.10  0.0001** 0.2058 
-0.21864    -1.51  0.1356   0.0339 
-139.780    -2.21  0.0308*  0.0698 
 0.05236     1.69  0.0958   0.0421 
-1.38478    -4.20  0.0001** 0.2137 
-45.5294    -1.33  0.1869   0.0266 
 0.76426     2.56  0.0128*  0.0916 
 
AR 1-7:      
ARCH 1-7:    
Normality:  
Hetero:      
RESET23:      
 
 F(5,58)   =   3.0409 [0.0166]*  
 F(5,53)   =   1.5415 [0.1929]   
 Chi^2(2)  =   4.7575 [0.0927]   
 F(36,26)  =   1.0727 [0.4321]   
F(1,62)   =   1.0144 [0.3178]   
 
 F(5,60)   =  0.54634 [0.7404]   
 F(5,55)   =  0.96812 [0.4454]   
 Chi^2(2)  =   1.3143 [0.5183]   
 F(32,32)  =  0.75185 [0.7879]   
 F(1,64)   = 0.039976 [0.8422] 
Notes: ** indicates significance at the 1% level, * indicates significance at the 5% level.  
D12 indicates annual differences, D indicates first difference, _1 indicates lagged one period; SLIBOR is 
the cash price times interest rate, Inventory is level of inventories; SPCOR3Y is systematic risk; com_H is 
hedging pressure using the COT data; H_com is hedging pressure using CIT data; H_index denotes index 
pressure using CIT data. 
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Appendix 4.9 Hansen Parameter Instability Tests Restricted Model 
 
Figure 4.9.1: Hansen Parameter Instability Test Wheat 
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Fiure 4.9.2: Hansen Parameter Instability Test Cocoa 
  
  
Notes: Graphics created by R with Hansen program.  
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Appendix 4.10 Recursive Coefficient Estimation Wheat 
Recursive estimates of the coefficient are surrounded by the approximately 95 per cent 
confidence interval formed by two lines, indicating plus-minus two standard deviations 
around the recursive estimates. If the estimate lies outside the band of the previous time 
period this is interpreted as a sign of parameter instability. The second graphic shows one-
step recursive residuals, framed by the 95 per cent confidence interval. Points outside the 
interval are either outliers or parameter changes. 
Figure 4.10.1: April 1995 – December 2013, Fcont Unrestricted Forward ECM (Y=S) 
 
 
Figure 4.10.2: April 1995 – December 2013, Fcont Restricted Forward ECM (Y=S) 
 
Note: Recurisve Estimation created by PcGive. 
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Figure 4.10.3: April 1995 – December 2013, Fcont Unrestricted Backward ECM (Y=F) 
 
 
Figure 4.10.4: April 1995 – December 2013, Fcont Restricted Backward ECM (Y=F) 
 
Note: Recurisve Estimation created by PcGive. 
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Figure 4.10.5: April 1995 – December 2013, Fwa Unrestricted Forward ECM (Y=S) 
 
 
Figure 4.10.6: April 1995 – December 2013, Fwa Restricted Forward ECM (Y=S) 
 
Note: Recurisve Estimation created by PcGive. 
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Figure 4.10.7: April 1995 – December 2013, Fwa Unrestricted Backward ECM (Y=F) 
 
 
Figure 4.10.8: April 1995 – December 2013, Fwa Restricted Nackward ECM (Y=F) 
 
Note: Recurisve Estimation created by PcGive. 
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Figure 4.10.9: January 2006 – December 2013, Fcont Unrestricted Forward ECM (Y=S) 
 
 
Figure 4.10.10: January 2006 – December 2013, Fcont Restricted Forward ECM (Y=S) 
 
Note: Recurisve Estimation created by PcGive. 
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Figure 4.10.11: January 2006 – December 2013, Fcont Unrestricted Backward ECM 
(Y=F) 
 
 
Figure 4.10.12: January 2006 – December 2013, Fcont Restricted Backward ECM (Y=F) 
 
Note: Recurisve Estimation created by PcGive. 
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Figure 4.10.13: January 2006 – December 2013, Fwa Unrestricted Backward ECM (Y=F) 
 
 
Figure 4.10.14: January 2006 – December 2013, Fwa Restricted Backward ECM (Y=F) 
 
Note: Recurisve Estimation created by PcGive. 
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Figure 4.10.15: January 2006 – December 2013, Fwa Unrestricted Forward ECM (Y=S) 
 
 
Figure 4.10.16: January 2006 – December 2013, Fwa Restricted Forward ECM (Y=S) 
 
Note: Recurisve Estimation created by PcGive. 
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Appendix 4.11 Recursive Coefficient Estimation Cocoa 
Recursive estimates of the coefficient are surrounded by the approximately 95 per cent 
confidence interval formed by two lines, indicating plus-minus two standard deviations 
around the recursive estimates. If the estimate lies outside the band of the previous time 
period this is interpreted as a sign of parameter instability. The second graphic shows one-
step recursive residuals, framed by the 95 per cent confidence interval. Points outside the 
interval are either outliers or parameter changes. 
Figure 4.11.1: April 1995 – December 2013, Fcont Unrestricted Backward ECM (Y=F) 
 
 
Figure 4.11.2: April 1995 – December 2013, Fcont Restricted Backward ECM (Y=F) 
 
Note: Recurisve Estimation created by PcGive. 
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Figure 4.11.3: April 1995 – December 2013, Fcont Unrestricted Forward ECM (Y=S) 
 
 
Figure 4.11.4: April 1995 – December 2013, Fcont Restricted Forward ECM (Y=S) 
 
Note: Recurisve Estimation created by PcGive. 
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Figure 4.11.5: April 1995 – December 2013, Fwa Unrestricted Backward ECM (Y=F) 
 
 
Figure 4.11.6: April 1995 – December 2013, Fwa Restricted Backward ECM (Y=F) 
 
Note: Recurisve Estimation created by PcGive. 
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Figure 4.11.7: April 1995 – December 2013, Fwa Unrestricted Forward ECM (Y=S) 
 
 
Figure 4.11.8: April 1995 – December 2013, Fwa Restricted Forward ECM (Y=S) 
 
Note: Recurisve Estimation created by PcGive. 
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Figure 4.11.9: January 2006 – December 2013, Fcont Unrestricted Forward ECM (Y=S) 
 
 
Figure 4.11.10: January 2006 – December 2013, Fcont Restricted Forward ECM (Y=S) 
 
Note: Recurisve Estimation created by PcGive. 
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Figure 4.11.11: January 2006 – December 2013, Fcont Unrestricted Backward ECM 
(Y=F) 
 
 
Figure 4.11.12: January 2006 – December 2013, Fcont Restricted Backward ECM (Y=F) 
 
Note: Recurisve Estimation created by PcGive. 
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Figure 4.11.13: January 2006 – December 2013, Fwa Unrestricted Backward ECM (Y=F) 
 
 
Figure 4.11.14: January 2006 – December 2013, Fwa Restricted Backward ECM (Y=F) 
 
Note: Recurisve Estimation created by PcGive. 
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Figure 4.11.15: January 2006 – December 2013, Fwa Unrestricted Forward ECM (Y=S) 
 
 
Figure 4.11.16: January 2006 – December 2013, Fwa Restricted Forward ECM (Y=S) 
 
Note: Recurisve Estimation created by PcGive. 
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Appendix 4.12 Rolling Coefficient Estimation Cocoa and Wheat 
Figure 4.12.1: Wheat Rolling Window Estimation ρ Restricted ECM Fcont - Spot 
Forward (Y=S) 
 
Backward (Y=F) 
 
Figure 4.12.2:  Cocoa Rolling Window Estimation ρ Restricted ECM Fcont - Spot 
Forward (Y=S) 
 
Backward (Y=F) 
 
Source: author’s calculation 
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Appendix Chapter 5 
Appendix 5.1 Unit Root Tests Annual Differences 
ADF tests (T=83, Constant; 5%=-2.90 1%=-3.51) – lag length decided by AIC 
information criteria with a maximum lag length of 6. 
Table 5.1.1: Unit Root Tests Annual Differences Cocoa 
 Variable D-lag t-adf D1_lag D1_t-adf D2_lag D2_t-adf Integration 
C
alen
d
ar S
p
read
s 
2-1 0 -6.715** - - - - I(0) 
3-2 2 -3.736** - - - - I(0) 
4-3 0 -5.204** - - - - I(0) 
5-4 2 -3.307* - - - - I(0) 
6-5 0 -3.669** - - - - I(0) 
7-6 2 -4.843** - - - - I(0) 
8-7 5 -3.059* - - - - I(0) 
E
xp
lan
ato
ry V
ariab
les 
I 4 -3.109* - - - - I(0) 
SLIBOR 1 -1.953   0 -12.76** - - I(1) 
VAR^       I(1) 
COR^       I(0) 
WEIGHT^       I(1) 
D_COM 0 -2.189 0 -8.509** - - I(1) 
D_INDX 2 -2.948* - - - - I(0) 
NCOM_EX 0 -7.789** - - - - I(0) 
^ Seven variables, one for each spread, fall under this category. Since the order of integration does not vary 
for different spreads, the dominant order of integration is reported here.  
 
Table 5.1.2: Unit Root Tests Annual Differences Coffee 
 Variable D-lag t-adf D1_lag D1_t-adf D2_lag D2_t-adf Integration 
C
alen
d
ar S
p
read
s 
2-1 1 -4.450** - - - - I(0) 
3-2 0 -2.937* - - - - I(0) 
4-3 0 -2.389 0 -10.77** - - I(1) 
5-4 4 -2.429 4 -4.217**   - - I(1) 
6-5 1 -1.942 0 -11.13** - - I(1) 
7-6 0 -2.099 0 -10.11** - - I(1) 
8-7 0 -2.394 0 -10.94** - - I(1) 
9-8 6 -3.330* - - - - I(0) 
E
xp
lan
ato
ry V
ariab
les 
I 2 -1.938 0 -4.102** - - I(1) 
SLIBOR 0 -2.064 3 -4.178** - - I(1) 
VAR^       I(1) 
COR^       I(0) 
WEIGHT^       I(1) 
D_COM 0 -2.964* - - - - I(0) 
D_INDX 1 -1.536 0 -12.38** - - I(1) 
NCOM_EX 4 -1.700 2 -5.499** - - I(1) 
^ Seven variables, one for each spread, fall under this category. Since the order of integration does not vary 
for different spreads, the dominant order of integration is reported here.  
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Appendix 5.2 Calendar Spread Regression Results Annual Differences Cocoa 
 
 Table 5.2.1: SPREAD_21 - Annual differences, constant, AR(5) 
 
Coefficient Std.Error t-value t-prob Part.R^2 
I ***2.093 0.769 2.72 0.0082 0.0932 
DI 2.934 1.870 1.57 0.1210 0.0331 
DI_1 0.190 1.746 0.11 0.9135 0.0002 
SLIBOR *-0.005 0.003 -1.82 0.0726 0.0441 
VAR_21 *-196.5 99.92 -1.97 0.0530 0.0510 
COR_21 4.885 6.068 0.81 0.4234 0.0089 
WEIGHT_21 69.20 165.7 0.42 0.6775 0.0024 
D_COM -0.034 0.023 -1.47 0.1461   0.0291 
D_INDX **0.150 0.059 2.54 0.0134 0.0820 
NCOM_EX -1.084 1.243 -0.87 0.3861   0.0104 
AR 1-6 test:       
ARCH 1-6 test:     
Normality test: 
Hetero test:  
RESET23 test:       
1.4711 [0.2110] 
0.8971 [0.4877] 
16.339 [0.0003]** 
0.6371 [0.8792] 
0.2816 [0.7554] 
                                
Joint F-test:        
R^2 :                  
 
3.431 [0.001]** 
0.343907 
Notes: Inventory data in 10.000 tonnes, trader-position data in 100 contracts. 
 
 
Table 5.2.2: SPREAD_32 - Annual differences, constant, AR(5) 
 
Coefficient Std.Error t-value t-prob Part.R^2 
I ***1.920 0.402 4.78 0.0000 0.2461 
DI -0.917 0.820 -1.12 0.2674 0.0175 
DI_1 -1.107 0.718 -1.54 0.1277 0.0328 
SLIBOR ***-0.006 0.001 -5.05 0.0000 0.2674 
VAR_32 ***-291.3 81.06 -3.59 0.0006 0.1558 
COR_32 -4.453 9.950 -0.45 0.6559 0.0029 
WEIGHT_23 **-41.66 19.14 -2.18 0.0329 0.0634 
D_COM -0.008 0.010 -0.79 0.4324 0.0088 
D_INDX ***0.074 0.022 3.42 0.0011 0.1430 
NCOM_EX -0.087 0.494 -0.18 0.8603 0.0004 
AR 1-6 test:       
ARCH 1-6 test:     
Normality test: 
Hetero test:  
RESET23 test:       
1.0571 [0.3923] 
0.4604 [0.8044] 
25.646 [0.0000]** 
0.6929 [0.8463] 
3.1238 [0.0504]    
                                
Joint F-test:        
R^2 :                 
 
7.319 [0.000]** 
0.576151 
Notes: Inventory data in 10.000 tonnes, trader-position data in 100 contracts. 
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Table 5.2.3: SPREAD_43 - Annual differences, constant, AR(3) 
 
Coefficient Std.Error t-value t-prob Part.R^2 
I ***9.738 3.367 2.89 0.0050 0.1016 
DI 7.054 7.835 0.90 0.3709 0.0108 
DI_1 -7.328 7.558 -0.97 0.3354 0.0125 
SLIBOR **-0.003 0.001 -2.30 0.0240 0.0669 
VAR_43 ***-379.3 95.26 -3.98 0.0002 0.1764 
COR_43 -4.990 5.040 -0.99 0.3253   0.0131 
WEIGHT_43 -28.54 17.94 -1.59 0.1158 0.0331 
D_COM 0.013 0.010 1.39 0.1688   0.0254 
D_INDX 0.039 0.025 1.57 0.1199 0.0324 
NCOM_EX -0.390 0.538 -0.73 0.4709 0.0070 
AR 1-6 test:       
ARCH 1-6 test:     
Normality test: 
Hetero test:  
RESET23 test:       
1.9131 [0.0911] 
1.0892 [0.3769]   
41.819 [0.0000]** 
0.8696 [0.6313] 
0.1220 [0.8854] 
                                
Joint F-test:        
R^2 :                 
 
4.341 [0.000]** 
0.392189 
Notes: Inventory data in 10.000 tonnes, trader-position data in 100 contracts. 
 
 
Table 5.2.4: SPREAD_54 - Annual differences, constant, AR(3) 
 
Coefficient Std.Error t-value t-prob Part.R^2 
I ***1.389 0.264 5.26 0.0000 0.2695 
DI -0.606 0.669 -0.91 0.3681 0.0108 
DI_1 **-1.509 0.725 -2.08 0.0409 0.0545 
SLIBOR -0.002 0.001 -1.66 0.1016 0.0353 
VAR_54 ***-332.7 88.81 -3.75 0.0004 0.1576 
COR_54 -0.003 0.349 -0.01 0.9929 0.0000 
WEIGHT_54 18.64 18.34 1.02 0.3127 0.0136 
D_COM **0.020 0.008 2.38 0.0200 0.0701 
D_INDX 0.001 0.021 0.04 0.9722 0.0000 
NCOM_EX -0.076 0.481 -0.16 0.8735   0.0003 
AR 1-6 test:       
ARCH 1-6 test:     
Normality test: 
Hetero test:  
RESET23 test:       
1.8423 [0.1036] 
1.0008 [0.4313] 
47.052 [0.0000]** 
0.6646 [0.8564] 
1.1227 [0.3310] 
                                
Joint F-test:        
R^2 :                 
 
4.693 [0.000]** 
0.407686 
Notes: Inventory data in 10.000 tonnes, trader-position data in 100 contracts. 
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Table 5.2.5: SPREAD_65 - Annual differences, constant, AR(3) 
 
Coefficient Std.Error t-value t-prob Part.R^2 
I ***7.788 2.159 3.61 0.0006 0.1512 
DI -4.276 5.924 -0.72 0.4728 0.0071 
DI_1 **-1.113 0.549 -2.03 0.0465 0.0532 
SLIBOR -0.001 0.001 -0.88 0.3809 0.0105 
VAR_65 ***-195.2 70.33 -2.78 0.0070 0.0955 
COR_65 -2.191 4.681 -0.47 0.6411 0.0030 
WEIGHT_65 -0.285 14.32 -0.02 0.9842 0.0000 
D_COM *0.014 0.008 1.82 0.0732 0.0433 
D_INDX -0.015 0.016 -0.90 0.3717 0.0109 
NCOM_EX -0.422 0.382 -1.10 0.2738 0.0164 
AR 1-6 test:       
ARCH 1-6 test:     
Normality test: 
Hetero test:  
RESET23 test:       
1.7714 [0.1184] 
0.8884 [0.5079] 
57.102 [0.0000]** 
0.9348 [0.5581] 
1.7319 [0.1843] 
                                
Joint F-test:        
R^2 :                 
 
10.34 [0.000]** 
0.62964 
Notes: Inventory data in 10.000 tonnes, trader-position data in 100 contracts. 
 
 
Table 5.2.6: SPREAD_76 - Annual differences, constant, AR(1) 
 
Coefficient Std.Error1 t-value1 t-prob Part.R^2 
I 0.270 1.770 1.53 0.1310 0.0310 
DI **-1.075 0.495 -2.17 0.0332 0.0606 
DI_1 -0.004 0.050 -0.07 0.9434 0.0001 
SLIBOR -0.001 0.001 -1.57 0.1212 0.0326 
VAR_76 **-168.0 82.04 -2.05 0.0442 0.0543 
COR_76 ***-3.296 1.214 -2.71 0.0083 0.0917 
WEIGHT_76 **-26.39 12.65 -2.09 0.0405 0.0563 
D_COM 0.001 0.005 0.18 0.8604 0.0004 
D_INDX **0.061 0.024 2.51 0.0141 0.0797 
NCOM_EX ***-0.956 0.303 -3.16 0.0023 0.1201 
AR 1-6 test:       
ARCH 1-6 test:     
Normality test: 
Hetero test:  
RESET23 test:       
1.1825 [0.3263] 
2.5013 [0.0294]* 
14.234 [0.0008]** 
1.7951 [0.0344]* 
7.7410 [0.0009]** 
                                
Joint F-test:        
R^2 :                 
 
8.041 [0.000]** 
0.56931 
Notes: Inventory data in 10.000 tonnes, trader-position data in 100 contracts. 
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Table 5.2.7: SPREAD_87 - Annual differences, constant, AR(6) 
 
Coefficient Std.Error t-value t-prob Part.R^2 
I **0.587 0.258 2.28 0.0259 0.0730 
DI *-1.064 0.622 -1.71 0.0920 0.0424 
DI_1 ***-1.654 0.615 -2.69 0.0091 0.0986 
SLIBOR **-0.002 0.001 -2.12 0.0375 0.0640 
VAR_87 ***-268.6 76.22 -3.52 0.0008 0.1583 
COR_87 5.896 10.48 0.56 0.5755 0.0048 
WEIGHT_87 -4.115 10.29 -0.40 0.6905 0.0024 
D_COM -0.009 0.008 -1.09 0.2807 0.0176 
D_INDX ***0.058 0.020 2.89 0.0052 0.1122 
NCOM_EX -0.576 0.459 -1.25 0.2140 0.0233 
AR 1-6 test:       
ARCH 1-6 test:     
Normality test: 
Hetero test:  
RESET23 test:       
0.6475 [0.6644] 
1.4351 [0.2219] 
5.7435 [0.0566] 
1.1144 [0.3590] 
3.1031 [0.0517] 
                                
Joint F-test:        
R^2 :                 
 
4.607 [0.000]** 
0.527592 
Notes: Inventory data in 10.000 tonnes, trader-position data in 100 contracts. 
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Appendix 5.3 Calendar Spread Regression Results Annual Differences Coffee 
 
Table 5.3.1: SPREAD_21 - Annual differences, constant, AR(5) 
 
Coefficient Std.Error t-value t-prob Part.R^2 
I^ ***6.804 1.611 4.22 0.0001   0.2009 
DI^ -0.195 0.127 -1.54 0.1271 0.0325 
DI_1^ ***0.358 0.133 2.68 0.0091 0.0920 
SLIBOR^^ 3.115 0.129 0.24 0.8096 0.0008 
VAR_21 *-0.172 0.087 -1.97 0.0528 0.0518 
COR_21 0.015 0.015 1.00 0.3212 0.0139 
WEIGHT_21 -0.012 0.035 -0.34 0.7375   0.0016 
D_COM^^ -0.023 0.090 -0.26 0.7979 0.0009 
D_INDX^^ 0.187 0.210 0.89 0.3767 0.0110 
NCOM_EX 0.002 0.005 0.46 0.6484 0.0029 
AR 1-6 test:       
ARCH 1-6 test:     
Normality test: 
Hetero test:  
RESET23 test:       
0.9884 [0.4316] 
2.2062 [0.0626] 
39.051 [0.0000]** 
1.4719 [0.1155] 
11.986 [0.0000]** 
                                
Joint F-test:        
R^2 :                 
 
4.623 [0.000]** 
0.438603 
^In 1,000,000,000, ^^ in 1,000,000. 
 
 
Table 5.3.2: SPREAD_32 - Annual differences, constant, AR(1) 
 
Coefficient Std.Error t-value t-prob Part.R^2 
I^ ***3.602 1.314 2.74 0.0076 0.0900 
DI^ -1.491 5.830 -0.26 0.7988 0.0009 
DI_1^ 4.583 6.257 0.73 0.4662 0.0070 
SLIBOR^^ **12.15 5.419 2.24 0.0279 0.0620 
VAR_32 -0.003 0.026 -0.13 0.8978 0.0002 
COR_32 -0.000 0.004 -0.10 0.9171 0.0001 
WEIGHT_32 **-0.011 0.005 -2.09 0.0396 0.0545 
D_COM^^ **0.090 0.034 2.61 0.0110 0.0821 
D_INDX^^ 0.041 0.097 0.42 0.6754 0.0023 
NCOM_EX -0.002 0.002 -0.82 0.4140 0.0088 
AR 1-6 test:       
ARCH 1-6 test:     
Normality test: 
Hetero test:  
RESET23 test:       
2.1010 [0.0639] 
0.4521 [0.8413]   
16.794 [0.0002]** 
1.1347 [0.3368]   
0.2219 [0.8015] 
                                
Joint F-test:        
R^2 :                 
 
17.88 [0.000]** 
0.721315 
^In 1,000,000,000, ^^ in 1,000,000, 1 HACSE standard errors 
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Table 5.3.3: SPREAD_43 - Annual differences, constant, AR(1) 
 
Coefficient Std.Error t-value t-prob Part.R^2 
I^ *1.395 0.792 1.76 0.0821 0.0392 
DI^ 5.435 5.857 0.93 0.3563 0.0112 
DI_1^ -2.355 6.379 -0.37 0.7130 0.0018 
SLIBOR^^ -2.246 4.755 -0.47 0.6380 0.0029 
VAR_43 ***-0.090 0.024 -3.80 0.0003 0.1598 
COR_43 0.000 0.001 0.10 0.9183 0.0001 
WEIGHT_43 0.010 0.007 1.50 0.1378 0.0287 
D_COM^^ *0.059 0.032 1.85 0.0678 0.0432 
D_INDX^^ 0.098 0.089 1.11 0.2722 0.0158 
NCOM_EX 0.002 0.002 0.79 0.4350 0.0080 
AR 1-6 test:       
ARCH 1-6 test:     
Normality test: 
Hetero test:  
RESET23 test:       
1.2676 [0.2835] 
0.9641 [0.4553] 
3.6354 [0.1624] 
0.9253 [0.5644] 
0.9936 [0.3751] 
Joint F-test:        
R^2 :                 
Res. ADF 
(0)3 
29.59 [0.000]** 
0.810719 
-8.017** 
^In 1,000,000,000, ^^ in 1,000,000 
 
 
Table 5.3.4: SPREAD_54 - Annual differences, constant, AR(1) 
 
Coefficient Std.Error2 t-value2 t-prob Part.R^2 
I^ **1.796 0.825 2.18 0.0325 0.0587 
DI^ 3.358 6.464 0.52 0.6049 0.0035 
DI_1^ 0.634 8.285 0.08 0.9392 0.0001 
SLIBOR^^ -11.68 8.622 -1.35 0.1795 0.0236 
VAR_54 ***-0.125 0.045 -2.79 0.0066 0.0930 
COR_54 -0.005 0.003 -1.54 0.1269 0.0304 
WEIGHT_54 0.006 0.006 1.03 0.3076 0.0137 
D_COM^^ ***0.145 0.035 4.18 0.0001 0.1870 
D_INDX^^ 0.021 0.107 0.19 0.8467 0.0005 
NCOM_EX 0.003 0.003 1.25 0.2158 0.0201 
AR 1-6 test:       
ARCH 1-6 test:     
Normality test: 
Hetero test:  
RESET23 test:       
2.1220 [0.0614] 
1.4038 [0.2242]   
0.9279 [0.6288]   
2.3351 [0.0044]** 
0.0270 [0.9734]   
Joint F-test:        
R^2 :                 
Res. PP (0)3 
37.03 [0.000]** 
0.842766 
-8.196** 
^In 1,000,000,000, ^^ in 1,000,000, 2 HCSE standard errors, 3 PP test for residuals, lags 
selected by AIC and reported in (.). 
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Table 5.3.5: SPREAD_65 - Annual differences, constant, AR(1) 
 
Coefficient Std.Error t-value t-prob Part.R^2 
I^ **2.847 1.216 2.34 0.0218 0.0673 
DI^ 8.745 6.787 1.29 0.2015 0.0214 
DI_1^ 3.826 7.299 0.52 0.6016 0.0036 
SLIBOR^^ **-11.56 5.727 -2.02 0.0472 0.0508 
VAR_65 ***-0.142 0.029 -4.90 0.0000 0.2401 
COR_65 ***-0.012 0.004 -2.80 0.0065 0.0935 
WEIGHT_65 0.002 0.004 0.46 0.6495 0.0027 
D_COM^^ ***0.141 0.041 3.45 0.0009 0.1355 
D_INDX^^ 0.114 0.118 0.97 0.3361 0.0122 
NCOM_EX 0.002 0.003 0.58 0.5621 0.0044 
AR 1-6 test:       
ARCH 1-6 test:     
Normality test: 
Hetero test:  
RESET23 test:       
1.2079 [0.3126] 
1.3095 [0.2633] 
1.4777 [0.4777]   
0.7686 [0.7502] 
0.4023 [0.6702] 
Joint F-test:        
R^2 :                 
Res. ADF 
(0)3 
43.91 [0.000]** 
0.864047 
-7.686** 
^In 1,000,000,000, ^^ in 1,000,000, 2 HCSE standard errors, 3 ADF test without constant  
for residuals, lags selected by AIC and reported in (.). 
 
 
 
Table 5.3.6: SPREAD_76 - Annual differences, constant, AR(5) 
 
Coefficient Std.Error t-value t-prob Part.R^2 
I^ 0.417 1.694 0.25 0.8064 0.0009 
DI^ 4.611 8.837 0.52 0.6035 0.0038 
DI_1^ 8.470 8.880 0.95 0.3434 0.0127 
SLIBOR^^ 2.624 6.171 0.43 0.6720 0.0025 
VAR_76 -0.046 0.028 -1.61 0.1118 0.0352 
COR_76 -0.002 0.001 -1.61 0.1120 0.0352 
WEIGHT_76 -0.005 0.003 -1.67 0.1002 0.0376 
D_COM^^ ***0.136 0.046 2.95 0.0043 0.1094 
D_INDX^^ 0.191 0.126 1.51 0.1345 0.0313 
NCOM_EX 0.000 0.003 -0.10 0.9245 0.0001 
AR 1-6 test:       
ARCH 1-6 test:     
Normality test: 
Hetero test:  
RESET23 test:       
2.2887 [0.0558]   
0.4652 [0.8009]   
2.4307 [0.2966] 
0.7435 [0.7861] 
0.1154 [0.8912] 
Joint F-test:        
R^2 :                 
Res. ADF 
(0)3 
34.55 [0.000]** 
0.853777 
-8.276** 
^In 1,000,000,000, ^^ in 1,000,000, 2 HCSE standard errors, 3 ADF test without constant  
for residuals, lags selected by AIC and reported in (.). 
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Table 5.3.7: SPREAD_87 - Annual differences, constant, AR(1) 
 
Coefficient Std.Error t-value t-prob Part.R^2 
I^ 2.328 1.503 1.55 0.1256 0.0306 
DI^ -1.975 8.802 -0.22 0.8231 0.0007 
DI_1^ 8.402 9.233 0.91 0.3657 0.0108 
SLIBOR^^ 0.276 6.875 0.04 0.9680 0.0000 
VAR_87 *-0.043 0.025 -1.76 0.0820 0.0393 
COR_87 0.003 0.004 0.82 0.4136 0.0088 
WEIGHT_87 0.004 0.003 1.44 0.1527 0.0267 
D_COM^^ *0.081 0.048 1.69 0.0945 0.0364 
D_INDX^^ 0.220 0.139 1.59 0.1165 0.0321 
NCOM_EX -0.004 0.003 -1.15 0.2531 0.0171 
AR 1-6 test:       
ARCH 1-6 test:     
Normality test: 
Hetero test:  
RESET23 test:       
1.9112 [0.0910] 
1.2775 [0.2778] 
1.5096 [0.4701] 
0.8389 [0.6683] 
0.1460 [0.8644] 
Joint F-test:        
R^2 :                 
Res. ADF 
(4)3 
25.47 [0.000]** 
0.786625 
-4.412** 
^In 1,000,000,000, ^^ in 1,000,000, 2 HCSE standard errors, 3 ADF test without constant  
for residuals, lags selected by AIC and reported in (.). 
 
 
 
Table 5.3.8: SPREAD_98 - Annual differences, constant, AR(0) 
 
Coefficient Std.Error2 t-value2 t-prob Part.R^2 
I^ 6.032 5.236 1.15 0.2529 0.0169 
DI^ -21.53 16.370 -1.31 0.1925 0.0220 
DI_1^ -1.621 18.100 -0.09 0.9289 0.0001 
SLIBOR^^ 30.38 19.040 1.60 0.1147 0.0320 
VAR_98 ***-0.181 0.025 -7.26 0.0000 0.4061 
COR_98 *-0.003 0.001 -1.87 0.0650 0.0435 
WEIGHT_98 0.014 0.005 2.81 0.0063 0.0929 
D_COM^^ -0.045 0.114 -0.40 0.6927 0.0020 
D_INDX^^ **0.996 0.443 2.25 0.0276 0.0615 
NCOM_EX **-0.019 0.009 -2.27 0.0262 0.0626 
AR 1-6 test:       
ARCH 1-6 test:     
Normality test: 
Hetero test:  
RESET23 test:       
9.5390 [0.0000]** 
6.3966 [0.0000]** 
16.374 [0.0003]** 
1.2791 [0.2241] 
0.38888 [0.6792] 
Joint F-test:        
R^2 :                 
Res. ADF 
(2)3 
9.107 [0.000]** 
0.54187 
-4.278** 
^In 1,000,000,000, ^^ in 1,000,000, 2 HCSE standard errors, 3 ADF test without constant  
for residuals, lags selected by AIC and reported in (.). 
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Appendix 5.4 Eigenvectors Principal Component Analysis 
 
Table 5.4.1: Eigenvectors Cocoa  
      
  
Source: author’s calculation 
 
Table 5.4.2: Eigenvectors Coffee 
  
  
  
  
Source: author’s calculation 
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Appendix 5.5 Component Indicators Level, Slope, Curvature, and Wave 
 
 Figure 5.5.1: Cocoa Component Indicators Level, Slope, Curvature, and Wave 
  
  
Source: author’s calculation   
 
Figure 5.5.2: Coffee Component Indicators Level, Slope, Curvature, and Wave 
  
  
Source: author’s calculation  
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Appendix 5.6 Three-factor Nelson-Siegel Model Fit 
 
Figure 5.6.1: R-Square Nelson-Siegel Three Factor Model for Cocoa 
 
Source: author’s calculation 
 
 
Figure 5.6.2: Fitted and Observed Future Curve 25 March 2008 Cocoa Market 
 
Note: For the example chosen, the first observation reflects the May 2008 contract. The second 
observation is the July 2008 contract when most confectionery companies start buying for the Christmas 
season and hence the price is high. The September 2008 contract goes at a lower price as the harvest is 
about to begin and for the December 2008 contract, the harvest time, the price is low as a short-term 
supply flood is expected during this season. However, in the long-run traders seem to expect that the 
harvest falls short of demand and later contracts trade at a higher price level. While the three factor model 
cannot replicate the wave form and instead suggests a hump-shaped fitted line, the four factor model 
almost perfectly replicates the observed futures curve. 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
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Appendix 5.7 Factors Level, Slope, Curvature, and Wave and Model Fit 
 
Figure 5.7.1: R-square Nelson-Siegel Four Factor Model for Cocoa 
 
Source: author’s calculation 
 
 
Figure 5.7.2: Cocoa Factors Level, Slope, Curvature, and Wave 
  
  
Source: author’s calculation 
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Figure 5.7.3: R-square Nelson-Siegel Four Factor Model for Coffee 
 
Source: author’s calculation 
  
Figure 5.7.4: Coffee Factors Level, Slope, Curvature, and Wave 
  
  
Source: author’s calculation 
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Appendix 5.8 Autocorrelation Functions Components and Factors 
 
Figure 5.8.1: Autocorrelation Function Cocoa Factors 
 
Figure 5.8.2: Autocorrelation Functions Cocoa Components 
 
Source: author’s calculation (graphics are created with PcGive) 
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Figure 5.8.3: Autocorrelation Function Coffee Factors 
 
Figure 5.8.4: Autocorrelation Function Coffee Components 
 
Source: author’s calculation (graphics are created with PcGive) 
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Appendix 5.9 Unit Root Test Factors 
 
Table 5.9.1: ADF Test Cocoa  
Variable D-lag t-adf D1_lag D1_t-adf Integration 
Level 
L 0 -2.240 0 -9.498** I(1) 
S 0 -3.355* - - I(0) 
C 0 -5.946** - - I(0) 
W 6 -4.971** - - I(0) 
Table 5.9.2: ADF Test Coffee 
L 2 -1.965 1 -5.586** I(1) 
S 2 -3.041* - - I(0) 
C 1 -2.558 0 -13.37** I(1) 
W 3 -1.992   2 -5.031** I(1) 
Notes: ADF tests (T=77, Constant; 5%=-2.90 1%=-3.51) – lag length 
decided by Akaike information criteria with a maximum lag length of 12. 
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Appendix 5.10 Cocoa Full Results Individual AR 
 
Table 5.10.1: Future Curve Factor Regression Results Cocoa First Differences 
Level  
AR(0) Coefficient Standard Error p-value  
I 64.5076 64.64 0.3214 
DI -22.3948 62.46 0.7209 
DI_1 7.5730 57.49 0.8955 
SLIBOR -0.4729 2.01 0.8148 
VAR -3.7496 3.59 0.9170 
COR 688.0390 802.40 0.3939 
WEIGHT 0.1004 4.14 0.9807 
COM_H -4.8995 1.67 0.0043 
IND_H -4.3257 3.58 0.2303 
NCOM_EX 2.4008 4.20 0.5688 
 Adj.R^2              0.0575    
 AR 0.86142 [0.5276] 
DIAGNOSTICS ARCH 1.9325 [0.0863] 
 Normality 2.259 [0.3232] 
 Hetero 0.87788 [0.6139] 
Slope 
AR(1) Coefficient Standard Error^ p-value  
I 26.9909 37.78 0.4771 
DI 35.0119 36.56 0.3413 
DI_1 0.8547 33.77 0.9799 
SLIBOR -0.4209 1.18 0.7221 
VAR 6.3740 2.10 0.0033 
COR 217.2030 470.50 0.6457 
WEIGHT -0.1944 2.42 0.9363 
COM_H -2.3387 0.97 0.0188 
IND_H -3.3145 2.09 0.1172 
NCOM_EX 7.1951 2.46 0.0045 
 Adj.R^2              0.1960   
 AR 2.959 [0.0124]* 
DIAGNOSTICS ARCH 1.4998 [0.1897] 
 Normality 2.357 [0.3077] 
 Hetero 2.1343 [0.0097]** 
Curvature 
AR(2) Coefficient Standard Error^ p-value  
I -32.9180 78.92 0.6778 
DI 111.6610 77.10 0.1517 
DI_1 20.3376 72.02 0.7784 
SLIBOR -0.1179 2.48 0.9621 
VAR 5.1448 4.41 0.2474 
COR -2013.8600 992.20 0.0459 
WEIGHT 9.4624 5.06 0.0653 
COM_H -1.5003 2.04 0.4653 
IND_H 2.1368 4.45 0.6321 
NCOM_EX -18.1408 5.12 0.0007 
 Adj.R^2              0.3603  
 AR 1.9432 [0.0860] 
DIAGNOSTICS ARCH 2.7196 [0.0190]* 
 Normality 15.28 [0.0005]** 
 Hetero 4.3309 [0.0000]** 
Wave 
AR(1) Coefficient Standard Error^ p-value  
I -2.9970 4.00 0.4560 
DI 2.4036 3.94 0.5431 
DI_1 0.4551 3.56 0.8986 
SLIBOR -0.0231 0.12 0.8535 
VAR 0.2498 0.22 0.2651 
COR -81.9375 49.80 0.1041 
WEIGHT 0.3953 0.26 0.1277 
COM_H -0.0784 0.10 0.4503 
IND_H 0.3297 0.22 0.1417 
NCOM_EX -0.5028 0.26 0.0565 
 Adj.R^2              0.0975    
 AR 1.0337 [0.4110] 
DIAGNOSTICS ARCH 1.4884 [0.1935] 
 Normality 3.7553 [0.1530] 
 Hetero 2.4905 [0.0024]** 
Note: ^White robust standard errors. 
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Table 5.10.2: Future Curve Factor Regression Results Cocoa Levels 
Level  
AR(2) Coefficient Standard Error p-value  
I -13.4999 26.63 0.6136 
DI 6.9085 52.85 0.8963 
DI_1 41.5070 57.07 0.4693 
SLIBOR -2.1547 0.85 0.0133 
VAR -0.1346 0.74 0.8571 
COR -249.9490 178.50 0.1654 
WEIGHT 11.2552 4.66 0.0182 
COM_H -3.5378 1.26 0.0063 
IND_H -1.7767 2.36 0.4534 
NCOM_EX -7.5960 5.29 0.1554 
 Adj.R^2              0.92104    
 AR 1.0931 [0.3752] 
DIAGNOSTICS ARCH 0.082209 [0.9978] 
 Normality 2.1515 [0.3410] 
 Hetero 1.0927 [0.3770] 
Unit Root (ADF) -4.858** Lag Length 8 
Slope 
AR(1) Coefficient Standard Error^ p-value  
I -4.6860 13.87 0.7364 
DI 71.4406 30.98 0.0238 
DI_1 8.2717 33.35 0.8048 
SLIBOR 0.5476 0.49 0.2656 
VAR 1.7027 0.52 0.0015 
COR 417.8920 112.40 0.0004 
WEIGHT 0.9881 2.72 0.7170 
COM_H -0.6688 0.73 0.3650 
IND_H -1.6087 1.40 0.2546 
NCOM_EX 2.5688 3.14 0.4160 
 Adj.R^2              0.7258  
 AR 1.9585 [0.0832] 
DIAGNOSTICS ARCH 1.2334 [0.2986] 
 Normality 7.831 [0.0199]* 
 Hetero 1.5844 [0.0780] 
Curvature 
AR(0) Coefficient Standard Error^ p-value  
I -36.8450 29.68 0.2181 
DI 96.4738 66.27 0.1495 
DI_1 -21.2352 70.13 0.7629 
SLIBOR -3.8402 1.04 0.0004 
VAR 2.7014 0.87 0.0026 
COR -526.4810 210.50 0.0145 
WEIGHT 11.6689 5.80 0.0477 
COM_H -4.5407 1.57 0.0050 
IND_H 5.1323 2.93 0.0842 
NCOM_EX -4.0461 6.63 0.5432 
 Adj.R^2              0.2938  
 AR 1.0383 [0.4079] 
DIAGNOSTICS ARCH 0.041175 [0.9997] 
 Normality 46.631 [0.0000]** 
 Hetero 0.96056 [0.5180] 
Wave 
AR(0) Coefficient Standard Error^ p-value  
I -1.6914 1.42 0.2378 
DI -1.1666 3.19 0.7155 
DI_1 -0.4908 3.34 0.8836 
SLIBOR -0.0594 0.05 0.2354 
VAR -0.0119 0.04 0.7755 
COR -19.0574 10.03 0.0613 
WEIGHT 0.4954 0.28 0.0773 
COM_H -0.1363 0.08 0.0744 
IND_H 0.3599 0.15 0.0162 
NCOM_EX -0.1698 0.32 0.5963 
 Adj.R^2              0.3150  
 AR 0.50294 [0.8041] 
DIAGNOSTICS ARCH 0.5806 [0.7447] 
 Normality 7.5692 [0.0227]* 
 Hetero 1.2927 [0.2101] 
Note: ^White robust standard errors. Lag length of ADF test decided by Akaike Information Criteria. 
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Appendix 5.11 Coffee Full Results Individual AR 
 
Table 5.11.1: Future Curve Factor Regression Results Coffee First Differences 
Level  
AR(0) Coefficient Standard Error^ p-value  
I -0.0101 0.01 0.4044 
DI 0.0405 0.02 0.0753 
DI_1 -0.0077 0.02 0.7226 
SLIBOR 14.6545 3.53 0.0001 
VAR 0.0623 0.09 0.4688 
COR 99.5802 133.00 0.4562 
WEIGHT -0.3869 0.18 0.0346 
COM_H 0.0495 0.15 0.7486 
IND_H -0.3650 0.35 0.2972 
NCOM_EX 1.3817 5.81 0.8128 
 Adj.R^2              0.4223  
 AR 0.87072 [0.5208] 
DIAGNOSTICS ARCH 6.3734 [0.0000]** 
 Normality 27.624 [0.0000]** 
 Hetero 7.3133 [0.0000]** 
Slope 
AR(1) Coefficient Standard Error^ p-value  
I -0.0120 0.01 0.0825 
DI -0.0073 0.02 0.6574 
DI_1 0.0111 0.02 0.5920 
SLIBOR -2.7225 1.83 0.1404 
VAR 0.0392 0.09 0.6573 
COR -120.8280 106.70 0.2611 
WEIGHT -0.0084 0.16 0.9591 
COM_H -0.3455 0.10 0.0006 
IND_H -0.2919 0.30 0.3347 
NCOM_EX 2.4652 4.07 0.5466 
 Adj.R^2              0.1652  
 AR 1.9194 [0.0894] 
DIAGNOSTICS ARCH 9.6718 [0.0000]** 
 Normality 81.581 [0.0000]** 
 Hetero 16.97 [0.0000]** 
Curvature 
AR(0) Coefficient Standard Error^ p-value  
I -0.0058 0.03 0.8556 
DI -0.0462 0.06 0.4117 
DI_1 0.0741 0.06 0.2066 
SLIBOR -10.2570 4.88 0.0390 
VAR -0.0269 0.23 0.9084 
COR -45.1602 314.50 0.8862 
WEIGHT 1.4824 0.44 0.0013 
COM_H -0.7940 0.26 0.0032 
IND_H -0.2389 0.79 0.7635 
NCOM_EX 4.1653 16.84 0.8053 
 Adj.R^2              0.2162  
 AR 2.035 [0.0719] 
DIAGNOSTICS ARCH 3.6523 [0.0030]** 
 Normality 83.598 [0.0000]** 
 Hetero 6.0761 [0.0000]** 
Wave 
AR(0) Coefficient Standard Error^ p-value  
I 0.0079 0.03 0.7642 
DI 0.0667 0.04 0.1396 
DI_1 -0.0900 0.05 0.0662 
SLIBOR 0.8698 0.76 0.2549 
VAR 0.0285 0.02 0.1172 
COR -19.3944 28.39 0.4965 
WEIGHT -0.1307 0.05 0.0070 
COM_H 0.0196 0.04 0.5970 
IND_H -0.0094 0.08 0.9053 
NCOM_EX 0.1714 1.45 0.9064 
 Adj.R^2              0.2578  
 AR 0.99323 [0.4365] 
DIAGNOSTICS ARCH 6.4264 [0.0000]** 
 Normality 22.304 [0.0000]** 
 Hetero 5.0105 [0.0000]** 
Note: ^White robust standard errors. 
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Table 5.11.2: Future Curve Factor Regression Results Coffee Levels 
Level  
AR(1) Coefficient Standard Error^ p-value  
I -0.0057 0.003 0.0767 
DI 0.0181 0.027 0.5016 
DI_1 0.0007 0.026 0.7848 
SLIBOR -1.0358 1.358 0.4481 
VAR 0.0385 0.023 0.0980 
COR 68.9598 43.930 0.1205 
WEIGHT -0.1619 0.231 0.4862 
COM_H -0.4867 0.218 0.0284 
IND_H -0.5040 0.359 0.1644 
NCOM_EX 0.9043 8.270 0.9132 
 Adj.R^2              0.9168  
 AR 1.5947 [0.1611] 
DIAGNOSTICS ARCH 2.1437 [0.0576] 
 Normality 11.8620 [0.0027]** 
 Hetero 3.7308 [0.0000]** 
Unit Root (ADF) -4.582** Lag Length 1 
Slope 
AR(1) Coefficient Standard Error^ p-value  
I -0.0020 0.002 0.2066 
DI -0.0259 0.014 0.0599 
DI_1 0.0012 0.016 0.9401 
SLIBOR 0.7701 0.659 0.2461 
VAR -0.0010 0.007 0.8888 
COR -59.5308 28.440 0.0396 
WEIGHT 0.0130 0.140 0.9267 
COM_H -0.1348 0.091 0.1445 
IND_H -0.1330 0.234 0.5717 
NCOM_EX -1.5898 3.854 0.6811 
 Adj.R^2              0.7040  
 AR 3.0422 [0.0104]* 
DIAGNOSTICS ARCH 1.7629 [0.1177] 
 Normality 34.3480 [0.0000]** 
 Hetero 2.2840 [0.0052]** 
Curvature 
AR(1) Coefficient Standard Error^ p-value  
I 0.0026 0.005 0.6144 
DI -0.0345 0.053 0.5200 
DI_1 0.0539 0.058 0.3589 
SLIBOR 1.6549 2.675 0.5380 
VAR -0.0167 0.021 0.4341 
COR -75.7106 90.520 0.4055 
WEIGHT 0.5382 0.514 0.2984 
COM_H -0.3608 0.385 0.3512 
IND_H -0.2803 0.637 0.6610 
NCOM_EX 1.9655 16.820 0.9073 
 Adj.R^2              0.5452  
 AR 1.2170 [0.3077] 
DIAGNOSTICS ARCH 2.6031 [0.0237]* 
 Normality 46.0050 [0.0000]** 
 Hetero 2.6849 [0.0010]** 
Unit Root (ADF) -8.692** Lag Length 0 
Wave 
AR(2) Coefficient Standard Error^ p-value  
I -0.0001 0.001 0.8049 
DI 0.0063 0.007 0.3631 
DI_1 -0.0087 0.001 0.1704 
SLIBOR -0.1639 0.315 0.6040 
VAR 0.0029 0.003 0.3225 
COR -2.8467 8.208 0.7297 
WEIGHT -0.0296 0.065 0.6492 
COM_H -0.0215 0.057 0.7078 
IND_H -0.0583 0.079 0.4652 
NCOM_EX 0.8270 1.819 0.6507 
 Adj.R^2              0.715214  
 AR 2.6752 [0.0214]* 
DIAGNOSTICS ARCH 6.7453 [0.0000]** 
 Normality 22.4790 [0.0000]** 
 Hetero 3.7645 [0.0000]** 
Unit Root (ADF) -3.710** Lag Length 2 
Note: ^White robust standard errors. Lag length of ADF test decided by Akaike Information Criteria. 
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Appendix Chapter 7 
Appendix 7.1: List of Interviewees 
Cat. Nr.  Company – Interviewee Name (position) Location  Date 
A Chocolate Producers 
 1 
August Storck – Markus Bohnemeier 
(Abteilungsleiter Einkauf) 
Halle Westfahlen, 
DE 
19 August 
2013 
B First-tier supplier, Trader 
 1 
Olam Internatioal Ltd. – Chris Thompson (senior 
vice president macro & strategic trading) 
London, UK 
20 August 
2013 
 2 Olam – Peter Peterson (pod counting) Accra, GH 
7 November 
2013 
C First-tier supplier, Processor 
 1 
Real Products – Richmond Boaitey (admin, general 
management) 
Takoradi, GH 
12 November 
2013 
 2 Barry Callebaut – Kofi Addo (logistics manager) 
Tema Free Zone, 
GH 
15 November 
2013 
 3 
Cargill Ghana Ltd. – Samuel Nobel (sustainability 
head)  
Tema Free Zone, 
GH 
29 November 
2013 
D Traders, Predominantly Exchange Related 
 1 Jenkins Sugar – Ken Lorenz Norwalk, CT, US 
16 September 
2013 
 2 Commodity Risk Analysis LLC – Steven Haws Pennsylvania, US 
30 September 
2013 
 3 Sucden – Whit Miller  New York, US 
04 October 
2013 
E Certification  
 1 
Touton – Charles Tellier (Ghana coordinator for 
sustainable sourcing) 
Accra, GH 
28 November 
2013 
 2 
Akuafo Adamfo, Finatrade Distribution - Hamid El-
Kareh (certification manager) 
Accra, GH 
28 November 
2013 
 3 
UTZ Certified - Siriki Diakité (regional 
representative for West Africa) 
Accra, GH 
28 November 
2013 
 4 
Cocoa Abrabopa – Mirjam van Leeuwen 
(certification manager) 
Dunkwa-On Offin, 
GH 
27 November 
2013 
F Farmer 
 1 Fair Trade Farmer Representative Accra, GH 
28 November 
2013 
 2 PPRC Farmer Representative Accra, GH 
28 November 
2013 
G Government Organisation Ghana, Division or Subsidiary 
 1 CMC – Moussa Lenboni (manager CMC UK) London, UK 
29 August 
2013 
 2 
COCOBOD – Fuad Abubakar (M&E and research 
analyst) 
Accra, GH 
28 October 
2013 
 3 CMC – Samuel Takyi (trader) Accra, GH 
28 October 
2013 
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 4 
QCD-COCOBOD – Thomas Kwame Osei 
(managing director) 
Accra, GH 
30 October 
2013 
 5 CMC – Paul Isaac Kwofie (shipping manager) Accra, GH 
30 October 
2013 
 6 CMC – Edem Amegashie (commodity trader) Accra, GH 
30 October 
2013 
 7 
Ministry of Finance & Economic Planning – Michael 
Owusu-Manu (technical advisor, cocoa affairs) 
Accra, GH 
3 November 
2013 
 8 COCOBOD – Ambrose Awity (research manager) Accra, GH 
4 November 
2013 
H Hauliers 
 1 
Global Haulage Company Lid. – E A. Kwakye 
(director of transport) 
Tema industrial area, 
GH 
19 November 
2013 
I Input and Extension Services 
 1 Ignitia Ghana Ltd. – Liisa Petrykowska (CEO) Accra, GH 
26. November 
2013 
 2 Wienco Ghana Ltd. – Marc Kok (managing director) Accra, GH 
12 December 
2013 
J Warehousing 
 1 
Continental Terminals (ICE) – Bob Forcillo 
(managing director) 
Port Jersey Blvd, 
Jersey City, US 
19 August 
2013 
 2 
CWT Commodities Ghana Ltd. – Dirk de Bruin 
(operations manager) 
Tema Free Zone, 
GH 
29. November 
2013 
 3 
Unicontrol Commodity Ghana Ltd. – Kor Ritsema 
(country manager) 
Takoradi Harbour, 
GH 
4 December 
2013 
K International Organisation 
 1 ICCO – Michele Nardella (econometrician) London, UK 
20 August 
2013 
L LBCs 
 1 
Cocoa Merchants Ltd. – Lawrence Ayisi Botwe 
(director of operations) 
Kumasi, GH 
12 November 
2013 
 2 
Akuafo Adamfo, Finatrade Distribution – 
Theophilus Agyare Asare (general manager of 
operations) 
Kumasi, GH 
13 November 
2013 
 3 
Adwumapa Buyers Limited – Ali Issaka (general 
manager) 
Kumasi, GH 
13 November 
2013 
 4 
Olam Ghana Ltd.– Gurinder Goindi (business head 
cocoa) 
Accra, GH 
15 November 
2013 
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Appendix 7.2: Fieldwork Plan and Implementation 
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LBCs  
Produce Buying Co. Ltd   X  X  
Akuafo Adamfo Mktg Co. Ltd.   X  X X 
Olam Ghana Ltd.   X  X X 
Adwumapa Buyers Ltd.   X  X X 
Armajaro Ghana ltd.   X  X X 
Kuapa Kokoo Ltd.   X  X X 
Federated Commodities Ltd.   X  X  
Cashpro Company Ltd.   X  X  
Transroyal Ghana Ltd.    X  X  
Cocoa Merchants Ghana Ltd.    X  X X 
Diaby Company Ltd.    X  X  
Premus Trading Co. Ltd.    X  X  
Royal Commodities Ltd.    X  X  
Others below 5% share   X  X  
International Buyers  
Olam  X X X X X 
Armajaro  X X X X  
ADM  X X X X  
Barry Callebaut  X X X X  
Cargill  X X X X  
Touton  X X X X  
… (?)  X X X X  
Traders  
Jenkins Sugar  X X X  X 
Commodity Risk Analysis  X X X  X 
Sucden  X X X  X 
…?  X X X   
Cocobod (divisions and subsidiaries)  
CMC London  X X X X X 
CMC Accra  X X X X X 
Warehousing and Port Operations Manager   X  X  
Shipping Manger   X  X X 
Marketing Manager  X X X X X 
Managing Director QCD   X  X X 
Director of Research CRIG   X  X X 
Head of CSSVD   X  X  
 
414 
PPRC Members  
Farmers’ Representative  X    X 
LBCs’ Representative  X    X 
Hauliers’ Representative   X    X 
Representative from Academia  X     
Cocobod Representative  X     
Other government bodies  
Ghana Ports and Harbours Authority   X  X  
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning  X X X  X 
Haulers  
Global Haulage Co. Ltd.  X X  X X 
... (?)  X X  X  
Processors   
Cocoa Processing Company  X X X X  
Cargill Ghana Limited  X X X X X 
Archer Daniels Midland  X X X X  
Barry Callebaut Ghana Limited  X X X X X 
Real Products   X X X X X 
Wamco Ltd  X X X X  
Commodities (now Niche Cocoa Industry Ltd)  X X X X  
Plot  X X X X  
B.D. Assoc  X X X X  
Calf Cocoa  X X X X  
Afrotropics  X X X X  
Warehousing and Extension Services  
Unicontrol Commodity Ghana Ltd   X   X 
Sitos Ghana Ltd   X   X 
Wienco   X  X X 
Certification  
UTZ  X X  X X 
Rainforest Alliance  X X  X  
Fair Trade  X X  X  
Inetrnational & National Organsiation & Federations  
International Cocoa Organisation   X X X X X 
Alliance of Cocoa Producing Countries  X X X X  
International Cocoa Initiative  X X X X  
The Federation of Cocoa Commerce  X X X   
Cocoa Merchants' Association of America  X X X   
Farmers Co-operatives  
Kuapa Kokoo Ltd  X X X X X 
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Appendix 7.3: Interview Agreement 
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Appendix 7.4: Letter of Introduction Cocobod 
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Appendix 7.5 Email to Interview Partners 
Dear [NAME] 
I hope this email finds you well. 
[NAME] kindly provided your email contact. [if applicable] 
I am Sophie, a second year PhD student at SOAS, University of London. My research is on 
cocoa chains and covers everything that is related to price discovery, price setting and price-
related risk mitigation practices throughout the chain. This includes trade practices and chain 
structure as well. 
Against this background, I am looking for interview partner, who are working in cocoa trade or 
associated areas and would be able to spend 30 to 40 minutes for an informal interview in 
person or over the phone. 
I am fully aware that some of this information is highly sensitive and cannot be shared with the 
general public. I am not seeking detailed information about company specific trade strategies 
and akin but rather a broad introduction in the functioning and peculiarities of cocoa trade in 
general. 
All information will be used for my PhD and related publications only (no commercial gain will be 
made from it). Interviews will be entirely anonymous, if it is not explicitly agreed upon 
mentioning name, profession, and/or affiliation. All information incorporated in my PhD and 
related publications will be sent for review by the interviewee before publication. Information or 
phrases which do not find approval will be deleted or rephrased until approval is given. 
For further information, I attached an outline of potential interview questions as well as an 
interview agreement. Questions are open and semi-structured and should only serve as a 
general guideline. 
I am very much looking forward to your reply. 
With sincere regards, 
Sophie  
********************************* 
Sophie van Huellen 
PhD Candidate, Economic Department 
School of Oriental and African Studies 
University of London 
********************************* 
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Appendix 7.6: Key Points for Interviews 
Introductory Text 
My research project covers four main areas regarding cocoa chains: (1) trade, (2) price 
discovery, and (3) price risk management, (4) value addition. Within these areas I focus 
particularly on beans originating from Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire. The following sub-
question could be relevant under the above headlines: 
Multinational/International Intermediaries and End-Producers 
1. Trade and logistics: 
• From whom and from where are beans bought (Government Agency, farmer co-
operative, local traders at ports, farm-gate, dedicated trading places)?  
• How are beans bought (by cash, by forward contracts, domestic or foreign 
currency)? 
• How are beans transported (own or third party vessels, bulk trade or other forms 
of transportation)? 
• How are beans stored (own or third party warehouses, exchange registered 
warehouses)?  
• How beans are sold (long-term contracts, one-period contracts, open market, in 
domestic or foreign currency)? 
 
2. Price discovery and price setting: 
• How are cocoa prices set/discovered (public or private available benchmark 
indicators for price setting, open markets, individual bargaining, futures or cash 
market prices)? 
• Have there been any significant changes in the way prices were specified over the 
last decades? 
• How on your opinion do financial investors influence commodity futures 
markets? 
• How do you assess the importance of the futures market relative to the physical 
market in price discovery? Which price does drive which? 
• How transparent is the physical market relative to the derivative market 
(transactions, trading partners, price settlement)? 
 
3. Price risk management (exchange rate risk and commodity price risk): 
• Which instruments are used for mitigating short-term and long-term price risk 
(hedging via derivatives, forward contracts, long-term contracts, 
diversification/vertical integration)? 
• Have there been any significant changes in the degree of price-related risk 
over the last decades? 
• Have there been any significant changes in the way such price-related risk is 
managed over the last decades? 
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4. Value addition and regional/global chains: 
• Where are cocoa beans processed?  
• What proportion is processed at origin and what proportion is processed after 
export?  
• Do beans processed and exported regionally differ from those exported and 
processed globally? 
• Who owns processing capacities at origin (privately owned, state owned)? 
• Which of the West African cocoa producing countries do engage in regional trade 
for cocoa beans and/or cocoa/chocolate products? 
 
5. Institutional questions 
• Who has the agenda setting power i.e. who defines the terms of trade and the way 
the trade is executed?  
o Who is setting the standards and organisational form of exchange – 
legislative 
o Who is monitoring the performance of these standards and forms of 
exchange; if there is any dispute, how do you settle it? – judicial 
o Who helps people to meet standards; who is enforcing these rules? – 
executive 
• Who decides about the prices for farmers? How is the farm-gate price calculated; 
what variables are considered? Who has a saying in the level of the farm-gate price? 
(legislative, judicial, executive) 
• How is the margin for the LBCs calculated? (legislative, judicial, executive) 
• The people you are trading with, do you know them in person? Are they the same 
people every year? 
• How do the contracts look like? What are the terms agreed upon? Are these 
contracts individually defined or standardised? If yes, who sets the standards for 
these contracts?  
• Demand and supply uncertainty? How unpredictable are they? How do you 
predict them? Do you know the demand of the multinational buyers ex ante? 
• Are contract terms sometimes renegotiated after the trade took place? Who is 
mediating such disputes? What is the subject of such renegotiations? 
• Who are the multinationals you are dealing with? How many trading partners do 
you have? What do you know about them? How often do new ones come along? 
• What is the salvage value of unsold cocoa? What are you doing with the cocoa 
you cannot sell do multinationals? Do you get less of more? 
• How does the Cocobod acquire its resources for its services? Trade margin, 
taxation, …? 
• Which international trade agreements do affect cocoa trade?  
 
6. Question about economic rents 
• Endogenous and/or constructed rents: 
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o Innovation rents; Technology or institutional rents, having command over 
scarce technologies 
o Human resource rents, having access to better skills than competitors 
o Organisational rents, possessing superior forms of internal organisation 
o Marketing rents, possessing better marketing capabilities and/or valuable 
brand names 
o Relational rents, having superior quality relationships with suppliers and 
customers 
• Exogenous: 
o Resource rents, access to scarce natural resources 
• What kind of barriers to entry exists for new trading firms/LBCs to enter the 
business in Ghana? 
• What is the information you would like to get about your trading partners? What 
kind of information gathering do you involve in? Does this give you an advantage 
over your trading partner? 
 
Local Processors 
1. Firm characteristcs 
• How many beans do you process annually? 
• How many people are employed in the factory? 
• When did this factory open? 
• What products are produced here? 
 
2. Incentives and processing economy 
• Why did you decide to process your beans at origin? 
• You are operating in a free zone. What are the benefits? 
• What are the main obstacles you face in processing at origin? 
• What are the main advantages in processing at origin? 
 
3. Inputs and costs 
• Beans 
o What kind of beans is bought for processing? 
o How are beans bought?  
o How are prices set for beans? 
o How many beans do you buy at origin and how many are imported? 
• Sugar, milk and other ingredients 
o Do you have to import other ingredients? 
o From where do you import these ingredients? 
o Would you welcome a development where you could source these inputs 
locally? 
• Infrastructure: Is the infrastructure sufficient? 
o Energy 
o Water 
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o Roads 
o Finance 
• Labour 
o What is the percent of foreign labour hired? 
o Which positions are filled with foreign labour? 
 
4. Trade and export/import duties 
• Trade 
o Who receives the intermediate products sold?  
 If they are shipped to the mother company for further processing, 
how is the value of the products defined in the books? (cost 
approach) 
 If they are sold to an external party, how are prices set for these 
goods? (financial market) 
o What is the price differential (value addition) of the product?  
o How are contracts for intermediate products specified? (forward sale, long-
term agreements, personal relationship) 
o What determines your decision in the amount and type of cocoa processed? 
o Can processed cocoa been stored for a longer duration? Do you own 
warehouses? 
• Trade duties 
o Are there any export duties you have to pay on the intermediate products? 
o Are there any import duties you have to pay if  
 Selling to the mother company? 
 Selling to another company? 
• International standards 
o Which in international standards do you have to follow?  
o Is it difficult to achieve these standards? 
o Can Barry Callebaut influence the definition of such standards?  
 
5. Competition  
• How stringent is competition in processed cocoa products? 
• What are barriers to entry into the sector for other companies? 
• Do you prefer Ghana as a sourcing country over others? Why? 
• Why does it make economic sense to source the beans yourself? 
• Are there attempts for specialty beans (organic, traceable, etc.). How is this 
achieved? 
 
6. Bean sourcing purely for export 
1. How are beans sourced for export? (different countries) 
2. How easy is bean sourcing in Ghana compared to other producing countries? 
3. How do you agree upon prices for the beans? (different countries) 
4. How does the process of sourcing differ?  
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Licenced Buying Companies 
1. Firm information 
• Your position in the firm? 
• What does your firm do? 
• How many districts do you cover?  
• How many farms do approximately deliver their cocoa to you? 
 
2. Profits, costs and competition 
• Profits and costs 
o How do you earn revenue if the margins per cocoa bag are fixed? 
o How are these margins fixed? Do you have a saying in this process? 
o Were these margins relatively stable over the last decade? Do they vary with 
the price of cocoa or only with industry costs? 
o What are your operational costs? Do you think the price committee 
accounts for them sufficiently? 
• Competition and ease of business 
o How did you start with your business? How did you establish the necessary 
relationships? 
o What was your motivation in starting to operate an LBC? 
o Did these expectations materialize? If not, why did you stay in business? 
o Are there any barriers to entry for competing firms? 
o How do you defend your sourcing grounds? How do you insure purchasing 
clerks and farmers are selling to you? 
• Wider business 
o Are you only operating as a cocoa LBC? If your company is involved in 
other business areas, what are those and how does this support you 
operations as a cocoa LBC? 
o Are you only operating in Ghana? If not, how does the system in Ghana 
compare to other countries and why might doing business there be more or 
less profitable? 
o Do you also buy specialty cocoa (organic, traceability, fair trade, …)? How 
do you ensure the required standards? Why does it make economic sense to 
purchase such beans?   
 
3. Personal relationships, supervision and information 
• Purchasing clerks 
o How important is your relationship to purchasing clerks in the cocoa 
villages? 
o How do you select purchasing clerks? 
o How do you pay purchasing clerks? How is the pay rate decided upon? 
o How do you supervise them, regarding handling cash and delivering high 
quality beans? 
• Hauliers 
 
424 
o How important is your relationship to hauliers? 
o How do you select hauliers? 
o How do you pay hauliers? How is the pay rate decided upon? 
o Do you outsource the transportation of beans (own vehicle or third party 
vehicles, vertical integration to hauliers or separate)? 
o Why is it/is it not advisable to outsource the transportation?  
• District officers 
o How important is your relationship with district officers? 
o How do you select district officers?  
o What falls under their responsibility? 
• On whom do you rely for/whom do you feed with information in order to tailor 
your business operations? 
 
4. Ownership and risk 
• When do you attain ownership of the crop (when the purchasing clerk buys the 
beans, when he delivers the beans, when they reach the sheds)? 
• Who is held responsible for the loss or damage of beans during transportation 
between society and district, district and port? 
• How is this responsibility dealt with? How do you insure yourself against bean loss 
and damage? 
• When do you start buying? How do you decide when to take ownership of the 
beans? 
 
5. Finance 
• How do you finance your operations? Is the funding by Cocobod sufficient? 
• Can availability of cash give you an edge over other LBCs? 
• How do you manage your cash exposure and credit turnaround? 
•  Why is your market share large/small compared to other LBCs? 
 
Hauliers 
1. Firm information 
a. How many beans do you transport annually on average (last three years)? 
b. How many districts do you cover?  
c. How many LBCs use your service? 
 
2. Profits, costs and competition 
a. Profits and costs 
i. How do you earn revenue if the margins per cocoa bag are fixed? 
ii. How are these margins fixed? Do you feel that you have an influence 
on the process in which these margins are fixed? 
iii. Were these margins relatively stable over the last decade? Do they 
vary with the price of cocoa and/or only with industry costs? 
iv. What are your main operational costs?  
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v. Do you think the price committee accounts for them sufficiently? 
 
b. Competition and ease of business 
i. How did you start with your business (company history)?  
ii. How did your business change since you entered? 
iii. How many other haulage businesses exist in Ghana? 
iv. Is it relatively easy for other competing firms to enter into the 
business? 
v. How do you defend your business against competitors? How do you 
ensure clients hire you and not others? 
 
c. Wider business 
i. Do you transport from farm-gate to district?  
ii. Do you transport from district to port? 
iii. Are you only operating as a hauler? If your company is involved in 
other business areas, what are those and how does this support you 
operations as a hauler? 
iv. Do you associate with any LBCs? If yes with which? 
 
3. Personal relationships, supervision and information 
a. Who hires your services (LBCs or CMC)?  
b. Who pays for your services? 
c. LBCs 
i. Do you maintain personal relationships to the LBC district officers? 
ii. How do the LBCs select you? 
iii. How do they pay for your services (advance, once you delivered)?  
 
d. CMC 
i. Do you maintain personal relationships to the CMC officers? 
ii. How does CMC hire you? 
iii. How do the pay for your service (advance, once you delivered)?  
iv. How do you pay hauliers? How is the pay rate decided upon? 
 
4. Ownership and risk 
a. Do you own your trucks? 
b. Do you have warehouses which belong to you? 
c. If during transportation beans are damaged (rain, road accident, etc.), who is 
held responsible? 
d. If there is any damage incurred, do you get paid for the damaged bags as well? 
 
5. Finance 
a. How do you finance your operations?  
General Questions for other Interview Partners 
1. Trade and logistics: 
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• From whom and from where are beans bought (Government Agency, farmer co-
operative, local traders at ports, farm-gate, dedicated trading places)?  
• How are beans bought (by cash, by forward contracts, domestic or foreign 
currency)? 
• How are beans transported (own or third party vessels, bulk trade or other forms 
of transportation)? 
• How are beans stored (own or third party warehouses, exchange registered 
warehouses)?  
• How are beans sold (long-term contracts, one-period contracts, open market, in 
domestic or foreign currency)? 
 
2. Price discovery and price setting: 
• How are cocoa prices set/discovered (public or private available benchmark 
indicators for price setting, open markets, individual bargaining, futures or cash 
market prices)? 
• Have there been any significant changes in the way prices were specified over 
the last decades? 
• How on your opinion do financial investors influence commodity futures 
markets? 
• How do you assess the importance of the futures market relative to the 
physical market in price discovery? Which price does drive which? 
• How transparent is the physical market relative to the derivative market 
(transactions, trading partners, price settlement)? 
 
3. Price risk management (exchange rate risk and commodity price risk): 
• Which instruments are used for mitigating short-term and long-term price risk 
(hedging via derivatives, forward contracts, long-term contracts, 
diversification/vertical integration)? 
• Have there been any significant changes in the degree of price-related risk 
over the last decades? 
• Have there been any significant changes in the way such price-related risk is 
managed over the last decades? 
 
4. Value addition and regional/global chains: 
• Where are cocoa beans processed?  
• What proportion is processed at origin and what proportion is processed after 
export?  
• Do beans processed and exported regionally differ from those exported and 
processed globally? 
• Who owns processing capacities at origin (privately owned, state owned)? 
• Which of the West African cocoa producing countries do engage in regional trade 
for cocoa beans and/or cocoa/chocolate products? 
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5. Institutional questions 
• Who has the agenda setting power i.e. who defines the terms of trade and the way 
the trade is executed?  
o Who is setting the standards and organisational form of exchange – 
legislative 
o Who is monitoring the performance of these standards and forms of 
exchange; if there is any dispute, how do you settle it? – judicial 
o Who helps people to meet standards; who is enforcing these rules? – 
executive 
• Who decides about the prices for farmers? How is the farm-gate price calculated; 
what variables are considered? Who has a saying in the level of the farm-gate price? 
(legislative, judicial, executive) 
• How is the margin for the LBCs calculated? (legislative, judicial, executive) 
• The people you are trading with, do you know them in person? Are they the same 
people every year? 
• How do the contracts look like? What are the terms agreed upon? Are these 
contracts individually defined or standardised? If yes, who sets the standards for 
these contracts?  
• Demand and supply uncertainty? How unpredictable are they? How do you 
predict them? Do you know the demand of the multinational buyers ex ante? 
• Are contract terms sometimes renegotiated after the trade took place? Who is 
mediating such disputes? What is the subject of such renegotiations? 
• Who are the multinationals you are dealing with? How many trading partners do 
you have? What do you know about them? How often do new ones come along? 
• What is the salvage value of unsold cocoa? What are you doing with the cocoa 
you cannot sell do multinationals? Do you get less of more? 
• How does the Cocobod acquire its resources for its services? Trade margin, 
taxation, …? 
• Which international trade agreements do affect cocoa trade?  
 
6. Question about economic rents 
• Endogenous and/or constructed rents: 
o Innovation rents; Technology or institutional rents, having command over 
scarce technologies 
o Human resource rents, having access to better skills than competitors 
o Organisational rents, possessing superior forms of internal organisation 
o Marketing rents, possessing better marketing capabilities and/or valuable 
brand names 
o Relational rents, having superior quality relationships with suppliers and 
customers 
• Exogenous: 
o Resource rents, access to scarce natural resources 
• What kind of barriers to entry exists for new trading firms/LBCs to enter the 
business in Ghana? 
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• What is the information you would like to get about your trading partners? What 
kind of information gathering do you involve in? Does this give you an advantage 
over your trading partner? 
 
Cocobod Research Manager 
1. Value Addition 
• How much cocoa is processed at origin? 
• What are the obstacles and difficulties in processing at origin? 
• Who owns processing capacities at origin (privately owned, state owned)? 
• How are intermediate products taxed in comparison to cocoa beans? How are 
cocoa beans taxed? 
• How many local workers are employed in the processing sector? 
• What is the percentage share of people directly or indirectly employed in the 
cocoa sector in total population? 
• Ghana Free Zones and who is benefitting from these zones? Only foreign or also 
domestic? 
• How much of the inputs are imported and how much is consumed from local 
sources?  
2. Regional Integration and Trade 
• Are cocoa beans or products traded within West Africa? Which of the West 
African cocoa producing countries do engage in regional trade for cocoa beans 
and/or cocoa/chocolate products? 
• Are there any particular trade agreements to enhance regional trade integration? 
• What are the obstacles for further regional integration?  
• Which institutions were established and are functional in order to promote and 
facilitate regional trade? 
3. Data 
• Producer price bonus. 
• Import/Export of Cocoa beans, intermediate products, and chocolate by 
origin/destination. 
• Import/Export taxes imposed on cocoa beans, intermediate products and 
chocolate.  
• Who was granted licenses for Ghana Free Zones and is data on the specification 
of such licenses available?  
• Data on processing. Percentage share of beans processed at origin by processor?  
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Technical Advisor, Cocoa Affairs, Ministry of Finance & Economic Planning  
1. Cocoa Board Budget 
• Who decides when and how about the Cocoa Board budget? 
• Is the Cocoa Board running a deficit or a surplus?  
• Stabilisation fund; what is if for and when was it implemented (crop finance, 
prices)? 
• How does the government extract revenues from cocoa trade (export tax, Cocoa 
Board revenue)? 
2. Price Committee 
• How much of a say does the Finance Ministry/Minister have in setting the prices? 
• What is taken into consideration by the Finance Ministry before entering into 
price negotiations? 
• How much political pressure goes into the price negotiations (election promises, 
international organization pressing for higher producer prices)? 
3. Historical Context 
• Why implement forward sales? What was before? 
• Why could Ghana withstand liberalization? 
• Why did the government decide to fix the producer prices? Was this always case? 
4. Cocoa Producer Alliance 
• How good is the cooperation among cocoa producing regions? How much of a 
competitor are other countries and how much cooperation takes place? 
• How much information is exchanged with one another? What kind of 
information exchange would you like to see not currently taking place? Are these 
information also shared with private entities? 
• What is the Alliance of Cocoa Producing Nations (organized the World Cocoa 
Conference 2012)? 
• Is there any cooperation regarding cocoa prices and bargaining power? Can you 
give an example for such cooperation? 
• How much supply coordination is possible in cocoa?  
5. Regional Integration and Trade 
• Are cocoa beans or products traded within West Africa? Which of the West 
African cocoa producing countries do engage in regional trade for cocoa beans 
and/or cocoa/chocolate products? 
• Are there any particular trade agreements to enhance regional trade integration? 
• Who owns processing capacities at origin (privately owned, state owned)? 
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Pod Counting 
1. Company Characteristics 
• Are you working for LBC or multinational buyer/exporter? 
• How many people are employed at your company? 
• When did your company start business in Ghana? 
• What is your task at this company? 
 
2. Information and institutions 
• How important is forecast of future demand and supply for the price formation 
process? 
• How important is forecast of exchange rate for the price formation process? 
• How predictable are these things? 
• With which information do firms go into price negotiations? 
• Which other information would you like to have? 
• How do you determine how many beans you are sourcing from which country? 
• Are the beans traceable?  
 
3. Transportation and logistics 
• How do you ensure buying clerks are selling only to you? 
• How do you ensure the quality of the beans? 
• How are the beans transported? 
• How do you select purchasing clerks? 
• How do you select hauliers? 
 
4. Price discovery and price setting 
 
• How is the buying price for the beans determined? 
• How does this process vary from other West African countries? 
• How important is the future market in this process? 
 
5. Price risk management? 
• Which techniques do you use to mitigate price and quantity risk? 
• Did these techniques change over the last decades? 
• Who owns the beans until delivery to the port? How do you insure yourself against 
risks while the cocoa is in your possession? 
• Why is vertical integration important? 
• What are potential barriers to entry into the cocoa business? 
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Appendix 7.8 Price for Shipping 
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